Bocage Busting: Bad history Bad CM

[dieseltaylor]

I was posting this at Band of Brothers and thought perhaps it should be more widely discussed so that the bad history, and the way it is replicated in CM can be appreciated for the garbage it is.

"I must admit to having a deep loathing of the way in CM after July 1944 US armour miraculously is able to drive through tall hedges whilst other countries armour cannot.

There is a discussion here where I have brought several sources to the discussion:

web page

Those of you who have checked the game will find that all US tanks can get through in just over a minute and perversely the light tanks even quicker.

If you are wondering how this ties in with the recorded history of using engineers etc and the preparatory work involved, the damage done to tanks by repeated charging of solid earth banks, the run up needed, the impossibiliy of getting enough speed purchase in wet/broken fields you make think thta the myth was spread to counter adverse comment on the US armies performance in the bocage and to raise home morale.

So should scenario designers be aware of the false advantage given in the game by this piece of 1944 propaganda? Should designers ignore tall hedges post June 1944 to prevent gamey exploitation - I think so.

[ September 14, 2006, 11:40 AM: Message edited by: dieseltaylor ]

[Darkmath]

At least it would be clearer for a scenario deigner ; instead of the tall hedge to -incorrectly- simulate bocage, road with wood will be used.

It is a more realistic way to simulate bocage.

[JonS]

To be fair ...

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

the damage done to tanks by repeated charging of solid earth banks,

Vehicle breakdown and maintenance is irrelevant as far as CM is concerned (see: no need to refuel, and many discussions of T-34 reliability or lack thereof)

the run up needed,

Irrelevant (see: tanks can turn on a dime)

the impossibiliy of getting enough speed purchase in wet/broken fields

True, but the high chance of a permanent bog somewhat counters this.

the US armies

IIRC, British and CW vehs can also traverse tall hedges post-July 44

Having said that, I agree that the tall hedges are 'broken' as a substitute for bocage. Still there are counters to it available to thoughtful designers.

Furthermore, whining that it's broken is a total waste of time. Accept its broken, then move on to figuring out what you can dfo about it given the current toolset, 'cos it ain't gonna be fixed.

Regards

Jon

[JasonC]

Bocage is a tile of terrain 1-2 levels higher than the surrounding fields. When you put scattered trees on it, you get a hedge that tanks can push through. When you use full woods, they can't. You can also use tree-lined roads with full woods borders to make them thinner, and just not put in any locations that let vehicles get onto the road itself. A simply ordinary hedge atop the berm can represent an easily passable one, and a tall hedge atop it can represent one that only Allied tanks can bull through. The scenario designer picks or mixes and matches as he sees fit.

[Harry Yeide]

Medium tanks v bocage, courtesy of the 741st Tank Battalion's AAR:

"With the new [Rhino] device, it was felt that the unit would be enabled to operate with more freedom, as the hedges were much less an obstacle than they had been before. . . .

The Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, after conferring with Lieutenant Colonel Skaggs, conceived a plan for the use of tanks in the next attack that would very nearly approximate the manner of using tanks in open country suited for tank combat. This plan, which came to be called a sortie, involved the maximum number of tanks, equipped with the Rhino device, that could be brought into position, allowing for the variation of the terrain. In most cases the full number of tanks could be used. The tanks would be placed in position at the line of departure and the infantry elements withdrawn several hundred yards in rear, for safety purposes. At H-hour a barrage of timed fire would be laid down over an area from 300 to 500 yards in depth past the LD. The tanks would advance rapidly under the airbursts, smashing hedges and uprooting enemy emplacements in the zone of action, at the same time placing a maximum amount of direct cannon and machine gun fire on the enemy. After breaking the enemy defenses the tanks would return to the line of departure, establish contact with supporting infantry, and resume the attack with the infantry-tank team.

On 26 July, 1944, at 0600, this battalion attacked in support of the 38th and 23d Infantry regiments, with the line of departure south of the St. Lô-Berigny road. . . .

With Companies A and B, both reinforced, attached to the 38th Infantry, and Company C attached to the 23d Infantry, the attack started on schedule and the tanks smashed through the hedges on the tank sortie. With their cannons blasting and machine guns stuttering, the tanks were an awe-inspiring spectacle as they churned their way through the enemy positions after a crashing barrage of timed fire. The enemy was obviously stunned by the ferocity of the attack, as not a single tank was lost on the initial sortie. Hundreds of German infantrymen were killed as they lay in their foxholes, and then ground under the tracks of the onrushing tanks. Machine gun emplacements were ripped out of the hedges by the impact of the Rhino devices, and the enemy lines, to a distance of 300 to 500 yards, were a shambles.

At H+20 [minutes] the tanks returned from the sortie, joined the infantry half of the team and resumed the onslaught at H+30."

As it happened, Company F, 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped with Rhino M5A1s participated in this sortie adjacent to the 741st Tank Bn, with similar results.

I'm not aware of a Rhino-equipped unit being unable to move through hedgerows with facility.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />the run up needed,

Irrelevant (see: tanks can turn on a dime) [/QB]</font>

[dieseltaylor]

Darkmath. I agree

Jon S. : I never thought it would be fixed. However people seem unaware of this travesty of history and of the Allied armours singular advantage. The details I provided were to illustrate the bogusness of the CM representation.

To add to the bogusness as you correctly point out it applies to all Allied fully tracked vehicles, and in Italy. So it sucks mightily as it is historically bogus. Rather like incredible air power it is a myth that needs slaying.

I am glad that you have posted as the comments might alert folk to the problems in truly representing it in CM

[rune]

actually you are right and wrong diesel. The Engineering with ramps and explosives were replaced by the cutters. The reason? I quote:

"Another approach was conceived by tankers of the 747th Tank Battalion, attached to the 29th Division. In conjunction with Lt. Col. Robert Ploger's 121st Engineer Combat Battalion, the tankers experimented with combined engineer-tank tactics to create breaches in the hedge wide enough for a tank to pass through. During an attack on 24 June, the engineers placed a pair of 24 lb charges eight feet apart at the base of the hedge. The tactics worked, but the engineers decided that a charge double the size was really needed. Ploger began a more careful study of the problem. A tank company, penetrating one and a half miles through bocage country, would on average encounter 34 separate hedgerows. This would require 17 tons of explosive per company or about 60 tons per battalion. This was clearly beyond the resources of any engineer battalion."

The quote is from Steve Zaloga.

He also goes on to explain that a runup was required and often due to bombardment the tanks couldn't cross the pastures.

Interesting reading for anyone interested:

Hedgerow Cutters

Rune

[John Kettler]

rune,

A nice account, but Sgt. Culin didn't come up with the original idea. That came from a guy he knew (don't remember it but saw it years ago in ARMOR magazine); Culin recognized a good idea and ran with it. There's some good stuff on the device in Cooper's DEATH TRAPS and Doubler's CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY, where I learned of a fascinating tactic involving an explosive breach, immediately followed by a pair of infantry bearing Stuarts blazing right and left on the backside of the breached hedgerow with canister and MG fire.

Regards,

John Kettler

[dieseltaylor]

JK.

The article mentions several men evolved in the evolution of the device - perhaps you read the linked article too hastily.

[dieseltaylor]

rune

Why not quote this from the same article?

One of the tankers came up with the idea of fitting a pair of timber prongs on the front of each tank, called a 'Salad Fork'. When a breach in the bocage was needed, a tank would charge across the field and embed the prongs in the base of the hedge. When the tank backed out, it would pull out the timber prong, leaving small tunnels. The engineers pre-packaged 15 lb of explosive in the fibre-board containers used to transport 105 mm artillery ammunition. Two of these improvised demolition charges could create a gap wide enough for a tank and the accompanying infantry. The small tracked M29 Weasel utility vehicles would follow the tank-engineer team, bringing along extra explosive. As only 53 tanks were available for the 11 July assault, they were concentrated in the sectors of the 116th Regiment. These new tactics and training paid off, and the 116th Regiment succeeded in rupturing the German lines far more effectively than in the past. These tactics were copied by other units, including the 703rd Tank Battalion attached to the 4th Infantry Division. There are records that indicate that other tank units in the neighboring V Corps fielded 'brush cutters' on their tanks in July, but details are lacking.

So only two thirds as much explosive plus an actual account of successful use.

[dieseltaylor]

Harry Yeide

The Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, after conferring with Lieutenant Colonel Skaggs, conceived a plan for the use of tanks in the next attack that would very nearly approximate the manner of using tanks in open country suited for tank combat. This plan, which came to be called a sortie, involved the maximum number of tanks, equipped with the Rhino device, that could be brought into position, allowing for the variation of the terrain

Do you have links?

You will note that the terrain was especially chosen for a particular type of attack. I think that also there is a tendency to believe rather like all tanks were Tigers all hedges were true bocage. If you sincerely believe a Stuart could drive through a 10ft thick mound of earth tied together with hundreds of years of roots I suggest you are wrong.

Reading the account makes me think that these hedges were fairly traditional European unmounded hedges of perhaps 4-5ft thick maximum, possibly even thinner at 3ft. Designed to be impenetrable to livestock they were plenty adequate to disrupt severely human movement. To a tank not a huge problem provided they had momentum.

Harry have you looked any any pictures of true bocage?

[John Kettler]

dieseltaylor,

What I looked for but didn't see was the name of the sergeant? in his unit who first came up with the idea. As I noted previously, the originator didn't execute on his idea, but Culin did and won a certain level of fame as a result.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Harry Yeide]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Harry Yeide

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> The Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, after conferring with Lieutenant Colonel Skaggs, conceived a plan for the use of tanks in the next attack that would very nearly approximate the manner of using tanks in open country suited for tank combat. This plan, which came to be called a sortie, involved the maximum number of tanks, equipped with the Rhino device, that could be brought into position, allowing for the variation of the terrain

Do you have links?

You will note that the terrain was especially chosen for a particular type of attack. I think that also there is a tendency to believe rather like all tanks were Tigers all hedges were true bocage. If you sincerely believe a Stuart could drive through a 10ft thick mound of earth tied together with hundreds of years of roots I suggest you are wrong.

Reading the account makes me think that these hedges were fairly traditional European unmounded hedges of perhaps 4-5ft thick maximum, possibly even thinner at 3ft. Designed to be impenetrable to livestock they were plenty adequate to disrupt severely human movement. To a tank not a huge problem provided they had momentum.

Harry have you looked any any pictures of true bocage? </font>

[Kingfish]

Road to Carentan

Road to Vierville

Road to Marigy

As you can see these pics were taken a few years after WW2, so the terrain is a good representation of what the US Army encountered during the Normandy campaign. While it certainly isn't tank country, it also isn't completely impassable either.

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Road to Carentan

Road to Vierville

Road to Marigy

As you can see these pics were taken a few years after WW2, so the terrain is a good representation of what the US Army encountered during the Normandy campaign. While it certainly isn't tank country, it also isn't completely impassable either.

Using the "Road to Marigny" photo as an example, if I wanted to move on the town from the E - W road labeled "D972", I'd have to plow through (at the least) 9 - 10 hedgerows. Not exactly a walk in the park --- especially under fire. I'd imagine it would take most of the day to go what's prolly only 2 - 3 miles.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

Using the "Road to Marigny" photo as an example, if I wanted to move on the town from the E - W road labeled "D972", I'd have to plow through (at the least) 9 - 10 hedgerows. Not exactly a walk in the park --- especially under fire. I'd imagine it would take most of the day to go what's prolly only 2 - 3 miles.

Just one point: The Americans were headed south. The route you describe is headed north, the direction the Germans would have to take if they were attacking. North or south, it crosses the same terrain, which is your point I believe. I only mention it because it seems that nearly everybody gets their directions mixed up when talking about Normandy.

Michael

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />the run up needed,

Irrelevant (see: tanks can turn on a dime) </font>

[rune]

Diesel,

I said right and wrong and posted the article. If you read further, it states the idea of ramming with the railroad ties had drawbacks, and the reason they went to the cutters. The ties would dislodge, the brackets would break, etc.

Rune

[GRUMLIN]

Having walked through the terrain just north of Falaise this summer, and around Carentan two years ago, the hedge quality varies massively, as it does in the UK.

Any of you near Orpington in Kent (UK), go look at the old road running from green st green up over the hill to farnborough (called old hill, funnily enough). That old road is about 10 feet below the banks of the woods and fields either side. Follow it up to farnborough church via church road and there is a fantastic bocage on the right hand side......although they may well build on that land soon enough...sigh.

However, just as in the SE of England, a lot of hedge boundaries were lesser obstacles. Tough to get through, yes, impossible to see through, sure, but not impassable to a determined tanker. I'd say scenario designers could continue to use scattered trees for these, but for the real bocages stick woods on a road edge, with a height variance as well.

btw, those of you that want to look on google maps:

http://maps.google.co.uk/maps?f=q&hl=en&sll=51.265393,0.49386&sspn=0.068099,0.161018&q=old+hill+farnborough&ie=UTF8&z=15&ll=51.353238,0.088105&spn=0.016992,0.040255&t=k&om=1

[Other Means]

Your URL makes the baby Jesus cry.