What if Poland had defeated the Blitz?

[Zalgiris 1410]

Originally posted by Tero:

The British and the French would have had more time to live up to their deglaration of war and promises.

But with what kind of casualties ? How long would the Germans had been able to sustain the drive with higher casualty rates ?

Have you taken a look at the failure rates of these (German) "superior" tanks ?

But then again how well would the Stukas worked against entrenched forces with more concentrated and coordinated AAA as opposed to formations in transit among droves of refugees ?

The Bofors 37mm was no pea shooter at the time.

(German Artillry with good communications and techniques) Which would have worked how well against a prepared defence ?

I can not see this comparison as being relevant to the case. The fight would have been 75mm AAG vs LW aircraft and not vs LW FLAK units.

Yes (the Russians come). But had the British and the French acted the way they did with Finland would Stalin have been prudent enough to abstain for fear of winding up in war with the Western Allies at this early stage ?

The British, French, Belgians Rumanians whoever were not going to make a move and anyway they were all hoping the Poles would contain the Germans for long enough all by them selves! The French actually had made a demonstraition across the boarder but decided pretty quickly to stay in the expensive Magionet fortifications, the pace of the Blitzkrieg served to excuse their inaction, afterwards.

The Germans expected heavier casualties and more time themselves hence their own surprise at Blitzkrieg, it came as much as a revelation to them as well, AIUI.

True the maintenance failure rates of the Panzers was fairly high in Poland running at some 30-50% at the worst, but I would suggest the Poles own armour running something worse and getting worse for whatever was left over time. The Germans had moved into Austria and Czechoslovakia with Panzer Divisions and had worked out much of the problems with supply for them. AFAIK their were more problems with the older types of PzIs and PzIIs and more of these fell victim to Polish ATRs and those Bofors 37mm ATGs.

The Stukas and the Luftwaffe mainly concentraited on interdiction in Poland as their focus but were used against fortified and prepared Polish forces at times. There was even some technique of ground to air co-ordination trial that funnily enough worked! The effectiveness of Stukas against prepared forces I think is obvious enough and the Poles were actually partly mobilised (from 30/Aug) but just didn't have enough AAGs to defend themselves properly.

Of course German Artllery would also have gone to work against those entrenched river defences and accurately enough with their good techniques of fire control!

My comparing of guns between the forces was to provide evidence of what I was answering to - that is to say support my contention that the Germans were technically advanced over the Poles pretty much across the field or were out gunning them overall. That said IMO the Bofors 37mm ATG was better than the 37mm Pak 35/36 but only slightly and they are enough the same that it doesn't really matter anyway.

Stalin bloody Stalin, he had already made the pact with Hitler to grab what he could, the Western powers be damed. (Took over my country quickly enough the murderer.)

[JasonC]

I can't believe this thread is still going. It started as a joke. It still is. Poland was a deterministic smash. There was no way the Poles were going to last against the Germans. The German army of WW I would have annihilated Poland a matter of months, even if the war were fought without tanks or planes.

[General Bolt]

Again, my point exactly.

I was expressing annoyance at all the "What if the Germans had done better" threads with a joke "What if they lost the 1st battle" thread.

I found it hiliarous that sooooo many took the bait. Can you spell T-R-O-L-L...

BTW: Not 100% joke. Sometimes me thinks those "What if the Germans had done better" threads are really veiled pro.... Never mind let us not get political.

There is no joking or politics at BFC.

[Tifosi]

Originally posted by General Colt:

So back to the topic: What if Poland had defeated the Blitz? :confused: Huh? :confused: You arm chair generals got any answers to this one?

BRB-I gotta go get another beer.

Oh - I got the answer. This is a trick question huh? The poles could not defeat the Blitz, because the Blitz was directed against London and other British cities. The Blitzkrieg on the other hand.....

[Zalgiris 1410]

The Polish campaigne both militarily and in geo-political terms was actually quite important, no joke at all. Plenty of interesting hard fighting and wide ranging consequences, obviously not just for the Poles. The Germans learnt a lot during it while the French in particular did not.

The belief that the Poles could have defeated or at least held the Germans was seriously held by some senior Polish officers and by at least some French ones as well, though may be that was more wishful thinking perhaps. Hence the shock and awe of Blitzkrieg! (What was the Polish cavalry meant to do; from themselves into Boer Commandos?)

Some of the interesting instances for example include the charge of some element of the Pomorska Cavalry Brigade into some Panzers of Guderians' 3rd Pz Div in the Corridor, a Panzer Division being holted in its tracks IIRC by nothing more than a single shot gun wielding franc-tireurs, the 4th Pz Div charge into Warsaw for the result the we all know, the tight run fighting by the Poles surprisingly coming out of the forrested Bzura Pocket both into the flank of the 8th Army and towards Warsaw into LAH, etc.

Trust me about the geo-politics because I'm half Lithuanian, Hitler had offferred to garrentee the Vilniyus region back to us if we had of co-operated in the invasion, we declined and the Russians were able to throw it into the bargin for our whole bloody occupation for its return!

[ August 22, 2005, 08:36 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

[David I]

Oh my...

DavidI

[Tiredboots]

Relax David I. Don't you see that they can't help themselves. Not enough maternal attention in early childhood... probly.

[Zalgiris 1410]

And teenhood as well Tiredboots, hopefully for your sake you weren't cought!

I haven't been posting for the benefit of those in the know about the Polish campaigne but for those who think something unrealistic like intelligent design!

And for those in the know and think this has been all trite, I hope you know that you don't have to read it. I mean what are you wasting your time for? You're missing out on playing with yourselves or else may be you are using what must be considered to be some very strange material for your self amusement! :eek:

[ August 23, 2005, 04:20 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

[Xipe66]

Originally posted by General Colt:

I'm sick and tired of all these hypothetical questions :mad: :

What if Jerry had won Stalingrad, Kursk, etc? What if Feyberg had screwed up Crete worse and the Falschrimmers were still a viable fighting force?

All I hear is: Friggin Go Herman Go.

Check your hearing then. Since Germany lost the war such hyptethical questions are much more interesting - all while allied questions can be interesting too (concerning how they could have won with lesser manspill for instance) it's quite "fun" to ponder about what turn the war would have taken what if something had happened.

Doesn't mean anyone's rooting for Herman, just an intellectual exercise.

As for Poland I pretty much agree with Tero and even more with Zalgiris - it's not even a very good pro-allied "what if" scenario you proposed.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Tero:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Sergei:

What was the original Soviet plan regarding the Polish campaign? Did they have a preliminary entry date, or did they intend to wait for the Germans to reach certain goals?

AFAIK they were taken by surprise when the Polish defences fell apart so rapidly. Consequently they had to for all intents and purposes trump up a force rather quickly with minimal planning so as not to let the Germans advance too far East. </font>

[Snow Leopard]

Oh well, what if Poles give Danzig Corridor up to Hilter's demand to then war may never happen for a while. He hate Versailles Treaty and try get some lands back as he ordered schools to explain to students what is all about Versailles Treaty that it was wrong and they should support Hilter to get rid of it.

[ August 31, 2005, 07:01 PM: Message edited by: Snow Leopard ]

[Zalgiris 1410]

Originally posted by jacobs_ladder2:

And btw, it's my understanding there was no "blitzkrieg" in Poland. German tactics were pretty much the same ones they had used during WWI. It's not until France that the Wehrmacht comes up with all of the little surprises that some now collectively refer to as blitzkrieg.

I have to disagree with you Paul, as there was absolutely a Blitzkrieg in Poland since the surprises that are collectively referred to under the term were pretty much all used in that campaigne. You are right in saying that by and large the German tactics had previously been been used during WWI and certainly the Infantry fought with such, but it was the combining of those tactics with Panzers and air support that made it the surprise that it was. The tactics were developed late in the 1st WW from AIUI the combining of the indirect approach with Sturmtroopen infiltraition tactics along with direct air support. Afterwards built upon the mobility of the Freikorps and not only the addition of Panzers but Guderians' insistance that they be their own operational component in a self-supporting combined arms formation, ie proper Panzer Divisions, equals Blitzkreig as it was all catch phrased.

IMHO the Blitzkreig in the West during 1940 was just the clssic example of it, it was the ultimate Shock and Awe Blitzkreig campaigne.

[ August 31, 2005, 03:55 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:

I have to disagree with you Paul, as there was absolutely a Blitzkrieg in Poland since the surprises that are collectively referred to under the term were pretty much all used in that campaign.

If there was a blitzkrieg in Poland then there was a blitzkrieg in WWI.

The surprise came from the Welle Plan which allowed the Germans to mobilize in secret. Without the concealed mobilization there would have been no surprise.

The Polish campaign was about infantry marching 30km a day and supply. The encirclement had little to do with anything. The fighting was effectively over long before Guderian ever reached Brest. The armoured formation working closely with concentrated airpower and artillery simply was not a factor or a reality in 1939.

In any case, the main German plan was to get behind the Vistula or stop the Poles from reaching it. The important elements of the attack did not rely even in the least on any of the new tactics the Germans would later employ in France.

Air support, as Guderian envisioned it, was not really used in Poland. Guderian envisioned the airplane covering the flanks of the panzer division after the infantry was left behind. He imagined it filling in for artillery when the heavy guns could not keep up. None of this happened in Poland on any appreciable scale.

Also, the word blitzkrieg is generally recognized as describing the revolutionary tactics employed by the Germans in the early war. Since none of those tactics had anything to do with the victory in Poland I do not see how that victory can be described as a blitzkrieg.

Cheers

Paul

[ August 31, 2005, 08:28 PM: Message edited by: jacobs_ladder2 ]

[stoat]

Blitzkreig in WWI? I believe a key point of blitzkrieg is the use of armored forces to break through. Kind of hard to do wen your tanks move 8 mph tops. Arial support is also part of this tactic. Kind of hard to get from inaccurate biplanes carrying 150 lbs of bombs.

Blitzkreig in Poland, the West, Russia? It depends on if you're a purist. Some people say these were blitzkrieg attacks as the basic principles were there. Others say some or all were not really blitzkreig because they didn't precisely follow all of the guidelines.

I say it doesn't really matter whether or not they were true blitzkreig attacks because the Germans won in all of these instances, and resoundingly. "Blitzkreig" is an overused catch-all for German offensives, though some were actually blitzkriegs.

[ August 31, 2005, 09:01 PM: Message edited by: stoat ]

[Aco4bn187inf]

Anyone want to recommend a good book on the Polish campaign? I've seen one, part of a series, (Osprey?) full of maps & illustrations, but I'd like to know of one with more extensive text.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by stoat:

Blitzkreig in WWI? I believe a key point of blitzkrieg is the use of armored forces to break through. Kind of hard to do wen your tanks move 8 mph tops. Arial support is also part of this tactic. Kind of hard to get from inaccurate biplanes carrying 150 lbs of bombs.

Read what I wrote again. You missed the point.

Also, you are missing the point in regards to the blitzkrieg.

The discussion has nothing to do with purist approaches to defining the blitzkrieg. My argument is simple. The blitzkrieg, as we are all aware, no matter what definition you ascribe to it, is a phenomena that first saw the light of day in WWII.

However, the belief that the Germans used tactics now associated with the word "blitzkrieg" in Poland is mistaken. There were no significant tank battles, no large concentrations of tanks, no concentrated use of what tanks there were, no tank armies, little cooperation between tanks and the Luftwaffe and no encirclements by armoured spearheads. Guderian's drive on Brest-Litovsk was never envisaged in the original German plan, but was a judgement call by Kuechler.

The Germans won in Poland by dusting off the old plan they used for the invasion of France and by ensuring that they did not make the same mistakes. With, of course, the addition of air power in the interdiction role.

In fact, beyond the expanded role of the Luftwaffe and the piecemeal participation of light tanks (little more than armoured cars) I fail to see radical changes from WWI.

So then, if it was a blitzkrieg we saw in Poland in 1939, then it was also a failed version of the blitzkrieg we saw in the opening days of WWI.

I am more inclined to agree with the blitzkrieg never being more than a creation of the media than I am to agree with its intentional use in Poland.

Cheers

Paul

[Zalgiris 1410]

Paul, you have a very well worked out position and I respect your opinion because you are backing what you are saying with some supporting evidence. You seem to know your stuff.

However, firstly while surprise is an important precept of the concept of Blitzkreig just because secret mobilization occurs doesn't mean that you have a situation categorically as such. After all I don't think Graf von Moltke produced a Blitzkrieg although he managed a revolution in mobilization and transportation that led to some fairly quick campaignes.

Secondly your point about encirclements is an interesting one regarding the Polish campaigne.

There were encirclements during it for sure but neither of the two largest were originally planned for. The larger Bzura Pocket came about essentially accidentally but was dealt with appropriately by the Germans ensuring that the forces there remained contained and didn't all storm out to Warsaw.

The smaller one that I'm referring to is the Pocket based in the wooded mountains of Lysa Gora near Radom but this one was created by the encircling movements of mobile Panzer formations. Gen von Wietersheims' XIV Motorised Korps with 13th & 29th Mot and 1st Light Divs surrounded the Pocket from the north, while Gen Hoths' XV Moterised Korps with 2nd & 3rd Light Divs surrounded it from the south as well as managing to deliberately cutting if off from Vistula crossings. I believe the 5th Panzer Div was deployed to reinforce the southern ring around the Pocket or at least to help in that area at some time during the existance of it.

While your point about small numbers of tin can Panzers being involved here unconsentraited would seem to be apparently supported by all those Light Divs despite the secondary inclussion of the 5th Panzer Div, I think one needs to consider what constituted those Light Divs. The 1st Light Div which became the 6th Panzer Div contained all the T-35s from Czechoslovakia, all of them. Both the 2nd and 3rd Light Divs had AIUI 1/3 each of the approximately 150 T-38As at least.

While I would describe both of these tanks as light, I really wouldn't consider them to be ineffective tin cans especially in the context of the Polish campaigne. Actually they were here operating according to Guderians' theories towards fast manoeuvres with Panzers directed against sensitive lines of C&C while avoiding or surrounding resistance to be dealt with later.

To be sure in this example there were obviously a lot of Motorised Infantry and ordinary Infantry in Infantry Divs on the west side of the Pocket fighting as their forefathers did during WWI. While their way of fighting as developed from Sturmtroopen tactics was not the outstanding feature of this campaigne IMO. The German Infantry alone were not the main element creating the exponential effects upon the enemies morale and determination to fight operationally as the Panzers did here. I suppose that they were somewhat capable of doing it at may be a slower pace and I'm not suggesting that they could not have achieved the strategic double pincer movement but IMO they were not the essential element in closing this campaigne as quickly as it was. They certainly performed their role and may even have performed the majority of the tasks involved in unsuring this Blitzkreig campaigne, but were not used as the essential element in the concept.

The German Infantry and their tactics could have created both of these pockets and secured the strategic movement objectives but IMO they ran secondarily to the Panzers and the Luftwaffes' interdiction bombings in operationally achieving this and to me that's Blitzkreig.

So Paul in regards to there not being a consentraited use of Panzers and to there not being any encirclement with armoured spearheads I hope that I've enlightened you. As I indicated in my earlier post AFAIK there were some instances of direct support of the Panzers by the Luftwaffe, though its main bombing role was interdiction after winning air superiority. The interdiction role IMHO is more important to Guderians' theories that correspond to the concept of Blitzkrieg. The use of direct dive bombing air support in lieu of artillery is only meant to have to be employed when required not as an essential element.

BTW during Guderians' XIX Korps drive to Breast-Litovsk there was a pocket created at Andrzeievo largely consisting of the 18th Polish Inf Div by the 20th Mot Div and part of the 10th Panzer Div.

Also a cardinal ingredient of Blitzkrieg is momentum, best ensured by having follow on as aposed to just follow up forces and concentraiting for that in depth and not just in width. The example of the 5th Panzer Div commitment to support the forces surrounding the Radom-Kielce Pocket is a slight example. Best though is how XIX Korps funtioned both during the assault through the Corridor and latter towards Breast-Litovsk, momentum sustaining as aposed to just the simple massed concentraition of Panzers.

The mistake by Ludendorf of sending his reserves to widen the flanks of the Michael offensive instead of providing them as re-inforcements to the centre to increase the impitus of the momentum of the attack towards the strategic target, the communications centre of Amiens is why it failed. Also, why Sturmtroopen tactics can't be classified as Blitzkrieg is because there effects are too local and foot paced even though they largely employed most off the essential element of what most would consider constitute Blitzkrieg.

BTW Paul did the Battle of Ulm occur during an example of a failed Napoleonic Bltzkrieg campaigne?

[ September 01, 2005, 07:04 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

[JasonC]

Z - the 1918 offensives did not fail because of the location reserves were fed in. They failed due to logistics and the speed differential, defenders having an intact rail network and plenty of artillery and shells, while the attackers had to manhandle everything 50 miles across a moonscape. There were plenty of breakthroughs in WW I, but they were never decisive. Chasing them was a mirage. Attrition was decisive, not momentum.

In Poland in 1940, the Luftwaffe did a fine job taking out the Polish air force rapidly, then wasted a lot of time killing civilians in Warsaw to no obvious purpose. It had some effect on the campaign from armed recce stuff, but nothing of operational significance.

The German IDs ate everything they ran into, and that is what destroyed the Polish army. The process was quite simple. Probe, get shot up a little but locate the Polish position, call down 105mm and 150mm fire, advance after it to find most of the Poles gone and the rest bleeding.

Yes the motorized corps also made a couple break ins, everybody did, it wasn't hard. They occasionally had the sense to get behind the first of these instead of each division making its own. But on the whole, the German army pushed rather than cutting, and evaporated Polish units directly in front of them as readily as they evaporated units they ran around.

It was a deterministic smash. The Polish and French hoped for long defense dominance conditions, 1916 style. They instead got exactly the same sort of rapid direct defeat the French did in 1870, or the Russians did at Tannenberg and Warsaw, or the French did in the battle of the frontiers. They would not have stood up to WW I Germans with 8 inch howitzers any better.

As for statements that Germans were low on ammo, all armies are low on ammo when they expend it freely. All armies regular ammo expenditure to thruput reaching the front at some point. Germany had the capacity to annihilate Poland with a fraction of its industry devoted to shell production, with nothing on earth the Polish could have done about it. And this would have been true even if no tanks or planes existed.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:

Paul, you have a very well worked out position and I respect your opinion because you are backing what you are saying with some supporting evidence. You seem to know your stuff.

Thank you and the same to you. A lot of what I am saying comes from a book called "Blitzkrieg" by Len Deighton. It is the only source I have on hand at the moment, but it is pretty decent for what we are discussing.

I agree with a lot of what you are saying here, but I still maintain that the Germans gained a very important advantage from secret mobilization. Now, without the Welle Plan, would the Germans have advanced so rapidly? Truthfully, I do not know. My feeling is that a prepared and mobilized Polish army would have been far more resistant to the German plan, but this is only my opinion.

I guess it really comes down to the significance of German armour in the campaign. I see numerous examples of effective kesselschlacht tactics from the infantry, but honestly do not see significant blitzkrieg tactics in the east. There are hints of the future, to be sure, but I am not convinced that they were either intentional or strategically important. Of course, I may very be wrong.

The examples you have cited are, at the very least, about as close to blitzkrieg as I know of during the Polish campaign. I see several critical differences in them (all of which I have already explained), but I am more than willing to concede that they are well within the realm of "new and revolutionary tactics".

My argument is that the Polish campaign did not rely on the success of these tactics in the way that we would later see in France and Russia. If the German armoured formations had failed completely, the Polish campaign would still have been carried convincingly by the infantry. If however, the tanks had failed in 1940 or 41, the Wehrmacht would have been in serious trouble.

Also, your point about the expected role of German armour is valid. Early German tanks were not designed for direct engagement of heavily defended enemy positions. I think Guderian would have liked to have had that ability, but it seems clear that he was realistic enough to not seriously expect it.

BTW Paul did the Battle of Ulm occur during an example of a failed Napoleonic Bltzkrieg campaigne?

I don't remember what happened at Ulm. Sorry. If you could refresh my memory I might be able to offer an opinion.

Cheers

Paul

[JasonC]

People who think there is anything to discuss here just have no conception of the scale of the difference between the military potential of Germany and that of Poland in 1939. The attacking German army was twice the size of the Polish one. That's in manpower, which was Poland's only long suit.

Per capita income in Poland was about a quarter of that in Germany. (Population was less than half Germany's, as well). Most of the population was engaged in agriculture (half still were in the 1980s). Half the population was illiterate, and lived on less than $100 a year.

The country came into existence in the aftermath of WW I as part of the civil war in Russia, had to fight for independence down to 1922. It then lost all accumulated savings in a hyperinflation, then had a trade war with Germany that wrecked agricultural exports, then a fascist coup (years before Germany's), then the great depression. This sequence amounted to an economic catastrophe of biblical proportions. In the mid 1930s per capital output was half the level reached under Russian rule in 1913.

The border they had to defend snaked around the country on three sides, coming to 3500 miles in all, not counting the Russian backstab. There were facing one of the strongest militaries on the planet, supported by a fifth of world industrial production and its highest technology.

The war was largely over in the first week. The Germans advanced 150 miles, destroyed or isolated in doomed pockets large portions of the Polish army (foolishly defending far forward in a vain effort to defend everyone), and breached or turned all the natural defense lines in the form of the major river systems.

There was one more week of serious fighting in which the Poles tried to concentrate on fighting a single German infantry army, which failed. After two weeks, it was utterly pointless. The rest was a completely uncoordinated collapse, and messy mop up.

[jacobs_ladder2]

German military spending in 1939 reached 9.7 billion dollars (up from 4.7 billion in 1938). Polish spending, in the same years, jumped from a whopping 160 million all the way to 180 million.

According to "The Polish Campaign" by Zaloga, the Polish defense budget from 1935 to 1939 was only about 10% of the Luftwaffe 1939 budget alone.

Poland was producing about 50 tanks annually where Germany was cranking out 1100 AFVs. Those 50 tanks being the result of a massive effort (70% of capital investment was military).

Not much competition really.

Cheers

Paul

[Zalgiris 1410]

Originally posted by jacobs_ladder2:

A lot of what I am saying comes from a book called "Blitzkrieg" by Len Deighton. It is the only source I have on hand at the moment, but it is pretty decent for what we are discussing.

I still maintain that the Germans gained a very important advantage from secret mobilization. Now, without the Welle Plan, would the Germans have advanced so rapidly?

I guess it really comes down to the significance of German armour in the campaign. I see numerous examples of effective kesselschlacht tactics from the infantry, but honestly do not see significant blitzkrieg tactics in the east. There are hints of the future, to be sure, but I am not convinced that they were either intentional or strategically important.I am more than willing to concede that they are well within the realm of "new and revolutionary tactics".

My argument is that the Polish campaign did not rely on the success of these tactics in the way that we would later see in France and Russia.

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />BTW Paul did the Battle of Ulm occur during an example of a failed Napoleonic Bltzkrieg campaigne?

I don't remember what happened at Ulm. Sorry. If you could refresh my memory I might be able to offer an opinion.

</font>

[JasonC]

Z - if someone defended the position that the US won the first gulf war by going around the Iraqis, what would you think of the argument? The 24th Mech did go around the Iraqis, quite effectively. Man for man it undoubtedly did the most damage. But the actual determining process was quite different, it was a whole corps going right through the RG, and the Marines going right up the coast, each smashing absolutely everything in their path. Overdetermined smash is the real process.

Beyond the Vistula may look as lovely as you please, but there wasn't a Polish army by then. The war was decided in the first week and the Polish army finished in the second. As for the contributions of the Luftwaffe, they may have had some morale-wise and certainly neutralized the much weaker Polish airforce. But I don't think they had any appreciable impact on the ground campaign, which would have proceeded very much as it did had both air forces been grounded the entire time.

As for those who try to make it a matter of mobilization speed, it seems to me they are conflating real concerns in the 19th century, and planned but not terribly relevant considerations in WW I, with WW II events. Perhaps trying to establish a continuity in German methods.

It was Molkte the elder who emphasized mobilization speed as the goal of good staff work. It was decisive against Austria in 1866, and made a large difference against France in 1870, though the actual victory hinged on other factors. In 1914, better mobilization speed was the primary point behind the German plan to knock out France first. Using reserves in the first wave and holding off the slow mobilizing Russians with a tenth of the army.

I see no large advantage through mobilization speed in Poland. The Poles knew they were going to be attacked, the "diplomatic" stuff before made that transparent. Heck, even the British peace party knew Poland was going to be attacked, and that this time it could not be finessed. The Polish army defended well forward, it was not caught unmobilized. Defending forward was a mistake, given 3500 miles of border over 180 degrees of arc.

Yes the mobile divisions made breakthroughs. Everyone made breakthroughs. Yes the overall attack was rapid. So was the fall of Rumania in WW I, using infantry. Pocket fighting made the annilations relatively cheap. Same had happened at Sedan in 1870, though in one large instead of many small. Were elements of modern mobile warfare tried out and successful? Yes. But they didn't determine anything. The outcome and speed were determined by the total mismatch in overall military power. The Germans were simply ten times as strong as the Poles.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Were elements of modern mobile warfare tried out and successful? Yes. But they didn't determine anything. The outcome and speed were determined by the total mismatch in overall military power. The Germans were simply ten times as strong as the Poles.

Exactly, take away the tanks and neutralize both air forces and the Polish still lose.

In fact, my understanding is that Kuechler set Guderian loose because he knew there was little danger of doing so. By that point in the campaign the contributions of the panzer forces were academic at best. Interesting from a tactical standpoint though they might be, they were not significant strategically or even operationally.

Zalgiris, I had the same criticisms of Deighton's motivations, but the man's research was complete and his points valid. I have read almost everything he read and I see no problem with his conclusions. Much was made of armour by people whose motivations were also suspect. The usual contributions of the "I told you so" camp. I think he probably was as ignorant of what happened in Russia as almost every other Western author has been, but I do not fault him for it. If I take his book as only being a comparison of Poland and France, I have no trouble accepting it. The truth is that his argument was nothing new. He just popularized it somewhat.

In the end, I can only agree with you on the use of new tactics. Despite my respect for your knowledge, I simply can't agree with you on their importance.

Good discussion though. At the very least I got to pull out an old classic from my closet.

Cheers

Paul

[Zalgiris 1410]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Beyond the Vistula may look as lovely as you please, but there wasn't a Polish army by then. The war was decided in the first week and the Polish army finished in the second. As for the contributions of the Luftwaffe, they may have had some morale-wise and certainly neutralized the much weaker Polish airforce. But I don't think they had any appreciable impact on the ground campaign, which would have proceeded very much as it did had both air forces been grounded the entire time.