Op Dragoon - head north or east?

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

I'm still not convinced that that is an ecomomical use of forces in terms of achieving the strategic goal of defeating Germany. And that after all is the goal. The fastest way to liberate the most people is to force an early surrender.

Michael

Americans.

This is a typical American pre-Truman WWII attitude, manifested in a post. Extreme focus and very here-and-now.

Exactly the attitude which frustrated Churchill to no end.

Not all agreed that "after all, that is the goal". And was it? Churchill - and Stalin, and de Gaulle, and the impressive number of exiled politicians milling about in London - were all thinking of future Europe. Germany´s defeat was inevitable. Goals were defined in terms of ten years, fifty years, positions in the next inevitable war.

"Liberation" was uninteresting and never more so to Churchill than areas liberated by the Soviets.

Agreements were subject to statistics of power.

Sending troops to Greece in 44-45 was relevant for future Europe, but it had precisely zip to do with defeating Germany, ridding the world of fascism or anysuch.

It was just politics.

Eventually, a more Euro-adapted Truman would see things clearer

But as for Dragoon, firmly in US hands, priorities will have been exclusively focused on the "after all" goal.

Which poses a bit of a problem with the what-if. The Americans would have wanted Dragoon to run straight to Berlin and be done with it. Meaning go North. When Berlin has fallen, German forces in Italy will fall.

And the Italians would be "free" anyway

Cheerio

Dandelion

[JonS]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Dandelion - while they decided it was not worth battling on for the lowlands of the Po valley in May 45, in August 44 this would probably have been different.

Eh? The German forces that were there in April 45 fought and were destroyed in the Po valley. They didn't retreeat north into some mountain fortress, the forces in front of 10th US Mtn Div excepted.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

Dandelion - while they decided it was not worth battling on for the lowlands of the Po valley in May 45, in August 44 this would probably have been different.

Eh? The German forces that were there in April 45 fought and were destroyed in the Po valley. They didn't retreeat north into some mountain fortress, the forces in front of 10th US Mtn Div excepted. </font>

[JonS]

Ok, gotcha. Sort of. The syntax is a bit convoluted to try and follow

But your point about the fight have gone out of the Germans is valid. For example, April/May 45 was the first time the Kiwis took prisoners from the Fallschirmjagers. That was after meeting them in Greece, Crete, Orsogna, and Cassino.

Also, IIRC some forces were pulled out of Italy and sent to NWE. 15th and 90th PzGr Divs come to mind, for instance. That would have made the forces in 45 less capable, as well as less motivated.

Jon

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

Ok, gotcha. Sort of. The syntax is a bit convoluted to try and follow

I considered breaking the sentence up, but it made me feel German to leave it as it is.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

But wouldn't the switch of forces also warrent a switch of logistics as well? Assume the Germans do withdraw into the alpine passes, reducing their forces accordingly. The allies could do the same, keeping a skeleton force in place, while the vast majority of men and supplies go to NWE.

But if you haven't launched Dragoon, you haven't captured Marseille. And if you don't hold Marseille and haven't cleared the routes from there northward, you can't push more supplies into NWE. The Normandy beaches were already delivering all they could and until Antwerp was captured and functioning, that was all they had north of the Loire. As stated earlier in this thread, the whole justification of Dragoon was to provide logistical support for all the divisions waiting in the wings to be brought onto the Continent. Eisenhower wanted to build up his forces as quickly as possible, but just having troops around was no good unless they could be supplied.

Michael </font>

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Keep in mind this was the same time when the German high command denuded the east of reserves to build up forces for operation Wacht am Rhein.

You are postulating the forces would go east - there is zero basis for this in reality. Quite the opposite was happening in fact, with newly available, or refreshed units primarily going to the west.

The German high command was planning Wacht am Rhein in August / September? That is news to me.

If forces were going west it was in response to the collapse of the front in Normandy, which I will concede would have also taken units from the Italian front.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

The German high command was planning Wacht am Rhein in August / September? That is news to me.

The idea came to Hitler while he was in his convalescent bed following the July 20 assassination attempt. He ordered preparations to begin at that time.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Not launched Dragoon? The whole basis for my argument is to take (at least part of) the Dragoon force and head east after the landings. The beachead would have already been secured, and the big ports captured. I would even go so far as to push a force (French?) northwards to link up with 3rd army, thus establishing the supply route.

Okay, thanks for the clarification. You still have problems however. The French forces that were available in the first instance were a. not that many and b. being used to clear out pockets of German resistence along the Atlantic seaboard. They can't do both that and drive north.

Michael

[Wisbech_lad]

North. Wine is much better along the Rhone valley - Burgundy needs liberating!

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

The German high command was planning Wacht am Rhein in August / September? That is news to me.

If forces were going west it was in response to the collapse of the front in Normandy, which I will concede would have also taken units from the Italian front.

Hitler ordered the beginning of preparations for a November offensive in the west on August 19th, four days after the Dragoon landings.

Whether he contemplated it much earlier, as Michael indicates, I do not know. Subsequent events in the east, with the desaster in Romania, and the autumn battles in the Baltics, did nothing to change matters.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Hitler ordered the beginning of preparations for a November offensive in the west on August 19th, four days after the Dragoon landings.

I stand corrected on that point.

Whether he contemplated it much earlier, as Michael indicates, I do not know.

As usual, I can't recall the source on that, but someone who either saw Hitler at that time or is quoting such a person reported that in something I read. Not very helpful. Sorry. But the important point for this discussion is the date you provide above.

Michael

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

One of those 'What if' scenarios to kick around. Suppose you were in charge of Op Dragoon's post-invasion planning and execution. Would you stick with the original plan - that of exploitation up the Rhone valley and eventual linkup with the Allied armies in Normandy, or would you turn east and threaten the LOCs of the German armies in Italy?

King,

Another one of your questions that stayed in the back of my mind, I came across the microfilm with the planning for "Fall Gustav". Turns out, Fall Gustav was the Germans planning for just such an eventuality which we discussed here, but in a somewhat alternative context.

Before the landings at Anzio (in Anzio? by Anzio? Ah well never mind), and some time after it, the Germans made scenarios and prepared for an allied landing in Northernmost Italy. The planning formed part of the bilateral agreement between Germany and fascist Italy. The Germans had the lines of communications between France and Italy as a priority issue, and thus wanted to make operational zones out of the coast all the way to the French border. As operational zone meant German control, this had to be negotiated with their ally, thus the issue appears. And the plan, as appendix to the treaty.

The plan lists the units earmarked for immediate intervention in case of landing, and how long approx it would take them to get there. 3 Divisions (Pz or Pzgren) and a para division from Vietinghoff, 2 divisions from Provence and 5 regiments from the Reich (i.e. Austria). Plus numerous minor units. Of course, that was before Anzio, "Fall Richard", which consumed these contributions.

Still, confirms that the Germans at least considered it a viable what-if in december 1943.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Steve McClaire]

There is a fairly thorough discussion of the Western Allies strategy in the Med. in the various US Army 'Green Books' about the campaign in Italy ("Salerno to Cassino" and "Cassino to the Alps"). There was a lot of political manuevering by the British to try and expand operations in the Mediterranean. The Americans had always been in favor of taking the fight straight to Germany (via France) and thought of the Med. as a side-show and a diversion of resources.

As I recall Anvil/Dragoon was delayed because of the Anzio landings and the necessity to supply the beachhead during the winter of 1944. After this the Americans 'just said no' to any British suggestion for major landings, including several proposals for landing units in the Balkans and near Trieste.

I believe that the US Army just didn't consider the capture of northern Italy an important military objective, and the Balkans were considered a Soviet area of operations. It was more important to topple the Vichy government and clear southern France and open a major port to bring in new units and supplies than to clear the Germans out of the Po valley.

Steve

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Steve McClaire:

As I recall Anvil/Dragoon was delayed because of the Anzio landings and the necessity to supply the beachhead during the winter of 1944.

Dragoon was delayed because a shortage of landing craft in Europe made it impossible to do both it and Normandy at the same time as originally envisioned. Anzio may have contributed something to that shortage, but the main culprit AIUI was Admiral King who sent landing craft to the Pacific that had been intended for Europe.

It was more important to topple the Vichy government...

The Vichy government had been militarily irrelevant since November, 1942 when the Germans had occupied southern France.

Michael

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

The plan lists the units earmarked for immediate intervention in case of landing, and how long approx it would take them to get there. 3 Divisions (Pz or Pzgren) and a para division from Vietinghoff, 2 divisions from Provence and 5 regiments from the Reich (i.e. Austria). Plus numerous minor units. Of course, that was before Anzio, "Fall Richard", which consumed these contributions.

Liddel Hart's "History of the second world war" mentions an army group headed by Rommel being dissolved once the allies landed at Anzio*, and those forces being placed at Kesselring's disposal. What units were in that AG, and where were they located? IIRC, He (Hart) mentioned northern Italy.

*I could be mistaking the Anzio landings for the earlier ones at Salerno. I no longer have the book to reference.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

*I could be mistaking the Anzio landings for the earlier ones at Salerno. I no longer have the book to reference.

I believe you are. It's been a long time, but I do recall that Rommel mentions this in The Rommel Papers, and IIRC he was called to form the army group right after the fall of Sicily and ordered to defend the Brenner Pass. In the event however, his command was dissolved almost immediately when Kesselring convinced Hitler that the Allies could be held in the southern part of the penninsula.

Michael

[Dandelion]

King,

You are not mistaken, Army Group B was located in Northern Italy and under Rommels command, with orders to pacify the region and secure the coast(s). It included between nine and thirteen divisions (as capital units - plus numerous minor units) throughout it's existence. The divisions were not immediately at disposal, since they were either forming or being reconstructed, and lack of tactical mobility made them unsuitable for commitment while the Southern front was still mobile.

On November 21st 1943, Army Group B staff was mainly transferred to C-in-C South and thus beefed Kesselrings thitherto rather skeletal AG Hq. The rest became part of 14th Army staff, as did most divisions in AG B. But even by that time, of the nine remaining divisions of the former AG B, only two were classified as ready for combat.

Thus by the planning of Fall Gustav, all former AG B were in 14th Army, and not tasked with invasion defence (i.e. not forced to at all times maintain readiness to march within a given timeframe). Simply because they were not all yet combat ready, and at any rate lacked the mobility to intervene rapidly. The only instance in which they had a role to fill (other than manning the now stabilized line), was Fall Ludwig, which was an allied landing at Livorno, not deemed very likely (level 2 threat). That's becase they were in the vicinity.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

*I could be mistaking the Anzio landings for the earlier ones at Salerno. I no longer have the book to reference.

I believe you are. It's been a long time, but I do recall that Rommel mentions this in The Rommel Papers, and IIRC he was called to form the army group right after the fall of Sicily and ordered to defend the Brenner Pass. In the event however, his command was dissolved almost immediately when Kesselring convinced Hitler that the Allies could be held in the southern part of the penninsula.

Michael </font>