Op Dragoon - head north or east?

[Kingfish]

One of those 'What if' scenarios to kick around. Suppose you were in charge of Op Dragoon's post-invasion planning and execution. Would you stick with the original plan - that of exploitation up the Rhone valley and eventual linkup with the Allied armies in Normandy, or would you turn east and threaten the LOCs of the German armies in Italy?

[Michael Emrys]

North. That's where the important action is. The main reason Eisenhower insisted on Dragoon was that he wanted Marseille to supply his armies, and the only way to open that line of communication is to drive north from the south of France. Also it was desireable to eliminate the German forces on the southern flank of the Normandy armies before they could do any mischief.

However nice it might have been to have destroyed some of the German armies in northern Italy at the start of summer, by the time of Dragoon, they were of little strategic importance. Best just to let them sit and rot. All that was really necessary was to keep enough pressure on them to prevent their being withdrawn to some other front. As long as they were in existence, the Germans were forced to supply and maintain them. If they were sitting in Allied prison camps, we would have had to maintain them.

Michael

[Dandelion]

I'm with Michael here.

Mainly because there was not much to be gained eastwards methinks.

A rather difficult mountainrange to cross to get into Italy. And if your arrival manages to force the Germans to retreat to the extreme North of Italy, you'd still have hell to pay dislodging them from there. There are extreme mountains all the North, way deep into Bavaria, and nothing much of any value to the German war effort along the way.

I'd head North as fast as I could.

Beside the point maybe, but the Dragoon force was largely French. It seems reasonable they'd fight fiercest liberating France.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[JonS]

ISTR there was a plan to head NE out of Italy into ?Austria?, and that there is a militarily valid route through there. Still, that would potentially have put the Allied forces coming out of northern Italy into conflict with the Russians. At the least it would have changed the dynamic of the multi-front advance. It would have changed the post-war world a tad though.

I've often wondered why they didn't send at least some forces east into Italy. However, its worth noting that by the time of the final offensives in the Po valley, there were more German troops in Italy than Allied. And the Germans still lost badly. So the 'better they support them in the field than we support them in POW camps' theory has strong suppport.

Regards

JonS

[Kingfish]

...dons devil's advocate hat...

North. That's where the important action is. The main reason Eisenhower insisted on Dragoon was that he wanted Marseille to supply his armies, and the only way to open that line of communication is to drive north from the south of France.

Hmm, that seems a rather odd strategy to this arm-chair general. Why secure a port that is literally a thousand miles away from the main action?

Also it was desireable to eliminate the German forces on the southern flank of the Normandy armies before they could do any mischief.

But could those forces really do much mischief? There was only one panzer division in the south of France when Op dragoon kicked off. The ones in Normandy were either already destroyed at Falasie or squeezing through the bottleneck - sans equipment. OKW would have been screaming for the forces in the south to head for the border, not play tag with Patton's spearheads somewhere west of Orleans.

However nice it might have been to have destroyed some of the German armies in northern Italy at the start of summer, by the time of Dragoon, they were of little strategic importance. Best just to let them sit and rot. All that was really necessary was to keep enough pressure on them to prevent their being withdrawn to some other front. As long as they were in existence, the Germans were forced to supply and maintain them. If they were sitting in Allied prison camps, we would have had to maintain them.

But by destroying them you a) force them to commit other units to the theater, forces that would have to be either withdrawn from the two fronts, or from reserves in the interior, and free up several veteran allied units for service in the west.

A rather difficult mountainrange to cross to get into Italy. And if your arrival manages to force the Germans to retreat to the extreme North of Italy, you'd still have hell to pay dislodging them from there.

No doubt it would have been difficult, but lets assume that this manuever forces the Germans to retreat into the Italian Alps. You've now pushed them several hundred miles north, and at less of a cost. You also still retain the option of releasing the Dragoon forces to assist in NWE.

Beside the point maybe, but the Dragoon force was largely French. It seems reasonable they'd fight fiercest liberating France.

Good point there. It would be a tough sell to get them to head back into Italy when they've already liberated a good chunk of their own soil.

[JonS]

I imagine the Americans too would have had a fundamental objection to going east rather than north, especially after the discussions and arguments about France vs the Med in 42 and 43.

Regards

JonS

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />North. That's where the important action is. The main reason Eisenhower insisted on Dragoon was that he wanted Marseille to supply his armies, and the only way to open that line of communication is to drive north from the south of France.

Hmm, that seems a rather odd strategy to this arm-chair general. Why secure a port that is literally a thousand miles away from the main action? </font>

[Shosties]

Remember the original notion was for Overlord and Anvil to come off at the same time, but the number of landing craft and LSTs available ruled this out. Anvil was seen as an all-too suggestive codename so they changed it to Dragoon. If they had been able to do both at the same time, the Germans would have been in a hell of a predicament.

As it was, in the weeks preceeding Cobra, Dragoon must have appeared the surest bet to the combined chiefs for breaking the deadlock in Normandy.

[Michael Emrys]

Anvil was changed to Dragoon at the insistence of Churchill, who turned cold on the project after originally touting it when he discovered that it would be delayed for so long. He claimed that the Americans "dragooned" him into going along against his will. At least that's what he wrote in his memoir.

Michael

[Shosties]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Anvil was changed to Dragoon at the insistence of Churchill, who turned cold on the project after originally touting it when he discovered that it would be delayed for so long. He claimed that the Americans "dragooned" him into going along against his will. At least that's what he wrote in his memoir.

Yeah, we could have done something really smooth and landed in the Balkans instead!

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

...dons devil's advocate hat...

No doubt it would have been difficult, but lets assume that this manuever forces the Germans to retreat into the Italian Alps. You've now pushed them several hundred miles north, and at less of a cost. You also still retain the option of releasing the Dragoon forces to assist in NWE.

Certainly. Of even greater scope would be the implications for the Eastern front. As a pretty afterthought, one can easily construct Dragoon to be a Soviet-Allied undertaking, in the meaning of a coordinated operation more than a joint operation of course, with the edge aimed at the Balkans. And quite a rational one too. The Soviet Balkan offensive coincided with Dragoon, more or less.

Had AG C in Italy been forced to fall back on the alpine range in Tirol in August, the position of AG E and F on the Balkans would have immediately become untenable. They had only two lifelines, the primary and credible one being the Thessaloniki-Skoplje-Nis-Beograd-Vukovar etc railroad. That one leads North from Croatia-Slovenia up into the Reich and would have been acutely threatened by allied armies reaching North of the Po river in Italy (which IRL they never did). In fact opportunity would arise to cut it entirely, trapping the two AGs.

The secondary lifeline used by E and F was the Thessaloniki-Dubrovnik railroad, relying on shipping along the Dalmatian coast - not a viable option with allied troops in Trieste.

As the Soviets launched their Balkan offensive in August, these issues immediately becomes critical.

Romania collapses and Bulgaria changes side Aug-Sept, AG E and F starts extraction late-August early september. But by October, they're still down in Macedonia-Albania.

The situation for the AG South Ukraina would have been equally problematic. IRL it fell back on the Carpathian wall after being overrun in August, and then back along the "iron gate", Vulcano pass and up to Tisza. Question is if this fallback would have been realistic if the allies were standing along the Po. Any other route of retreat would have left the AG out in the open. I believe it would have been overrun and completely destroyed.

Even if all German troops could have been safely evacuated to new positions (Say Tirol-Slovenian alps-Dreva-Tisza), for millions of Italians, Greeks, Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Romanians et cetera, war would have become half a year shorter. Well, almost a full year shorter in some cases come to think of it.

Still, it is difficult to imagine exactly what the consequences would be for the allies in France. I find it difficult to assess. What if the Germans managed to transfer reserves to Savoy and manage to tie down more allied troops in alpine terrain at very low cost to themselves? Would it pose a serious complication for the Normandy forces to have a wide open South flank?

As for the French - I read an interesting chapter in "Rearming The French" last night. Turns out that the French actually wanted to continue across the mountains into Italy, not instead but as well. They put forth a plan to immediately raise three divisions, based on available maquis and volounteers. These could head straight into the Po basin in a coup-de-main manner. A typical FFI plan insofar that it was brilliant and had no funding. At the time of Dragoon, the US had very real problems meeting all demands, not least in shipping, and were unable to divert the massive assets needed for three whole divisions on a whim.

Nonetheless it seems I have to retreat on the French-lack-of-enthusiasm point.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Michael Emrys]

Interesting scenario, Dandelion, and the most convincing argument I've seen in support of a Balkan operation. But I have to say that I find the idea of coördination with the Soviets problematical, to say the least.

Michael

[Shosties]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

...coördination...

Umlaut grog.

[Kingfish]

...takes off devil's advocate hat and replaces it with fantasy scenario sombrero...

Certainly. Of even greater scope would be the implications for the Eastern front. As a pretty afterthought, one can easily construct Dragoon to be a Soviet-Allied undertaking, in the meaning of a coordinated operation more than a joint operation of course, with the edge aimed at the Balkans. And quite a rational one too. The Soviet Balkan offensive coincided with Dragoon, more or less.

Hmmm, Dragoon doesn't land in the French Riviera, but instead lands along the Yugoslav coast, with limited support from Tito's partisans. At the same time the Russians drive into Romania & Bulgaria. German forces in Greece suddenly realize they all have a dentist appointment in Hamburg.

Still, I can see Michael's point about the Russians not being too keen on this scenario. By now Stalin is thinking less of crushing the Germans, and more on gobbling up as much of Europe as possible. Dropping an allied army into what he considers his turf would have brought about some unpleasant encounters.

[Lars]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

One of those 'What if' scenarios to kick around. Suppose you were in charge of Op Dragoon's post-invasion planning and execution. Would you stick with the original plan - that of exploitation up the Rhone valley and eventual linkup with the Allied armies in Normandy, or would you turn east and threaten the LOCs of the German armies in Italy?

Why on earth would I launch a southern invasion of France to get out of Italy's mountains just to turn east and head right back into them?

[Kingfish]

For the same reasons, although on a much larger scale, of why the allies landed an invasion force at Anzio. By the time Dragoon was launched the front in Italy ran more or less from Leghorn to Rimini. That is still deep inside Italy. Threatening the LOCs might have forced the Germans to quit the Gothic line and the Po valley. Granted, it is a stretch, but it wouldn't have been something the Germans could ignore.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Shosties4th:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

...coördination...

Umlaut grog. </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

For the same reasons, although on a much larger scale, of why the allies landed an invasion force at Anzio. By the time Dragoon was launched the front in Italy ran more or less from Leghorn to Rimini. That is still deep inside Italy. Threatening the LOCs might have forced the Germans to quit the Gothic line and the Po valley. Granted, it is a stretch, but it wouldn't have been something the Germans could ignore.

I'm still not convinced that that is an ecomomical use of forces in terms of achieving the strategic goal of defeating Germany. And that after all is the goal. The fastest way to liberate the most people is to force an early surrender.

Michael

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

For the same reasons, although on a much larger scale, of why the allies landed an invasion force at Anzio. By the time Dragoon was launched the front in Italy ran more or less from Leghorn to Rimini. That is still deep inside Italy. Threatening the LOCs might have forced the Germans to quit the Gothic line and the Po valley. Granted, it is a stretch, but it wouldn't have been something the Germans could ignore.

I'm still not convinced that that is an ecomomical use of forces in terms of achieving the strategic goal of defeating Germany. And that after all is the goal. The fastest way to liberate the most people is to force an early surrender.

Michael </font>

[Sergei]

Wouldn't Allies benefit the most the longer the frontline was, while it would have been in German interests to shorten it as much as possible and base on mountain ranges and bodies of water. Because the longer the line, the thinner it is.

[Andreas]

The allied troops at this stage kept a larger number of Germans in theatre then they had to deploy there. Liberating the rest of Italy in one fell swoop would have created a logistics problem in having to supply the Italian population. It may have enabled more Germans to withdraw from southern France, and it would have been against the principle of concentration of force.

Finally, there was one place where Germany could be beaten, and that was Germany. Losing Italy would have been a benefit to the German war effort at this stage, freeing a large number of troops and logistical assets for the battle for Germany.

The German high command's willingness to squander forces in pointless areas (Baltics, Italy) was of huge benefit to the Red Army and the western allies alike.

I don't think the western allies would have benefited much from the additional forces at this stage - they would most likely have been a further drain on the already strained logistical assets in the French theatre. In early September they grounded a lot of infantry divisions to keep the tank formations moving - this indicates that they were not wanting for men, but for POL, trucks, ammunition, etc.

[Kingfish]

Finally, there was one place where Germany could be beaten, and that was Germany. Losing Italy would have been a benefit to the German war effort at this stage, freeing a large number of troops and logistical assets for the battle for Germany.

Agreed, but wouldn't (most of) those assets head east? Keep in mind that this was post Bargraton, when the Germans were scrapping up reserves to fill in the hole that once was army group center. They were also about to lose another huge slice of men and machines in the Romanian debacle.

I don't think the western allies would have benefited much from the additional forces at this stage - they would most likely have been a further drain on the already strained logistical assets in the French theatre. In early September they grounded a lot of infantry divisions to keep the tank formations moving - this indicates that they were not wanting for men, but for POL, trucks, ammunition, etc

But wouldn't the switch of forces also warrent a switch of logistics as well? Assume the Germans do withdraw into the alpine passes, reducing their forces accordingly. The allies could do the same, keeping a skeleton force in place, while the vast majority of men and supplies go to NWE. Afterall, that is the point you and Michael have stressed, that taking the fight directly to Germany is what counts. I'm arguing that by breaking open the Italian front you free up the very thing you need to really drive the war into Germany.

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

...takes off devil's advocate hat and replaces it with fantasy scenario sombrero...

Hmmm, Dragoon doesn't land in the French Riviera, but instead lands along the Yugoslav coast, with limited support from Tito's partisans. At the same time the Russians drive into Romania & Bulgaria. German forces in Greece suddenly realize they all have a dentist appointment in Hamburg.

Sombrero? What is the implicit significance of wearing a sombrero? My idiomatic English fails me here.

The allies would have had to stay and remain west of Trieste, unless it was explicitly agreed that they temporary crossed the demarcation line. Otherwise both Stalin and Tito would have been severely... disappointed. Tito would not have assisted a landing in Yugoslavia IMHO, he might even have fought it. I feel certain of it if the UK was involved in any way. Tito didn't trust the British.

Both Stalin and Tito still had far greater faith in the Americans though - Roosevelt is still alive, there is yet no bomb, no Truman. I don't feel it totally unreasonable they might have agreed upon a temporary crossing of the line. As long as no UK forces whatsoever were involved and as long as Roosevelt was still breathing.

But not a landing in Yugoslavia. I think more like crossing the Trieste line and thrusting to Ljubljana, severing the German Balkan connection. Then fall back to Trieste as the partisans or Soviets arrive. Everyone nice and calm.

The Adriatic is a problematic body of water, for military operations. At least as long as the enemy controls one side of it. On the "German" (i.e. Croatian) side there is a (very lovely) archipelago capable of hiding all kinds of military mischief. Even small groups of torpedoboats could raise hell from there. There were still a dozen 10 MAS boats operating and the Germans had flotillas of S-Boots and a few subs there. Not like they would claim supremacy of the Med, but a hassle to any invasionfleet in such narrow waters.

Well ok so I'm no admiral, but it still seems a dangerous idea to me.

So the riviera, or the west side of Italy, sounds fine I think.

Riviera, yes.. I keep getting back to... Those mountains between Italy and France, the Alpes Maritimes. We're talking some se-erious mountains here Kingfish, those are steep slopes and high peaks. There is only one viable valley, the combined Durance-Dora Riparia river valleys, and four other passes of semi-credibility. Bit of flatland along the coast by Monte Carlo, but not much. I still get hung up on this. It looks like a wall stretching to the sky rising in front of you from the Italian side. This is a touristpic of a village between Nice and Torino;

Its not very army friendly terrain. I still feel it would be overly bold to land in Cote d'Azur with the Po basin as objective. Not much is demanded of the Germans, they only need to send a few battallions in an area rich in infrastructure. And semi-nearby were the entire recruiting- and training area of the whole Gebirgstruppen. I can just see a few battallions shipping out on short notice from Kärnten, and we're finished.

They chose a flat area to land in, they always do, so I imagine there is a problem making large landings in mountaneous areas. No such flat areas on the Italian side, but frankly the mountains around Genova - no offence - aren't all that impressive. More like rolling high hills, sort of. Softened by lots of rivervalleys too. And it's just a thin screen of mountains along the coast, then you're right down in the Po basin, and it's flat flat flat all the way to Trieste. So flat in fact, much of it lies below sealevel. And roads, lots of roads and rail, this was a modern industralised region. Securing the Milano-Verona-Venezia-Trieste line seems geographically uncomplicated, if one can just get through the hellish (from a military view) Appennines. Of course, there are countless rivers in that valley, and a few dams as well. These would pose problems. But my guess is the Germans had not had time to prepare them for defence. In the book on Franz Stangl, he recalls being posted there in October 44 to start preparing bridges and rivers for military purpouses. He was in the group starting these projects. Of course, he's a liar and a murderer, but he needn't lie about everything.

Still, I can see Michael's point about the Russians not being too keen on this scenario.

I do too, absolutely. If the plan entailed any UK presence in the Balkans, of any kind, anywhere, they would have been as unkeen as Churchill would have been keen, and for the very same reasons too

I guess it would depend upon wether or not the objective was to threaten or cut the Balkan connection. I thought of it more as a coordinated operation in the sense that Soviet and allied staff agreed upon dates. There were several such attempts at coordination during the war, though I can't seem to think of any that worked right now.

Allies push into the Po basin, Soviets push into the Balkans, all simultaneously. Allied forces need not actually push into Slovenia and sit on the railway, their presence in force at Trieste would trigger a withdrawal of E and F anyway, making the Soviet and Tito offensives that much easier. And it's not entirely inconceivable that the Soviets would have allowed a very temporary thrust into Slovenia to cut the rail, in order to forward the offensive. In Stalins aim lay a necessity of rapid seizure of control of the Balkan states.

But of course, this is all highly what-if, all of it.

By now Stalin is thinking less of crushing the Germans, and more on gobbling up as much of Europe as possible. Dropping an allied army into what he considers his turf would have brought about some unpleasant encounters.

Agreed, very unpleasant indeed, and untimely too. Bulgaria called for US help, but it was refused. Greek communists called for Soviet help, and it too was refused. Churchills coup sending troops to Trieste very nearly triggered war. People stuck to agreements. Any failure to do so would have had explosive implications, literally. The US still had absolute and uncompromising focus on defeating the fascists, at that point she had no other priorities at all in Europe. No US troops in Athens, none on Cyprus either and if she had her way (and she tends to get it, doesn't she) there would be no breach of agreements with the Soviets. And the US was in control of Dragoon. So yes, absolutely, the Dragoon operation would never significanlty have crossed any demarcation line without explicit concurre... conc... ah you know what I mean, Vereinbarung.

The allies reached Bologna mid/late april 1945. Reaching Bologna from the South, you are clear of the Appennines, it's just flat from there. All fighting ceased in Italy on may 2nd. Total German surrender to western allies was signed five days later. It is impossible to tell if the Germans in Italy, who were under semi-independent command, thought the situation so hopeless because the allies reached the flatlands, or because it was May 1945 and all was crap anyway. Clear enough is, that like the Japanese in Indochina, they needn't, and weren't allowed to, have surrendered before Germany did. It took a locally relevant reason to do so. They chose to. And if they did it because they thought themselves unable to defend the flatlands, the eastward orientation of Dragoon would have meaning in August 1944, at least in the limited scope of the Italian context. So at least my genuinely humble opinion.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

But wouldn't the switch of forces also warrent a switch of logistics as well? Assume the Germans do withdraw into the alpine passes, reducing their forces accordingly. The allies could do the same, keeping a skeleton force in place, while the vast majority of men and supplies go to NWE.

But if you haven't launched Dragoon, you haven't captured Marseille. And if you don't hold Marseille and haven't cleared the routes from there northward, you can't push more supplies into NWE. The Normandy beaches were already delivering all they could and until Antwerp was captured and functioning, that was all they had north of the Loire. As stated earlier in this thread, the whole justification of Dragoon was to provide logistical support for all the divisions waiting in the wings to be brought onto the Continent. Eisenhower wanted to build up his forces as quickly as possible, but just having troops around was no good unless they could be supplied.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Agreed, but wouldn't (most of) those assets head east? Keep in mind that this was post Bargraton, when the Germans were scrapping up reserves to fill in the hole that once was army group center. They were also about to lose another huge slice of men and machines in the Romanian debacle.

Keep in mind this was the same time when the German high command denuded the east of reserves to build up forces for operation Wacht am Rhein.

You are postulating the forces would go east - there is zero basis for this in reality. Quite the opposite was happening in fact, with newly available, or refreshed units primarily going to the west.

Dandelion - while they decided it was not worth battling on for the lowlands of the Po valley in May 45, in August 44 this would probably have been different.