Sherman 76 vs. Panther

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

The M8 Armored car was actually supposed to be a light TD. It ended up being used in recon roles because there was nothing better for it to do. It was not a good vehicle to drive into an ambush because it had crappy off road capabilty and was difficult to turn around.

I read that the British were pleased with it's terrain handling. It wouldn't, of course, have the capabilities of a tracked vehicle.

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

I think my main thoughts are what could the US have done to make the summer of 1944 battles in ETO less hampered by superior German tanks. [snip]

Do you have a particular battle in mind? In general, the US seemed particularly unhampered by superior German tanks during the summer of '44

[poppy]

How well did the panther do on the offense vs the Sherman.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by poppys:

How well did the panther do on the offense vs the Sherman.

Given that none of their offenses launched against armies equipped with the Sherman ever succeeded (so far as I can recall), not especially well. I would not put that as due to any particular deficiency on the part of the Panther though. It is pretty universally held to be among the best tanks of the war.

Michael

[poppy]

Hello Micheal. Im trying to get information about the performance of the Sherman vs the Panther in attack and in defense. The Sherman was used mostly in offense but the statistics are related in kill ratios without regard to offense vs deffense. As I said in an earlier post the fighter bombers were credited with kills of Panthers and Tigers that were actually killed by direct fire of anti tank guns and Shermans. Any refs will be appreciated.poppys

[Michael Emrys]

As you note, it is not easy to tease out such statistics. I've never seen any of the type you are looking for in 50 years of reading on WW II. I frankly don't know if anyone has ever done that kind of research, but I'll ask around.

Probably what you will have to do is go carefully over unit histories of both sides, determine who was in a given fight, and look at their returns. That's a lot of work. Assuming you can even find the relevant documentation.

But as I say, I'll ask around.

Michael

[Mr. Tittles]

Theres a very good study of ETO armored battles. The bottom line(s) is that the German tech advantage was only decisive at medium and long ranges. Another thing is that most allied AFV were destroyed by AT fire while most German were not.

[poppy]

Thank you all for the replies, hopefully someone somewhere has researchd this before and Il be lucky enough to find his or her results.

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

Theres a very good study of ETO armored battles. The bottom line(s) is that the German tech advantage was only decisive at medium and long ranges. Another thing is that most allied AFV were destroyed by AT fire while most German were not.

Do you have a link to the study? I'm suspicious of the word "decisive" since I can't think of any important occasion in the ETO where superior tanks gave the Germans any sort of real advantage. The allies were hemmed in until Cobra, but that didn't have anything to do with ueber tanks; ueber tanks didn't stop the breakout; the Mortain counterattack was quickly contained and defeated; and the initial success of the Bulge had nothing to do with tank-v-tank ueberness.

Similarly, I don't think that the fact that most allied tanks were destroyed by AT fire while most German tanks were destroyed by other methods has anything to do with German armor supremacy on the battlefield. More than anything, I think it reflects the absence of any other way for the Germans to destroy allied tanks. I.e., how else are the Germans going to destroy allied tanks? By tactical air? I don't think so. By using strategic bombing to destroy oil production, railroads, and supply trains (leaving the tanks to run out of gas)? Nope. By overwhelming artillery that either damages the tank or prevents resupply? No. By encircling the allies and forcing them to abandon their tanks to escape on foot? No, not that way either.

In fact, the only reliable means that the Germans had of destroying allied tanks was by using AT weapons against them. So it's not surprising that this is how the Germans knocked out allied tanks - it was pretty much the only way they could do so. (Even disabling them wasn't enough, as the allies tended to retain the battlefields). And of course knocking out tanks with AT weapons is the worst way of knocking out tanks because it exposes you to return fire from the tanks.

[Mr. Tittles]

It also reflects the absense of allied AT from being effective. In other words, German superiority.

The study is a fairly recent work but I forget the title. I know of a university library that has it so I may drop in there to read it again.

[dieseltaylor]

Hmmm I ask myself which tank would I rather be in

Panther , Tiger - Sherman, T34, Churchill

Really quite an easy answer : ) I have a suspicion most of the Allied troops would agree with me.

Of course Allied combined arms and numbers made sure that whatever superiority an individual tank had over other tanks was never the decisive point. For a day or so there might be success but it would never last.

Mr Tittles - "It also reflects the absense of allied AT from being effective. In other words, German superiority."

The "failure" of Allied ATG's to be a huge battlefield killer surely reflects there limited role in advance on the battlefield. Also the US never really got the hang of ATG's so mostly the CW were notching up ATG kills. There are plenty of ETO and NA battles were ATG's did account for a lot of tanks. But then it did rely on the Axis attacking them : )

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

I think my main thoughts are what could the US have done to make the summer of 1944 battles in ETO less hampered by superior German tanks. [snip]

Do you have a particular battle in mind? In general, the US seemed particularly unhampered by superior German tanks during the summer of '44 </font>

[poppy]

One thing that needs to be considered is that it is more difficult to use an antitank gun in the offensive role than in the defensive role. I would rather have, using hindsight, been in a Sherman than in a Panther in WW2. It took, according to German accounts 5 Shermans to kill one Panther,but also according to German accounts there was always that "Fifth Sherman."

[poppy]

I meant that I would have wanted to be in the "Fifth Sherman" along with the other lucky ones. I have read where damaged Shermans were repaired faster than crews could be trained for them and the result was in effect "conscript" crews. I dont know whether the Germans were faced with this or not.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

I think my main thoughts are what could the US have done to make the summer of 1944 battles in ETO less hampered by superior German tanks. [snip]

Do you have a particular battle in mind? In general, the US seemed particularly unhampered by superior German tanks during the summer of '44 </font>

[Wisbech_lad]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

It also reflects the absense of allied AT from being effective. In other words, German superiority.

The study is a fairly recent work but I forget the title. I know of a university library that has it so I may drop in there to read it again.

Lol. Read up on "Snipe" sometime. (German tanks being shredded by RA ATG position) As has been pointed out, lack of Allied AT kills in Normandy has more to do with who was attacking - ATG's aren't that offensive a weapon.

[Mr. Tittles]

The study showed that German tanks did not have an advantage at close ranges (either attacking OR defending). Reasons for this are that guns (almost ALL guns) made exposing ones flank suicide because side armor was so much weaker than frontal armor. The Tiger was probably one of the last WWII vehciles that had some degree of side armor protection. Even this was not for most hits at 90 degrees.

Other reasons were being outnumbered, facing excellent artillery (smoke and HE and concentration) and airpower (both against the panzers and the supply train system).

The US M10s certainly had success in Normandy (mostly due to favorable terrain) but the later battles showed even the M36 and most all US armor was being hopelessly outclassed. This was due to open tarrain that allowed the Germans to utilize the advantage of armor, gun, sight, ROF (Panther could out-fire a M36!) and mobility. The US armor, with its narrow tracks, were at a distinct disadvantage in muddy terrain.

Another mandatory reading is the comparison of US vs German equipment report to Ike in 1945.

[Mr. Tittles]

3rd DIVISION VEHICULAR COMBAT LOSES

29 June 1944 to 22 April 1945 (231 combat days)

Medium Tanks 633

Light Tanks 147

Artillery Pieces 17

Assault Guns 38

Half-Tracks 204

Armored Cars 53

Motorcycles 115

2.5-ton Trucks 88

Jeeps 340

Others 197

TOTAL 1832

In addition to the losses reflected in the above table, there were "temporary" losses resulting from combat operation. Crews of the Division Maintenance Battalion repaired a total of 6,324 vehicles of all types. Of this number there were 1305 Medium Tanks, 395 Light Tanks, 728 Half-Tracks, 1063 2.5-ton trucks, and 1260 jeeps.

[Mr. Tittles]

The above stat shows this armored division losing about 25 tanks a week (med+lt+AG). These are total write offs. They are repairing about 50 a week. So roughly 75 tanks a week are getting whacked.

An odd thing is that TDs are not listed (perhaps they are 'others'? This unit had other units attached and the losses for those units may not be included also.

[poppy]

For some insight into day by day experiences of American WW2 tankers,http://www.tankbooks.com/tanksfor/chap1.htm

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by poppys:

Hello Micheal. Im trying to get information about the performance of the Sherman vs the Panther in attack and in defense. The Sherman was used mostly in offense but the statistics are related in kill ratios without regard to offense vs deffense. As I said in an earlier post the fighter bombers were credited with kills of Panthers and Tigers that were actually killed by direct fire of anti tank guns and Shermans. Any refs will be appreciated.poppys

Hi poppys,

Here is a response evoked by my queries on this subject.

A good start would be to analyse the engagements around Arracourt where

there were numerous Sherman/Panther encounters. Plenty of resources

available (e.g. the recent Osprey on the subject), however you may well find

that crew quality and unit cohesion had a far greater influence on the

outcome of individual engagements than minor technical differences between

vehicles.

The War Office commissioned an operations research study into the thesis

that numbers were the sole determinant of success in tank battles after

1942. Analysing all the available data covering tank battles between 6th

June 1944 and 18th August 1944 they found that the allies required a

superiority of 2.2:1 to guarantee success in battle whereas the Germans only

required a superiority of 1.8:1, perhaps indicating there was a bit more to

it than just numbers. This was obviously averaged out over both attacking

and defending situations.

More as they come in.

Michael

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

The supporting field artillery of 3rd Cdn Div was mounted in SPs for the invasion, but in August went back to towed guns, while the Priests were defrocked and used as APCs. Is it possible they did the same with the 17 pounders??

The three CW assault divisions (3 Brit, 3 Can, 50 Northumberland) replaced tehir towed 25-pr with SP 105mm (Priest) for the invaison. They also had a different setup in their divisional A-Tk regt.

By mid-44 a 'normal' CW infantry div in England had one A-Tk regt of 4 btys. Each bty had 3 troops, and each tp had 4 guns. One of the tps would be towed 6-pr, and the other 2 towed 17-pr. However, for the 3 assault divs it was two of 6-pr, and one of M-10 Wolverine (3-in). I believe that these divs kept their M-10s, even though the Priests were handed back in late July.

Later some (all?) inf divs started getting the Archer.

The 17-pr M-10s were in the A-Tk regts of the armd divs and in the corps A-Tk regts (which had the same org as the armd div ones).

[ October 14, 2004, 01:54 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

[snippity] Analysing all the available data covering tank battles between 6th

June 1944 and 18th August 1944 they found that the allies required a

superiority of 2.2:1 to guarantee success in battle whereas the Germans only

required a superiority of 1.8:1, perhaps indicating there was a bit more to

it than just numbers. [snip]

This is a very interesting statistic as it reconciles two somewhat contradictory facts: (1) the fact that technologically the Panther was clearly superior to the Sherman; and (2) the fact that this superiority did not seem to matter on the battlefield. (I'll note in passing that the much repeated "need five Shermans to take out a Panther" quote was US doctrine for engaging Panthers; it does not mean that the US lost 5 Shermans (or four or whatever) for every Panther, as this was not the case.

Here's an interesting report of a battle between some Panthers and Shermans - it's very close range and doesn't shed too much light on this subject - but it does remind me a lot of close-range CM tankfights:

Shell fragments and machinegun fire had made the cupola episcopes unserviceable. Time was dragging on uncanny slow. Everybody knew something must and would happen soon. But whatever one would have to face in such situations, your wish to let it happen, to get out of this intolerable tension, becomes stronger every minute. Every word, every movement of the crew gets in your nerves. More and more it is difficult to contain self discipline. Panic-like emotional outbursts get hold of the crew. You feel locked-up, hopeless, worn out. Suddenly, someone wants to bail out and get away. One is on the verge of breaking. But almost more serious is the status of total indifference, when you give a damn for the whole world and you are just dejectedly sitting there, awaiting some kind of end. To keep out of this mood, that takes the greatest effort.

I had just dozed off once more, when all of us became wide awake. Very strong bursts of machinegun fire hit our 'Panther' and we hear the second tank start its motor and get going. Then there is a tremendous bang on our vehicle, as if hit by a big calibre. I must somewhat open my hatch to find out what is going on. I see the other Panther is rushing through the orchard, onto the road, thereby knocking over trees. One fell on us; that was the big bang.

I thought the second tank had seen approaching Shermans and was gaining the road to engage them. So we hastened to follow them. All the while, we are under heavy machinegun fire. The radio communication didn't work. We could hear something, but we couldn't understand it. Our antenna was gone.

I realize I must be able to observe better. So I open fully my hatch, risking the danger for the whole vehicle. But, 'field of fire' has precedence over 'cover', (the basic military rule), and when you want to shoot, you first have to see something. At high speed, we nearly shoot ahead to the other roadside, swing the tank around to face the enemy and immediately get a whole burst of hits. Driver and gunner cry we can't see any more. Myself, watching over the rim of my cupola can make out what's going on. A number of Shermans are standing behind their knocked out comrade on the left roadside in a row, so that only the gun of each tank can shoot along the turret of the vehicle in front, and they are firing salvoes.

The events of the last minutes have driven out all fatigue, weakness and despair. Forced to action, you feel like newborn. The crew is back again to normal, cool and self-assured. It functions like a machine in good shape. Such moments of the very highest challenge let a man develop energy and abilities far beyond the every day level.

I realize immediately that we will be done in no time if we keep our position. Using the board radio I quickly told the crew, we drive in a sharp angle to the left roadside, to get cover by the knocked out tank. Then the Americans have to surround us, and they will come in sight, one after the other. That, we can handle. While moving sidewards, we will keep the tower straight toward the Shermans. That means the driver (without sight) gets his orders through the board radio, and the gunner (without sight too), reacts to shoulder tapping, left/right.

All this of course, split-second. While instructing the driver the second or third time "pull to the left", we are hit again by a salvo mainly on the sloped glacis, this time that hard that the welding seam between the front and sideplate of the hull sprang open, and the radio set (located on the gear box between driver and radio operator) was thrown out of its clamping fixture and didn't function any more. Meanwhile, we keep firing, whether with or without result, I can't say.

I order "straight on, straight on", but the driver, not hearing the order, continues pulling to the left. Pretty soon, our hull is nearly across to the road. That, I tell myself, is the end for us. Immediately, there is a big bang in our tank, although not too loud and the loader (Sturmmann Fahnrich from Duisburg) stands in a big flame. It was as if a great number of sparklers were burning. I only holler "bail out" and jump out of the cupola into the road ditch. I tumble over, lie for awhile on my back, and see immediately thereafter the gunner and loader jump out in the same way (the loader had only minor splinters in his back, and there his uniform was somewhat scorched). Only then we realized that we had been knocked out by a bazooka from the right side of the road, where the terrain was a little bit elevated, and not by the Shermans. Likewise, it became clear to us that we were surrounded by American infantry.

After the turret crew had bailed out, the Panther was covered heavily by automatic weapons fire, so that driver and radio operator were pinned down in the burning tank. Opening their hatches would have meant death for them. They had nerves of steel, pulled the Panther right close to the ditch, waited a moment until the fire slacked off, threw open the hatches simultaneously and made it to jump out, to join us in the ditch.

Now, the whole crew was lying on the roadside, panting with exertion, except for the minor scratches of the loader, miraculously unhurt. Most urgently, we wanted to get away, before our burning tank would blow up. But as soon as we raised our heads, we got fire from all sides.

Only then did we remember the other Panther and saw that it was standing a good 100 meters behind us. It's gun was defective and defenseless against the Shermans; he stayed a little outside their field of fire. Despite his precarious situation, Schlomka had not left us. It is evident without him, we would have been lost. Firing with both machineguns, he held down the Americans around us. After we understood what was going on, we mustered our last reserves and ran toward the Panther which, always firing, slowly drove back, until on a downward slope of the road, it found some cover.

There's a lot more of this here , including a charge by a sherman in an attempt to get a close-in flank shot at a Panther.

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

[qb] [snippity] Analysing all the available data covering tank battles between 6th

June 1944 and 18th August 1944 they found that the allies required a

superiority of 2.2:1 to guarantee success in battle whereas the Germans only

required a superiority of 1.8:1, perhaps indicating there was a bit more to

it than just numbers. [snip]

This is a very interesting statistic as it reconciles two somewhat contradictory facts: (1) the fact that technologically the Panther was clearly superior to the Sherman; and (2) the fact that this superiority did not seem to matter on the battlefield. (I'll note in passing that the much repeated "need five Shermans to take out a Panther" quote was US doctrine for engaging Panthers; it does not mean that the US lost 5 Shermans (or four or whatever) for every Panther, as this was not the case.

</font>

[Michael Emrys]

@ poppys:

One more response to your question.

I think your friend is attempting the impossible. To begin

with, I very much doubt that there are comprehensive records

of every time Shermans and Panthers were in combat against

each other.

One would have to have a definition of what 'in combat against

each other' means. Every time a Sherman and Panther were in

maximum gun range of one another? In gun range and one sighted

the other?

What if one or both tanks were engaged with other forces?

What if other AFVs, not Shermans or Panthers, were present?

If a Sherman maneuvering to get to the flank of a dug-in

Panther was ambushed and destroyed by a Hetzer, how does

that count? (One can guess that the Sherman would not have

been maneuvering that way if not facing the heavy armor and

powerful gun of the Panther.)

Do we count variants, such as the Sherman "Jumbo", or the

M4/105, or the Firefly?

And is there any real hope of getting comprehensive information

on the Shermans which fought on the Eastern Front in Soviet

service? Some thousands of Shermans saw action there, and it is

practically certain that somewhere Soviet Shermans encountered

Panthers.

Michael