Fascinating S.L.A. Marshall commentary

[cassh]

John Kettler - if you haven't read it yet try Not Mentioned in Despatches - Spencer Fitz-Gibbon - very good account of 2 Para at Goose Green and how the CO's personality and command push (befehlstaktik) style of leadership stifled the attack. With Jone's death 2iC Keeble was able to introduce mission tactics (auftragstaktik) to successfully manoeuvre the battalion and press the attack.

[Aco4bn187inf]

Was the issue with Marshal a question of who fired in a particular engagement, or in a day, a week, or a whole campaign?

I ask because, in my amateur opinion, it seems perfectly normal for only a limited number of men in a company to get a shot at the enemy, in many types of engagements.

Terrain limits how many men can see the enemy, unless you are fighting on a giant chessboard. In the defense, for example, many of the positions may be to some degree 'keyholed' and never get targets.

Even when a target is identified, your own available cover will limit how many guys can pop up and shoot. If your house has only two or three small windows, you probably don't want the entire squad crowding up to get a shot. (I don't think the mechanics of the game adresses this limitation, by the way.)

Likewise with walls, craters, etc.

Also, of course, some contacts happen at ranges that only MG's can reach.

This issue reminds me of being on live fire ranges. As a radioman, I would be some distance behind the lead squad, and when they started blazing away at pop-up targets I'd run up to try to get a few shots in. (Not really my job, but, hey...) Sometimes, because all the available cover was overcrowded, I'd just have to accept that I wasn't going to fire my weapon that day, because I wasn't willing to stand out in the open like an idiot to do so. What would Marshal make of that situation?

[John Kettler]

cassh,

Appreciate the book referral! What I was describing was not the style of the attack, but rather the fact that the paras' packs were so heavy it was all the overburdened men could do to slowly stagger forward a few meters, flop down, drag themselves back up and repeat. With upwards of 110 pounds of load per man, their tactical mobility was practically nil.

Aco....,

Good point!

Regards,

John Kettler

[LongLeftFlank]

Heard several mentions of John Keegan on this thread. Keegan is one of my favorite historians, although like SLAM he's never served under fire (although unlike SLAM he has been very up front -- pardon the pun -- about this fact).

However, similarly to MAF, the Face of Battle formulates basic hypotheses -- models if you will (without much sound numerical data to go on, much less firsthand interviews)-- relating to what each battle "must have been like" for the P.B.I. involved in each classic battle, and what kinds of physical activity and behavior created victory and defeat.

e.g. at Agincourt, the rugger scrum in the post-archery stage of the battle among pikemen and archers and surviving horsemen crammed together and virtually immobile in the mud, a far cry from the Olivier vision of knights charging home at full speed, lances leveled, or even the mass kung fu swordplay depicted in Braveheart (and every Hollywood film since, excepting the otherwise mediocre Alexander).

Since the participants in this and most of the other battles in FOB are deceased, the accuracy of Keegan's hypotheses is unlikely ever to be reliably tested, or challenged. And all this is to say: hypotheses are acceptable historical method in the absence of data, but not when you have hundreds of after action interviews available.

While not disagreeing with anything people have said above about Marshall, I continue to honor him as a groundbreaker who drew popular attention to what was happening at the "sharp end" of combat (as opposed to the command, maneuver and victory through airpower level). His work made it respectable for better-informed thinkers in the US military to devote careers to studying ways to improve infantry firepower, equipment, etc. at the sharp end.

Think of him as the Bill Gates of military science -- a pitchman who hogged the credit and had some real dumb ideas (WYSIWYG), but saw the big picture potential of the concept and got the ball rolling.

Otherwise, the Marines might well have splashed ashore at Da Nang still bearing Garands, BARs and M1919s.

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

I read a borrowed copy of A SOLDIER'S LOAD many years ago, and it's burned into my brain to this day. Can't help noticing how little attention has been paid to the hard won lessons in that book. See, for example, the terrible predicament of the yomping paras in the Falklands trying to advance by successive rushes while under fire (got to see the formerly classified MoD debriefing film).

Yes, I know a Navy SEAL who felt that the whole "load bearing work" concept in SOF (i.e. teaching trainees to hump 120 pounds on 10 mile marches) was utterly pointless and stupid. His slogan was "pack light, eat lousy, remember your feet; cache the rest." Carry only what you need to survive.

The type of combat his unit trained to do (keeping in mind that combat wasn't necessarily the point of most SEAL ops) was bump and run... (a) blow claymores ( fire 2 clips from 50 meters back in the woods then © fall back so return fire just hits your empty scrapes. Then set a new ambush down the trail or simply disengage. The premium was on mobility and stealth, not sustained firefights and massive ammo load.

[Wicky]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

cassh,

Appreciate the book referral! What I was describing was not the style of the attack, but rather the fact that the paras' packs were so heavy it was all the overburdened men could do to slowly stagger forward a few meters, flop down, drag themselves back up and repeat. With upwards of 110 pounds of load per man, their tactical mobility was practically nil.

Aco....,

Good point!

Regards,

John Kettler

tactical mobility was practically nil.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/mov1.html

As the three Chinooks and five Wessex helicopters had been lost with the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor, these units were forced to walk, carrying most of their equipment. 45 Commando were the first to go. They were taken from their positions surrounding Ajax Bay to the north side of San Carlos Water, near Port San Carlos, by landing craft, then they yomped for 13 hours continuously and covered 14 miles. They reached a deserted shepherd's house at around 2am where they stopped for the rest of the night. The next day they carried on to Douglas Settlement. They stayed here for two nights and a day and then moved on to Teal Inlet arriving late on 30 May.

Soon after 45 Commando left Port San Carlos, 3 Para moved out. They tabbed directly to Teal carrying lighter loads than the Marines, but this did not alleviate the terrible conditions. The 460 men covered the twenty miles in thirty three hours, breaking the 'tab', tabbing being the Para word for a long march, into two stages. Again, the conditions took their toll and fourteen of the Paras had to be evacuated as exposure cases. One tank troop of the Blues and Royals accompanied the march, picking their way with great care through the soft peat bogs, but successfully crossing the uneven trackless ground despite many doubts of their ability to operate over such terrain. The Paras were forced to spend one night in the open before making a tactical approach to Teal Inlet during the night of 28 May, but only one Argentinian was found in the settlement. Once the men of 45 Commando arrived on 30 May, the units were ready for the next phase of the advance, into the mountains overlooking Stanley itself.

[John Kettler]

LongLeftFlank,

I've seen those break contact live fire exercises on TLC and the like. Eeeek!!! Would definitely want urgent business elsewhere were I in pursuit.

Wicky,

I know a bunch of helos sank on the Atlantic Conveyor, but I was talking about the inability of the men to do routine infantry combat stuff. As for falling out during the yomp, great was the glee of one interviewee regarding the fact that the RSM, a super cut and muscular man who rode everyone else constantly about fitness, was the first to fall out. Seems he had no body fat to keep him going when the unit had no rations, wheras the objects of his athletic disdain kept plodding on.

BTW, am delighted to point out that my brother, Ed Kettler, is the author of the Harpoon wargame module THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS WAR. So comprehensive and thorough was his research on both sides that the U.S. Naval War College bought 200 copies for use as a textbook. He went on from that to work on The First World War at Sea 1914-1916 and Command at Sea: The War in the Pacific 1941-1943, with the second part currently in development.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ March 16, 2006, 10:41 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[Carl Puppchen]

What is the opinion on Marshall's comments that stragglers from broken units were extremely ineffective relative to cohesive units? I read the book and definitely remember that element seemed to be important to Marshall.

That thread generally leads to the point that during Vietnam the rotation system badly hurt small unit cohesion.

But since I am not a military guy and have only seen things through books I don't have a lot of confidence in these opinions.

What is the opinion of the board on aggressiveness of fire in today's army engaged in combat in Iraq? Also must be matched against the fact that they often face an enemy intentionally blending in with civilians which makes indiscriminate use of firepower and artillery a difficult proposition.

[JasonC]

Here is a modest reality check for the aggressive use of fire types. Admittedly, from an earlier war. In WW I, specifically 1915, the following were the typical amounts supplied per front line riflemen in different allied armies. French - 30 rifle bullets. British 50 rifle bullets. Russians (with much weaker artillery and single trenches) - 125 rifle bullets.

Not at once, not to be fired off in one engagement. Per *month*. Oh and the Russian use rate was thought extravagant and led to supply problems. In other words, the typical rifleman fired 1-2 times a day, and if he fired 4 times whole armies ran low on ammo.

[John Kettler]

Carl Puppchen,

I clearly recall that he had a relatively high opinion of crew-served weapons, when it came to actually firing under battlefield conditions. He felt that it was harder for these men to shirk their duty with someone in such close proximity, the shame factor, than it was for the average, and relatively more isolated, GI to do so.

Given that the average GI didn't fire much on the battlefield, I find it no particular surprise that remnants of shattered units would perform worse than men in cohesive units.

The American officer rotation policy in Vietnam was an unmitigated diaster for the men commanded, in that by the time the combat officer finally got up to speed and the men knew how to work with him effectively, he was gone, and the break-in process began anew. This only compounded the havoc caused by the one-year individual combat tours.

JasonC,

Call me gobsmacked! Ammo allotments per month?!

I thought 20 cartridges per man was an individual combat load going back to at least the American Revolution.

Regards,

John Kettler

[LongLeftFlank]

You'd know a lot more than I would on this, but if I'm not mistaken, European armies went to war in 1914 still expecting to win decisive battles with (a) bold maneuver, followed by ( massed musketry, followed by © cold steel; as opposed to the artillery murderfest that actually transpired.

So one way to look at the ammo load is 2 bullets a day in the positional warfare that actually occurred; the other is the intended 29 days of grand maneuver followed by that epic Waterloo the generals dreamed of in which each Tommy could "give 'em ten rounds rapid, good and 'ot" up to five volleys worth, and then "in with the bayonet". And that would show the Hun proper.

Tangentially, my memory is hazy on this, but didn't the British up their ammo loads for the Martini-Henry rifles after ammo ran short during well-publicized "decisive actions" in the Zulu War, Khartoum, Omdurman, etc?

Forward, he cried, from the rear, as the front rank died...

[JasonC]

What is really means is there was an awful lot of sitting around in the safety of the trenches. Hardly unexpected in a war that lasted 4 years. What wargamers underestimate is the "hours of boredom" merely punctuated by the "moments" of terror. Wars can't last 4 years with everyone sergeant rock -ing it all the time, since that results in minute life expectancies.

Plenty of front line rifle strength was inactive for days on end, with only thin outpost portions occasionally dueling with each other. Still enough to cause "wastage" - if a company of 100-200 men fire 1-2 times a day average, 1-2 get hit on the other side, etc. If you read through a WW I narrative like Junger, the boring bits involve occasional losses of 1 man, nobody, 3 men, nobody, nobody, 1 man, nobody for a week, 5 men, nobody, 1 man, etc. With random shelling doing most of it, not rifle sniping.

In heavier action, up to 3/4s of the time he describes failure under shellfire or successful holding in which losses are taken from shellfire, but the enemy is held off by shellfire or machineguns, and no rifle infantry vs. rifle infantry action proper takes place. The heavier arms smash one side's formations before they get to grips, instead.

Infantry units are rotated out of front line duty weekly if there is any real action, and have lost up to a third in those periods.

He describes maybe half a dozen occasions of the real version of rifle infantry vs. rifle infantry in the whole war - and only lives through each of them by getting wounded but not dying. One side is generally wiped out and the other cut in half - but the "sides" so hit are companies or battalions; the larger formations just feed in a new one to replace the ones destroyed. He spends half the dangerous parts of the war in the hospital - nobody could spend all of them at the front and live.

Even with only 1-2 bullets fired per day on average. There are a lot of days, and the artillery is three times as dangerous.

[cassh]

John Kettler - as Wicky shows in his quotes the lack of mobility in the Falklands was born out of necessity as the brigade's helicopter-transports were on the bottom of the southern Atlantic - along with most of the really important kit that Atlantic Conveyor was carrying.

The 110lb loads were mostly taken up with ammo for the mortars and SF platoons (two-bomb 'handbag' and 800-round brick).

Much of the trouble with the tabbing (TAB Tactical Advance to Battle)/yomping came not entirely from the backbreaking loads carried, but also from the bitterly cold weather and damp, and also the inherent flaws of the DMS boot. The toms were going down with trench-foot as the ground they were digging into was water-logged and their boots offered little protection. Many RM units faired much better due to their arctic warfare training and use of COTS footwear that saved them the indignity of having to march cross-country bearing loads with disintegrating feet!

[cassh]

Just a note about fates of fire etc.

In the British Army there is a slang expression termed a 'Vietnam unload' by which they mean to fire-off everything left in your magazine (often un-aimed in the enemy's general direction) regardless of how many rounds are left. It is generally used with blank ammunition in FIBUA/MOUT training where ammunition scales are high.

Its origins are unknown, but it is surely a reflection of observations of the prodigious use of fire and duck-and-shoot technique seen from contacts in close-country and jungle from SE Asia where enemy locations were often not know, but a great deal of fire was put down in their general direction.

A simple observation of this reaction to a contact would instantly lead one to believe that no matter how improved the training methods of the 1960's over 1940's that man's natural instincts of fight or flight would mean Marshall's basic premise would need further investigation.

[JasonC]

Here is another look at wound processes and implied achieved accuracies with WW I as a model, simply because I have the relevant items of data for that one. Not all of them, but enough to support the reasoning with rough figures, good enough to get the right order of magnitude on the outcome.

The war lasted 50 months. The ammo ratios per man in the allied armies I gave above. Those are a snapshot at one point in time, though, and it may have gone higher or lower at other points in the war. Probably higher in the first few months - before everyone was well entrenched - and progressively higher later on, as armies grew and war economies improved etc. There might be a factor of 2 more of total supply, it won't be lower.

About 1 in 4 wounds were fatal and an equal number, about, resulted in someone invalided home. The average wounds per man lost can't exceed 2, therefore. (Some give KIA figures as high as 1/3rd, depending on the state of combat medicine). We don't have to worry about repeated woundings skewing the outcomes, and can just estimate wounded at 2-3 times KIA. Since there is much better info on KIAs than all wounds that helps considerably. German KIA ran about 1.8-2 million, AH lost about 1.2-1.5, the Turks lower, 0.3 or so, Bulgarians lower still. 3.5-4 million is a proper KIA estimate for the central powers therefore, implying very roughly 7-12 million wounded and 11-16 million total hits. (I have since seen other sources which put CP total casualties, excluding civilians, at around 15 million).

Now, 70-80% of those came from artillery. Which puts bullet hits back around 3.5-4 million. A fair portion of those come from machineguns rather than rifles, but just how many we don't know. Call it 3 million rifle hits. In 50 months that comes to 60,000 a month or 2000 a day, for all the CP combined, Germans around half that.

Some corrections on the allied side for time and forces engaged. The Brits had only small forces in the field for the first half of the war. I can estimate them as a diagonal to their end strength, or half the number of months. The Russians drop out at the end and are quiet for stretches before that as political turmoil there increases. I can estimate their active engagement time at 35 months. The French do get smaller at points but rebound, not significant in my opinion.

In "million man months" the Russians might have 225, the Brits more like 100, the French close to 200, making up lower strength than the Russians in longer duration fighting. Since French combat losses about equalled Russian that is not implausible. (Russians had more PWs and civilian losses, though). Another check is the FR-BR causalty ratio, and it tracks, with just under 3 million for the Brits (with Empire allies included) vs. 5.7 million for the French.

225 125 + 100 50 + 200 30 = 39125. Not quite million rounds because we must adjust down for trench strength vs. army strength. Call it 10-20 billion rifle rounds fired. That implies it took about 4000 rounds fired by rifles to generate each rifle hit.

They won't let you pass basic rifle marksmanship unless you can hit 70% of the time inside 250 yards (300, but you can miss the longest ones without appreciably affecting your score). Needless to say, there aren't such neat targets on actual battlefields. In fact we can conclude that the portion of shots taken in which the chance of a hit was 10% or higher cannot have exceeded 0.25%, or they would account for all the hits themselves.

In these circumstances, telling people to just fire to create a suppression effect is more than a little superfluous. Coals to Newcastle. What else can they have been doing, to hit so infrequently? Vastly better advice would be to take every shot you get where you can actually see the target, no matter how small, covered, or moving. Because your average hit chance doing that would still be better than the actual shots taken, by a long way.

It also shows that and how snipers who actually took only aimed shots at visible targets, must vastly exceed the combat performance of typical ordinary infantrymen. Telling men to spray and pray more is exactly the wrong advice.

[Mad Russian]

An interesting point to the ammo usage, in basic training in the US Army you are taught to conserve ammo! You are taught that you should always try to fire only at good targets, only the automatic weapons men fire on auto, fire in short bursts, etc...

Another interesting point is that I can't remember ever having read, in all the books I've turned pages on, about an attack that was stopped for lack of ammo.

Anybody ever seen a story on a battle that was stopped because the men were out of ammo?

[JasonC]

PC - I've certainly read of attacks stopped for lack of ammo. Operationally, low artillery ammo forcing a whole army onto the defensive. Micro-tactically, small infantry units being overrun and destroyed after running out of ammo. In between, cut off units fighting until ammo is exhausted and then surrendering, on scales from platoons up to multiple armies in some cases in Barbarossa. It is not like the effect of lack of supplies operates through missing ham sandwiches.

Not just cut off units, also units in heavy action for too long without relief. E.g. 6 FJR lost the town of Carentan without much of a fight, after fighting like Tigers for the marshes north of the town, in part because they were running low on ammo. All rifle ammo was being fed to the MGs and mortar ammo was gone. Tactical narratives say the heavy weapons had been the key to the defense and were so low the gave ground repeatedly. They got more from 17SS when it arrived for its counterattack.

[Mad Russian]

Jason, being cut off from supplies is obviously a different situation than simply running out of ammo in the normal sense of the word. I guess you could claim, using that rationale, that the entire German 6th Army was destroyed when it ran out of ammo.

Also, I am aware of many situations where the artillery ran out of ammo. You read about that more often. What seems to be rare in print anyway is documented situations of running out of small arms.

Great discussion.

[dieseltaylor]

Fascinating discussion. The slaying of Bonn by Nutter was superb.

The number of useful troops seems very reminiscent of a British report to the War Office from Italy which unfortunately I cannot locate at the moment. The basic contention was that about 20% of a force was fit for fighting with a proportion totally useless and the balance would be adequate for defence. No doubt someone wull recall it.

[dieseltaylor]

Any thoughts?

The Dupuy group's assumptions concerning air interdiction were threefold: (1) that the supply capability of the interdicted force is reduced through both the destruction of supplies and the difficulties created for moving such supplies; (2) that the ability of the interdicted force to move reinforcements as well as troops actually engaged is impaired; and (3) that the damage done to the interdicted force's communications impairs its command and control function. Dupuy and his colleagues were only able to investigate the effect of interdiction upon the supply function. When this element was considered in connection with the Developmental Data Base (the original 60 engagements studied), it was found that it was decisive in 25% of the engagements in which interdiction effects were discernible. But whereas it was somewhat difficult for the group to evaluate the effects of interdiction, the effects of direct interaction between air and ground weapons were much more susceptible to evaluation. The group identified eight different ways in which airpower affects ground action; most of these effects increase the combat power of the side with air superiority. The group applied the eight air superiority elements to the Developmental Data Base, in which there were 38 instances of Allied success, as well as seven in which the outcome was inconclusive. Dupuy and his colleagues found that if the air component had been removed from these 45 engagements, a German success would have been either predictable or very likely in 20-24 of them. Put another way, in this subset of 45 engagements, "airpower provided the margin which provided victory or prevented defeat" in at least 44% (perhaps as high as 53%) of Allied successes and inconclusive engagements.(84

[JonS]

Dear Brigadier mayhap?

... The battle goes something like this:-

Enemy MGs open fire, the whole Pl lie down except the Pl Comd and three or four gutful men. Five or six men start making tracks for home, meanwhile the gutful men under the Pl Comd dash straight in to the enemy position without any covering fire and always succeed in taking the position. In some instances some positions are taken by as few as two men, and every Bn Comd will confirm that it is always the same group of nine or ten who are there first, and on whom the battle depends.

I have personally seen this method of attack used in all, except one, of the battles in which I took part, and this explains one of the mysteries I have never been able to solve before - that is the saying of many experienced soldiers that 'you must never allow men to lie down in a battle'.

This method of attack is peculiarly British and from the point of view of sheer courage it really has no equal. I am convinced however that we can find other and better methods, and I make the following observations:

(i) Some Comds say that this method is successful with few casualties. This is true if you speak of casualties in quantity, but it is far from true if you speak of casualties in quality. The Pl in action is almost invariably twenty-two strong and of whatever Regt good or bad, every Pl can be analysed as follows:

Six gutful men [27%] who will go anywhere and do anything, 12 'sheep' [55%] who will follow a short distance behind if they are well led, [4] [18%] who will run away.

I have discussed these figures with many people and they all agree, although there is some slight disagreement on figures. These figures are roughly accurate as shown by the number of Court-Martials for running away that follow every Campaign. Every Bn has between forty to sixty and there are, of course, many others who aren't caught.

Looking at these figures it will be seen that the group from which casualties cannot be spared is the gutful group, yet I would say that casualties in this group are often 100 per cent per month. We must find a method of fighting which is more economical.

(ii) Battle Drill or Fire and Movement ...

Jon

[ March 20, 2006, 07:53 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

The slaying of Bonn by Nutter was superb.

Do you think? In addition to his [Nutter] swallowing SLAM in toto, I thought he lost the wood for the trees in a few places.

Still, an interesting essay nonetheless, and a useful counterpoint.

Jon

[JasonC]

dt - utter rot. Air had practically nothing to do with it. In Normandy in particular, the Germans simply ran out of front line infantry strength opposite the US main effort. Air was less important in that happening than the simple and repeated application of artillery and battalion sized probes over a time scale of weeks, which bled the Germans white. The actual breakthrough was likewise accomplished by corps level infantry attack.

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by JonS:

Dear Brigadier mayhap?

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />... The battle goes something like this:-

Enemy MGs open fire, the whole PI lie down except the PI Comd and three or four gutful men. Five or six men start making tracks for home, meanwhile the gutful men under the PI Comd dash straight in to the enemy position without any covering fire and always succeed in taking the position. ...

</font>

[dieseltaylor]

As in normal life the proportions of doers and sheeps seems right to me. Thanks for locating the item for me.

Yes accepting SLAM might be an error but the rebuttals were very well rsearched and highly illuminating - in information aswell as the quality of some writers.

dt - utter rot. Air had practically nothing to do with it. In Normandy in particular, the Germans simply ran out of front line infantry strength opposite the US main effort. Air was less important in that happening than the simple and repeated application of artillery and battalion sized probes over a time scale of weeks, which bled the Germans white. The actual breakthrough was likewise accomplished by corps level infantry attack.

JC - I am of course interested in your view as opposed to Dupuys but I do not now which 45 battles were chosen for their survey. I doubt they were all Normandy so there seems little point in us discussing it. I share your overall view of the Normandy campaign.

Dupuy's conclusions may not be based on actual damage done, as measured in tanks, but the inability/disinclination to move immediate reserves during daylight thereby compromising the German attack/defence. I do not think I will in the near future have a chance to research further but I certainly know that most PBI felt very depressed by enemy planes taking an interest in them.