Differences in Recon Doctrine

[vils]

Just a quick note on answer to the guy that says that recon units should play on their own battles.

Very very wrong!

I am playing the larger version of the game, thus an op on a map 4*6 km 60 turns battles, with 20 battles in it. In H2H, recons are fast, and really needed to track what opposition forces are doing, and concentrations. The lack of Air-spotters demands this, if you dont want to get your assault stranded as you discover that the enemy is to strong there. You cant attack an area if the enemy is to strong there, or at least you have to wait for reinforcements , which can take over 100 turns!

Btw, those interested in this big-way thinking way of playing, contact me. Its an truly way of playing an campaign!

/vils

[CombinedArms]

I think the suggestion that Allied (US, UK, USSR, etc) fighting for information probably improved with time, in part by imitating German techniques, is probably true. Many German generals complained that they were beaten by enemies using their own methods. C'est la guerre!

Re: incorporating the recon battle (which may have happened before) into the CM battlefield, I think this CAN be a part of scenario design. In other words, the designer can give the attacker a comparatively detailed briefing, indicating the results of recon to date--including perhaps the naming of tentatively or securely identified positions. This would be consistent with the idea that the recce happened the night before. Such detailed and genuinely useful briefing does sometimes happen but is rather rare, in my experience.

More common, at least in CMBO, is the sort of briefing which says--"Expect no enemy armor in the area" when you KNOW you're facing the better part of an armored brigade. Nuff said about the value of the info in such briefings--not even the designer expects you to believe it (often because the General Briefing has already contradicted it.) In CMBB, there does seem to be a recognition that the attacker needs more help, and thus we seem to be getting somewhat more detailed and plausible briefings. I'd like to see that trend continue.

[ December 12, 2002, 11:57 AM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[kipanderson]

Hi,

Interesting question and thread. However, in the real world, both in WWII and in Cold War terms, i.e. post WWII, recon normally splits into two, that is ground recon.

Observation, and fighting recon, really probe attacks. Militaries go through all sorts of hoops designing and training specialist Recon battalions, but when war really gets going, Recon tends to fall back on observation, or a probe attack of some kind.

Under observation would come small listening patrols, four man SAS type infiltration and observation missions, a mix of stuff. Put all forms of observation mission. Really just watching and listening in some form. However, when really hard recon information is required, say just before a possible major assault, a probe attack turns out to be the only practical solution.

It has been interesting reading the various Jane’s journals that I subscribe to over the last fifteen years. There have been many articles on Recon, and Recon equipment. There is an on going major debate in most armies about the usefulness of specialised Recon vehicles such as armoured cars and the like. It is well understood in most militaries, because they are professional and rational people who study AARs and history; that in the end, observation and probe attacks is what Recon normally ends up as in war.

One explanation for all the effort put into the design of Recon equipment and the training of specialist Recon units is that armies tend to train a lot for meeting engagements, even though in reality there are very few of these in major wars. In major wars lines form very quickly, it is a case of “assault”, after “assault”, after “assault”…. Very like a CMBB static operation. (Which why I am such a fan of CMBB static operations. )

In WWII many specialist Recon units were simply used as just another regular battalion combat team. One example is that some, may well be the great majority, I do not know, but some Commonwealth Armoured Recon battalions in Armoured Divisions were used entirely as “line armoured battalions”, with no difference in their use. The divisional commanders were after more combat power, not Recon units.

One point to remember, on those rare occasions when Recon units are involved in meeting engagements, they tend to end up spending a lot of their time fighting other Recon units. That is doing Counter-reconnaissance.

All the best,

Kip

[Grisha]

per Michael emrys:

I would be cautious about comparing Soviet and 3rd. Army practices until I know a lot more about both. I suspect the differences are significant.

As would I, Michael. But, what has always fascinated me are similarities borne out, not from imitation, but from responses to similar situations. That the US and Red Armies were probably not involved in any joint doctrinal developments in military art during the war is probably an understatement. However, both armies seem to have hit on very similar approaches on some aspects. I would love to know more about Patton's operations and his methods merely to see where these similarities lie. I'm somewhat familiar with the US Army's use of task groups and how their force structure was designed around the idea, but it would be instructive to see how Patton dealt with this in his operations.

Contary to popular belief, Soviet tank commanders often did whatever was necessary to complete their mission with the forces assigned. By 1943-44, tank commanders like Rotmistrov would restructure their forces on the fly due to attrition, creating ad hoc groups out of their entire corps/army. You won't find this in any Soviet field regulation, but it was done, mostly because of the isolation that was often the case with mobile groups committed to exploitation.

Regrettably, the reconnaisance battle can't be entirely reproduced in CM as there are no points awarded for simply discovering the deployment of the enemy's forces. It would be nice if this could be incorporated in the engine rewrite.

I completely agree. It's often said by developers (not only by BFC) that this aspect of combat is not implemented for various reasons. I would like it implemented, since it was a very important part of combat - decisive, in fact.

per JaegerMeister:

Grisha, you seem 'very' well informed on the Soviet recon methods. Have you close personal experience of those tactics, ie relatives that served in it? Great insight into a field that not many western authors seem to cover.Good stuff.

No, no relatives, no relations whatsoever. Just an intense interest in Soviet military art. Thanks for the comment

Just to continue the debate (at the risk of digging a bigger hole for myself ), and no i'm not saying the Germans were the best at everything, was it not a case that the other nations adopted the same doctrine/agressive recon in force tactics, after witnessing the way the German forces fought in the early war years? After all the Russians seemed to teach them a thing or two about 'blitzkrieg'/encirclement ops in the later war years after learning about their adversaries tactics and improving upon them.

Or did these other nations have the same doctrine in place at the start of war with regards to heavily armed recon? ie whats the OOB for an early war British or Russian recon unit? Mind you, its possibly hard to evaluate, because the Germans were the ones doing the advancing/invading and therefore needing to be aggressive.

I think what the Germans really showed the world in WWII was that mechanized warfare worked fabulously. Up until Poland and France, the world had specific ideas about mechanized warfare. The Soviets probably had the most similar idea to the Germans, but their political elements made sure that any of that knowledge was trashed just as it was most desperately needed.

Aggressive reconniassance is very much in keeping with the idea of initiative and displacement via mobility. German military art by WWII heavily underscored the need to move and respond quickly to the situation, and to minimize any time from planning to actual execution of offensive operations. Of course, the use of massed tanks in combined arms with artillery, infantry, and aviation is assumed here, but I suspect people forget that the 'need for speed' was almost a mantra with German forces.

That's not to say the Germans didn't possess any flaws or limitations, because they certainly did. Probably the most pressing one was that they placed all of their hopes on the offensive campaign itself. A surfing analogy (of sorts) would be that rather than rely and plan on a set of waves to defeat an enemy in war, the Germans based everything on creating a tsunami. The problem became obvious when the Soviet Union survived Barbarossa. This reliance on what was really a subset of operational art had repercussions all throughout German military structure, since it ultimately limited their full capabilities. Basically, the Germans were excellent at what they did, but what they did had limited applications in the conduct of war.

per Warren Peace:

This may or may not be of interest to the topic. I have an uncle who was a junior officer in the recon battalian of fourth armored division, US army in ww2. When I asked him about his job he said basically he would take a team out at night and recon the route which the tanks were to travel the next morning. If they encountered enemy positions they marked them on the map and bypassed them to continue the mission. They generally slept during the day. Interestingly, he was never wounded and rose from 2nd luietenant to major by the end of the war.

Thus from this conversation I would suggest that much recon took place at night.

See, it's this sort of thing that continual strikes me. First, Michael talks of how armored cav units functioned with the 3rd Army, and now this story of night operations. Very interesting stuff, Warren. Thank you

The Soviets were very big on working at night, and by 1944 their tank forces often used the night for attacks and advances in the German operational depths. I recall reading in 1944 a tank brigade from a tank corps (from an exploiting tank army) successfully conducting two attacks on successive towns, and all done at night. It might even be safe to say that forward detachments preferred to operate at night.

[manchildstein (ii)]

in cmbo, i designed a number of american cavalry scenarios... a couple of things that i remember from the webpages on the subject were:

1) u.s. cavalry squadrons (battalions) would sometimes be used to defened large stretches of 'quiet' sectors of the line. this was because, man for man they had more firepower than any other unit type... thus they could be 'strung out' and still offer a 'tough picket'

2) the m24 chaffee as a replacement for the stuart gave the american recon squadron 'f troop,' "the ability to operate in the vicinity of enemy tanks"

i really enjoyed attempting to depict u.s. recon operations in cmbo... as a matter of fact it was my favorite thing in that game...

as for the germans and their willingness to 'stick around for a fight,' the only thing 'concrete' i remember was a book on various german formation 'to&es;' in there they had mentioned that the germans were a sort of 'fighting recon'

and again, i can believe that because for instance in 1941 those 20mm cars can go 'toe to toe' with the russian t26 and bt tanks...

...and in cmbb this is 'fun' to portray...

[manchildstein (ii)]

Originally posted by Pak40:

actually, in at least one other case they were used to 'hold a flank'... it was prior to/during the german 'lorraine' offensive in what - 'late september?'

i don't remember the unit name but remember having created a huge, semi-hysterical scenario 'about it.'

[Andreas]

I think it is clear that there are various types of recce work and I will attempt a grouping. These are situation dependent, and not mutually exclusive.

1) Recce by observation

2) Recce by patrolling/small scale combat

3) Recce by fighting/larger scale combat - this includes seizing objectives 'off the march'

1) and 2) are not exclusive, and would presumably occur in fixed positions, where 3) is most unlikely. They include amongst other things observing firing positions, trench works, relief in place procedures, supply procedures, gathering of prisoners, gathering of information from locals/partisans behind the enemy lines.

3) is different from that, and can either be a stand-alone operation, or part of a larger operation. Forces for undertaking three are operating either in a void ahead of the bulk of ones own forces, or to the flanks, in highly mobile situations (German army 1940/41, Africa, 3rd Army, Northern France 1944, Soviets 1943-5). If in battle, they are units detached from the bulk of the assault that are to be launched into less well established positions of the enemy (e.g. his 3rd line of trenches, which could not be observed/patrolled well).

Anyway, I have to run and catch my train now, I post more from work.

[Frunze]

Originally posted by Grisha:

I think what the Germans really showed the world in WWII was that mechanized warfare worked fabulously. Up until Poland and France, the world had specific ideas about mechanized warfare. The Soviets probably had the most similar idea to the Germans, but their political elements made sure that any of that knowledge was trashed just as it was most desperately needed.

(Drift)

Yeah. Not that I know an incredible amount about this stuff, but...

If every army prepares to fight the last war, for the Red Army that was the highly mobile Russian Civil War, not the relatively positional WWI. So people like Tukhachevsky and the guy I took my username from worked up a doctrine that said in the future, the Soviet army would fight in a highly mobile, maneuver-oriented fashion, as it had by the end of the Russian Civil War. There was some Marshal-Foch-style "cult of the offensive" stuff in there, too, maybe that part served the USSR poorly during Barbarossa?

[JonS]

Doublers' Closing with the Enemy has a number of comments about US recce practice.

Also I seem to recall - though for the life of me I can't remember where - that US recce units were habitually misused. I've seen a table that has the various tasks they were called on to perform, and the percentage of the time they performed that task. From memory, actual recce related tasks were down around the 10% region, regular combat was high, screening was high, and convoy escorting was a very common task. Sorry, but I can't provide a reference. We all seem to read similar books though, so hopefully the above will jog someones memory?

The reason for the disparity could be, IMHO, that the US army was trained and equipped for a style war that it didn't get to fight, except for short periods (notably Pattons' breakout). For a lot of the rest of the time there wasn't a whole lot for the dedicated recce units to do, and hence were called on to do the other tasks - for which they were well equipped (as already discussed in this thread).

Regards

JonS

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Frunze:

(Drift)

Yeah. Not that I know an incredible amount about this stuff, but...

If every army prepares to fight the last war, for the Red Army that was the highly mobile Russian Civil War, not the relatively positional WWI. So people like Tukhachevsky and the guy I took my username from worked up a doctrine that said in the future, the Soviet army would fight in a highly mobile, maneuver-oriented fashion, as it had by the end of the Russian Civil War. There was some Marshal-Foch-style "cult of the offensive" stuff in there, too, maybe that part served the USSR poorly during Barbarossa?

It was quite a few people who developed the Soviet theories of deep battle and deep operations, as well as recognize the need to add an operational level between strategy and tactics. A whole community of Red Army military officers and theorists, in fact. Off the top of my head I can also think of Svechin, Triandafillov, and Kamenev, but there were many, many more. It was amazing how intellectually fertile the Soviet military community was in the 1920s and 1930s, which makes the purge of 1937 all the more tragic. Incidently, they were also strong supporters of the Soviet industrial revolution, since any implementation of mechanized warfare needed to have a modern industrial base to work from.

But getting back to your question of Red Army failure in Barbarossa. Putting it quite simply, by 1940 the fine theories developed in the 1920s and 1930s were no longer in vogue due to the purges. The authors were not mentioned, nor were their works. It was dangerous to do so. Not that the majority of the officers in the Red Army of 1940 could've been able to digest these theories, given so many of them were out of their depth, having been promoted beyond their training to fill up the void left by the purge. What made everything much worse though was that after the experiences of the Spanish Civil War and the Winter War, the Red Army had actually rejected the theories of deep battle and deep operations, as well as the force structure that was meant to implement them. Instead, they elected to go the route of infantry, artillery, and cavalry with tanks used only as infantry support. The amazing German success of France '40 brought them out of that politically-derived dementia, but it left the Soviet government with about one year to resurrect all they had undone - which was simply an impossible task.

In Sun Tzu, there's a passage that refers to indicators, and one is particularly relevant to the Red Army during Barbarossa. It goes something like, "if you see Generals gesturing madly and shouting at their troops, their army is lossing control." There was a lot of that going on in the Red Army in summer of 1941.

[Andreas]

The book I referred to earlier (Przytocki - Im Aufklaerungspanzer) turns out to be a very interesting read. The chap was apparently in charge of the Recce company of 1st Polish Armoured Brigade 'Heroes of the Westerplatte'. It has a lot of info on combat operations, and what kind of recon was undertaken. In line with my earlier classification, it was almost entirely '2)', and a little bit of '1)' and '3)', with the latter more often than not ending pear-shaped it seems.

Some interesting observations - while he was regularly ordered to bring in 'tongues', often he was not given the time needed before the operation started. So he ended up bringing back a prisoner while the tanks trundled past him to the attack, without the benefit of the information.

Another interesting info is that at times the grand total of tanks in the Brigade was <10, with battalions made up of 3 or 2 tanks. Talk about attrition...

[Andreas]

I would also love to see John Salt start quoting from classified information in this thread

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I would also love to see John Salt start quoting from classified information in this thread

Ah, but if I did that, then I'd have to kill you. Well, maybe not for the stuff that's only RESTRICTED, but I'd probably have to kick you in the shins really hard, or somefink.

If anyone cleared for UK RESTRICTED feels like trying to get interesting exercise reports about recce out of DRIC, the ones to look for are White Ermine and Chinese Eye (1980s) and Flying Cast and Badger's Stress (1990s).

Yes, I did say "Badger's Stress", and I accept no responsibility for the exotic names the donkey-wallopers choose for their training exercises.

All the best,

John.