Battalion actions impacting on a campaign

[Tero]

Originally posted by Sergei:

While an individual unit might occasionally make a difference at a certain time and place, the likelihood of one unit decisively changing the outcome of a whole campaign is low. Well okay, I guess if the Finnish StuG Battalion hadn't stopped the T-34's in summer of 1944, then Abba would probably have sung Waterloo in Russian. But I think that mostly these individual factors affect things like "when" and "at what cost", not whether the overall outcome would be attained. Take the Cook's case, for instance. What difference did it make? Germans got Arnhem anyway, and then kept it for some months. XXX Corps didn't open the road to Berlin.

Of course, then there's the chaos theory. If a butterfly flaps its wings in Brazil, could it cause an early winter in Russia?

The Finnish Stug's are the most obvious and notable operators. But looking from a different angle, their operations WORKED in the framework of the Finnish master plan while they threw a monkey wrench in the Red Army master plan.

So what has to be looked for is success/failure in relation to the master plan.

The Finnish defenders of Viipuri in 1944 failed miserably but that did not affect the Finnish army master plan as the loss was only a prestige loss of little military importance.

If we take the defenders at Kollaa, those companies/brigades/battalions had a huge overall effected on the larger theater of operations. Not to mention the units along the Raate road.

IMO a suitable non-Finnish example would be for example the various Kharkov operations.

The induction of DAK elements in Africa in the early stages another.

The defenders of Tobruk spring to mind too.

The units keeping the Falaise gap open could be included in this cathegory too.

[Agua Perdido]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

One point: Most of the Dauntlesses were armed with 1,000lb bombs. I don't recall what the mark number was on the torpedo, possibly Mk. XIII...

So, an SDB would be what, 200 points with rarity off? (And the air torp was the Mk.13 at the time, nice recollection.)

As an aside to the "McClusky Miracle" on his attack timing, interwar USN doctrine called specifically for timing air attacks to catch enemy carriers rearming. I grant you that attacks may not have been arranged with such deliberation in practice, but it's interesting that pre-war tacticians noted the vulnerability and planned to exploit it.

Agua Perdido

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by CombinedArms:

The capture of the Ludendorff Bridge certainly changed the course of the campaign, diverting major resources of both the Allied and German armies to the Remagen area (which had been considered a low priority area by the Allies until the bridge fell.) Now, one could argue that the Germans were going to lose the war anyway, at this point, but it's always possible to expand the scale of any discussion with the point of trivializing a specific event. This did affect the war on the campaign level.

The argument in favor of the Remagen bridge seems awfully thin to me. When the big pushes across the Rhine came in the spring, they occurred north and south of Remagen. The simple reason was that the terrain behind the Rhine at that point was not conducive to the movement of large bodies of troops.

Seems to me that about the only contribution to the campaign that that crossing made was to draw troops from other zones, and I've never heard anything to indicate that that might have been decisive.

Michael </font>

[Mick15]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh

quote:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Originally posted by Sergei:

While an individual unit might occasionally make a difference at a certain time and place, the likelihood of one unit decisively changing the outcome of a whole campaign is low.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No doubt, but the original position was that it could never happen.

I would suggest that Mr Dorosh is being charitable to Sergei and that it the 'likelihood' is not all that low either. There are examples from the 300 Spartans to date where the effect on the campaign is significant and not just bridges. Another theme could be defence of passes/defiles where numbers engaged to critical effect are kept low by the terrain. Leaving Leonidas and to keep to CMAK era - for example;-

Sidi Nisir February 1943 - the very bloody nose inflicted on Kampfgruppe Lang by 5bn Hants and particularly E & F Troops 155 battery RA meant Oschenkopf had no chance of success and the outcome of the Tunisian campaign would not be at best very significantly delayed.

Kohima various company actions on the hilltops around in the two weeks prior to 19th April 1944.

The Royal West Kents prevented the Japanese 31st Division debouching onto the vital Imphal-Dimapur Road. This would have been catastrophic for the defence of India.

Gloster Hill - The delaying action by the 622 men of the 1st Bn Gloucestershires, 23-25th April 1951, on the hill above the Imjin near Solma-Ri Korea. This was and still is acknowledged as preventing the Chinese encirclement of I Corps and playing a large part in bringing the chinese communists to face saving negotiation - protracted though it was.

I am sure there are many more knowledgable than I who can add greatly to this list.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

The capture of the bridge at Remagen didn't end the war.

That wasn't my point. You are creating a straw man.

But so what? You could argue no military action could have ichanged the final outcome of the war after 1943, and I might even agree with you. We were arguing the nature of operations, and you have to admit, the unexpected bridge seizure by a single company of armored infantrymen greatly changed the flow the operations in that sector.

Except that it didn't. Reamagen was operationally a dead end. Like I posted, when the big push across the Rhine, it didn't come at Remagen.

The story of its capture makes for exciting reading, and the men who grabbed it deserve to be congratulated on a job well done. They showed courage, initiative and dash. But as far as the strategy of getting the Allied armies across the Rhine is concerned, its effects were almost negligible.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

The capture of the bridge at Remagen didn't end the war.

That wasn't my point. You are creating a straw man.

But so what? You could argue no military action could have ichanged the final outcome of the war after 1943, and I might even agree with you. We were arguing the nature of operations, and you have to admit, the unexpected bridge seizure by a single company of armored infantrymen greatly changed the flow the operations in that sector.

Except that it didn't. Reamagen was operationally a dead end. Like I posted, when the big push across the Rhine, it didn't come at Remagen.

The story of its capture makes for exciting reading, and the men who grabbed it deserve to be congratulated on a job well done. They showed courage, initiative and dash. But as far as the strategy of getting the Allied armies across the Rhine is concerned, its effects were almost negligible.

Michael </font>

[Gpig]

Wasn't there a btn/coy of men that saved the Americans in Korea (from the Chinese)?

The Frozen Chosin Res.?

Some guys travelled through the blizzard and kept a pass open? Or did they OPEN the pass?

Can't remember.

Saved the Division (or more) of encircled troops.

Gpig

[CombinedArms]

Also, I think Michael E is mixing up the pre-Ludendorff Bridge capture viewpoint on the Remagen area with the post-capture viewpoint. Before the bridge was captured the area was indeed viewed as "operationally a dead end." But after the bridge was captured enormous resources were poured into the area by the Allies (with OK's by Bradley and Ike--this went up to the Army Group and Theatre Command levels) to expand and exploit the bridgehead. Bradley took the lead in pouring in said resources and when he was balked by an Ike subordinant for approval because the captured bridge was "in the wrong place," Bradley went directly to Ike who in fact approved a change in direction in the campaign. Hitler, on the other side, was incensed when Remagen fell, and he insisted on pouring enormous resources into the area to block and if possible destroy the Allied bridgehead. This helped to reshape the campaign very significantly. Germany was going to lose anyway--that I concede. And the Rhine was crossed at other points without the capture of a bridge. But the shape of the campaign was significantly altered as the result of, in this case, a company level action, and that's all that was initially claimed.

We've had several other examples, cited above, that I also find pursuasive.

Getting back to the original issue, which is the implications of battalion or company level actions on larger campaigns, Dorosh's initial point seems to be backed by history: there do seem to be fairly numerous examples of battalion level actions that changed the shape of campaigns.

[gibsonm]

Dorosh,

What about James Wolfe at Quebec?

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

The Germans thought it damaging enough to send one of their two Jadgtiger Battalions to the area.

What makes a decisive contribution to an operation? Would the major deployment of troops alone be enough to influence the campaign? If so, then I think the Ludendorf Bridge would count. Neither side expected anything to happen there and when it did then both sides scrambled to adjust. I think that makes it decisive.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Mick15:

[snips]

Sidi Nisir February 1943

A favourite action of mine, and a good example.

It seems to me that there are likely to be three sets of circumstances that tend to magnify the effect of an action by a single unit (and don't forget that in WW2 terms battalions are small change indeed; a division, or in a pinch a brigade, was supposed to be the smallest organisation capable of independent operations).

The first is (as Mike has already mentioned in passing) the seizure of bridges or other key points. Such coups de main may be planned, special-forces type operations, or they may be opportunistic grabs by units in the line. Examples of the impromptu variant include "Dickie's Bridge" over the Soulevre, and Remagen Bridge already mentioned. Examples of the planned kind include Rudder's Rangers at Pointe du Hoc,

Otway's Paras at the Merville Battery,

Howard and D Coy 6 Ox & Bucks at Pegasus Bridge, the seizure of Eben Emael and the seizure of Maleme airfield.

The second is the raid, always a planned operation, which may be executed by a very small raiding force and have strategic effects out of all proportion to the forces involved by capturing or sabotaging some vital person or installation. Examples are Telemark/Vermork, St. Nazaire, Bruneval, Gran Sasso and Skorzeny's kidnapping of Horthy. Of course, if you include aeronaval operations, as well as the Midway operations already discussed there's the Taranto raid, the Decima MAS' brilliant operation against Alexandria, and the X-craft attack on the Tirpitz.

Finally, there is the stubborn defence where a small unit imposes disproportionate delay or losses on an attacker and so prevents the larger offensive operation developing successfully. Villers-Bocage, Snipe and Sidi Nsir have been mentioned; I would add Krinkelt-Rocherath, Wake Island, and the action of Sgts Andrew and Crangles at Medenine.

The only example action I can think of that does not fit quite into these categories -- perhaps it's a sort of impromtu raid -- is the loss of Rommel's radio intercept unit at Alamein. The Allies probably did not realise what they had destroyed, but the loss of his specialised eavesdropping unit meant that Rommel's situational awareness was never quite the same again. This was covered in an article in the British Army Review which I can;t find at the moment entitled "Rommel: Spitzenfingergefuhl or common eavesdropper?".

All the best,

John.

[Mad Russian]

What about the Tiger Battalions in Russia?

Almost every single Russian breakthrough that was stopped by these battalions alone. They surely will rank among the issues that changed the operations for months at a time in some cases.

The Tiger Battalions almost always operated singly. At times they supported other units and at times they plugged the gap by themselves.

They were spread across the entire theater, with just such a result in mind. If the Russians breakthrough, the Tigers were stop them, and they did far more often than not.

[ January 07, 2005, 04:42 PM: Message edited by: Panther Commander ]

[Mad Russian]

DP

[ January 07, 2005, 04:41 PM: Message edited by: Panther Commander ]

[Lawrenson]

One battle which leapt to mind for me was from the American Civil War. Perhaps the stand by the 20th Maine at Little Round Top would qualify as a small unit action that ultimately determined a campaign?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mick15:

[snips]

Sidi Nisir February 1943

A favourite action of mine, and a good example.

It seems to me that there are likely to be three sets of circumstances that tend to magnify the effect of an action by a single unit (and don't forget that in WW2 terms battalions are small change indeed; a division, or in a pinch a brigade, was supposed to be the smallest organisation capable of independent operations).

The first is (as Mike has already mentioned in passing) the seizure of bridges or other key points. Such coups de main may be planned, special-forces type operations, or they may be opportunistic grabs by units in the line. Examples of the impromptu variant include "Dickie's Bridge" over the Soulevre, and Remagen Bridge already mentioned. Examples of the planned kind include Rudder's Rangers at Pointe du Hoc,

Otway's Paras at the Merville Battery,

Howard and D Coy 6 Ox & Bucks at Pegasus Bridge, the seizure of Eben Emael and the seizure of Maleme airfield.

The second is the raid, always a planned operation, which may be executed by a very small raiding force and have strategic effects out of all proportion to the forces involved by capturing or sabotaging some vital person or installation. Examples are Telemark/Vermork, St. Nazaire, Bruneval, Gran Sasso and Skorzeny's kidnapping of Horthy. Of course, if you include aeronaval operations, as well as the Midway operations already discussed there's the Taranto raid, the Decima MAS' brilliant operation against Alexandria, and the X-craft attack on the Tirpitz.

Finally, there is the stubborn defence where a small unit imposes disproportionate delay or losses on an attacker and so prevents the larger offensive operation developing successfully. Villers-Bocage, Snipe and Sidi Nsir have been mentioned; I would add Krinkelt-Rocherath, Wake Island, and the action of Sgts Andrew and Crangles at Medenine.

The only example action I can think of that does not fit quite into these categories -- perhaps it's a sort of impromtu raid -- is the loss of Rommel's radio intercept unit at Alamein. The Allies probably did not realise what they had destroyed, but the loss of his specialised eavesdropping unit meant that Rommel's situational awareness was never quite the same again. This was covered in an article in the British Army Review which I can;t find at the moment entitled "Rommel: Spitzenfingergefuhl or common eavesdropper?".

All the best,

John. </font>

[JonS]

Michael D:

Pegasus Bridge: yes, since it opened up the E bank of the Orne to the Allies, and denied passage of same to the Axis. If the bridges had not been captured, GOODWOOD, for example, never would have happened. Also, the Germans would have had a secure right flank running along the Orne/Caen Canal. They also would have had good and secure observation onto SWORD beach throughtout June and July. In other words, the geographic shape of the British bridgehead would have been significantly different, and it seems to follow that ops would have followed a rather diferent path.

Merville and Pointe du Hoc: No. Not least because the targetted guns were in the event either missing (PdH) or smaller than expected (MB).

Jon

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JonS:

Michael D:

Pegasus Bridge: yes,

[snips]

Merville and Pointe du Hoc: No. Not least because the targetted guns were in the event either missing (PdH) or smaller than expected (MB).

I would agree; Pegasus Bridge was the vital one, and really had no backup plan, whereas the Merville and Pointe du Hoc batteries could have been dealt with by NGS had the coup de main parties failed. I would still say, though, that both operations made a disproportionately large contribution to the success of the operation considering the size of forces involved.

BTW the "missing" guns from Pointe du Hoc were located and destroyed a few hundred meters inland from their expected positions, so I think Rudder's Rangers get full brownie points for the action.

All the best,

John.

[JonS]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

BTW the "missing" guns from Pointe du Hoc were located and destroyed a few hundred meters inland from their expected positions, so I think Rudder's Rangers get full brownie points for the action.

Yeah, I knew that. But weren't they essentially in storage at the place where they were found, and unable to fire?

[David Chapuis]

How about John Paulding capturing Major Andre (American Revolution)? That, quite possibly, changed the outcome of the entire war.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JonS:

[snips]

But weren't they essentially in storage at the place where they were found, and unable to fire?

It's only Ambrose, so you might have a better source, but a swift spot of googlage reveals the following at

http://www.worldwar2history.info/D-Day/cannons.html

"Unbelievably, the well-camouflaged guns were set up in battery, ready to fire in the direction of Utah Beach, with piles of ammunition around them, but no Germans."

There's also the point, with respect to neutralising high-value targets, that an action may shape an operation or campaign even if the target turns out, with hindsight, not to have been as valuable as the attacker thought. Merely the assurance that it is neutralised, rather than not knowing, may be sufficient to influence a campaign. Of the examples I've already given, it is possible to argue that Telemark/Vermork and Saint-Nazaire did not make much difference, because the Germans were never going to develop an A-bomb or transfer the Tirpitz to the Atlantic in any case. However, Allied decision-makers at the time did not and could not know that, so the operations were worthwhile if only to provide assurance. Conversely, despite the brilliance of Decima MAS' operation against British battleships, their success went unexploited by Supermarina because there was no accurate assessment of the damage.

All the best,

John.

[JonS]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

There's also the point, with respect to neutralising high-value targets, that an action may shape an operation or campaign even if the target turns out, with hindsight, not to have been as valuable as the attacker thought. Merely the assurance that it is neutralised, rather than not knowing, may be sufficient to influence a campaign.

Good point. What is thought is often more important than what is.

[ January 08, 2005, 11:10 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[kipanderson]

Hi,

Hate to sound just like a fan sitting on the sidelines, but both JonS and John Salt have hit it on the head.

Snipe is, in my view, others will differ, the true classic of a single battalion having a near strategic effect.

At its height, around 70 heavy German AFVs were out of action, 48 total losses, as a result of the actions of one infantry battalion and one battery of 6prds.

Another, off topic point, is that at Snipe and elsewhere post-Alamein, the Germans had very similar problems to Commonwealth forces when attacking AT-guns with real penetrating power. Over open desert.

All the best,

Kip.

[jim crowley]

Hmmmmm....

My original comment, "The outcome of a company or battalion level battle would never have had much overall impact on the larger theatre of operations. (emphasis added)", was made in the context of a thread discussing the use of CM-level battles as the cornerstones of broad-based campaigns.

In hindsight, "never" was a poor choice and really ought to have been "very rarely"

Compared to the huge number (?) of company/battalion actions fought throughout all the main WW11 theatres, those relevant examples that have been given thus far, represent a very small percentage.

The point that I was originally trying to make was that such small-scale engagements, for the most part, would not, in themselves, carry much weight in determining the outcome of, say, the North African campaign.

So "Well done Mr Player, the outstanding performance of your battalion over the course of the 12 battles in this campaign has pushed the British out of North Africa and given you a decisive win" doesn't really ring true.

I still think that these exceptional cases are only influential in so far as other actions, on the same front at the same time, complemented them. The Snipe action, a remarkable feat of arms, only had the effect that it did because other British units did their "bit", albeit less spectacularly. Had the DAK found and exploited a weakness elsewhere in the British line, at the same time as the Snipe encounter, Alemein may well have played out differently and the influence of Snipe may have been diminished.

So using company/battalion level battles to determine the course of a campaign (Normandy, Italy, Sicily etc.) seems entirely wrong to me.

[willbell]

Michael, you are cheating a little bit by using sophistry in your replies, although I have a tendency to agree with your position. You sometimes counter someones case of a small unit effecting a larger outcome by pointing out that it was a different small unit that made the difference. Makes the poster feel like they lost the argument just because you are right, but in reality you are just shifting the credit to a different small unit, not supporting your argument.

[Tero]

Originally posted by jim crowley:

So using company/battalion level battles to determine the course of a campaign (Normandy, Italy, Sicily etc.) seems entirely wrong to me.

The thing is it seems every campaign has a "make or break" king pin moment where the deciding battalion/company/platoon/squad/individual action has the success/failure of the entire campaign/action is hanging in the balance. In some cases it seems there were several such moments.