historical question

[coe]

What makes an airlanding division an airlanding division as opposed to a regular division or parachute division (role, equipment)?

and a curiosity question - I wonder what it would take to make a true armored parachute division (i.e. an armored division parachuting from the sky.

Conan

[Kingfish]

The airlanding battalions, or brigades, of a British Para division would be deployed to the battle in Gliders, and as such would normally carry most of the division's heavy weapons.

Not sure about divisional-sized formations. AFAIK, the allies never used one in combat. The Germans did deploy 2 during the war, the 22nd and 91st Luftlande divisions, of which the latter saw extensive combat around the Contentin peninsula during the Normandy campaign.

Edit: it turns out the allies did use an airlanding division in combat, but not in its intended role. The 52nd (lowland) infantry division was redesignated as an airlanding division for Market-Garden, but was never used as such.

[ June 14, 2006, 10:17 AM: Message edited by: Kingfish ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by coe:

What makes an airlanding division an airlanding division as opposed to a regular division or parachute division (role, equipment)?

"Airlanding" means they land, by trasport aircraft or glider, "parachute" means they parachute. Although I've only ever heard of German airlanding divs (IIRC 52nd Lowland was trained for the role but never did it, otherwise airlanding formations were brigades), and in the German case the difference was usually that one operated like conventional infantry, and so did the other.

Originally posted by coe:

and a curiosity question - I wonder what it would take to make a true armored parachute division (i.e. an armored division parachuting from the sky.

Very light tanks, very big parachutes, or extremely thick air.

All the best,

John.

[tar]

Airlanding units vs. paratrooopers. The airlanding units were not jump-trained and as noted above were expected to land either on transport aircraft stopping at airfields or on gliders.

Airlanding vs. normal infantry. They were "lighter" units, particularly as regards to the heavier weapons. I would expect to see more pack howitzers and other smaller caliber artillery. Unlike late war infantry units that often had organic armor support, airlanding units would not be able to have such luxuries.

Of course, since at least for the Axis, many of the parachute, etc. units ended up being employed as regular infantry rather than in an air assault role, the actual support weapons would have gotten heavier since air transport was no longer a concern.

[dieseltaylor]

Tetrarch - Wiki will tell you all about them : )

Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment, 6th Airborne Division- landed by Hamilcar glider as part of Operation Overlord on June 6, 1944 on the River Orne

[Kingfish]

The Tetrach wasn't the only armored vehicle the Brit 6th AB used in combat. During Op Varsity in '45 a small number of M22 Locust light tanks were deployed via Hamilcar gliders.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by coe:

What makes an airlanding division an airlanding division as opposed to a regular division or parachute division (role, equipment)?

"Airlanding" means they land, by trasport aircraft or glider, "parachute" means they parachute. Although I've only ever heard of German airlanding divs (IIRC 52nd Lowland was trained for the role but never did it, otherwise airlanding formations were brigades), and in the German case the difference was usually that one operated like conventional infantry, and so did the other.

Originally posted by coe:

and a curiosity question - I wonder what it would take to make a true armored parachute division (i.e. an armored division parachuting from the sky.

Very light tanks, very big parachutes, or extremely thick air.

All the best,

John. </font>

[Dandelion]

Hey there

I'll give it a whirl, with a specifically German perspective. As has been mentioned, the short answer to the issue of difference between paras and airlanding infantry is weight and mode of deployment.

Operational context

In German airborne operations the seizing of an airhead was pivotal (as in any nation) and to them, airheads meant airfields. They did not develop any skills in the improvised building of airfields, nor indeed did they become very skilled at paradropping supplies. Focus was on airfields and in the territories of the foreseen enemies, there were plenty of airfields to steal anyway. The ultralight paras were capable of seizing these airfields but not, it was argued, to hold them against regular enemy forces for any meaningful period of time. Enter the airlanding infantry. Being airmobile and using transport planes, they could carry along the heavy equipment of the infantry division.

The role of airlanding infantry - the LL

Airlanding infantry was light infantry trained to rapidly deploy from transport planes, and in some cases but not normally from gliders too. Their training focused on securing perimeters, specifically airfield perimeters, and doing so under extreme conditions (darkness, hostile fire, deploying at great speed in spite of total confusion etc). Thus, airlanding infantry needed an airstrip to deploy, unlike the paras who could drop just about wherever they wanted (well...). Apart from that training, they were ordinary light infantry.

LL Sturm Rgt

An exception here was the Luftlande Sturm Regiment, which was a paratroop formation organised and equipped for glider insertion. It took part in all major German airborne operations. In spite of the unit designation it was not an airlanding unit (in the German sense of the word), it was a gliderborne air assault unit. Like the paras and unlike airlanding infantry, it belonged to the airforce.

LL organisation and equipment

Airlanding divisions (22nd, 91st) were organised and equipped very similar to other light infantry, such as the Gebirgsjäger and Jäger. All artillery formations used mountain organisation and equipment. Similarly, regimental assets (regimental companies) were permanently distributed to company level, and the divisions used two regiments of three battallions (instead of three rgts with 3 bns, as was initially the infantry norm). The battallions, however, had five companies instead of the normal four, and these were all identical and equal strength companies (thus not the three rifle plus support company pattern of regular infantry). The airlanding divisions were thus organised (and indeed trained) for sustained fighting in smaller formations.

22 I.D. LL

The 22nd was designated Airlanding division but initially had only parts of it trained and equipped for the role. The rest was regular infantry (not light infantry), e.g. the division had three regiments and not two. The airlanding elements participated in the airborne operations of 1940. Mainly by landing in transport planes on Dutch airfields. The division, howerer, never took to the skies again, as they were tied down guarding oilfields during the operations in the Balkans in 41. The elements trained and equipped for the airlanding role were assembled in a battlegroup (KG Buhse) and sent to Africa, where it was destroyed in 1943. The rest of 22nd went East and laboured on, and retained the name Luftlande until it too was destroyed in 1945.

91 I.D. LL

On the contrary, the 91st was a fully equipped, trained and organised airlanding division from her creation in january 1944. About a third of the personnel were veteran paratroopers. Rather than air assault, she was intended for the strategic reserve role as a rapid intervention force. The division never participated in anything airborne however, she didn't even have to airlift to any threatened front. The threat came to her instead, and she was destroyed in august 1944.

Apart from these, mountain troops were used in the very same role on more than one occasion.

As for airborne armour, the soviets came a few steps along that path I think, much later.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Andreas]

Dandelion

Can you get Mattias to drop me an email? His old email and mobile phone seems to be no more.

Thanks a lot in advance!

Cheers

Andreas

[Dandelion]

Hi there Andreas

Unfortunately, he has ceased answering any attempts of mine to contact him as well.

This happens regularly. He disapperars.

He's usually back in a year or two.

I've gotten more or less used to it.

All the best

Dandelion

[Andreas]

Ah well, I'll just wait for that to happen then. Or maybe next time someone calls my mobile and starts talking Swedish, I answer, instead of looking bemused and hanging up.

Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond.

Cheers

Andreas

[painfbat]

==================================

LL organisation and equipment

Airlanding divisions (22nd, 91st) were organised and equipped very similar to other light infantry, such as the Gebirgsjäger and Jäger. All artillery formations used mountain organisation and equipment. Similarly, regimental assets (regimental companies) were permanently distributed to company level, and the divisions used two regiments of three battallions (instead of three rgts with 3 bns, as was initially the infantry norm). The battallions, however, had five companies instead of the normal four, and these were all identical and equal strength companies (thus not the three rifle plus support company pattern of regular infantry). The airlanding divisions were thus organised (and indeed trained) for sustained fighting in smaller formations.

22 I.D. LL

The 22nd was designated Airlanding division but initially had only parts of it trained and equipped for the role. The rest was regular infantry (not light infantry), e.g. the division had three regiments and not two. The airlanding elements participated in the airborne operations of 1940. Mainly by landing in transport planes on Dutch airfields. The division, howerer, never took to the skies again, as they were tied down guarding oilfields during the operations in the Balkans in 41. The elements trained and equipped for the airlanding role were assembled in a battlegroup (KG Buhse) and sent to Africa, where it was destroyed in 1943. The rest of 22nd went East and laboured on, and retained the name Luftlande until it too was destroyed in 1945.

================================================

I could be wrong but books like "Die Geschichte der 22.Infanterie-Division" and "Flak-Bat.22 Seine Geschichte" tell me something different.

As do these sources:

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Infanterieregimenter/IR16.htm

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Infanterieregimenter/IR47.htm

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Infanterieregimenter/IR65.htm

http://www.balsi.de/Weltkrieg/Einheiten/Infanteriedivisionen/22-ID.htm

http://www.historic.de/

Cheers,

[Dandelion]

Er... Might you please disclose how any of the links you provide conflict with anything I wrote?

First link tells us of Rgt 16, and how parts of it was trained and used for airlanding duties. Right.

Second link tells us that the companies of 47nd regiment were equal in strength and organisation. Ok.

Third link tells us the 65th was partially trained and equipped for airlanding tasks (III Batl to be more specific than this source). Mhm.

Fourth link is a link telling us not much of anything at all.

Fifth link leads to a frontal page of a... what? Pictoral history of the Bremen guys and some guys of the Oldenburg Regiment. That's some nice googling there. Great pics.

And I wrote what above? That the regiments were not partially trained and equipped for airlanding duties? That the companies were not equal in strength and organisation?

You mentioned the German name of the divisional history of the 22nd infantry. Presumably evoking you own it, as I do. I am interested to read of the ways I contradicted it above. Since you own it, might you be so kind as to extend the courtesy of explaining the ways in which I erred these Hanseatic Germans in my misguided comment? And while you are at it - I do not own any volume on the 22nd artillery, didn't even know there was one, but seeing as you seem to do - would it be too much to ask that you elucidate the manners in which I erred them as wll in my comment above?

Or is this just another case of mistaking the artillery of 1 Fallschirm-Jäger-Division with I. Fallschirm Korps?

Yours Sincerely

Dandelion

[JonS]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

LL organisation and equipment

Airlanding divisions (22nd, 91st) were organised and equipped very similar to other light infantry, such as the Gebirgsjäger and Jäger. All artillery formations used mountain organisation and equipment. Similarly, regimental assets (regimental companies) were permanently distributed to company level, and the divisions used two regiments of three battallions (instead of three rgts with 3 bns, as was initially the infantry norm). The battallions, however, had five companies instead of the normal four, and these were all identical and equal strength companies (thus not the three rifle plus support company pattern of regular infantry). The airlanding divisions were thus organised (and indeed trained) for sustained fighting in smaller formations.

Is anyone able to confirm the bit in bold? Zetterling gives the org of 91LLID bns as a typical four coys, not five as Dandelion indicates above.

Also, assuming that it is five coys per bn, does anyone know the strength and org of those companies?

Finally, web-based sources show two div insignia for this Div.

Feldgrau has a bow and arrow superimposed over a red and black shield, while Axis History has an arm weilding a sword within a shield. Which of these is correct for June 1944 please?

Thanks

Jon

[ October 09, 2006, 03:39 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Dandelion]

Jon, that was a sweeping summary of the airlanding arm in general, matching the level of interest displayed by the questioner. It wasn't intended for detail study. You know, I was speaking (writing, as it was) generally, as a rule. As the 22nd fought six years of war and pioneered the airlanding operations, they tend to be the rule. 91st existed a few months and so her divergence in structure out of practical necessity, while interesting of course, will not usually warrant comment in a sweeping summary.

Had on the other hand the questioner wanted a detailed study, one might have made an effort to deliver one. But he was just generally curious, as you can see above. I could have written more extensively on the topic but I assumed I would have lost him by page 2. He just wanted to know the characteristics of these arms.

Specifically the three battallions of 1057th and 1058th respectively had four understrength companies each, plus regimental companies. The regimental companies were semi-permanently distributed. This according to Tessin.

As for the Luftlande companies I know how they were supposed to be organised. That's not saying they always were. They manifestly weren't as they changed organisation even officially at two times, not mentioning field realities et cetera. One would need the divisional history of the 91st to know how closely exactly they followed authorised organisation, and I don't have access to it. But you know, generally speaking, as a rule (literally):

Companies were divided into a Fliegende Staffel and a Erdstaffel (flying- and Ground units).

Fliegende Staffel (called "I" in military jargon) had a

Coy Hq

Company commander

Coy Hq section

Coy Hq section leader

Communications NCO

4 Runners

Recon section

Section leader

5 privates (recon)

Antitank section

Section leader

4 privates (initially, eventually 11 men, reflecting the increasing need to crew ever heavier weapons)

(here later also a machinegun section of two guns)

Platoons 1 -3

Platoon commander

Platoon hq section

Section leader

4 runners

4 squads (per platoon)

Squadleader

7 privates, except 4th squad which had only 6.

Incidentally, issue was one machinegun per squad.

mortar section

Section leader

2 privates (initially, eventually 8 men)

There was also a number of men included in the flying part of the company but not in any specific subsection, namely

Equipment NCO

Medical NCO

4 stretcher bearers

a weapon mechanic/specialist.

All in all the flying (bayonet) part of the company had 4 officers, 24 NCOs, 140 privates.

In addition was the ground element (called "II" in military jargon).As the name suggests it was not meant to take part in air assaults.

It consisted of

Combat support

Commanding NCO (the Spiess)

A company clerk

Two cooks

Two horse-tenders

9 privates primarily acting drivers of horse-carts or trucks.

Supply section

Section commander

1 private

Pack column

Column commander

3 privates (of which one a tailor and one a shoemaker)

Special Equipment section

2 privates, driving the tuck of the section.

All in all then, the LL company counted 4 officers, 26 NCOs and 162 men.

This to be found in the K.St.N./KAN 131c.

After 1941 there was also a machinegun section of two guns. This was distributed from the initial machinegun companies. The machinegun companies were scrapped following the Crete experience (in which the airlanding units did not take part - depending how you look upon the Sturm Regiment - but from which could be drawn valuable experiences of air assault nonetheless). While they existed they used the K.St.N/KAN 151c.

Regimental companies were, after 1941, supposed to be distributed to battallion command. Regiments were supposed to be 15 company regiments (instead of 14) all units belonging to battallion organisation. Rgt HQ was thin, Bat HQ was fat, in the LL org. Exist the regimental companies did in various periods nonetheless however. Either on paper (while in fact distributed), or for real.

For the in-depth study of these units I sincerely recommend "Die Deutsche Fallschirmtruppe 1939-1941" by Karl-Heinz Golla and "Die Deutsche Fallschirmtruppe 1942-1945" by Hans-Martin Stimpel. In spite of the titles, the airlanding arm is covered in painful detail.

All the best

Dandelion

[JonS]

Many thanks D. Very helpful as always

[Black Jack Pershing II]

Very light tanks, very big parachutes, or extremely thick air.

Very springy ground and/or giant trampolines might also work.

You also neglect the German's pioneering work in hover-tanks which used superconductors and cold fusion to travel in the air. How do you think they got to Mars? Rockets? Nah -- the lift capacity was too small.

[Kingfish]

Why not just disassemble the tanks and drop them in 16,249 individual cannisters?

[Sergei]

Or just capture enemy tank factories with paratroops, then start producing heavy tanks?

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Why not just disassemble the tanks and drop them in 16,249 individual cannisters?

Actually they did that at Dien Bien Phu, using Chaffees. Worked marvellously, all 10 were assembled in time to be destroyed in the battle.

Although I am not to sure about the number of cannisters of course...

Cheers

D

[dog of war]

are the luftwaffe infantry in this game a air landing unit or what are they

[Andreas]

They are Felddivisionen (L) type chaps if they are after 11/43. Before that, they are from Luftwaffe-Felddivisionen.

If you think it does not make a difference, you are wrong.

All the best

Andreas

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by dog of war:

are the luftwaffe infantry in this game a air landing unit or what are they

They are not airlanding units. Below my text from cmakdb psted in:

With the catastrophic casualties suffered in the East, the German army had already spent the part of the army Reserve (men aged 20 to 35) considered first line (i.e. the youngest eight classes) by the winter of 1942. Their eyes turned to the Luftwaffe. The latter had only received a small section of the classes 1921 to 1924, but as these were unspent there were around 200 000 young, fit and motivated men in the Luftwaffe Reserve. Roughly 100 000 of these had already undergone Grundausbildung (regardless of service, basic infantry training had to be passed) and the army demanded the transfer of these immediately.

Hermann Göring, chief of the Luftwaffe and minister of the government, feared the reduction of armed force under his immediate control. His position in the government and party would be reduced accordingly. Thus, he countered the army demand with a promise to raise 20 ground troop divisions, using the entire Reserve of 200 000 men, if these divisions would be kept under Luftwaffe control. Confronted with this or nothing, the army reluctantly agreed. Thus were created the Luftwaffe-Feld-Divisionen.

The men were all taken from the Luftwaffe, as a rule the army did not even train them. As a rule, the divisions raised contained no men with infantry combat experience, not even officers or staff. Generally, instructors lacking the same experiences trained the men. While excellent quality recruits, the result was still the lowest quality trained regular combat formations ever entering German service in the war, with officers incapable of reading maps and signallers unfamiliar with army radios, and so on. Sounded grand enough, with units carrying the title Luftwaffe-Jäger-Regiment and several formations using titles such as Ski-Bataillone so and so.

The divisions were generally well equipped(this could vary though). The army was forced to supply the equipment necessary for 20 divisions. In addition, the Luftwaffe had liberal supplies of their own. Given that the divisions were very small, this usually meant levels of equipment quite a way away from that of ordinary army infantry divisions. Precious vehicles were issued in a scale ensuring almost complete motorisation of many of these formations.

Göring did not keep his promise and did not use the entire Reserve. The first eight divisions (1-8) were actually brigades, with four infantry battalions each plus support units. The following 13 divisions (9-21) were stronger, but still only two regiments of three battalions each (normal infantry divisions would have three such regiments at that point in the war).

All were sent to the East.

Some dissolved upon contact with the enemy, such as divisions 7 and 8, simply disappearing and never heard from again. Several were totally destroyed in their first combat, with drastic casualty rates and rapid loss of all heavy equipment (i.e. "bugging out"). The divisions generally failed every tactical objective issued to them and suffered abnormal casualty rates in every action.

By November 1943 the army had had enough and forcibly transferred all remaining units (to the army). All were withdrawn from the front for retraining and reorganisation, usually used as occupation troops in quiet corners of Europe. Army instructors preformed six months of retraining and the divisions were beefed with experienced army leaders, NCOs as well as officers. In the end, the army was able to create 14 fully-fledged infantry divisions (most of them using the Division n.A. organisation) from these remnants. They now carried the name Feld-Divisionen (L) and had switched to army colours and insignia (but not uniforms if they could help it, since those supplied by the Luftwaffe were of superior quality). Most were sent to the front again, performing on quite another level.

Only two served in the Mediterranean, the 19th and 20th. These were both slightly odd, as units serving in the Med had a tendency to be.

The 19th was stationed in a quiet part of the Netherlands after the transfer to the army. It was a Bodenstndig (static) division at that point. By the summer of 1944 it was sent to Italy, where it transformed to Division n.A. organisation (receiving the title Sturm when completed) and entered combat in June. In July, the division was almost completely destroyed. Having displayed fine qualities however, the remaining men were sent to Denmark, to form a regular army division there (19.Gren.Div.). Some of the men were also transferred to the 20th as noted below.

The 20th was withdrawn to Denmark for retraining and during the transformation process it was classified as a bicycleborne division (and thus changed not to white Waffenfarbe but to yellow, interestingly rather similar to Luftwaffe Yellow). Like the 19th, it was sent to Italy in the summer of 1944 and there completed its transformation to a standard infantry division (also obtaining the title Sturm, signifying only that it was now capable of offensive action). If fought until December 1944, reinforced by men from the 19th in August. By December, the division was so depleted that it was dissolved. As it has performed more than credibly however, the remaining men entered service with the 26th Panzerdivision.

[Corvidae]

Sergei,

have you been playing C&C again?

UGH!

Dandelion,

Sounds interesting, I would like to find more info on these luftwaffe infantry divisions,

[Andreas]

For info on LW Felddivisionen:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=6292

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=73733

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=55943

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=90624

All the best

Andreas