CMAK - Battle of Monte Cassino

[Holien]

Originally posted by Scarhead:

@Holien:

Letting loose a million points (in CM terms) to annihilate a single FO (or two)? Maybe you create some rubble, and some temporary dust (being a mountaintop, there is a strong wind clearing any dust soon). But once the smoke settles, the rubble on the mountaintop is still a good OP. Just send some other FO in. So I doubt it made sense to send in an air fleet just to erase an OP.

Gruß

Joachim

If we are talking CM you are not comparing apples with apples.

1. In a CM game it would be a Church or some such tall building.

2. There are not that many Arty OP's in a game and taking out one or two would be very useful.

3. The loss of a high point. Tall building and dust can be very useful to the attacker.

If you want to talk CM then please don't switch between the real world and the game.

If you want to talk Real world I agree that in the long term destroying the Abbey had no good points for the Allies. As my post alluded to.

Michael I have heard the same points KF made from Andreas at the weekend. Now he does more reading than me and is a Uber Grog so I believe him.

Andreas if you are lurking come out and explain this point.

H

[Andreas]

Bombarding the abbey was wrong because it served no constructive purpose in the context of the Allied strategy. The Allied commanders at Cassino, with the exception of Dimoline (who was sacked for being too smart and showing it), probably Tuker (who was off sick) and Juin (who was not listened to on general principle) had no fecking clue what they were doing. None of them, at no time. That includes Freyberg, Anders, and any of the Americans you care to mention. Reading up about the conduct of the battle from the Allied side makes me angry every time I do it.

Fact is that Tuker requested the bombing, with the support of Dimoline (who commanded 4th Indian when Tuker left), if the ground forces could follow it up immediately. Freyberg tried to get Clark to agree to it but failed, so he went over his head to Alexander. He got his wish, the bombers went in, but the ground forces could not follow through, which was hardly surprising. Bombing the Abbey was a desperate act, borne out of frustration. It was supposed to be the answer, but the Allies had failed to figure out what the problem was.

Allied forces could not know what sort of agreement the Germans had with the Benedictine order and the Vatican. There were battle reports that Allied forces were fired on from the Abbey before the bombardment. It is almost certain that these are wrong. There are any number of hills and positions close to the abbey, so how in the heat of battle, when often fire was coming from all sides, the abbey could be clearly identified as the culprit, is a bit of a mystery. Especially when the monks and the Germans are very clear about whether they were there or not, and both agree that the Germans were not. So you have the impression of some grunts during the chaos of battle vs. the documented evidence by the Germans and the monks. Except for apologists for Freyberg and encyclopedia.com, I don't think anybody seriously still claims that bombing the Abbey was anything but a stupid mistake. I have seen it suggested in a study on Cassino (Ben Ariel 'Cassino', probably similar in Ellis 'Cassino') that Freyberg only got his way because he was the resident New Zealander, with a special role of representing his country in the theatre.

The point stands - the whole of the massif was a giant OP and provided a wealth of MG nests, outside the Abbey ground. Removing the abbey did change squat about that, and actually benefitted the Germans (and that could have been known). If any of the Allied commanders could have been bothered to have a look from up close, they would have noticed.

Here is a picture of the massif, probably from the NW, I would think.

Cassino picture

To argue that this is all with the benefit of hindsight and therefore does the Allied commanders an injustice would also be incorrect. Juin and Dimoline had the right answers in February 1944, if not before. They were not listened to.

All that still does not make it all the Allies fault though. The Germans incorporated the Abbey into their defensive line. To then complain later when it gets destroyed is extremely rich. Just marking an exclusion zone of a few hundred yards around it does not change the fundamental point that the Germans loaded the gun and aimed it at the Abbey. The Allies just pulled the trigger.

[Joachim]

Originally posted by Holien:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Scarhead:

@Holien:

Letting loose a million points (in CM terms) to annihilate a single FO (or two)? Maybe you create some rubble, and some temporary dust (being a mountaintop, there is a strong wind clearing any dust soon). But once the smoke settles, the rubble on the mountaintop is still a good OP. Just send some other FO in. So I doubt it made sense to send in an air fleet just to erase an OP.

Gruß

Joachim

If we are talking CM you are not comparing apples with apples.

1. In a CM game it would be a Church or some such tall building.

2. There are not that many Arty OP's in a game and taking out one or two would be very useful.

3. The loss of a high point. Tall building and dust can be very useful to the attacker.

If you want to talk CM then please don't switch between the real world and the game.

If you want to talk Real world I agree that in the long term destroying the Abbey had no good points for the Allies. As my post alluded to.

H </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Holien:

Michael I have heard the same points KF made from Andreas at the weekend. Now he does more reading than me and is a Uber Grog so I believe him.

This astounds me. IIRC there was a long thread a couple of months ago in which Andreas was an active participant that thrashed all this out and reached the opposite conclusions. Namely that although Lucas should surely have pushed his outpost line much further inland, he lacked adequate forces to really do a job on the Gothic Line without a major push from the south to keep the Germans occupied.

The whole idea of rushing to Rome is ridiculous, let alone the Alpine passes. Suppose he can get a small force there, then what? They get cut off, surrounded, and it's into the prisoners' cages with them. Not the way to win a war.

I notice that Andreas did not comment on this question in his post above. Perhaps he will honor us with a return visit to clarify his position on this point.

Michael

[Andreas]

Ah, overlooked that.

I think Lucas was far too cautious, and the failure to set up aggressive patrolling, especially in the face of German non-resistance, was just very poor generalship. Apparently there were no patrols sent out beyond the phase lines, and no attempt was made to push beyond them, even though no Germans were encountered. The Allies could have achieved more at Anzio, in the view of German analysts after the war. More aggressive allied commanders would probably have done so.

As for the risk to having units cut off - the same units later bled out on the frontlines of the bridgehead for five months. Risk them quick, and hope for a quick return, or risk to lose them through attrition later. There were enough forces quickly available, and shipping to carry them, to make up for the odd battalion or two that are lost in such gambles.

I know that the loss of the Rangers at Cisterna has been used as a proof that the cautious strategy paid off. I responded to it then, but just to reiterate:

a) the situation was different, because it was a couple of days later, and the Germans had now had time to react

they were still lost - would you rather lose them trying to achieve something, or on a bungled trip into a prepared enemy defense?

In fairness to Lucas though, it seems that he was badly let down by the intel available to him. It seems that at this time of the war intel quality on the allied side was quite shoddy, despite aerial superiority and ULTRA.

As an aside. Interestingly, we come back to one of the things claimed by those quenching their thirst from the Ra-Ra Kool Aid fountain of Allied air power. Aerial intel did not detect the absence of the Germans, and it did not interdict the movement of German forces or their supply towards the very restricted area of the bridgehead in any great way, shape or form.

[Holien]

Micheal to clarify my discussion with Andreas this last weekend.

His last post explains how dumb the Allied Commanders were (IMO) and how they failed to truly understand the lie of the land and what was required.

Andreas then said that the right move was flanking the position and that was what KF alluded to.

I was not suggesting that Andreas agrees with the 2 days to end the Italian War statement.

Andreas might explain further the weaker area that could have been exploited if it was known.

As always it is easy to sit back and view things with hindsight.

Scarhead I think you are still mixing scales up.

In CM terms you could justify it if you thought that for the few minutes of effect you could move your men into a better position.

In the Real life situation (bigger scale, bigger time frame, more CM points) this might be justified (wrongly as it turned out) in a similar fashion.

I know what you are saying about cost and I think that is a different issue and should not be mixed between the scale of CM (Small local Actions) and the actual battle which would have been multiple CM battles.

H

Edited to say I typed too slowly before Andreas popped back in.

[ October 28, 2003, 10:57 AM: Message edited by: Holien ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Holien:

Andreas then said that the right move was flanking the position and that was what KF alluded to.

I don't think so. KF made three statements of substance in his post.

1. "The allies didn't have to fight at Monte Cassino. All that was needed was for Lucas to push the Anzio forces to route 6, and the whole Gustav line would have collapsed like a house of cards."

This is wrong, because if the Allies do not maintain pressure on the German line, the Germans pull units out of the line to attack the Anzio position. And I don't know what makes him think that the German line would "collapse like a house of cards" just because Lucas got some troops to Rt. 6. It would have certainly made things problematical for the Germans, but if no major fighting is occurring on the line, then they organize an attack against the blocking force. This either cleans it out or holds it in check long enough for the forces further south to make an orderly withdrawal.

2. "He could have been in Rome in 8 hours..."

So what? So he gets a company of Rangers in jeeps to Rome. This is essentially a commando raid. It might stir up some trouble and discomfort the Germans a bit, but it achieves nothing worthwhile or lasting.

3. "...and as far as the Alpine passes inside of 2 days."

Again, supposing this is the case—and I am not nearly so complacent as KF is about this—so what? Does he believe that company of Rangers is going to seal off the passes long enough that the Germans in Italy are going to starve? Gimme a break.

Michael

[Andreas]

Kingfish was joking, it was an allusion to our earlier discussion where he was the one who brought up the Rangers example as indication/proof that a rapid move off the bridgehead would have been disastrous, IIRC.

I then (or before) brought up (mostly in jest) the point that the drive from Anzio to Rome is one hour today. That was however mostly aimed at making clear the distances involved.

Why don't you shred my post instead Famine?

WBR

War

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

As for the risk to having units cut off - the same units later bled out on the frontlines of the bridgehead for five months. Risk them quick, and hope for a quick return, or risk to lose them through attrition later. There were enough forces quickly available, and shipping to carry them, to make up for the odd battalion or two that are lost in such gambles.

Andreas, I can't believe you'd write a thing like that. Such a gamble is justified only when there is a reasonable chance of winning something with it.

I say that there is a great deal of difference between losing those battalions as part of a unified defence and simply throwing them into the fire.

Besides, it really isn't an either/or propostion. There is a third course that Lucas might have pursued, and that is neither sitting tight on the beachhead nor haring off on some wild scheme beyond his capacity to pull off. And that is to expand the perimeter of the beachhead to capture the points from which it could be observed and brought under fire. This would have also have given him some room to maneuver as additional units were fed into the position.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Kingfish was joking...

That was my first thought and the reason why I asked. Then Holien got into the act and said oh no it was serious and you had convinced them all that it was true.

Oh well, fouled comms. S.N.A.F.U.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

As for the risk to having units cut off - the same units later bled out on the frontlines of the bridgehead for five months. Risk them quick, and hope for a quick return, or risk to lose them through attrition later. There were enough forces quickly available, and shipping to carry them, to make up for the odd battalion or two that are lost in such gambles.

Andreas, I can't believe you'd write a thing like that. Such a gamble is justified only when there is a reasonable chance of winning something with it.

I say that there is a great deal of difference between losing those battalions as part of a unified defence and simply throwing them into the fire.

Besides, it really isn't an either/or propostion. There is a third course that Lucas might have pursued, and that is neither sitting tight on the beachhead nor haring off on some wild scheme beyond his capacity to pull off. And that is to expand the perimeter of the beachhead to capture the points from which it could be observed and brought under fire. This would have also have given him some room to maneuver as additional units were fed into the position.

Michael </font>

[JonS]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I certainly do not argue that whole battalions should go swanning off to liberate Rome, or destroy the Terni railway junction.

That's a relief, since that's exactly the impression of your position that I had gathered from your previous posts.

Regarding the Monastery: Morale is one of the key principles of war, and the Monastary was certainly bringing everyones morale down south of the Gustav Line. Thus, it's destruction became a legitimate operation in itself.

I still think it was a damn waste - not so much the building. Heck, its just a building, and the Order just rebuilt it after the war, just like they had the dozen or more other times it had been destroyed. What was wasted was the opportunity. Sitting back, watching the fireworks, having a nice cuppa, then eventually rousing themselves to go see if anyone survived is no way to use firesupport, and by that stage of the game the Allies - and particularly the British/CW should have known far better.

Against that, though, it was the first (or nearly the first?) time that heavy bombers had been used on such a scale in intimate support of ground forces, so perhaps expecting the world was - and still is - a bit optimistic. In addition there was some short bombing, and other incidents, that tend to gum up the works.

I'd agree with Andreas that the 'obvious' solution was to simply avoid the bloody place altogether.

BTW, I just found out on the weekend that another Grandfather of mine (yes, yes. I have about six. Go figure) was in the NZE at Cassino, and wounded there. Sadly, he's dead too, about 10 years ago

Regards

JonS

[ October 28, 2003, 02:54 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Michael Emrys]

Okay, looks like we are in perfect agreement then. Harmony once more reigns in the Allied camp.

Now, let's go kill some Krauts!

Oh. Er. Wait. You are a Kraut, aren't you? Sorry.

Famine

[Andreas]

Do you want a cup of tea with your Kraut?

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Kingfish was joking

No I wasn't! Lucas had a clear path off the beach. A week of hard charging and he would have been knocking on the door of the Fuhrer bunker! But he blew it!!!

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I guess nows the time to come clean before they unleash the Grogs of war on me

As Andreas pointed out, I was only joking. Sorry for the hubbub. It was all in good fun.

Now, Holien, whats this about me being an Uber grog? :confused:

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

Kingfish was joking

No I wasn't! Lucas had a clear path off the beach. A week of hard charging and he would have been knocking on the door of the Fuhrer bunker! But he blew it!!!</font>

[Spook]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Cue the 'We love the USAF' faction:

'You totally, like, underestimate the power of the (air) force, man. They would have bombed, like, like the sh*t out of them. Two days man, two days max.'

Or sumfink.

Okay, cued. The above sounds about right.

Except that it was USAAF during WWII, Andreas. Still part & parcel to the US Army back then, for right or wrong.

Now, would you like one or two lumps of sugar with that niggle?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Spook:

Now, would you like one or two lumps of sugar with that niggle?

Just a dash of milk would be fine, thanks.

[Kingfish]

I have to admit it was fun while it lasted. Lets see if we can fool Emrys again, shall we?

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If I was Lucas I would have designated the shores of the Adriatic as my first day's objective. This would be followed up by a drive on Budapest, with a diversionary raid on the Ploesti oilfields by the Rangers. If all goes well I would be in Helsinki by the third day.

[Holien]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Now, Holien, whats this about me being an Uber grog? :confused:

Bloody keep me out of it...

You an Uber Grog!!!

Where did I say that?

I shall stop relaying what Andreas said as the power of type is too much for me to handle.

Anyway who wanted such an old building to survie? Far better to have it rebuilt to the new heating and building regulations of the modern world.

That way the monks can dispense with their robes and wander around in swim wear....

H

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Do you want a cup of tea with your Kraut?

I'd be pleased to take a cup with you, sir. As long as you don't make it the English way.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Lets see if we can fool Emrys again, shall we?

No fair. You know what a gentle, trusting soul I am. Seanachai said so. And you know he wouldn't lie, at least not when he's drunk. Or is it the other way 'round?

:confused:

Michael

[Spook]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

Lets see if we can fool Emrys again, shall we?

No fair. You know what a gentle, trusting soul I am. Seanachai said so. And you know he wouldn't lie, at least not when he's drunk. Or is it the other way 'round?

</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Spook:

BTW, what was your vote on the latte tax, Michael? Or was that just a Seattle thing?

Since I never heard of it, it must have been confined to Seattle. Seattlites (sounds like something you would expect to see whizzing through the sky after dark, doesn't it?) tend to be a peculiar lot anyway. Probably all that coffee they drink.

BTW, the weather where I live is actually quite nice. We are in the rain shadow of the Olympic Mtns. and so receive only about a quarter of the rain that Seattle receives. But don't tell Californians that.

Michael

[Joachim]

Originally posted by Holien:

Scarhead I think you are still mixing scales up.

In CM terms you could justify it if you thought that for the few minutes of effect you could move your men into a better position.

In the Real life situation (bigger scale, bigger time frame, more CM points) this might be justified (wrongly as it turned out) in a similar fashion.

I know what you are saying about cost and I think that is a different issue and should not be mixed between the scale of CM (Small local Actions) and the actual battle which would have been multiple CM battles.

H

CM: Here cost is an issue. The bang for the buck will leave you no units to exploit the suppression (maybe even the destruction of an FO). Exploiting an arty barrage might work, exploiting an airstrike is virtually impossible (which IMHO is an adequate model for a RL airstrike from level bombers. Don't wanna discuss CAS )

RL: Cost in a given Schwerpunkt is not an issue. But leaning on the barrage by an airstrike of level bombers is calling for disaster. I doubt the suppressive effect of a front line bombing on a single target of limited size - especially if the defenders on the slopes below the abbey get away pretty much unharmed.

Until the allies are up close in strength, the Germans should be able to deploy another FO in the abbey. TRPs could enable other FOs to fill the gap in the meantime, further reducing the value of reducing a good OP. The suppressive effects were not used, the barrage was wasted.

Thus except for the morale effect, the bombing was an unneccessary failure. My opinion is it was done for the morale - softening some angry voices.

Gruß

Joachim

[ October 29, 2003, 11:38 AM: Message edited by: Scarhead ]