WWII doctrines

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Wasn't the terrain in Italy mostly mountainous?

Fair question. I'm not an authority on that war either, but my impression is that by that time the fighting was south of the mountains, though there were several river crossings involved.

Or was there extended periods of trench warfare there?

I think the fighting had settled into the usual pattern of stalemate and trench warfare before the 1917 offensive. It was mostly the Austro-Hungarians on this front until then.

From reading Rommel's INFANTRY ATTACKS I got the impression that the fightng there was somewhat different than in France, but that was a long time ago and dimly remembered.

My equally dim impression as well. I know that in Rumania, where Rommel was first introduced to the tactic, the fighting was not so static.

Unless you are being coy and know specifically why they adopted storm troop tactics?

Well, the conventional answer is because they worked. I recall reading a little something about the origin of the tactic against the Russians, but I could stand to know a whole lot more. I think it was the usual case of someone stumbling upon it mostly by accident and then refining and formalising the technique.

Part of the problem in employing it was that the troops had to be withdrawn from the line and retrained. This was hard to do because the Germans were already being hard pressed on all fronts. Therefore, only a small proportion of the infantry was ever trained in the techniques. I think I still have my copy of the game that SPI did on Operation Michel. As I recall, only about a tenth of the infantry divisions there are rated infiltration-capable.

Then again, the Canadians used the same tactics at VIMY despite overwhelming artillery superiority, so that pretty much blows my whole theory right there.

Like I said, IT WORKED. There were people on the Allied side who were capable of recognising that fact as well. They just weren't occupying the top command slots.

Michael

[Stalin's Organ]

I believe teh Stosstruppen ida was taken from a pamphlet on the subject from the French but never put into use by them......

[Hun Hunter]

Originally posted by Philippe:

...Personally I have always suspected that culture affects how you go about problem-solving in the most fundamental ways. North Americans tend to get hung up on gadgetry, and assume that the answers flow from the hardware.

...

Perhaps these days but in WW2, the Americans rejected many gadgets that would have actually made their life easier in the ETO (funnies anyone?). Of course you are right for WW2 if the "gadgetry" you are referring to is HE.

Greg

[ June 12, 2002, 12:24 AM: Message edited by: Hun Hunter ]

[Michael Dorosh]

The mechanization of the American Army in itself is gadgetry, isn't it? Don't forgot the Germans and Russians were still using horses....

[JasonC]

On Russian doctrine, I suggest to Fionn not to be so coy and go ahead. I personally have never said, and do not seriously think, that "WW II American doctrine" is "the best way to fight in CM". It is simple and focuses on one thing that does matter - coordination with fire support and full use of suppression. It was not terribly imaginative. The maneuvering itself didn't get much beyond two step overwatch fire and movement to creep up on the enemy. It was certainly much less elaborate that German notions. Fionn no doubt believes Russian doctrine works better in CM than either, and he may well be right. Being coy about it won't make the argument, however.

As to Strosstruppen tactics from WW I, the first large scale use of them was indeed on the Russian front, specifically in the attack around Riga in 1916. They were used again in the Caporetto offensive in Italy in 1917, and in the counterattack at Cambrai in late 1917. As well as their most famous and largest scale use, in the 1918 spring offensives, especially the first big breakthrough fight against the British.

They were a synthesis of related developments that had been going on for much longer, and an extension of tactics first refined in small scale trench raids, to larger scale operational attacks.

Squad "packet" movement had been adopted earlier. The emphasis on grenades on the attack was recognized from trench raid fighting. Mortars and lighter MGs had been added to the force gradually, well before there were any coherent ideas about how to use them. And gas had been tried on a large scale before, but typically relying on some new type thought to be able to defeat existing masks, relying on a sort of temporary technical surprise. Artillery preparations were generally long and involved, but in later portions of the 1916 fighting both at Verdun and the Somme, the alternate idea of going for surprise first of all, by keeping bombardments very short before jump off, were sometimes used. As were night attacks, particularly in small scale trench raiding.

What distinguished strosstruppen or "infiltration" tactics (as they are sometimes known) was a particular way of putting all of the above together, and combining them with a basic emphasis on "hitting where they ain't" that was quite new at the tactical scale. See, many conventional WW I attacks were turned into shambles by a few holdout MGs flanking the more successful units, or by only local successful areas being cut off by artillery and then counterattacked or hit with massed defending guns.

The result was a mindset that attacks could only succeed if the area of penetration was broad, eliminating threats to the flanks and preventing easy concentration of defender artillery and reserves on just a few narrow sectors. And in practice, this meant reinforcing failure, because typically the only way to clear up the "hung" flank or holdout positions was to launch additional waves of infantry at them, trying to overwhelm them. Artillery alone was not really responsive enough to do this.

So an attack goes in, and it succeeds in sectors B and E, say, while at least temporarily failing in sectors A, C and D. Then the attackers would typically direct their following wave at C and D, trying to broaden the success. Since the attack failed there the first time, however, this was in some respects throwing good money after bad. It was hitting where the enemy still was. There didn't seem to be much alternative, though, because a few MGs at C could hold up any attempt to reinforce directly at B, which is where the enemy artillery would probably be falling anyway.

Meanwhile, the first task of the troops that had penetrated to B and E was to hold the sections of trench they had secured, and then to fight up the front to left and right, trying to broaden their hold on the same trench. All this is old style, understand - the WW I standard.

Strosstruppen tactics changed all of that. Instead of reinforcing failure, reinforce success. Instead of the penetrators to B and E fanning out left and right, push straight on. Let the following forces coming up behind fan out to left and right if need be. Don't send anyone at C and D.

Alone these changes would not have worked particularly well. There were reasons, after all, that the other way of doing things had been adopted. Not just stupidity. What allowed strosstruppen tactics to work was all the other aspects of the equation they changed along with this one.

For instance, gas preceded the attack, very close to the jump off in time. This meant the defenders would all be masked, limiting their visibility at longer ranges. No long artillery prep meant the enemy would not be on alert. The first waves were supposed to hit the front line trenches while shells were still falling. Attacks were often begun at night, or in the pre-dawn, often with fog present too. Overall, the initial attack was a limited visibility, limited warning engagement - like trench raids.

That limits the importance of taking out neighoring sectors, and also reduced the total number of defenders encountered. The leading groups were small, moving in packets irregularly spaced, with denser groups behind them following directly in their path, not widespread waves along a long space of front. So not all of the defenders were engaged. The attackers in the first wave relied on grenades, which can be delivered by stealth and from defilade - you know somebody is somewhere near point A, but no gunshot or muzzle flash tells you where. The idea is to kill the nearest set of eyes while the ones farther away are still blind, and to run through the sighting gap thus created before it disappears.

Once through the first trench line, pressing on spreads confusion through the enemy defense. Confusion and surprise and limited visibility - those are the watchwords. What you want is a completely jumbled melee inside the enemy's trench system, with greater numbers, the initiative, and better preparedness for the fight on your side. You then "exchange off" the defenders in particular sectors where you did best, and ignore the others. Push deep.

The defender can't deal with this just by massing artillery fire, as in the old case, because his own infantry artillery communications will be disrupted. He doesn't know where his own guys are still holding out, and where you have penetrated. His reserves don't at first know where to go, and on their way to some sensible spot, they are waylayed by leading infiltration troops far from where they wanted to go. And held up there by grenade duels ("bombing up the traverse trenches"), while the overall attack continues all around them.

It requires highly trained troops that show high initiative. But even with them, it always leads to indescribable confusion. The attacking units following paths of least resistence will not stay in any phase lines or unit boundaries. Units become thoroughly jumbled, and you have to rely on whatever officer is on the scene well forward, just coralling people to get his aims accomplished. It can take days afterward to sort out the mess and reconstitute proper units again, for a second go. If you've smashed the enemy defense system in the meantime, though, you hardly care. For its time, it was a highly effective technique.

Oh, an addition I left out. Mortars were valued in this sort of attack to take out MGs holding you up ahead of the particular sectors you had to push forward on. They could fire from defilade, and coordination with them was much closer than with the artillery of the day. Lighter MGs were valued to help hold the shoulders of the many narrow penetrations such an attack created in the enemy defense. They were light enough to be moved forward, but still had MG firepower to prevent above-ground attacks on either side of the break-in. With enough of them pushed far enough forward, this created some impressive area denial effects inside the enemy defense system once the sun came out, even while parts of that system were still intact. Both were elements known from trench raids, but in a new operationally significant role.

I hope this is useful.

[ June 12, 2002, 01:48 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JasonC:

It requires highly trained troops that show high initiative. But even with them, it always leads to indescribable confusion. The attacking units following paths of least resistence will not stay in any phase lines or unit boundaries. Units become thoroughly jumbled, and you have to rely on whatever officer is on the scene well forward, just coralling people to get his aims accomplished.

Hmmm, this is starting to sound an awful lot like the Kampfgruppe system. Is this how it got started or does it have other origins as well?

Michael

[JasonC]

Certainly you will need something as flexible as that wherever you use "vunerability pull" rather than "command push" to route units. Because which will wind up going down which route will not stay in neat organization categories commanders set beforehand. But I think the amount of jumbling was probably much higher in WW I infiltration attacks.

There is a certain inherent organizing power to vehicles and heavy crew served weapons. Men cluster around them to use them, and retain a fair amount of their organization. And the more mobile your forces are, the easier it can be to sort out messes by shuttling so and so to here or there.

All infantry on a battlefield cut up by trench lines and pock-marked with shell holes, with MG fire zones or falling barrages or uncut wire making wide areas impassible by direct routes, you can get a lot more tangled up.

I have not heard of any formal KG system being used to deal with strosstruppen battle confusion, but something like it would definitely have helped. Did they organize it de facto in the field, back then? I haven't seen anything saying so in things I've read, but I would not be surprised.

[Naja]

Excellent discussion by learned men. I also think that Philippe hit the nail on the head. The dynamics of the 30s and 40s have more to do with one's ability to adapt to a new tactic. In the 20s and 30s there was debate and a real try by few on all sides to analyze what worked and what did not, but by the late 30's my impression is that each country was dealing with its own independent set of realities. The average U.S. soldier coming out of the Depression would in my view be less likely to believe in "new and improved", "make attacks faster," "live longer." I talk with people who still have ration cards and they, well "hold back." Not to go into each country's politics and their reasons for using a certain tactic.... My guess would be Germany would be more open to "new" ideas and implement them; they were "unjustly" dealt with. Russia was a "new" country and open to suggestion... France wanted to hold on... UK.. most felt "well the war is over and move on." Very practical. If you said a year ago that we would have a proposal in the U.S.A. "Internal police force...combined" I would say implausible. Give a person time and training - that rings true in that time frame, I'm sure you will see results. Like Philippe said, it's regional... a CO yelling "over the top" for a MG nest will ring deferent in each country.. but if you teach people after they learn to hate a new idea, they may implement it. From what I read of German and I'll give Fione this, Russian doctrine was movement with fire "new idea"…Do not get caught in minutia of the moment, hey what do I know I can't spell.

[Naja]

As for JasonC - GREAT! If the guys fighting bother to read it. I'm afraid it sounds good as a 2004 era Warcraft game manual. In 1942 the ability of leading men and earning their trust was paramount. Sure, in ideal circumstances all is possible, like communism - it would be GREAT!!! But as long as one person wants more than his neighbor the whole house of cards falls in most Americans' view. I have read many American accounts; very few went according to "plan". I have read more though that U.S. docrine was made up from pure battlefield experience gained the hard way. We all know training and experience pay dividends but the U.S. was playing catch-up in WWII, be it at a faster pace than most.. If we are talking about WWII, a sound training program paid dividends in lives saved, we lacked that. For simple lives saved let's add camo to the mix. A very simple doctrine: I see you, you don't see me.

[JasonC]

Well, I'll flub it and then perhaps Fionn will correct my errors. Or anybody else who knows the system. I don't claim to be any expert on Russian doctrine, but I know at least a cartoon version of it.

First divide your command into 3-4 bits. Assign one bit to the recon battle and the rest to your main body. Deploy the main body well behind the recon screen, and in column formation on a frontage of only 1/3 to 1/4 of your force. The recon force is in a broad thin line, though not necessarily over the whole map. It definitely does cover the front of the main body column, however.

Then you fight the battle in stages. In the first or recon stage, your job is to locate the enemy, keep some of your recon force elements alive to continually update you with new information, and above all to deny the enemy any information about the whereabouts of your main body by killing his scouts or preventing them from crossing your recon screen. Once you have assessed the location of the enemy, you are ready to transition to the next stage.

In the second or attack stage, you pick one, count 'em one, point of attack. It should be a spot that is vunerable, but what that vunerability consists in can change from case to case. Where the enemy isn't at all, and you can get to his flank or rear - or where he is thin and you can get through - or dominate terrain you can get onto - or most simply, just a digestible piece of his force that you can beat rapidly.

Then you launch your main body at that point, in column. It is in 2-3 layers, or echelons deep. This enables you to hit a single portion of the line with far more power than in typical line deployments, which dissipate combat power along wide frontages.

And it especially emphasizes the limited staying power of enemy formations, which are typically engaged and pinned by the first element and smashed to bits by the second or third. Which can go in directly over the same ground, or make minor, last minute swerves to take him from two directions. When your following echelons have reached the attack point and the enemy that once was there is history, you are ready to transition to the next phase.

The third or last phase of the battle is exploitation. You attack from the point gained in the previous phase. Sometimes this will mean moving to an objective, sometimes proceeding against another portion of the enemy force from a flank or rear. At this point it is for the first time permissible to give seperate targets to the successive echelons of your force, but their goals should still be coordinated with each other, not divergent. E.g. the first element goes deep then right, second goes shallow then right. Or they hook around two sides of the same enemy target.

Nothing is left back along the rest of the initial line of the battlefield but the remnants of the recon screen. Overall, the axis of the battle often changes in the course of the battle, in the transition from the 2nd to the 3rd stage. You achieve mass at the point of main effort by an almost complete focus on that point (only the recon screen isn't) and by deployment and movement in deep column.

You want the point of main effort to come as a surprise to the enemy as to place and time. The recon battle is crucial to achieving this. So is a tightly focused target and careful choice of that target. Victory there as rapidly as possible lets you transition to the exploitation phase on your terms, before the enemy is ready or has reacted with his reserves.

Overall, some preliminary recon skirmishing followed by a massive blow at one point delivered and followed up as fast as possible. The focus is intensely on the maneuver elements, and on the principle of concentration.

That is my cartoon version of Russian doctrine. Anyone who is actually an expert on the subject is welcome to correct me or to elaborate finer points.

P.S. anybody want to guess why CM minefields aren't popular with everybody? You often can't find them in a relatively stand-off recon phase (and AT ones in particular with just infantry). Columns directed at speed over hidden minefields are not happy campers.

[ June 12, 2002, 03:56 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

We still teach this. I well remember my Section commander a Vietnam veteran wearing a meathook attached to a long rope, on his webbing, on my infantry IET course. When questioned, he merely said wait and see and then demonstrated it on a pre-arranged "corpse" later in the course. The NLF and CTs were also known to use the same tactic as the Japanese.

Many of the various "handbooks" around, feature such diagrams for the Germans and the Russians. I think it would be quite possible to produce similar diagrams for other nationalities. However, while this is how they might have been taught "how to", rarely would a good commander rely only on doing the minimum that such doctrines represent. They'd build on them and develop their own ideas and of course, the situation might well dictate against them.

[ June 12, 2002, 11:03 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Philippe:

Personally I have always suspected that culture affects how you go about problem-solving in the most fundamental ways. North Americans tend to get hung up on gadgetry, and assume that the answers flow from the hardware.

An interesting claim. While I'm not North American, I've think I've come to realise that in reality, in WWII in particular, the reverse was true. All too often, American commanders preferred to rely upon the PBI to achieve their objectives, without the use of technical means to shield them from enemy fire, as in Normandy. Omaha beach was essentially treated as a frontal attack by infantry, nearly all technical "gadgetry" was eschewed - few DD tanks, no other "funnies" and so on. In the hard slog forward through the hedgerows, one reads continually of how the US commanders were attempting to force their infantry forwards, through the use of what appears to be almost pure willpower, rather than a proper understanding of the conditions facing them.

If anything, its the British who show an almost childlike fascination with "gadgetry" in WWII. They created an entire armoured division to exploit the potentials offered by it and Montgomery developed an almost complete operational doctrine centred around shielding his most precious (and finite!) resource - manpower through the use of "gadgetry" to reduce casualties - his "colossal cracks" theories.

My favorite (albeit half-baked) example of the influence of culture on thought process is the German attempt to use a philosophical solution (Stosstruppen tactics) to end the stalemate of trench warfare in WW I, rather than relying (at least in their imagination) on more artillery, more tanks, more blood.

Well, Paddy Griffiths would suggest that in reality, they copied the Stosstruppen from both the French and the British. Indeed, in his Infantry Tactics of the Western Front he suggests that the British, through the adoption, again of "gadgetry" and the exploitation of the opportunities offerred through the use in minor tactics, were able to create the lightning advance of the 100 days.

Continuing in that vein, given the disparity of national cultures involved, I am sure that the French, the Poles, the English, and the Germans, presented with an identical problem and given identical hardware, would tend to come up with different solutions to it simply because their culture (read: education and training) would compel them to think differently about what they were facing, and equip them with different problem-solving styles.

I'd suggest that in reality you'd find them startling similar in broad outline. The difference would be in the detail.

[ June 12, 2002, 11:01 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

[Fionn]

Guys,

Last time I responded to JasonC he chose to avoid the points and take to wilfully misinterpreting my position/calling me names/putting words in my mouth. Now he wants me to spend my free time writing something to illuminate him in the hope that he won't do the same again? LOL!!! Not bloody likely .

No, once bitten, twice shy. Jason, it was more important for you to misinterpret things and name-call. Well, that was your choice. Now, you pay the price as yet another person is unwilling to be a further target.

Wilfully misinterpreting my usage of the word "moral" to paint me as some sort of nutter when I believe I quite clearly stated that I was using it in the 18th and 19th Century context of the word and not the modern context is pretty low by any standards. ie. When Napoleon said "The moral is to the physical as 3 is to 1" do you seriously think he meant that a pious soldier was better than a hard-swearing but tough vet? Of course not. He meant it in exactly the same way I meant it... the same meaning it had around the time of Clausewitz who was being brought into the discussion at the time I raised the moral factor.

Anyways, just wanted to explain to the less vitriolic members of the thread ( which is raising some very interesting points which I would love to comment on) why I won't be participating or commenting on the errors in Jason's representation of Soviet doctrine.

[ June 12, 2002, 10:09 AM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[Farslayer]

Originally posted by Philippe:

So please, somebody, tell me how to make my Germans act like Germans when I play CM.

Do really well at the beginning of the Quick Battle or Scenario. Then over-extend yourself in the middle phases. Next you must lose horribly at the end. Oh, and a small case of insanity on your part might come in handy as well...

[Michael Dorosh]

Funny...I've always thought that if you don't care to share something, then why post about it to begin with. We saw the same intellectual dishonesty with P51D, but he proved that he didn't know anything about the topic in question, so we let it pass. I'm sure we can all come to the appropriate conclusions here.

Pillar - I would be interested in such a discussion of Canadian doctrine as well - but I am far from an expert on it. What little I do know is probably best explained by someone else; I can check with a couple of friends. You may want to contact The_Capt with regards to these issues, though I can't speak for his knowledge of contemporary WW II doctrine. I doubt we differed much from the British; JonS, Simon Fox, Andreas, Brian and John Salt would all be better prepared then I for such a discourse. I'm still not sure - as John alludes to - of the difference between tactics and doctrine, especially in reference to his thread.

I presume we are all interested in how battalions and lower did business, yes? I've always associated "doctrine" with the higher levels, but that is no doubt due to ignorance of the true meaning of the word.

I think the point that Michael Emrys, Brian and John, as well as myself, have made at various times in this thread is accurate - junior leaders on the field often had to extemporize. If we don't agree that "doctrine" applies to the section and platoon battle, I would suggest the British/Canadians were more rigid in their company and battalion actions, preferring fixed fireplans. I am really not sure how well tank support was incorporated into "doctrine" - I know that most infantry battalions had at least a little experience working with tanks in the UK, but how that translated into battle procedure on the continent, I couldn't tell you. I suspect Normandy brought about a lot of changes, since "doctrine" in the British/Canadian Armies by 1944 would have been based mainly on experience in North Africa.

We have seen how casualty estimations based on North African experience were woefully inaccurate (with the category Double Intense having to be created in the summer of 1944). I would suspect many tactical aspects of "doctrine" also proved themselves inadequate in Normandy but I don't have any specific examples in mind. I get the feeling Normandy was very much seat of the pants battlefighting. The fact that Simonds had to invent the armoured personnel carrier - and it helped them achieve gains not possible before - kind of tells me that whatever doctrine they were following wasn't working.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Brian:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by John D Salt:

Of course, the ability to express TTPs/doctrines in a precise (or, for that matter, neatly fuzzy; formal, anyway), executable symbolic form would have the side-benefit of enabling wargame writers to produce different national-flavoured AIs for games like CM. But I suspect that there would be a lot more benefits than just that.

Many of the various "handbooks" around, feature such diagrams for the Germans and the Russians. I think it would be quite possible to produce similar diagrams for other nationalities.

</font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Actually, while I am posting on the sly here at work, I do remember reading a document by Guy Simonds given to his Normandy division commanders, based on his experience in Italy. I think it might be a core document in dealing with the subject of Canadian "doctrine" in NW Europe. I'll have to see if I can remember which book I read it in - he goes on at length about stuff the Germans liked to do, and the best way to counter it. Mostly general stuff IIRC, and not a "battalion X should do Y when A, B, and C occurs" but interesting reading nonetheless.

Oddly enough, some division commanders seemed to either resent the Italian experiences of Simonds and Crerar, usually saying things like "senior command seems to believe the history of the Candian Army began on 10 July 1943", or at least feel that too much emphasis was being placed on it.

Simonds commanded 1 Cdn Div in Sicily and Crerar very, very briefly had active corps command in Italy in early 1944, to prepare him for running 1 Cdn Army. I think the only real action he oversaw was the poor showing of 5 Armd Div at the Arielli in Jan 44, but I may be wrong about that.

[Fionn]

Dorosh,

The REASON I posted something was cause JasonC had asked me to post and I wanted to explain why I wouldn't.

Of course, according to you, EVERYTHING I do is wrong and evidence of some sort of inner core of evil so you insist on interpreting it in the worst way possible.

No, the explanation is simple. I was asked to post. I decided it wasn't something that would be healthy for me to do and I wanted to explain why I wouldn't post.

Simple. Anyways, like I said to you before, I'm more than willing to talk things out with you since I really don't know what I've done for you to be this angry. ALL you have to do is drop me an email. That's all. You're the one who chooses not to email me and chooses to remain imprisoned in your walls of hatred.

To be honest I simply don't see how it can be worthwhile conserving this core of anger when the other person is so obviously:

a) at a loss to know why you're angry at him

willing to talk it over privately to see if amends can't be made.

[ June 12, 2002, 02:40 PM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[Philippe]

At that risk of moving the discussion slightly off-topic, I was wondering if our learned contributors have had any thoughts on German versus Russian cavalry doctrine since our last horse discussion ? Did anyone actually have cavalry doctrine ? The Germans had quite a few cavalry units, and didn't just use them on the eastern front (the Balkans and Northern Italy at the end of the war, I think).

I have to admit that my interest in cavalry is very sentimental and has to do with my senior year in college, many years ago. There was a tailor shop with a wonderful collection of 19th century military headgear off Rittenhouse Square in Philadelphia. Every afternoon, around four, the owner would get bored, break out the single malt, and start recounting the folklore of Philadelphia's cavalry troop, which had last seen mounted action during Black Jack Pershing's Mexican incursion. Apparently Pershing needed every cavalry unit he could get his hands on to hunt down Pancho Villa, and there just weren't enough Buffalo soldiers to go around. So the when Philadelphia's finest were summoned to the Southwest, since they included many of the senior officers, directors, and major shareholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad, they had no difficulty in arranging for a private train to bring their Studtz Bearcats and polo ponies to the front with them. Legend has it that the "war" ended when Pershing threatened to make the Mexicans pay their bar bill.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Farslayer:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Philippe:

So please, somebody, tell me how to make my Germans act like Germans when I play CM.

Do really well at the beginning of the Quick Battle or Scenario. Then over-extend yourself in the middle phases. Next you must lose horribly at the end. Oh, and a small case of insanity on your part might come in handy as well...</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

INGERSOLL, R. I. "The Battle is the Pay-off", Harcourt Brace, New York, 1943.

Good lord! And here I was thinking that I was the only person on the planet who had read this in the last forty years. Lovely book. Just came across it yesterday while attempting to put my library in some kind of order.

Michael

[JasonC]

To Fionn - well I don't want to sidetrack a useful thread over irrelevant matters, but I will say that I meant "moral" quite exactly as it is usually meant in military discussions, which was Napoleon's usage as well. The connection of that to broader meanings of the term is simply that courage is considered a part of moral virtue, particularly in soldiers. It really never occurred to me that anyone would think of it otherwise.

That said, I wouldn't mind hearing your elaboration of Russian doctrine, but for myself is really not the reason I suggested it. There are lots of interested people here. An instructing role is a serving role; it caters to the wants of the instructed, and puts their interests above anything having to do with the instructor.

Why should you care about slights real or imagined in these forums, anyway? And why should people who want to learn something concrete about the range of military doctrines, wait upon my manners or your willingness to find offense? They have nothing to do with either. Of course, in the end it is your affair.

[JasonC]

Brian said "Omaha beach was essentially treated as a frontal attack by infantry, nearly all technical "gadgetry" was eschewed...In the hard slog forward through the hedgerows, one reads continually of how the US commanders were attempting to force their infantry forwards, through the use of what appears to be almost pure willpower"

I'm afraid I don't recognize a hint of reality in either statement. OK, there may be a small element of truth in the second, in that the overall push to St. Lo did feature plenty of straight ahead attack in hedgerow country. But both strike me as significant distortions.

The invasion itself features Higgins boats (nothing of the kind existed as recently as 3 years earlier), LSTs, artificial harbors, hundreds of DD tanks, DUWKs, rocket-firing barges, heavy and medium bombers (which unfortunately dropped too far inland), P-47 dive bombing, mass paratroop drops to isolate the beachheads the night before of course, sundry diversions and special forces operations, naval bombardment by BBs, CAs, and DDs, the last continuing for hours after the men were ashore from so close that a couple of DDs ran aground delivering it, plastic explosives designed to destroy beach obstacles, bangolore torpedos to blow gaps in wire - just off the top of my head, without looking anything up.

Half or more of these technical means did not exist when the US entered the war. If the courage of small groups of men ashore to scale the bluffs wound up mattering more than the gadgetry, it wasn't for lack of trying. And without all the gadgetry, it is questionable any of them would have gotten there in the first place, or that the thing would even have been tried.

As for the hedgerow fighting, which Brian regards as merely forcing infantry forward by willpower, it involved rather more than that. In particular, it involved intense levels of artillery support trying to shoot the infantry forward - with mixed success, of course. But e.g. two companies crossing a river 20 yards wide was supported by 9 battalions of artillery. Rolling barrages were tried, but proved less than adapted to hedgerow terrain - it was very easy to "lose the barrage".

Tanks were fitted with hedgerow cutters, and extensively used to support the infantry - but with limited success in the tight terrain, which made infantry AT more effective. Rifle grenades and mortars were extensively used to toss HE into the next field. Part of 3rd armored was put into the area trying to force an armored breakthrough, but failed.

Panzer Lehr delivered a division-level counterattack, and was repulsed with the loss of half its armor. Lehr, 2SS, and 17SS PzGdr bolstered the German front with armor. The FJ corps was consumed in the fighting, with 5 FJ brought up from Brittany to help out. The overall push kept the German front close to cracking, and it was preventing from cracking only by continually adding additional forces. When that could no longer be kept up, the front did crack.

Eventually the attack ground through the forces the Germans could put in front of it, though taking about twice the losses inflicted in the process. That the Germans nevertheless ran out of front line infantry manpower in the area is primarily due to the weight of artillery used. The eventual transition to full scale breakout was further aided by the carpet-bombing of Panzer Lehr in late July, a technique tried previously on the British part of the front - twice - without success.

There is no question the bulk of the US infantry in Normandy was green. The terrain was well suited to defense. Depth of replacements and weight of artillery fire still ground through the German defenders. The eventual payoff in the breakout more than repaid the loss differential in the attrition phase of the fighting, not just by taking France but in absolute loss terms. By September the loss ratio was 2 to 1 the other way.

The strategy applied on the US part of the front in Normandy was almost daily attack supported by lots of artillery. Compared to the episodic armor-heavy flurries on the UK portion of the front, it cost the Germans less in armor but more in infantry. The breakout fighting equalized even the armor losses on the two ends of the front, nearly (2AD's breakout fighting in particular, and Mortain).

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JasonC:

[snips]

The invasion itself features Higgins boats (nothing of the kind existed as recently as 3 years earlier), LSTs, artificial harbors, hundreds of DD tanks, DUWKs, rocket-firing barges, heavy and medium bombers (which unfortunately dropped too far inland), P-47 dive bombing, mass paratroop drops to isolate the beachheads the night before of course, sundry diversions and special forces operations, naval bombardment by BBs, CAs, and DDs, the last continuing for hours after the men were ashore from so close that a couple of DDs ran aground delivering it, plastic explosives designed to destroy beach obstacles, bangolore torpedos to blow gaps in wire - just off the top of my head, without looking anything up.

Half or more of these technical means did not exist when the US entered the war.

Let's count 'em, shall we?

LSTs, artificial harbours, DUKWs and DDs -- no, none of these existed in 1941, because nobody was expecting to do an amphibious invasion. But two of the four are loggy devices anyway, and so cannot reasonably be counted as featuring in the initial assault.

Rocket-firing barges I'll count as a no, too.

Heavy, medium and fighter-bombers, special forces and paratroops all clearly existed before the US entry into the war. That's five for the other side. Naval bombardment and bangalore torpedoes add another two. Plastic explosive I'm not sure of the dates for, but RDX was certainly around before 1941, and I understand that it is the main component of compositions C3 and C4.

So the proportion of "gadgets" you list existing before the US entry into the war is less than 50%. What's more, Mulberry, Hedgerow and the DD are specifically British (well, OK, for the DD, Hungarian) inventions.

At all events, there seems little doubt that Marshall and MacNair had decided that the US Army should be made up of a mass of standard, general-purpose formations, rather than employ the vast selection of "funnies" (and "private armies") that wwre to be found in British organisation (although Bill Slim in Burma also favoured this single-standard approach). Insofar as specialised "gadgets" fulfil a special, rather than a general purpose, the apparent American aversion to such gadgetry seems to me to have been a good idea. Probably the worst gadget-fiends were the Germans; the total amount of national effort wasted on teachnically excellent but operationally futile devices is incalculable. The US seems to have preferred to bet heavily only on "gadgets" of demonstrable operational worth under all circumstances -- the VT fuze, the 6x6 truck, the M-1 rifle.

Originally posted by JasonC:

[snips]

The eventual transition to full scale breakout was further aided by the carpet-bombing of Panzer Lehr in late July, a technique tried previously on the British part of the front - twice - without success.

I don't know about "without success". While the fashion seems to be to regard "Goodwood" as less successful with every passing year, the fact remains that the Germans could hardly afford to have an entire division deleted from their orbat, mainly as a result of the airstrikes accompanying the operation.

Originally posted by JasonC:

[snips]

Depth of replacements and weight of artillery fire still ground through the German defenders.

I'm not convinced about "depth of replacements", either. It is my understanding that the US infantry replacement pool was desperately over-stretched during the Normandy fighting -- and, because of the dreadful US replacement policy, replacements were incorporated into existing units less effectively than in any other army in the ETO.

Originally posted by JasonC:

[snips]

The strategy applied on the US part of the front in Normandy was almost daily attack supported by lots of artillery. Compared to the episodic armor-heavy flurries on the UK portion of the front, it cost the Germans less in armor but more in infantry. The breakout fighting equalized even the armor losses on the two ends of the front, nearly (2AD's breakout fighting in particular, and Mortain).

"Episodic armour-heavy flurries"? Sorry, that's almost as ludicrous a misrepresentation as Steve Ambrose's "The tendency was to stop to brew up a tea and ... congratulate themselves on getting ashore". The Anglo-Canadians put more armour ashore than the Americans initially, and used it more; but this is hardly surprising, given the relative suitability of the terrain for armoured warfare in their respective sectors. They were also facing almost the whole of the German armoured force in theatre. The units on the Anglo-Canadian front faced "hard pounding" throughout Perch, Epsom, Charnwood, Spring, Atlantic, Goodwood, the battles around Hill 112 and Mont Pincon, Tractable, Totalize and Bluecoat. Mike Dorosh has previously made reference to the need to create a new "double intense" daily loss rate for planning because of the intensity of the Normandy fighting.

The British role in creating the breakout is very badly under-represented in the standard histories, too; the left flank of "Bluecoat" bit deeper and faster into the German lines than "Cobra" in the first few days, and pulled the critical German armoured counterattack forces onto the British front at Periers Ridge.

All the best,

John.

[JasonC]

"They were also facing almost the whole of the German armoured force in theatre"

This is demonstrably false, as I have shown previously on this forum. The split in German armor deployment in Normandy over the whole campaign, by numbers of AFVs engaged and dealt with, was only about 6-5 weighted toward the British sector - around 1200 AFVs compared to 1000. A fair portion of the armor the US faced was during (e.g. 116 Pz and 2 StuG brigades, both from reserve and previously unengaged) and after the breakout (e.g. Mortain, including "switch hitters") rather than before it, and the portion of heavies and turreted rather than turretless AFVs were somewhat higher in the British sector. That is all.

Episodic I used in contrast to daily. The Brits prepared offensives extensively over a week or so and then fought intensely for a few days. After which flurries the front general went quite for another week or so. The Americans paused on the St. Lo front while attacking up the penisula to Cherbourg, but other than that attacked daily.

This difference was in no way meant to imply that the Brits were drinking tea. They were preparing offensives and delivering them, then pausing before the next to make such preparations again. As I said, these highly prepared attacks generally wound up costing the Germans more in armor, as they put in reserves to stop them. But the daily infantry wastage from regular arty supported infantry attacks was less.

As for the point about replacements, US forces in the line at the time of the breakout where 2/3rds of TOE or above, despite high causalties. The Germans got practically no infantry replacements and had been attrited to quite low percentages of TOE in front line infantry strength. That is the point about depth of replacements - the US may have been shallower than would have been best on that score, but they were way better off than their opponents. The US did so while also continually expanding the number of formations engaged, as they could be brought ashore obviously.

At any rate, it seems to me this discussion has moved from interesting stuff about doctrinal differences to petty and time-worn inter-allied rivalries, which to me are frankly about as interesting as a bucket of warm spit.