Battle of Berlin (Hist.Ch. U.S.) 8 p.m. E/ 7p.m. Central. Sat

[Scott B]

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

Wasn`t it more a matter of equipment? How would the russian "Operational art" looks like without hundred of thousend of U.S. made Trucks and other mobile equipment? Now it`s the "germans" why not say A.H. himself was the poor understander (yeah...spelling.. ) Dont think you can blame the Army staff for A.H.`s mistakes!

I think you misunderstand the nature of operational art, and, moreover, profoundly underestimate the tactical ability of the German army in WWII to suggest that the decision was merely a matter of Soviet materiel superiority. The Germans repeatedly showed themselves the masters of the tactical engagement against virtually limitless odds early in the war. It was the qualitative improvements in Soviet warfighting ability and superior performance at the operational and strategic levels that negated German tactical excellence. To suggest that it was merely a matter of numbers - and particularly that it was a matter of lend lease - severely underestimates German combat ability.

The Germans were fantastic at the tactical level. Peerless in many respects, and worthy of study in that regard.

As to the final comment on Hitler, well, I can only quote Napoleon:

A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under cover of his sovereign, or of a minister, when they are both distant from the scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill informed or wholly ignorant of the actual state of things. Hence if follows that every general is culpable who undertakes the execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to represent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan; in short to give his resignation rather than allow himself to become the instrument of his army's ruin. Every general-in-chief who fights a battle in consequence of superior orders, with the certainty of losing it, is equally blamable.

Scott

[Grisha]

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

Wasn`t it more a matter of equipment? How would the russian "Operational art" looks like without hundred of thousend of U.S. made Trucks and other mobile equipment? Now it`s the "germans" why not say A.H. himself was the poor understander (yeah...spelling.. ) Dont think you can blame the Army staff for A.H.`s mistakes!

If Soviet operations had been conducted without the large amounts of lend lease trucks, they would've likely been just as successful, but with smaller gains. In other words, operational success would not have been much affected, but the scale and scope of objectives would have been pulled back some to match the level of mobility of Soviet forces. The end result would've been a longer war, but with the same ending.

Putting all the blame on Hitler is a fallacy. Granted, he was responsible for some really bad decisions as the war progressed, but during the earlier years - up to the end of 1942 - the German General Staff was more or less in his camp - except when their operations started to unravel in the ending phases. And this is the key: German operations were planned without sufficient consideration for long-term consequences or even the end phase of the operation. The German General Staff was just as optimistic as Hitler about the probabilities of success for their planned operations during the early years. It was only when operations started to fall apart towards the ending phase that the German Generals started to "complain" about their Fuhrer's "meddling." So, yes, I do blame the German General Staff for the defeat of the Wehrmacht - along with Adolph Hitler.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

If Soviet operations had been conducted without the large amounts of lend lease trucks, they would've likely been just as successful, but with smaller gains. In other words, operational success would not have been much affected, but the scale and scope of objectives would have been pulled back some to match the level of mobility of Soviet forces. The end result would've been a longer war, but with the same ending.

Now that is a naive comment (sorry about my bluntness), and shows only what happens when people fall in love with Soviet operational art of war. Next step is to deny that material has any importance, and the side that masters

Soviet operational art is always the winner...

[Keke]

I'd like to remind you that it was not only trucks. Significant amounts of tanks, aircrafts, canned food, boots etc. etc. belonged to the lend-lease material.

[ July 24, 2003, 02:05 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Putting all the blame on Hitler is a fallacy. Granted, he was responsible for some really bad decisions as the war progressed, but during the earlier years - up to the end of 1942 - the German General Staff was more or less in his camp - except when their operations started to unravel in the ending phases. And this is the key: German operations were planned without sufficient consideration for long-term consequences or even the end phase of the operation. The German General Staff was just as optimistic as Hitler about the probabilities of success for their planned operations during the early years. It was only when operations started to fall apart towards the ending phase that the German Generals started to "complain" about their Fuhrer's "meddling." So, yes, I do blame the German General Staff for the defeat of the Wehrmacht - along with Adolph Hitler.

Surely not all the blame cannot put on Hitler, but have you even read FE how he messed up German plans on latter part of 1942?

[White Phosphorus]

Originally posted by Keke:

I'd like to remind you that it was not only trucks. Significant amounts of tanks, aircrafts, canned food, boots etc. etc. belonged to the lend-lease material.

What is significant? Could you post some numbers.

[Grisha]

Now that is a naive comment (sorry about my bluntness), and shows only what happens when people fall in love with Soviet operational art of war. Next step is to deny that material has any importance, and the side that masters Soviet operational art is always the winner...

The flaw in your argument is that you term "operational art" as a distinctly Soviet term. It is not, anymore than tactics or strategy are somehow a concept specific to a country. Soviet operational art was the Soviet theory and practice of operational art. That no other country during WWII understood the fullness or completeness of the operational level as well as the USSR does not mean that operational art was a term specific to Soviet military art. Some of the concepts and mechanics behind modern American operational art are quite different from Soviet operational art though they both do share many major similarities, so please understand that the operational level is a universal level or branch of military art - strategic, operational, and tactical. The term "strategy and tactics" is a concept from a past era and lost its theoretical validity in the real world by the late nineteenth century.

Now, when considering Soviet operational art, what one sees as a major characteristic is the use of massive force especially at the main direction of attack or defense. It would indeed be naïve to not consider this when studying Soviet operational art, and numerical superiority was a prime factor of Soviet operations. Not only was it a sound application of the ancient military principle of attaining numerical supremacy, but it also acted as a buffer against German tactical superiority. So, the oft-heard quantity versus quality principle applies here as well, no doubt. But realize that numerical superiority was mainly an effect that had the greatest impact at the tactical level. In fact, it would be logical to assume that conducting such large forces at the operational level would be a huge undertaking both logistically and via command-control. If German impressions are to be believed, Soviet operations should've been nothing more than broadfront operations that did little more than slowly push back the Germans all the way to Berlin, and this may appear to make sense especially when one realizes the largely poor-average tactical quality of Soviet troops throughout the war. But any decent map that covers in some depth Soviet operations from winter 1942/43 will illustrate just how wrong this impression was - and is. There is a consistency in the complexity, timing and finesse of Soviet operations from 1944 that reveals great skill in their conduct and employment. That such operations were often truly massive in scale and scope, and that there was an undeniable unity of purpose from the operational to the strategic is often overlooked or missed as a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. This should be so obvious that I won't bother to discuss it any further here.

Surely not all the blame cannot put on Hitler, but have you even read FE how he messed up German plans on latter part of 1942?

My point is that nobody seriously objected to conducting Case Blau in the first place as it was planned - if you can call it planned. Sort of "let's go over there and see where we're at. By then I'm sure the Soviets will surrender. Besides, we could use the oil." Sure, there were complaints about the objective, but were there any real concerns by the German General Staff that it couldn't be done? Not really. Some of them had misgivings, but they figured it would work out somehow. Incidently, most German generals were replaced towards the end of an operation after conditions had taken a turn for the worst, and the general in question disagreed with an order. Not at the beginning when it should've been obvious that things needed to be planned out more and viewed in their proper perspective.

[ July 24, 2003, 03:54 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Keke]

From Pravda (which is a Russian newspaper):

http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/90/363/9941_roosevelt.html

The USSR received hundreds of thousands of military vehicles and motorbikes. Lack of fuel was ameliorated with deliveries of 2.5 million tons of petroleum products. The profusion of Roosevelt's "garden hose" provided Stalin with 595 ships, including 28 frigates, 105 submarines, 77 trawlers, 22 torpedo boats, 140 anti-submarine vessels and others. The Soviet air force received 4,952 Aerocobra and 2,410 Kingcobra fighter jets. Soviet pilot Alexander Pokryshkin fought with Hitler's Luftwaffe aces in Aerocobra planes, which made him a Hero of the Soviet Union hero three times over.

The lend-lease agreement supplied the USSR with 2,7 thousand A-20 and 861 B-25 bomber planes. Soviet tank divisions received 7,056 tanks, 8,218 anti-aircraft emplacements, 131,600 machine guns and other arms.

Soviet propaganda tried to diminish the importance of the American help. Back in those years, it was said that the Soviet Union had produced 30,000 tanks and 40,000 planes since the middle of 1943. Well, as a matter of fact, this was true. However, one has to take into consideration the fact that lend and lease deliveries were made to the USSR during the most difficult period of the war - during the second half of 1942. In addition, the USSR would not have been capable of producing its arms without the lend-lease agreement: The USA shipped 2.3 million tons of steel to the USSR during the WWII years. That volume of steel was enough for the production of 70,000 T-34 tanks. Aluminum was received in the volume of 229,000 tons, which helped the Soviet aviation and tank industries to run for two years. One has to mention food deliveries as well: 3.8 million tons of tinned pork, sausages, butter, chocolate, egg powder and so on. The lend-lease agreement provided orderlies with 423,000 telephones and tens of thousands of wireless stations. Deliveries also included oil distillation equipment, field bakeries, tents, parachutes, and so on and so forth. The Soviet Union also received 15 million pairs of army boots.

The help was delivered to the USSR via Iran and major Soviet sea ports. About 3,000 transport vessels arrived at the ports of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok, and delivered 1.3 million tons of cargo. It would be incorrect to diminish the significance of such all-embracing help from the New World as a serious factor that assisted in the victorious ending of the war.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

The flaw in your argument is that you term "operational art" as a distinctly Soviet term. It is not, anymore than tactics or strategy are somehow a concept specific to a country. Soviet operational art was the Soviet theory and practice of operational art. That no other country during WWII understood the fullness or completeness of the operational level as well as the USSR does not mean that operational art was a term specific to Soviet military art. Some of the concepts and mechanics behind modern American operational art are quite different from Soviet operational art though they both do share many major similarities, so please understand that the operational level is a universal level or branch of military art - strategic, operational, and tactical. The term "strategy and tactics" is a concept from a past era and lost its theoretical validity in the real world by the late nineteenth century.

The flaw in your argument is that you term "strategy and tactics" a concept from a past era, when in fact it is very flexible concept, and just inventing a middle layer doesn't mean a thing in reality, just in theory.

Originally posted by Grisha:

Now, when considering Soviet operational art, what one sees as a major characteristic is the use of massive force especially at the main direction of attack or defense. It would indeed be naïve to not consider this when studying Soviet operational art, and numerical superiority was a prime factor of Soviet operations. Not only was it a sound application of the ancient military principle of attaining numerical supremacy, but it also acted as a buffer against German tactical superiority. So, the oft-heard quantity versus quality principle applies here as well, no doubt. But realize that numerical superiority was mainly an effect that had the greatest impact at the tactical level. In fact, it would be logical to assume that conducting such large forces at the operational level would be a huge undertaking both logistically and via command-control. If German impressions are to be believed, Soviet operations should've been nothing more than broadfront operations that did little more than slowly push back the Germans all the way to Berlin, and this may appear to make sense especially when one realizes the largely poor-average tactical quality of Soviet troops throughout the war. But any decent map that covers in some depth Soviet operations from winter 1942/43 will illustrate just how wrong this impression was - and is. There is a consistency in the complexity, timing and finesse of Soviet operations from 1944 that reveals great skill in their conduct and employment. That such operations were often truly massive in scale and scope, and that there was an undeniable unity of purpose from the operational to the strategic is often overlooked or missed as a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. This should be so obvious that I won't bother to discuss it any further here.

Well, if it is so obvious, I guess the concept is more of a religion, not something that could be critically scrutinized...

My point is that nobody seriously objected to conducting Case Blau in the first place as it was planned - if you can call it planned. Sort of "let's go over there and see where we're at. By then I'm sure the Soviets will surrender. Besides, we could use the oil." Sure, there were complaints about the objective, but were there any real concerns by the German General Staff that it couldn't be done? Not really. Some of them had misgivings, but they figured it would work out somehow. Incidently, most German generals were replaced towards the end of an operation after conditions had taken a turn for the worst, and the general in question disagreed with an order. Not at the beginning when it should've been obvious that things needed to be planned out more and viewed in their proper perspective.

From your comments, I got the impression that you have not studied Case Blau from German viewpoint at all, or you just fancy making ridicilous simplifications of German operations in a same way that Soviet operations have been traditionally seen in the West.

[Grisha]

Keke,

I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree. I see nothing worth discussing at this point.

[rum]

Originally posted by Keke:

From Pravda (which is a Russian newspaper):

This is modern russian newspaper, it could be with definite anti-communistic bias.

The article you mentioned is dated 05/12/2003 12:43

"The Soviet air force received 4,952 Aerocobra and 2,410 Kingcobra fighter jets. "

Take note on the last word. Even this could make me ask myself - "how competent the journalist who wrote this article?"

I wont mention what KingKobras never saw action in VVS during WWII...

"Soviet pilot Alexander Pokryshkin fought with Hitler's Luftwaffe aces in Aerocobra planes, which made him a Hero of the Soviet Union hero three times over. "

Yes, Pokryshkin fought in american Aerocobra. As well as in Soviet MiG-3.

The top Soviet ace - Kozhedub - flew all war in Lavochkin's planes

"However, one has to take into consideration the fact that lend and lease deliveries were made to the USSR during the most difficult period of the war - during the second half of 1942. "

This is wrong.

The most horrible for USSR was 1941 and the beginning of 1942.

" In addition, the USSR would not have been capable of producing its arms without the lend-lease agreement:"

Another argurable quote.

Enouth for me

I do not trying to say what USA aid was worthless.

Im just dont like the propaganda what USSR would not be able to win without it.

The most valuable lend-lease products were medicals - which saved hundreds thousands of lifes, and the trucks, which wastly increased mobility of soviet troops.

[Keke]

Originally posted by rum:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Keke:

From Pravda (which is a Russian newspaper):

This is modern russian newspaper, it could be with definite anti-communistic bias.</font>

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Keke,

I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree. I see nothing worth discussing at this point.

To clarify things, I don't disagree with the fact that the Red Army had better overall command than the German Army. I disagree with the notion that the Red Army could have won just with the concept of operational art, and without any outside help.

[White Phosphorus]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by rum:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Keke:

From Pravda (which is a Russian newspaper):

This is modern russian newspaper, it could be with definite anti-communistic bias.</font>

[John Kettler]

Keke,

Huge thanks for the Lend-Lease list! Here's why.

A friend of mine was telling me about a book called THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND (Edward Griffin?) in which it describes the security breach fits General Leslie Groves (ran the Manhattan Project--the Top Secret atomic bomb program) threw when he found out that someone had authorized the shipment of all manner of nuclear and nuclear research materials to the Soviet Union, when that country was emphatically not cleared for the Manhattan Project.

Guess what? You posted the smoking gun! In your

long Lend-Lease list (source? link?) is an entire section which constitutes the proof of precisely the nuclear program security hemorrhage which put General Groves into orbit (thorium, uranium oxide, deuterium oxide "heavy water" and much, much more).

Even disregarding the nuclear stuff, what do you figure the technological value of Lend-Lease was to the Soviets, given their relatively weak technology base compared to the U.S.?

Regards,

John Kettler

[Flesh]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Keke,

Huge thanks for the Lend-Lease list! Here's why.

A friend of mine was telling me about a book called THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND (Edward Griffin?) in which it describes the security breach fits General Leslie Groves (ran the Manhattan Project--the Top Secret atomic bomb program) threw when he found out that someone had authorized the shipment of all manner of nuclear and nuclear research materials to the Soviet Union, when that country was emphatically not cleared for the Manhattan Project.

Guess what? You posted the smoking gun! In your

long Lend-Lease list (source? link?) is an entire section which constitutes the proof of precisely the nuclear program security hemorrhage which put General Groves into orbit (thorium, uranium oxide, deuterium oxide "heavy water" and much, much more).

Even disregarding the nuclear stuff, what do you figure the technological value of Lend-Lease was to the Soviets, given their relatively weak technology base compared to the U.S.?

Regards,

John Kettler

John, here's an article on the subject, split into two parts. I thought you might find it interesting.

http://www.nexusmagazine.com/mjd1.html

http://www.nexusmagazine.com/mjd2.html

[Kevin Kinscherf]

I always tend to think it was Germany's weakness in the number of infantry they could place at the front as the empire expanded. Every time the panzer divisions were halted (eg Yelnia, Moscow, Stalingrad) the Soviet counteroffensives took a toll on the German's infantry that was impossible

to replace compared to the manpower of the Soviets. Lend Lease probably shortened the war but the end result would have been the same. It was an interesting balance - the west trying to keep the Soviets in the war but not giving enough material to conquer Eastern AND Western Europe before the US and Britian landed in Normandy.

[Grisha]

Even disregarding the nuclear stuff, what do you figure the technological value of Lend-Lease was to the Soviets, given their relatively weak technology base compared to the U.S.?

I agree there were weaknesses in Soviet technology compared to the USA's, but it wasn't across the board. As one example, Soviet aircraft armaments generally were superior to USA or UK. In fact, when the Soviets received lend lease aircraft, they often replaced all mgs with their own. If sufficient UB mgs or ShVAK cannons were available, then the Brownings were usually replaced. So, to answer your question, it would depend on an item by item basis.

[White Phosphorus]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Even disregarding the nuclear stuff, what do you figure the technological value of Lend-Lease was to the Soviets, given their relatively weak technology base compared to the U.S.?

Regards,

John Kettler

Well didn't the USSR buy most of it's tech from the west anyways? The Lend-lease was just a continuation of the process, but instead of confiscated gold the USSR was paying in blood.

[Stavka_lite]

Reeds, hemp, perilla, poppy,etc l,094,976 lbs. :eek:

Whats up with that huh?

To heck with the nuclear stuff!!!

Hemp and poppies!!! When you are getting this stuff anything is art

Ok comrade dude, I'll attack Berlin :cool:

Whatsa Berlin?

Got any cookies?

[John Kettler]

Flesh,

Had seen it listed on the site but didn't know what it was (almost wish I didn't now). A truly disturbing but valuable article, which I'm partway through. Thanks!

Have you read Hoover Fellow Anthony Sutton's NATIONAL SUICIDE and THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY? The first is the distillation of a scholarly multivolume set on the history of U.S. technology transfer to the Soviet Union; the second picks up where the first leaves off and takes the sordid story up to the Reagan years.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Andreas]

Okay, I have finally found some decent casualty statistics in an article on the fighting leading up to the Winter Line on CMH.

5th Army strength is given as ~100,000 men. Major units are split 50:50 US/British (3 divisions each).

In the period 7th October to 15th November (5 1/2 weeks), which involved two river crossing assaults and a pursuit operation over extremely difficult terrain, but no encirclement and wholesale destruction of German units, 5th Army lost 9,693 battle casualties and a roughly equivalent number of non-battle casualties (US shouldered ~2/3rds of the battle casualties). That is just short of a 20% total casualty rate. I believe that the 17.5% for the Berlin operation includes non-battle casualties. So much for 'the Western allies/the US were more careful with the lives of their soldiers.'

Interestingly, one of the US divisions was Truscott's 3rd Infantry. AIUI, Truscott is generally seen as a general who cared about the lives of his men - compared to e.g. Clark or Patton. 3rd Infantry had the highest casualties in the operation - 2,699. Assuming (heroically) the division was at full strength (14,253) when the assault began, this would be close to a 20% casualty rate over all, and between 25-35% of the rifle battalions - excluding non-battle casualties.

I guess this shows that in World War 2, all sides were prepared to take 'horrific' casualty rates that today would be absolutely unacceptable for the same nations.

[winkelried]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I guess this shows that in World War 2, all sides were prepared to take 'horrific' casualty rates that today would be absolutely unacceptable for the same nations.

I always understood, that one of the motivations for Eisenhower/Roosevelt (?) to stop at the Elbe and not to attack Berlin were the losses to expect from such a venture that late in the war.

And the same motivation drove Truman to drop the bomb on Japan to avoid the perspective of loosing hundreds of thousands of American lives with an invasion of Japan.

[Grisha]

A little more on German casualties, quoting from Ziemke's "Moscow to Stalingrad:"

German casualties stood, as of 1 November [1941], at 686,000 men - 20 percent of the 3.4 million, including replacements, committed since June, the equivalent of one regiment in every division.

I think along with Andreas' data on western allied casualties a more reasonable picture is coming to the fore.

Part of the problem is that some posters are using present political perspectives and limitations especially of the USA to support their arguments. At present, 10% casualties of an American military venture would be universally labelled a US disaster, and rightly so given the very unique environment in our existing world. But, in a total war between nations of similar technologies, casualties such as those seen in WWII were, and are, the norm. In fact, if such a war were to happen with present technology WWII casualty percentages might seem low by comparison.