British Infantry

[Simon Fox]

Originally posted by tero:

The thing is the British army seems to have worked through the officers. It would appear the regular soldiers were treated as cannon fodder more than anything else. Like the Germans their SOP had its roots in the WWI experiences. Only, they had learned different lessons. The very term "minor tactics" is IMO very indicative how much value was given to the execution of battlefield manouvers. Whereas the Germans had evolved the Stosstruppe tactics into an art form the British held on to the WWI linear tactics.

The Stosstruppe tactics require highly skilled leadership and careful coordination. These tactics are also more demanding on the individual soldier. It seems the British leaders did not and/or were indoctrinated not to trust in the regular individual soldiers as much as the Germans trusted their individual soldiers.

Really tero that is a load of bollocks. Now you're trotting out the completely ahistorical stereotype of the WW1 ubergerman development of infantry tactics (Stosstruppe) vs blundering Brit 'linear tactics'. You've read Timothy Harrison-Place's PhD and now you're a world expert, why is that not suprising, hehe.

[Brian]

Originally posted by tero:

The thing is the British army seems to have worked through the officers. It would appear the regular soldiers were treated as cannon fodder more than anything else. Like the Germans their SOP had its roots in the WWI experiences. Only, they had learned different lessons. The very term "minor tactics" is IMO very indicative how much value was given to the execution of battlefield manouvers. Whereas the Germans had evolved the Stosstruppe tactics into an art form the British held on to the WWI linear tactics.

The Stosstruppe tactics require highly skilled leadership and careful coordination. These tactics are also more demanding on the individual soldier. It seems the British leaders did not and/or were indoctrinated not to trust in the regular individual soldiers as much as the Germans trusted their individual soldiers.

Tero, you are treading on a topic I suspect you have little knowledge in. In reality, the British did not "hold onto onto WWI linear tactics" - they abandoned them in late 1916 after the Somme had proved the problems associated with them. I'd recommend that you read Paddy Griffith's excellent treatise on the subject "Battle Tactics of the Western Front".

Then there is the claim that, "The thing is the British army seems to have worked through the officers. It would appear the regular soldiers were treated as cannon fodder more than anything else." This assumes no authority for the NCO's. Obviously you've no experience of the Sergeants' Union and in particular its most fearsome of shopstewards, the RSM! In the British/Commonwealth Army, while the officer may direct the mission, its the NCO's who organise the men and actually achieve it!

In reality, in WWII, the British army built upon its excellent experience in WWI and in particular the NW Frontier, to produce a far more flexible army than you're giving them credit for. Men were definitly not treated as "cannon fodder". Indeed, to even suggest it appears to ignore the very obvious tactical innovations introduced in order to save lives, particularly in 21 Army Group.

The rest of your post moves beyond the merely tactical considerations which has been the main part of this discussion to higher-level considerations at the operational level.

[qb]Is it that the Brits had an SOP for something the Germans didn't feel the need for? Great, but so what? Or maybe its that having SOPs is a bad idea? In that case I disagree.

The Germans had evolved their tactics and doctrine so that their SOP made it less likely they would need to re-org after an assault in the scale the British apparently had to.

My point is that, IMO, re-orging to an SOP after an assault is a good idea.

Re-orging to an SOP ?

I do agree re-orging is OK and sometimes necessary. But the SOP should have re-org elements in it every step of the way, not just the end. And this is IMO how the Germans had it worked out.

Re-organisation is always necessary, otherwise you end up with an amorphous mass of men at the end of your assault who have no clear lines of command and are ill organised to resist any counter-attack or even perhaps more importantly, to go onto the next objective. You appear to believe that its merely possible for an entire battalion to charge forward and take an objective and once there, not sort themselves out and reassert authority and more importantly direction. This brooks on the silly IMO. To do prevent this from occurring, re-orgs were introduced because in WWI the British found themselves all too often being pushed out of any gains they might have made.

Where the British may have fallen down, in comparison to the Germans who also did indeed undertake re-orgs once an objective had been achieved, was that they were slower to actually carry them out and tended all too often to "rest on their laurals". The German re-orgs were speedier and better organised. This still doesn't meant they didn't happen.

[ April 03, 2002, 11:28 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by Brian:

Tero, have you ever had to assemble link out of a matter of interest?

Luckily the Finnish army does not use disintegrating link that much.

Its not a job for the light-hearted or those pressed for time.

I have filled a few belts to know what it is like even when you are not in a hurry.

Then again one man can fill up the 70-round magazine of the Suomi/PPSh SMG fast enough to rotate 5 magazines so the gunner will not run out of ready magazines.

[Mattias]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

"The British Soldier, Volume 2" by Jean Bouchery, page 42.

--

At the first glance I was very disappointed by that book but after a few minutes I realized that the almost comic style colourfulness of this book is matched by considerable depth in facts.

--

M.

[Jeff Duquette]

Thanks Mattias.

[Sailor Malan]

I know that a lot of these points have been covered already, but there are some issues here that are getting very clouded.

Originally posted by tero:

Re-orging at any level is serious business. Losing control at any level is also a serious business, especially if it is done as a point of SOP.

Saying reorganisation at any level is serious is just plain silly. A reorganisation can be at section level: "Fred, you take over as no2 for the LMG, Burt you get that wound seen to", or at higher level "Lt Smith, you are now btn commander, take the remenants of A, and B coys, to make one effective company. The Weapons Coy will have to act as the other" - somewhat more serious, huh!

Any forward movement onto a position requires reorganisation, regardless of what your doing next. The support weapons are set up to fire on your current postion, they need new positions, probably ammo, etc. I think we are arguing over the meaning of words.

The thing is the British army seems to have worked through the officers. It would appear the regular soldiers were treated as cannon fodder more than anything else. Like the Germans their SOP had its roots in the WWI experiences. Only, they had learned different lessons. The very term "minor tactics" is IMO very indicative how much value was given to the execution of battlefield manouvers. Whereas the Germans had evolved the Stosstruppe tactics into an art form the British held on to the WWI linear tactics.

The Stosstruppe tactics require highly skilled leadership and careful coordination. These tactics are also more demanding on the individual soldier. It seems the British leaders did not and/or were indoctrinated not to trust in the regular individual soldiers as much as the Germans trusted their individual soldiers.

I don't know where to start here! The British army (especially by 1944) did NOT use infantry as fodder, they were very aware of the manpower shortage, and in fact were breaking up btns to provide replacements. The British army was very dependant on NCO's for command and control, as are most armies. The idea that units would cease to function if the platoon commanders became casualties (as is implied by your comments) is silly. There are examples of the only surviving officer commanding the company, with NCO's commanding platoons. The units did not lose their ability to operate!

"Minor tactics" you have misunderstood. The British army was taught field craft the hard way by the Boers in South Africa. The infantry emphesised field skills (and accuracy at long range, which goes partly to explain the long life of the Lee Enfield). You probably should read it as "minor (i.e. small) unit tactics"

I'm looking at events beyond the landing, when there was more time to do things and the situation was nowhere as chaotic or desperate. During the landing I would expect any army would have done it that way. But beyond it, it was far too rigid and cumbersome (as an SOP) to yield the best results possible. How long do you think it took the Germans to realize there would be a gap between the assault and the follow up and to utilize that gap to the fullest ?

Whilst the overall situation may have been more organised after the initial landings, any combat situation tends towards disorder. The famous quote "no plan survives contact with the enemy" says it all. The side that manages the disorder better will come out on top (all else being equal). As to assuming there would always be a gap between assault and follow up - the British fought the Germans (actively) from May 1940 until the end of the war. By 1944 (with normal differences for unit performance etc) the British knew how to operate successfully, with managed risk.

And I am amazed the German counter attack was still the bogey man for the British commader after so many years of first hand experience. Before reading the book on the training I would have thought they had learned to counter the German tactics. It took only 2 years for the Red Army to come up with a plan to reduce the effectiveness of the German style counter attack (namely directing massive arty barrages on the flanks and shoulders of the break-in where the counterattack would normally come from).

You are mixing your drinks as we say. The Russian response is on a operational or grand tactical scale. The counter attack you talk abot the British being unable to handle is the small (company) local counter attack, that will often recapture a recently taken position, if the defenders haven't resupplied, scraped a few new foxholes, etc. (In other words, re-organised). In effect the British did know how to handle it - one very good way is to assume it is coming, and prepare to receive it. THEN you can jump off for phase two (or whatever). This was not the only method the British could use however (they used art on likely concentrations - and in fact having MUCH better art control, didn't need to use preplanned spoiling shoots in the Russian style)

I do agree re-orging is OK and sometimes necessary. But the SOP should have re-org elements in it every step of the way, not just the end. And this is IMO how the Germans had it worked out.

Again you are arguing over words. If you think that a British company attack (or assault) consisted of a single ops group at which the commander said something like "I say chaps, we're going forward 1000yds to Hill xyz. See you there!" you are a victim of your own preconceptions. The plan (as in most armies) had stage (or reporting) lines, rally points, contingencies, etc. The British infantry more than held their own in most situations. The real difference was probably the recognition that the army could not expect the infantry units to be fought until casualties reduced them to small cadres. Every attempt was made to achieve objectives as economically in men as possible. Stosstruppen tactics are VERY expensive to maintain. Casualties, and Allied learning defeated them in 1918, and they were not (in their pure form) any more effective in WWII. The world had moved on, what would later be called the combined arms battle is what mattered. (P.S. Who won in Normandy BTW, I haven't got my books here?)

(Even better when I correct the typo's!)

[ April 03, 2002, 12:55 PM: Message edited by: Sailor Malan ]

[gibsonm]

Originally posted by Brian:

Tero, have you ever had to assemble link out of a matter of interest? Its not a job for the light-hearted or those pressed for time.

De-Tracing is even better!! pulling out every 5th round and then relinking so you don't start fire down range. Bad enough for an Infanteer but AFV's carry tens of thousands of rounds.

[edward_n_kelly]

Originally posted by gibsonm:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:

Tero, have you ever had to assemble link out of a matter of interest? Its not a job for the light-hearted or those pressed for time.

De-Tracing is even better!! pulling out every 5th round and then relinking so you don't start fire down range. Bad enough for an Infanteer but AFV's carry tens of thousands of rounds.</font>

[Brian]

Originally posted by gibsonm:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:

Tero, have you ever had to assemble link out of a matter of interest? Its not a job for the light-hearted or those pressed for time.

De-Tracing is even better!! pulling out every 5th round and then relinking so you don't start fire down range. Bad enough for an Infanteer but AFV's carry tens of thousands of rounds.</font>

[Tero]

Just a quick remark, I'll respond to the other points ASAP

Originally posted by Brian:

Anybody care to hazard a guess as to what the Vickers gunners had to do to prepare their belts of non-distintegrating canvas belts for firing?

I know.

The überFinnish Maxim-gunners preferred domestic metallic non-disintegrating belts over the Russian/Soviet canvas belts for that reason (as well as jams/stoppages were less likely to happen with the metal belt than with the canves belt).

You could use captured canvas belts as is but normally the gunners would transfer the ammo from the captured belts to their own belts.

I wonder if that Red Army Maxim canvas belt vs Finnish army Maxim metal belt thing will be modelled in CMBB......

[Brian]

Originally posted by tero:

Just a quick remark, I'll respond to the other points ASAP

Originally posted by Brian:

Anybody care to hazard a guess as to what the Vickers gunners had to do to prepare their belts of non-distintegrating canvas belts for firing?

I know.

Then do not keep us in suspense, oh, wise UberFinn!

[Charlie Rock]

In the US Army there are two separate events: "Consolidate and Reorganize"

Reorganize in this case means: evacuate wounded, process EPWs, bring up ammunition, appoint new leaders to replace casualties, cross level squads and platoons, reassign key weapons, disseminate the plan, etc.

Consolidate comes first, and involves putting out security(LP/OPs), assign sectors of fire, emplacing key weapon systems, designating battle positions, calling in and registering pre planned FA targets, and all the tasks that imply that you are getting ready for a counterattack. You consolidate before you reorganize.

I would venture that every army has an SOP for this, most of them are very close to each other.

I don't think any professional army teaches junior leaders, say, to search POWs (reorganize task) before laying in the machine guns (consolidation).

At company level and below there wasn't much of a difference. One of the problems in the British Army, however, was a bad byproduct of the regimental system, and afflicted British officers to varying degrees.

While loyalty to a regiment greatly enhanced unit cohesion, it did not facilitate combined arms training. Infantry and armor units routinely had difficulty consolidating as one combined arms unit, because they were from different regiments and did not trace their source of unit cohesion to the same place. Nor did they train together, mess together, have the same history/traditions, etc. A German rifle company and British rifle company, up to that level, would do the same sorts of things, but there are more than a few occurrences of German combined arms attacks falling on British infantry formations where there was a disconnect between the Armor and infantry, infantry and towed AT sections, etc.

It was most prevalent in North Africa, where British "Cavalry" regiments, for example, would attack without FA to suppress German anti-tank positions, then fall back to laager while British infantry, under-supported, would get hit by combained arms counterattacks. It was still not completely solved by Normandy. German units had no similar regimental system, and panzer grenadier, panzer, and AT units were much more likely to synchronize their efforts.

This is not a reflection on British officers and NCOs at large, but it was a system that promoted officers to high rank without providing a perspective that valued what others outside "The Regiment" could offer. The whole was less than the sum of it's parts, but the parts could fight as well as the parts in anybody else's army.

My 2 cents.

[edward_n_kelly]

Originally posted by Brian:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by gibsonm:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:

Tero, have you ever had to assemble link out of a matter of interest? Its not a job for the light-hearted or those pressed for time.

De-Tracing is even better!! pulling out every 5th round and then relinking so you don't start fire down range. Bad enough for an Infanteer but AFV's carry tens of thousands of rounds.</font>

[Brian]

Originally posted by edward_n_kelly:

Originally posted by Brian:

Originally posted by gibsonm:

Originally posted by Brian:

Tero, have you ever had to assemble link out of a matter of interest? Its not a job for the light-hearted or those pressed for time.

De-Tracing is even better!! pulling out every 5th round and then relinking so you don't start fire down range. Bad enough for an Infanteer but AFV's carry tens of thousands of rounds.

De-tracing is relatively easy compared to assembling complete belts from scratch. I look at pictures of RAF Armourers doing it for Spitfires/Hurricanes during the Battle of Britain and my sympathy goes out to them. What most people don't appreciate is that every round fired by the RAF's fighters in WWII usually had to be assembled into a belt, between sorties. At least in most cases the PBI got their's issued linked already. I've had to assemble large quantities of rounds into link by hand and even with all hands turned to, for the task, it still took longer than I care to contemplate.

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Actually most ammunition (particularly .303 for the RAF) was received at an airfield already linked with its ABBBBT sequence (where A = AP B= Ball T= Tracer).

It could be delivered as its individual components – rounds (by type – there was also an Incendiary round), link.

Where a squadron commander had a particular fetish, established airfields had powered de-linking/linking machines. All squadrons had hand-powered ones.

Where an individual pilot had his whims the armourers could oblige him.

The pictures are probably posed or are done at an airfield like Kenley that was severely damaged at one time (and may have lost equipment).

How else could they have coped with the demands of Bomber Command later in the war ?

I didn't mean to imply that they were doing it by hand, without mechanical aids, Ned. In fact they were using hand-operated linking machines in the pictures I'm thinking of. I don't doubt they were posed. Out by the dispersals of course, which would make one wonder where their source of power would have been?

However, I'm glad you've cleared up the matter of the rounds not being issued loose.

Anybody care to hazard a guess as to what the Vickers gunners had to do to prepare their belts of non-distintegrating canvas belts for firing?

Go on - do tell us and stop pulling it !

Edward[/qb]</font>

[JonS]

Aust. Got rid of them in the 80's I believe.

On a related note, we got rid of our last 25prs in the late 70's. It was mainly due to an inability to obtain fuzes, rather than there being anything wrong with the gun per-se.

Oh, we do still have a troop used for saluting :cool:

[Brian]

Originally posted by JonS:

Aust. Got rid of them in the 80's I believe.

Nope. The South Africans were using them into the late 80s. They converted them according to one source to 7.62x51mm calibre which wouldn't have done wonders for their accuracy. The ADF brought them back for a short period in the early 80s - about 1982-3 when the M60s were declared unsafe for SFMG use. I knew one of the WOs who rewrote the pam (from memory largely) on them. However we'd sold the filling plant to India in the 70s and as a consequence found purchasing .303in back from them too expensive and it was only ever percieved as a stopgap until we could get sufficient FN-MAG58s. Interestingly, the FN-MAG58 was the weapon which beat the M60 in the original competition but was not adopted for political reasons.

On a related note, we got rid of our last 25prs in the late 70's. It was mainly due to an inability to obtain fuzes, rather than there being anything wrong with the gun per-se.

Oh, we do still have a troop used for saluting :cool:

Ours went at about the same time, to be replaced by M2 105mm Howitzers. Not a popular gun, by all accounts, compared to the 25 Pdr. Replaced them with the 105mm Light Gun since, which is popular. We also brought back the L5 105mm Howitzer for a short period in the early 80s for use by our ODF because it was easily airlifted but its lack of wheel bearings never endeared it to the gunners very much (limited towing speed to 25 mph).

We were using 5.5in until the mid 80s. Again, the South Africans kept them until about then as well. The M198 which replaced them in the ADF was chosen for political and financial reasons rather than necessarily it was the best gun (the FH70 apparently was because of its onboard relocation engine).

BTW, I thought Helen was trying to disband your military.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Brian:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />

On a related note, we got rid of our last 25prs in the late 70's. It was mainly due to an inability to obtain fuzes, rather than there being anything wrong with the gun per-se.

Oh, we do still have a troop used for saluting :cool:

Ours went at about the same time, to be replaced by M2 105mm Howitzers. Not a popular gun, by all accounts, compared to the 25 Pdr. Replaced them with the 105mm Light Gun since, which is popular. We also brought back the L5 105mm Howitzer for a short period in the early 80s for use by our ODF because it was easily airlifted but its lack of wheel bearings never endeared it to the gunners very much (limited towing speed to 25 mph).

We were using 5.5in until the mid 80s. Again, the South Africans kept them until about then as well. The M198 which replaced them in the ADF was chosen for political and financial reasons rather than necessarily it was the best gun (the FH70 apparently was because of its onboard relocation engine).</font>