MG battalions on the attack?

[SteveP]

From reading about the battle of Mersa Brega in N. Africa just after Rommel arrived, I understand that the key to German victory at the end of the daylong battle, was a flanking attack by an MG Bn. I am puzzled by this, as I do not think of MGs, other than LMGs, as useful in conducting an assault. I am unclear as to what were the elements of an MG Bn (HMGs only, or LMGs too?). I also have difficulty understanding how such a unit would have been used on an attack that involved infiltrating around an enemy position. Two of these units were also used extensively in the pursuit that immediately followed the battle, which I also find a little puzzling. Can anyone shed light on this?

[John Kettler]

SteveP,

The MG Battalion is a motorized formation, not foot.

Here's a partial depiction of it from a battle in miniature.

http://www.warsweb.com/WGM/07.08.19-Libya-1941/07.08.19-Libya-1941-Pages/Image10.html

Here's the link to the overall battle.

http://www.warsweb.com/WGM/07.08.19-Libya-1941/07.08.19-Libya-1941.html

That the formation was motorized is shown in the October 24 account here, where the 8th MG Battalion constitutes part of one column in the attack.

http://panzer-abwehr.blogspot.com/2005_10_01_archive.html

and the earlier one from October 10th, in which the MG Battalion is clearly described as motorized

= on trucks.

Naturally, if actually fighting, the MG Battalion dismounts.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Andreas]

The German HMG could be turned into an LMG by not using the bipod. Than you can form a squad of twelve with two LMGs in support, i.e. very considerable firepower. A platoon had four HMGs, so this would give you a two squad platoon. Or you can come up with different organisations (e.g. 3x8 guys with 1x2 LMG,, 2x1 LMG in the squad; 1xHMG w/6, 3x half-squad of 6 with one LMG as maneuver elements). All the guys in the battalion would have had basic infantry training in any case.

All the best

Andreas

[John Kettler]

Andreas,

Good point! Had temporarily forgotten how slick the German tripod set up was, with the MG and bipod on a quick detach mount. Would certainly improve tactical mobility!

Regards,

John Kettler

[SteveP]

I suspected it might be something like what you're saying: the MGs were really being used as LMGs in some fashion. So, if you wanted to do this in CM, you would have to use a bunch of LMG teams under a Company HQ. Or would that be too far off the mark for some reason? Unfortunately, you can't really imitate the ability to go from LMG setup on the attack to HMG setup (for overwatch, for example) in a CM battle or even an operation.

[Andreas]

I'd just use late-war Panzergrenadiers with two LMG per squad.

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

The 5th light division had a panzer regiment, a single motorized infantry regiment with 2 battalions, 2 "MG battalions", independent attachments at division level, a recon battalion, a panzer jaeger battalion, flak, artillery etc.

The key thing to realize, then, is that as a light rather than a panzer division, it had only 2 organic "infantry" battalions in the full sense. The 2 "MG" battalions were effectively there in place of the usual second regiment of motorized infantry. They were used as additional motorized infantry battalions, and constituted half the infantry strength of the division.

[SteveP]

So Jason, were the MG bns misnamed to some extent, but were really equipped more like regular motor inf -- except perhaps with additional LMGs? Or were they MG Bns in fact, using their MGs as assault weapons?

I'm also curious about how these units compared to similarly named units in WWI.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by SteveP:

So Jason, were the MG bns misnamed to some extent, but were really equipped more like regular motor inf -- except perhaps with additional LMGs? Or were they MG Bns in fact, using their MGs as assault weapons?

I'm also curious about how these units compared to similarly named units in WWI.

I would say misemployed, or rather, creatively employed, rather than misnamed.

The problem with North Africa was that no one wanted to send enough troops there. Certainly Hitler didn't; he had a war in Russia he was planning for in early 1941, when he wasn't bailing the Italians out of Greece and Yugoslavia, and was none too happy to bail the Italians out of North Africa as well. So he sent as little as he could to Africa.

Troops in theatre had to make do with what they had. Sometimes it worked out better than anticipated. The British found the 25-pounder made a good anti-tank gun; the Germans found the FlaK 88 made an even better one.

The terrain in Africa also required that all units employed there have mechanical transport - i.e. they were all "motorized" in more than just name. German trucks, particularly early in the war, were ill-suited for the desert (lacking oil and fuel filters, notably) and captured trucks were often preferred. I don't believe this is reflected in CM:AK.

So it is no surprise that machine gun units may have been employed in an assault role - anti-aircraft units were employed as anti-tank artillery (on purpose by the Germans, unintentionally by the British IIRC), armoured divisions were extremely tank-heavy and would bear little resemblance to the more balanced tank-infantry formations that eventually did balance in,say, NW Europe in 1944-45.

I don't think it was a case of misnaming anything. Doctrine was evolving throughout the desert experience, trying, as had been the case in the First World War, to catch up to the technology. The British started out with Infantry and Cruiser tanks that lumbered forth at walking pace with 2-pounder cannon and ended the campaign with Sherman tanks racing about at 23 mph and lumbering Churchills impervious to the guns of the PzKpfw III and "Mark III Specials" with high-velocity 50mm guns; the Germans began the campaign with handfuls of PzKpfw III and IV as their main battle tanks and managed to field Tigers in Tunisia two years later. Technology and doctrine chased each other's tail for two years, and shaped the way battle would be joined on the Continent.

British infantry sections were increased officially by two men over the course of the North African experience, the rifle battalion was reorganized to remove anti-aircraft assets and include a "Support Company" under command. Everyone was kind of making things up as they found out what worked and what didn't.

[ March 29, 2008, 09:49 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by SteveP:

I am puzzled by this, as I do not think of MGs, other than LMGs, as useful in conducting an assault.

in general, MGs together with mortars made 90% of all the work in typical infantry assaults. the offensive power of an infantry battalion comes from its MGs & mortars. riflemen are there mostly to hold ground, support heavy weapons and do some mopping up when on offensive. it was more an exception for riflemen to do the glorious stuff they do in most CM battles.

[Andreas]

I think what Steve meant was that HMGs were not that useful on the assault. Which is correct - they are support weapons, but it takes actual riflemen to maneuver and take ground. I suggest reading "18 Platoon" for a thorough discussion of WW2 British platoon tactics, and on how to take ground without any HMGs being present.

All the best

Andreas

[SteveP]

I think we may be slipping off track here. But I think I can guess at the answer to my question. In CM, an HMG unit represents essentially one weapon with a bunch of soldier who are essentially ammo bearers. In the light, I was imagining an MG battalion as something like an artillery battalion. I could not imagine such a unit engaging in an infantry assault.

However, if you equip the ammo bearers with rifles, leave the tripod and extra ammo in the truck, you then have a unit that looks a lot like an infantry squad equipped with an LMG. If you put two of these HMG units together, you get something that looks a lot like an infantry squad with two LMGs. Presumably such a unit could move at the same speed and with the same stealth as any other infantry unit.

Two questions remain: Is CM to have the German HMGs move at slow speed? It seems to me that carrying the tripod mount and the extra MG ammo (rather than rifles and rifle ammo) should not mean such a dramatic drop in speed.

The other question is whether an MG battalion in WWI was designed in this same way to shift between being an infantry assault unit and being a bunch of MG nests.

[Andreas]

Slow speed is because of the heavy ammo load.

In WW I HMGs were water-cooled, which makes mobility that much more difficult.

All the best

Andreas

[Webs]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[QB]Sometimes it worked out better than anticipated. The British found the 25-pounder made a good anti-tank gun; the Germans found the FlaK 88 made an even better one.

To be fair, the Germans discovered that in May 1940, much to the consternation of the Matilda crews.

P.S. That's me who just friended you on FB.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I think what Steve meant was that HMGs were not that useful on the assault. Which is correct - they are support weapons, but it takes actual riflemen to maneuver and take ground. I suggest reading "18 Platoon" for a thorough discussion of WW2 British platoon tactics, and on how to take ground without any HMGs being present.

you are of course right. it's the riflemen who take the ground and when there's not enough of "support weapons", like with 1941 Soviets for example, the battalions will replace the firepower of MGs & mortars with the flesh & blood of riflemen. still, typically, it's the MGs & mortars that made up most of the offensive firepower of rifle battalions. CM just doesn't recreate that very well, perhaps not so much by undermodelling MGs & mortars but more because the battles don't take place in a larger context and morale isn't thus that well modelled, the result being excessive microlevel maneuver and unnaturally costly close range combat.

[JasonC]

In the specific early Rommel attack mentioned, the key factor involved was simply the use of infantry rather than armor in a flanking movement across rough, roadless, "escarpment" terrain, to outflank a position that depended on any attacker being channeled through passable tank country.

It is of course always possible to outflank in the Libyan fighting through the desert, far south, and Rommel's recon battalion was trying to do so. But the success in question was due to infliltrating infantry around the northern, seaward flank instead, where they were not expected because the terrain was too daunting for vehicles.

When infantry appeared behind the British positions and threatened the road to their rear with fire (direct by their MGs and mortars, and observation for artillery), the British withdrew past them - in some disorder, closely pursued by the balance of 5th Light, etc.

The real lesson has nothing to do with MG battalions vs. other "schutzen", or heavy weapons vs. rifles. It is about dismounts sometimes having greater tactical mobility than vehicles, about there being some tasks only dismounts can perform, and about the importance of tactical surprise achieved by doing the unexpected, etc.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Webs:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[QB]Sometimes it worked out better than anticipated. The British found the 25-pounder made a good anti-tank gun; the Germans found the FlaK 88 made an even better one.

To be fair, the Germans discovered that in May 1940, much to the consternation of the Matilda crews.

P.S. That's me who just friended you on FB. </font>

[JasonC]

More detail for those who can't picture it yet.

Imagine a shoreline along the north verge, with a sharp, rugged bluff rising in open, bare rock formations ("gebel" country) from it up to a plateau. A bit of a bump at the top, meaning a small amount of "down" on the other side, then an endless flat plain of rock and scattered light sand patches extending away to the south. Not far below the bit of "down", a single road running from east to west, paralleling the coast and the escarpment.

Now, position a British 7th Armoured force to block the road. They will be deployed in a line straight across it, stretching south several kilometers to positions that can still see the road, but at long range, and refused back to their left to protect the open, desert flank against any easy turning movement. A couple of kilometers behind the outpost line, itself mixed infantry (not much of it though), a few light guns, and an outpost line of tanks - put the British reserve, with some tanks, whatever larger guns they have, HQs and a flock of soft skin transport. Since they are expecting an armored attack straight down the road intent on opening it rapidly, they have minimal forces on their right or seaward side - a few OPs looking along the bluff, at best. They are somewhat more concerned about a possible wide flanking movement to their south, and have some scouts out to warn of any such, might react along the road themselves or counterpunch with a small body of armor etc.

Now have the Germans pull up before the position and screen it, modest sniping back and forth etc. Meanwhile, a recon battalion in light vehicles heads south and southeast, making lots of dust, threatening the expected turning movement. The German tanks are in fact stationary along the road, mostly, but the Brits may think they are with the southern column etc.

Meanwhile, the Germans debus an infantry type battalion on their side of the skirmishing, and they head north, below the lip of the escarpment and immediately out of view. They then work their way, laboriously, along the face of the escarpment, moving parallel to its length rather than descending or ascending, until well past the entire British position. Then they ascend to the top of the escarpment, brushing aside if necessary a few OPs. Once up, they can see all the mass of soft transport off their right front, can call fire on it, can interdict the first 1-2 km of desert including the road itself with MG and mortar fire, etc.

Once they are detected in place, what are the British going to do? You can't charge with tanks over the escarpment. You might drive the Germans slightly below the crest temporarily, but they will be back as soon as the pressure eases. You can't really hit them with artillery easily, so close by on a reverse slope (though mortars might). They have good rock cover there and will not be directly observed. The Brits have little infantry to just tangle with them and would find it decidedly hot once past the crest, without supporting arms etc.

Nor can the Brits just ignore them as insufficiently armed to hurt them. The tanks might, but the tanks are helpless in a larger sense without the rest of the combine arms force, without their transport and supply elements, etc. The transport is in immediate danger and something must be done right away to protect it. If attacking cannot protect it, then it has to move.

So the Brits plain bug out. They have to swing off the road to get around the German infantry fire - tanks might hug closer and try to suppress them while others pass, to be sure. All the soft elements up at the screened front need to be loaded and brought back, alive.

As soon as they are seen to move, the Germans press them from the front with the main body. After they break contact, the trucks come up the road, reload the infantry force that did the flanking job, and everybody rakes off along the road to catch the flying British. Especially if the Brits had to deviate from the road in the early part of the flight, they are in danger of not getting back to it ahead of the Germans.

Simple, really. The brazen risk in it was simply that it launched unsupported infantry over the most difficult sort of terrain, ending with a need to climb a steep escarpment right into the teeth of a possibly waiting defense. It succeeded because the risk was taken with the correct estimate that the Brits simply would not expect such a thing, and therefore the attempt would be practically unopposed, until the movement was nearly accomplished.

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[JasonC]

Sure. And Rommel is literally the man who wrote the book on the subject. Remember he was an alpine corps infantry commander in WW I, and cut his teeth using unexpected maneuver by infantry in steep terrain to isolate enemy elements. In fact he won a medal for capturing nearly an entire division's worth of WW I Italians with a single alpine infantry company that way, during the Caperetto offensive. It was just the sort of thought that would have sprung naturally to a mountaineer's tactical mind. His book on infantry is all about such things, and he didn't need any tanks to operate that way, even in the first world war.

[Andreas]

It did of course also lead to an unfortunate preference for using far too weak elements in assaults on strongpoints, with predictable consequences.

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

Basically a fair point, though there was variation in the matter. Particularly when he wasn't himself physically present to perform the "coup d'oeil", he frequently underestimated the force needed for a given tactical task, and expected his subordinates to produce brilliancies to compensate.

His staff protected subunits from some of the worst consequences, at least sometimes. E.g. order a motorized infantry battalion to assault a rocky enemy ridgeline held by alert infantry with arty support, with no support themselves beyond their organic heavy weapons, across a flat plain. The result is a staffer switches the order to a screening and recon mission to prevent the predictable stuff-up. (That one was in a staffer's memoir iirc).

His major weakness as a commander was inattention to logistics, along with prizing the initiative too highly and generally asking more of his men than human beings could be expected to deliver. A failing many maneuverists develop. "Who needs artillery shells, just be imaginative!" lol

[SteveP]

It strikes me that this ability of the Germans to switch their MG Bns between fighting as infantry or as HMG emplacements is significant. Other nationalities also had MG Bns (or the equivalent) but I don't think they had this ability (presumably because a Vickers or a Maxim couldn't be used as an LMG).

If I am right about this, then the next question is whether this is a significant missing element in CM. In a battle scenario, in which I have a platoon of HMGs, shouldn't I be able to convert them to a platoon as 2-LMG equipped infantry squads, if my tactical plan dictates doing that? Or was this switch off more complicated IRL than that? For example, did the MG Bns in the 5th Light almost always fight as an infantry battalion regardless of its name?

With regard to the question of speed in movement -- if the slow speed is due solely to ammo load, then it is too bad that CM doesn't allow an HMG unit to drop ammo when it needs to move quickly (for example, to escape an artillery barrage).

[Andreas]

Just see the losses taken from the barrage as a loss of unit cohesion. It would not be realistic to get everyone together in the time of a scenario in any case.

Regarding the other, no I don't think you should be able to switch in a 45-60 minute scenario. I don't think it worked like this. Either the guys were told before the action to work as HMGs, or as infantry. A drop off the hat switch is not realistic in my view.

My 2 cents on the matter.

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

As for other powers switching, the US cannabilized 57mm ATG formations for extra riflemen, HQ companies fought as infantry in defensive situations, cavalry squadrons dismounted from their vehicles to fight as infantry in some attacks, etc. Bodies are bodies, small arms are not scarce, and if the men are trained to use small arms and to understand close combat tactics, lots of them could and did "switch hit" on occasion.