Kursk

[LynnL53]

Hay WHite Phosphorus-- the book is the first of two volumes dealing with Kursk and Kursk only -- lots of pictures and descent text--good book This one is about the southern fighting- I see there is a lot of discussion about this battle still -- I like it because of near Parity I can use Arty-Air- Armor as well as troops- How ever one classes it the Germany did not succeed and could never have --they were famous for local or tactical wins but could not win on the strategic level on the eastern front- even if they had encircled could they have held - could they have then wiped out the encirclement- anyway the answer is they did not for what ever the reason truly win-- good book, good to have and good for our game CMBB

[Pak_43]

Well Lt. Hortlund...At least some of my sources disagree about the combat readiness of the SST at the time the plug was pulled on Zitadelle...

"Soldiers of Destruction" by Charles W Sydnor Jr, has the following to say about SST at Kursk...

"By dusk on July 14th SST had lost over half it's tanks and vehicles and had taken heavy casualties amongst it's combat units..."

"For several weeks (I think he really means two...) after the battle of Kursk SST had to remain out of the line recuperating while some extra tanks and assault guns were scraped together to stiffen the thinning ranks.."

His sources for this particular passage is:

BAMA, RS 2-2/18 ,Gen Kdo II SS Pz Kps. "Meldungen and Befehle" daily reports of SSTK for July 13th and the SS Panzercorps reports for July 14th and July 15th....and a recorded interview with Hellmuth Becker, commander of the SSTK Panzer Regiment "Theodor Eicke" covering the period July 10th to July 15th...

An interesting passage n'est ce pas?

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Pak_43:

"By dusk on July 14th SST had lost over half it's tanks and vehicles and had taken heavy casualties amongst it's combat units..."

"For several weeks (I think he really means two...) after the battle of Kursk SST had to remain out of the line recuperating while some extra tanks and assault guns were scraped together to stiffen the thinning ranks.."

Very interesting source! How did you get your hands on that one? Is it in English or German? I have been looking for something like that for SSDR (What Im using now is Otto Weidingers "Division Das Reich" combat diary, its in German and my German is not what it should be )

----

*edit. Opps, just saw that the source I was talking about was something footnoted in that Soldiers of destruction book, sorry.

---

ANYWAY, over to your question. I'm sure all of the SS divisions were in "not-100% condition" by July 15th. Das Reich for example had been more or less constantly in battle since early January (parts of DF) with short periods of rest and refit. As for Totenkopf, that division had bore the brunt of the fighting during the latter half of Zitadelle, and the division took heavy casualties when crossing the Psel.

I am not saying that these divisions were as good as new or anything like that. I have no doubt whatsoever though that they would have been able to continue the offensive had they been ordered to. You have to remember the track record of these divisions. During 41 and early 42 they practically blead themselves to death either on the offensive towards Moscow (DR) or on the defensive during the soviet winter offensive (T and DR). If you look at the casualty figures for DR for example during the defensive battles of Jan-Feb 42 it is amazing that the division survived at all actually. 11 Reg was disbanded to stengthen D and DF, and during the defensive battles of Rzhev, DF was reduced to 80something men. They never ceased to function though, and in the end DF was the regiment that held the line that saved 9th army. If you look at T in the Demyansk pocket, you will find a similar story.

Why bring that up? It gives an indication on what kind of punishment these divisions would take and still be able to get the job done.

At dusk on July 14th SST halts its push to the NE. During the 13th, the division was hit from the north by 24th Gds tank bde, 10th Gds Mech bde and units from 5th Gds army. In order to counter those attacks the Germans had to take units from its "attack group" (Consisting primarely of Pz Companies together with the SPW Battalion) and shift them north. This led to a weakening of the "tip of the spear", and on the 14th it was decided that the push NE should be dropped in favour of Mansteins axis shift N. That axis shift did not mean that the divisions would just turn north and attack that way, instead II SS Pz were to regroup some miles to the west while units from III Pz Corps took over the positions around Prokhorovka.

Anyway, Im drifting from the subject again. The reason SST spent "several weeks" resting and refitting after the 15th is because SST was taken from the frontline and put in reserve on that day. If the attack had continued, they would have kept going with what they had, if they were in worse condition than anyone else, they would presumably get "light" duty, like flank protection. Personally I see no reason to doubt their ability to continue the offensive though.

[ January 04, 2003, 04:24 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[ichadwick]

Lots of resources available online. Here are a few... First, a review of Glantz's book: Sonic Net and a different review here: Book review

A list of various data sources for Kursk scenarios:

Allan Wilson's site and also a source of OOB data, maps and more on his site.

A board game about Kursk I've never seen before:

Critical Hit's Kursk game and here: Scenario

Another source of books:

Atlantic Crossroads some in Russian. And here's a picture book: Images of Kursk

A brief history of the SS involvement: Waffen SS

A site with many paintings and some contemporary photos of the monuments and museum:

Belgorod site

And another bibliography (no reviews): Kursk sources

And another OOB: Order of Battle: Kursk

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Pak_43:

"Soldiers of Destruction" by Charles W Sydnor Jr, has the following to say about SST at Kursk...

"By dusk on July 14th SST had lost over half it's tanks and vehicles and had taken heavy casualties amongst it's combat units..."

His sources for this particular passage is:

BAMA, RS 2-2/18 ,Gen Kdo II SS Pz Kps. "Meldungen and Befehle" daily reports of SSTK for July 13th and the SS Panzercorps reports for July 14th and July 15th....and a recorded interview with Hellmuth Becker, commander of the SSTK Panzer Regiment "Theodor Eicke" covering the period July 10th to July 15th...

An interesting passage n'est ce pas?

Very intresting considering that BA-MARH 21-4/118. KTB Ia Tagesmeldungen und Nachmeldeungen 'von' II.SS.Pz,Korps 'zu' Pz.A.O.K.4

have operational Panzers/StuG of SSTK at;

11 July, 122

12 July, 121

13 July, 74

14 July, 73

15 July, 77

16 July, 93

I'm guessing that Sydnor has been rounding down the numbers for a better argument.

BA-MA RS 2-2/17 Gen.Kdo II. SS-Pz.Korps, der Korpsarzt. (11 July to 2 Aug).

Manpower losses (KIA/MIA/WIA) For 3 SS PzG Div

11 July, 430

12 July, 316

13 July, 160

14 July, 175

15 July, 65

16 July, 89

[ January 04, 2003, 07:28 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Pak_43]

Very interesting source! How did you get your hands on that one? Is it in English or German?

----

It's in English (Sydnor is an American, I think...) and is fantastically hard to get hold of, I had to go the effort of typing in some search terms in Amazon and lo, there it was The ISBN is 0691008531...

ANYWAY, over to your question. I'm sure all of the SS divisions were in "not-100% condition" by July 15th.

Agreed

Anyway, Im drifting from the subject again. The reason SST spent "several weeks" resting and refitting after the 15th is because SST was taken from the frontline and put in reserve on that day. If the attack had continued, they would have kept going with what they had, if they were in worse condition than anyone else, they would presumably get "light" duty, like flank protection. Personally I see no reason to doubt their ability to continue the offensive though.

You are failing to make a distinction here IMO, between offensive and defensive tasks, Typhoon is the exception which I grant you..(and one could argue that in fact the DR did not get the job done in this operation but that's a seperate issue..) All of the other examples you cite are defensive actions where it is quite possible to take serious casualties and "get the job done" I'm not so sure it's possible to have the same flagrant disregard for casualties that SSTK showed in the Demyansk pocket and continue offensive operations of the manner required in the Kusrk offensive, but I grant you that is only my opinion. Eickes early combat tactics consigned his division several times to having to stop offensives as casualties were excessive...

Bastables...good catch, The message posted above has a link showing the SSTK at 189 starting AFV's on July 4th, so less than half would be correct??

Also the second part of the quote says..."Heavy losses amongst all combat units.." not just tanks...perhaps they were running out of infantry also??

[Bastables]

Sorry edited to include manpower losses for SSTK before reading your reply. It's still above.

I think Syndor, just from looking at the actual figures is prone to exaggeration. He does this by showing total starting AFV numbers versus operational AFV and then concludes that losses were greater than 50%.

3rd SS Started "Krusk" with 165 AFVs, 70 to 80% of them operational, at the end of the battle 3rd SS had lost (total write off aka burnt out/unrepairable) 2 PIII, 6 PIVs, 1 Tiger and 1 StuG (BA-MA RH 10/64). 10 destroyed Panzers/StuGs is not quite the destruction of the Panzer regts is it?

The higher numbers of starting AFV arrived at seems to only be possible if things like Wespe's slf, bergepanzers and other support AFV are included.

[ January 04, 2003, 07:24 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[PiggDogg]

This discussion has been interesting and informative. I shall weigh in.

At the time of Kursk, certainly before Kursk, and generally long after Kursk (to nearly the end of the war), the Germans were better than the Russians (and for that matter, the Western Allies: Amis & Brits) on a man for man, tank for tank, plane for plane, company for company, division for division, etc. basis. If anyone asserts differently, may I respectfully state that they are mistaken.

Notice that I stated that this was the general, majority of the time situation on the Eastern front. One can certainly find many exceptions to this general state of affairs. Further, things deteriorated for the Germans in the later war times, January through May 1945.

I dont think anyone is arguing that Zitadelle was a German victory. Zitadelle should not be held up as an example of how the Soviets managed to defeat a German blitzkrieg offensive though.

I suggest that Zitadelle is the example of how the 1943 Soviets managed to defeat a German offensive whether it is blitzkrieg offensive or not. The Russians applied a massive superiority of men, vehicles, arty, and planes plus great intellegence to grind the Germans to a halt.

If the Russians suffered massive and disproportionate casualties in stopping the Germans, it made no difference and so be it. They stopped Zitadelle the only way that they could against a tactically superior foe. They quite masterfully did what they were capable of performing. That was the application of numerically superior force to defeat the Germans.

The fact that a corps or two of really good German troops were still advancing when the offensive was called off is of little importance. One knows that these tough German guys were advancing and inflicing disproportionate losses upon the Russians because they were man for man better than the Russians that they faced.

Eventually, one must suspect that if these tough Germans guys had continued to advance, they would have also been ground to pulp and defeated by the superior numbers of well employed Russian forces ... probably .

In short, in WWII, the superior numbers of well employed Russians and Western Allies defeated the man for man superior Germans. That was the way, the only way, that the Allies could have defeated the Germans. Kursk was a fine example of how, albeit expensively, to be successful and defeat a German offensive (blitzkrieg or not) and the Germans.

Cheers, Richard

[ January 04, 2003, 09:01 PM: Message edited by: PiggDogg ]

[Grisha]

Lt. Hortlund,

All the disputing aside, thanks for the discussion. I understand your points and find them reasonable and valid points to be addressed on this topic. I may not agree with them, having my own set of arguments, but it's discussions like these that force me - well, all of us really - to dig deeper into it all. Only good can come from that - and knowledge.

Take care

[Frunze]

I find it a little hard to understand what your position ultimately is, Lt. Hortlund. For example:

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

As I said, I agree that the Kursk offensive failed.

versus

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

As I said, if you want to lable Kursk a failed German operation, then go ahead, but it is wrong to lable it as such...

Did the Germans fail or not? And if you agree they failed, what's the disagreement? Are you arguing that both the Germans and the Soviets lost the battle, or that it was a draw?

The defenders retained possession of the battlefield, which makes them the victors by conventional criteria. They suffered heavy casualties, true, but at most that would make it a Pyrrhic victory - "another victory like that and we are ruined." And I don't think you could even make that claim, since the casualties didn't ruin the Red Army.

[ichadwick]

I'd find it hard to accept any account of Kursk if it suggested that the Germans somehow didn't fail. Even the most revisionist historians wouldn't dare make that statement. In fact it wouldn't be history at all - just propaganda.

Now had the Germans attacked in May before the Soviets built their defences up... hmmm...

Ian

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by ichadwick:

I'd find it hard to accept any account of Kursk if it suggested that the Germans somehow didn't fail. Even the most revisionist historians wouldn't dare make that statement. In fact it wouldn't be history at all - just propaganda.

Since I feel this is directed at me...

Seriously, have you seen anyone in this thread argue that Zitadelle was a German success?

I thought we were talking about the reasons why the offensive failed to achieve its objectives. That and some (in my opinion) interesting what ifs.

[Splinty]

I wouldn't say the Germans were better man for man,than the Soviets or the West. Tank for tank or even unit for unit (Company and above)I'd say yes to those, but I think man for man is a bit much.

[Pak_43]

Yes, a big thank you to Lt Hortlund and Bastables, food for thought indeed, I shall go away and cogitate...and Lt Hortlund, you are right, I don't recall you at any point saying Zitadelle was not a failure...as you say, why it failed is the topic under discussion (at least by me..)

[Stormhouse]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by ichadwick:

I'd find it hard to accept any account of Kursk if it suggested that the Germans somehow didn't fail. Even the most revisionist historians wouldn't dare make that statement. In fact it wouldn't be history at all - just propaganda.

Since I feel this is directed at me...

Seriously, have you seen anyone in this thread argue that Zitadelle was a German success?

I thought we were talking about the reasons why the offensive failed to achieve its objectives. That and some (in my opinion) interesting what ifs.</font>

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Stormhouse:

This is I guess what some people have a issue with, there really is no what if... Unless the what if is, what if the Germans had a nuke at Kursk.

So the II SS division was still moving, that’s almost like a dead body that is still twitching. I asked people to look at how much further they had to go, and nobody did. And the talk that Kursk was not suppose to be a blitz, well yes it was but it just didn’t happen... When did the Germans decide to take it slow??? They didn’t, they just had no choice, the ground was heavily mind and well defended they didn’t have freedom of movement, well as much as they would have liked too. The German Air force didn’t have air superiority. The Germans wanted the blitz and they needed the blitz but it was not going to happen.

If you are unable to see any interesting what if situation on the southern pincer before the offensive was called off, I suppose we just see things differently. I must admit that I dont really understand your point of view though, because in my opinion, every battle, operation or offensive have hundreds of possible and interesting what if situations during the cource of that battle, operation or offensive. "What would have happened if 6th army had attempted to breakout from Stalingrad? What would the effects have been for 6th army but more importanty, for the German units in the Kaukasus?" Personally I find questions like that interesting and intriguing. Apparently you are of a different opinon. Fine, in the future, I will try not to discuss any what if situation with you then.

I find your statement "Kursk offensive was supposed to be a blitz, it just didnt happen" interesting though. When you say that, do you mean that the entire offensive, Zitadelle, was envisioned as a blitzkrieg offensive? And if so, then what are your sources for that statement?

Model on the northern pincer tried to use infantry divisions to pierce a hole in the Soviet defensive lines, and his intention was to reinforce that breakthrough with his panzer divisions. That is the direct opposite to the "normal" blitzkrieg-schwerpunkt tactic the Germans had used previously. Is it your opinion that the Germans had modified their view on blitzkrieg by 1943?

Same in the south. III Pz Corps had a bridgehead on the Donets at Michailovka where 168th infantry division was located. Breith (CO III Pz Corps) intended to use 168th infantry to punch a hole through the Soviet defences, and then send in 6th Pz division to exploit that gap. Again, the exact opposite of blitzkrieg. What we are seeing here is two German commanders attempting to use the soviet breakthrough method. In both locations the tactic failed though. Model only achieved a break in in the soviet lines after he committed panzers to reinforce the infantry divisions. And 168th infantry was repulsed by the soviets, forcing 7th and 19th Pz divisions to make forced crossings of the Donets.

Nevertheless, in the south the first day of the offensive was successful. By nightfall II SS Pz Corps had penetrated the first Soviet line of defence and had made contact with the second line. The day saw II SS advance 8 kilometers. Day two the advance continued, and by dusk on July 6th, LAH and DR had advanced some 30 kilometers.

The only reason Im bringing this up is because I want to know what your opinion is about this rate of advance. That is a 30 kilometer penetration in 36 hours against a numerically superior enemy in heavily entrenched positions, behind extensive belts of minefields. Not only that, the soviets knew the exact time of the German attack (thanks to taking prisoners during the night between 4th-5th, pioneers clearing mines), and most of the attacking units were hit by a preemptive artillery strike from the soviets as they were moving towards the assembly areas.

In the south, the German attack plan called for 4 corps advancing line abreast. You had 48th Pz Corps to the left, then II SS Pz, then III Pz, and then Corps Raus. These four corps were to steadily move forwards, pushing all opposition aside in the process like a gigant ice-breaker. Now I ask you, IF the Germans had envisioned a blitzkrieg type of attack, then why did they use their panzer divisions this way? If they wanted a blitz-type offensive, then why did they not use one of the pz corps to punch a hole, and then have the other two pour through to exploit? I can tell you why. Because they knew that they were facing 6-7 layers of defensive belts. You cannot blitz defenses like that, that is why they didnt try. The only feasable way to break through such a defensive line is to do it slowly and methodically, like they did.

But if you feel I am somehow misstaken here, it would be very interesting to hear your arguments.

[ January 05, 2003, 01:24 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Lt. Hortlund,

Regarding Soviet superiority against the Germans, that's not quite the correct picture. One of the big problems for Vatutin was in determining the German main axis. He didn't quite get it right, and it showed. Nothing against Vatutin really, since the Germans did have a number of directions to pick from in the south. And though the Soviets knew pretty much when Zitadelle was going to happen and where to a general degree, knowing the actual main axes is a big deal. The Soviets later used this to great effect against the Germans in 1944-45, masking scale and location, for the most part, in their offensives.

Grisha, sorry for not replying sooner to this post. I wanted to check some details before writing my reply, and it turned out I had to modify one of my theories a bit...you learn something every day. That is really what is so great with discussions like these.

Yes, if we are to drift a bit from the subject at hand, my personal opinion is that this is one of the key factors in Soviet operational doctrin/thinking (the other one being achieving complete [almost rediculous] superiority in firepower and numbers at the schwerpunkt). The ability to move your units without being detected, and the ability to pinpoint the exact location of your opponents troops is extremely important in any battle, and since the soviets were so good at this, while the Germans were oh so bad at this, it gives the soviets a very clear and definite advantage in any operation, especially when on the offensive.

If you look at soviet operations plans, I think it is a correct description to say that they are rudimentary "attack here on this axis, once you reach this point exploitation units will take over the advance". What made them so lethal during the last two years of the war was the combination of intel advantage mentioned above, and the successful concentration of forces and firepower at the breakthrough point. This meant that any soviet offensive was pretty much guaranteed to achieve a breakthrough of the German defensive lines, and when you take the general German lack of reserves into calculation, it is no wonder that the soviet breakthroughs became so big/successful.

I'm still maintaining however, that if the soviet offensive would get bogged down in the initial stages, or if something unexpected would happen, the soviets were generally not able to react to that situation properly. Two examples of this: Zhukov at Seelowe, and the entire offensive operation at Targul Frumos. This is where the difference in small unit tactics and initiative among the lower ranks come in to play, and my position is that on that level, the Germans outshined the Soviets from 41 to 45.

Another thing to bear in mind is that the attacker determines the location of the attack, thereby creating initial favorable conditions in numbers and surprise. What saved the Soviet was in the deployment and employment of their reserves. Without them the German assaults would've been much more devastating.

If you take the southern pincer as an example, the soviets had 6-7 layers of defensive lines in a depth of up to 50 kms. The soviets knew about the German jump off points, and the knew about the axis of attack before the German offensive started. Not well enough in advance to be able to constuct their fortifications accordingly, but they knew before the German attack started (information about jump off point and day 1 objectives were extracted from German prisoners on the night between 4th-5th).

When these lines would not contain the southern attack, I think we can see signs of panic among the soviet commanders. Example: On the night between 11th and 12th, III Pz Corps managed to break through the Soviet defensive lines and advanced 11 km along the Donets, and managed to establish a bridgehead on the western banks of the river. At this point in time, the II SS Pz Corps is standing N of the Psel and S-SW of Prokhorovka. That means that between II SS Pz and III Pz 69th Soviet army is occupying an area extending south like a wedge into the German lines. Here the 69th army is close to being surrounded. As a result, Rotmistrov is ordered to split his tank army and hit both II SS Pz at Prokhorovka and 6th Pz div:s bridgehead on the Donets. The result is horrible for the Soviets with both counterattacks being beaten back with heavy casualties.

As to the SS panzer divisions not being at full strength, this may be the case to some degree, but they still were all assigned an additional heavy tank company that was very large, as companies - even German companies - go.

Well, I'm not sure if the heavy companies were that much larger, but then again, since we are talking about the Tigers, I'll give you that. An interesting number I came across right now reading up on the battle to write this post is that on July 4th, LAH and DR had 298 Panzers and StuGs combined. That means that both these divisions were far from full strenght at the start of Zitadelle.

von Manstein was an amazing military commander, and his intuitive understanding of operational art was on par with anyone at the time. However, I'm not so sure he could have pulled off a miracle, which is what he would need to do. I'm at a loss as to what he could've done, since he would've been making a breakthrough from a single point. Certainly, he would've wreaked havoc, but from an operational-strategic level any move that went too deep into the Soviet operational depths would be very dangerous. There were still very strong Soviet forces on the flanks of the Kursk salient, and they most definitely would've been employed in containing von Manstein, or even cutting him off. At the very most, the result might've been a trade-off: destruction of the SS Panzer Corps for the calling off of the Soviet counteroffensive.

Here we are coming into the what if part. I suppose my line of reasoning goes something like this. If we begin by looking at what happened to 5th Guards Tank army after its failed counterattack at Prokhorovka, we can see that this unit lost pretty much all of its combat strength that day. It would take a long time before it became an effective unit again. Suppose Manstein switches axis and attacks towards Obojan. Facing him is parts of 1st Tank army and 6th Gds army. Both these units are spent, they have suffered heavy losses in the battles so far. Lets assume for arguments sake that Manstein punches through them and reach Obojan. Here the soviets have two options. Either pull out from the southwestern parts of the bulge to avoid encirclement of 40th and 38th army. OR pull another unit from the reserves and do another counterattack. But the problem now is that the main reserve unit is spent (5th Gds Tank and 5th Gds), at the same time, the northern reserve unit 2nd Tank army has also suffered heavy during its counterattacks on the northern flank. Whats left really is 53rd army east of Kursk or 47th army east of Belgorod. But if these units are committed, then the ability for the Soviets to wage any offensive operations in the south is severely weakened. If the Soviets would have launched another counteroffensive, and if that counteroffensive had failed like the one at Prokhorovka, then I am seriously doubting we would have seen any Soviet autumn/winter offensive in the south. And even if we did, I'm seriously doubting that it would have had any serious success at all. That is what Im aiming at.

Another point to note regarding von Manstein is that the Soviets were learning fast. In late 1943 after the 3rd Guards Tank Army broke out of the Lyutezh bridgehead north of Kiev, von Manstein conducted a 'backhand blow' at Rybalko's tank army. It failed.

I really think the most favorable result the Germans could've realistically expected would've been a stalemate. And since you speak of psychology, I would expect any extended attempts by the Germans to turn the south pincer at Kursk into an operational victory as an operation bathed in extreme angst. The north pincer has failed utterly, and all that remains is an attack sector, 50km wide, that must somehow do amazing things in the Soviet operational rear without being cut off.

Yes, but dont you see that that is exactly what the Germans were after when they launched Zitadelle in the first place. This was no "lets advance to Moscow" type offensive. This was a desperate attempt to lock the front. By attacking and defeating the soviets at Kursk, the Germans hoped to eliminate the risk of a Soviet autumn/winter offensive and at the same time shorten the front to free units for the west. A stalemate was what they wanted. This is what Im talking about when I say that I see a possibility for the Germans to snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat.

[Hortlund]

Found some interesting numbers. (Its amazing what you find when you are going through your old books)

On July 4th, Das Reich had combat ready

48 PzIII (no info on what type unfortunately)

30 PzIV (1/4 with short barrels)

12 PzVIE

8 PzIII command tanks,

18 T-34 (no info on what type)

33 StuG's (no info on what type)

10 Marders (no info on what type)

From July 5th to July 16th, Das Reich claimed 448 Russian tanks and SU's destroyed, losing a total of 46 panzers and assault guns (write offs).

[ January 05, 2003, 06:04 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[Grisha]

I'm still maintaining however, that if the soviet offensive would get bogged down in the initial stages, or if something unexpected would happen, the soviets were generally not able to react to that situation properly. Two examples of this: Zhukov at Seelowe, and the entire offensive operation at Targul Frumos. This is where the difference in small unit tactics and initiative among the lower ranks come in to play, and my position is that on that level, the Germans outshined the Soviets from 41 to 45.

In general I disagree with this so long as we're talking about Soviet operations from late 1943 on. Wrt Zhukov, I'm not too fond of his operational methods which lacked finesse. That Heinrici(?) was opposite him just insured a real mess. The other reference, Targul Frumos, I'm not familiar with unless that's in Romania. There were a lot of diversionary operations at work around 1944 in Romania and Hungary, but proper Soviet historical research hasn't really been done to weed it all out. From late 1943, I could name quite a few operations were things didn't initially go as planned, yet Soviet contingency planning or the initiative of Soviet rifle and tank army commanders prevailed nonetheless. By this time the Soviets were displaying very convincing battlefield agility.

When these lines would not contain the southern attack, I think we can see signs of panic among the soviet commanders. Example: On the night between 11th and 12th, III Pz Corps managed to break through the Soviet defensive lines and advanced 11 km along the Donets, and managed to establish a bridgehead on the western banks of the river. At this point in time, the II SS Pz Corps is standing N of the Psel and S-SW of Prokhorovka. That means that between II SS Pz and III Pz 69th Soviet army is occupying an area extending south like a wedge into the German lines. Here the 69th army is close to being surrounded. As a result, Rotmistrov is ordered to split his tank army and hit both II SS Pz at Prokhorovka and 6th Pz div:s bridgehead on the Donets. The result is horrible for the Soviets with both counterattacks being beaten back with heavy casualties.

Yes, Vatutin wasn't quite sure where the main attack route was, and that resulted in an evening out of Soviet defenses. Then when von Manstein later shifted his advance right, towards Prokhorovka, it created additional problems for Vatutin.

Well, I'm not sure if the heavy companies were that much larger, but then again, since we are talking about the Tigers, I'll give you that. An interesting number I came across right now reading up on the battle to write this post is that on July 4th, LAH and DR had 298 Panzers and StuGs combined. That means that both these divisions were far from full strenght at the start of Zitadelle.

You're right on both counts. I got confused with what I was seeing in my references. The heavy tank company had 15 Pz VIs. I have tank numbers for the three SS divisions from 1 Jul 1943:</font>

• LAH - 4 Mk II; 3 Mk III(kz); 10 Mk III(lg); 67 Mk IV(lg); 13 Mk VI; 9 Cmd</font>
• DR - 1 Mk II; 62 Mk III(lg); 33 Mk IV(lg); 14 Mk VI; 25 T-34; 10 Cmd</font>
• TK - 63 Mk III(lg); 8 Mk IV(kz); 44 Mk IV(lg); 15 Mk VI; 9 Cmd</font>

Yes, but dont you see that that is exactly what the Germans were after when they launched Zitadelle in the first place. This was no "lets advance to Moscow" type offensive. This was a desperate attempt to lock the front. By attacking and defeating the soviets at Kursk, the Germans hoped to eliminate the risk of a Soviet autumn/winter offensive and at the same time shorten the front to free units for the west. A stalemate was what they wanted. This is what Im talking about when I say that I see a possibility for the Germans to snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat.

I understand what you're saying, and realize the strategic objective of Zitadelle was to buy time. However, this operation intended to accomplish this by conducting another huge encirclement battle, thereby seriously gutting Soviet forces enough to negate any possibility of a Soviet offensive for the rest of that year. Had von Manstein been allowed to continue his advance, I don't see how he could have done much more damage to Soviet forces, since an encirclement was out of the question. Yes, it probably would've put a temporary halt to Soviet offensive operations, but not to the degree the Germans were hoping for. A Soviet winter offensive would've been a near certainty. Is that good enough a reason to risk the loss of an SS Panzer Corps?

[mididoctors]

Here we are coming into the what if part. I suppose my line of reasoning goes something like this. If we begin by looking at what happened to 5th Guards Tank army after its failed counterattack at Prokhorovka, we can see that this unit lost pretty much all of its combat strength that day. It would take a long time before it became an effective unit again. Suppose Manstein switches axis and attacks towards Obojan. Facing him is parts of 1st Tank army and 6th Gds army. Both these units are spent, they have suffered heavy losses in the battles so far. Lets assume for arguments sake that Manstein punches through them and reach Obojan. Here the soviets have two options. Either pull out from the southwestern parts of the bulge to avoid encirclement of 40th and 38th army. OR pull another unit from the reserves and do another counterattack. But the problem now is that the main reserve unit is spent (5th Gds Tank and 5th Gds), at the same time, the northern reserve unit 2nd Tank army has also suffered heavy during its counterattacks on the northern flank. Whats left really is 53rd army east of Kursk or 47th army east of Belgorod. But if these units are committed, then the ability for the Soviets to wage any offensive operations in the south is severely weakened. If the Soviets would have launched another counteroffensive, and if that counteroffensive had failed like the one at Prokhorovka, then I am seriously doubting we would have seen any Soviet autumn/winter offensive in the south. And even if we did, I'm seriously doubting that it would have had any serious success at all. That is what Im aiming at.

defeat.[/QB]

hmmm a lot of the arguments in this thread have the commanders in the field having realtime hindsight..if only axis of attacks where changed etc.......

A re-evalution of Kursk must enevitably still conceed a strategic reversal for the Germans and all hope of winning or stalemating the east front......the outcome of the battle is more a indication of the wars turing point rather than a tactical or operational defeat for one side or the other......in essence any result less than total Soviet defeat is a German defeat!..the argument of operational goals is an admission of loss of stratigic initative.

Hitler failed infront of moscow in 41..all hopes of knocking Russia out were over..pretence at reversing fortunes latter in 42 and even more in 43 where pure pipe dreams...(in my view invading in 41 was a ridiculus long shot in its self) Kursk was folly as was the whole Third Reich Mission in general....but thats another argument.......

what could of the wehrmacht done instead in 43?...who knows but sustaining the east front for a further year in some stalemate is not going to help germany win the war after all the US are comming from the other side and Germany is steadily getting flattened..

War winning what ifs in 43 really boil down too:

a German detection and defeat of ENIGMA

(some evidence it was detected but Krammer sabotaged its discovery?).

Advanced type XXI U-boats being available for N atlantic battle in large numbers

Early introduction of German Jet aircraft to re-establish/maintain air superiority over all fronts in 44

further rationalisation of german production from an earlier date (1939 at least).

even given these options your probably still need a Nazi Nuke.....

Germany just was not going to win this war..what on earth they thought they were doing has always bamboozeled me!!!!

Boris

london

[mididoctors]

Here we are coming into the what if part. I suppose my line of reasoning goes something like this. If we begin by looking at what happened to 5th Guards Tank army after its failed counterattack at Prokhorovka, we can see that this unit lost pretty much all of its combat strength that day. It would take a long time before it became an effective unit again. Suppose Manstein switches axis and attacks towards Obojan. Facing him is parts of 1st Tank army and 6th Gds army. Both these units are spent, they have suffered heavy losses in the battles so far. Lets assume for arguments sake that Manstein punches through them and reach Obojan. Here the soviets have two options. Either pull out from the southwestern parts of the bulge to avoid encirclement of 40th and 38th army. OR pull another unit from the reserves and do another counterattack. But the problem now is that the main reserve unit is spent (5th Gds Tank and 5th Gds), at the same time, the northern reserve unit 2nd Tank army has also suffered heavy during its counterattacks on the northern flank. Whats left really is 53rd army east of Kursk or 47th army east of Belgorod. But if these units are committed, then the ability for the Soviets to wage any offensive operations in the south is severely weakened. If the Soviets would have launched another counteroffensive, and if that counteroffensive had failed like the one at Prokhorovka, then I am seriously doubting we would have seen any Soviet autumn/winter offensive in the south. And even if we did, I'm seriously doubting that it would have had any serious success at all. That is what Im aiming at.

defeat.[/QB]

hmmm a lot of the arguments in this thread have the commanders in the field having realtime hindsight..if only axis of attacks where changed etc.......

A re-evalution of Kursk must enevitably still conceed a strategic reversal for the Germans and all hope of winning or stalemating the east front......the outcome of the battle is more a indication of the wars turing point rather than a tactical or operational defeat for one side or the other......in essence any result less than total Soviet defeat is a German defeat!..the argument of operational goals is an admission of loss of stratigic initative.

Hitler failed infront of moscow in 41..all hopes of knocking Russia out were over..pretence at reversing fortunes latter in 42 and even more in 43 where pure pipe dreams...(in my view invading in 41 was a ridiculus long shot in its self) Kursk was folly as was the whole Third Reich Mission in general....but thats another argument.......

what could of the wehrmacht done instead in 43?...who knows but sustaining the east front for a further year in some stalemate is not going to help germany win the war after all the US are comming from the other side and Germany is steadily getting flattened..

War winning what ifs in 43 really boil down too:

a German detection and defeat of ENIGMA

(some evidence it was detected but Krammer sabotaged its discovery?).

Advanced type XXI U-boats being available for N atlantic battle in large numbers

Early introduction of German Jet aircraft to re-establish/maintain air superiority over all fronts in 44

further rationalisation of german production from an earlier date (1939 at least).

even given these options your probably still need a Nazi Nuke.....

Germany just was not going to win this war..what on earth they thought they were doing has always bamboozeled me!!!!

Boris

london

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by mididoctors:

War winning what ifs in 43 really boil down too:

Just FYI, I dont think anyone has been talking about war winning what ifs here.

[mididoctors]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by mididoctors:

War winning what ifs in 43 really boil down too:

Just FYI, I dont think anyone has been talking about war winning what ifs here.</font>

[Foxbat]

I see that a lot of the smoke has cleared whi8le I was away So we can cut right to the real issue.

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

Here we are coming into the what if part. I suppose my line of reasoning goes something like this. If we begin by looking at what happened to 5th Guards Tank army after its failed counterattack at Prokhorovka, we can see that this unit lost pretty much all of its combat strength that day. It would take a long time before it became an effective unit again.

5th Guards had lost something like 90% of it's combat strength and would have to be pulled from the line to be refurbished so it could take part in subsequent offensive operations (where they would again lose 90% of their tanks, a habit that ultimatly got Rotmistrov demoted ). Whether or not they have enough crews left to reequip and return to the line is imho academic, but.. 5th Gds Tank is not the only reserve force they have. And they might not even be neccesary.

Suppose Manstein switches axis and attacks towards Obojan.

I guess we were essentialy on the same train of tought all along, as Obojan seemed to me the best possible outcome for the germans.

Facing him is parts of 1st Tank army and 6th Gds army. Both these units are spent, they have suffered heavy losses in the battles so far. Lets assume for arguments sake that Manstein punches through them and reach Obojan.

While I agree that Manstein could have taken Obojan if he had wanted (or more precisely was allowed) to he'd have to do a little more than that, Obojan was still part of a defensive belt and his offensive would have to take into account infantry forces to the west that could threaten his flank, not to mention the possibility of the soviets mounting a counterattack near Belgorod (or even Kharkov) that might threaten his entire rear area.

Here the soviets have two options. Either pull out from the southwestern parts of the bulge to avoid encirclement of 40th and 38th army.

That would be an attractive option because it would leave the germans an empty victory as they close the pocket while pulling back units to strengthen the defense.

In reality I doubt that this would be possible or acceptable to the russians.

OR pull another unit from the reserves and do another counterattack.

If they keep repeating their mistakes they are in real trouble, but they don't have to. There are several options for a counterattack, one of them would be to simply wait and let the germans choose an axis after taking Obojan.

But the problem now is that the main reserve unit is spent (5th Gds Tank and 5th Gds), at the same time, the northern reserve unit 2nd Tank army has also suffered heavy during its counterattacks on the northern flank. Whats left really is 53rd army east of Kursk or 47th army east of Belgorod. But if these units are committed, then the ability for the Soviets to wage any offensive operations in the south is severely weakened.

Using the remnants of 1st Tank to attack through the sector of 40th army would allow the soviets to unbalance a german move towards Obojan without requiring the use of major reserve units (such a counter-attack would not be strong enough to achieve very much, but it would force the germans to relocate units there).

And if they are going to throw in some major units it would make more sense to use the Steppe Front units then those assigned to the Kharkov area. After all they are going to need those units rather soon.

But a better alternative would be to attack elsewhere, which was in fact already happening on the northern shoulder (and in Sicily). Now with Manstein's forces still locked in combat that is going to have some interesting consequences, the units needed to defend Italy have to come from somewhere and his forces won't be available to counter soviet offenses in the Donbas area.

If the Soviets would have launched another counteroffensive, and if that counteroffensive had failed like the one at Prokhorovka, then I am seriously doubting we would have seen any Soviet autumn/winter offensive in the south.

If everything went along the worst case scenario for the soviets then the germans would be celebrating christmas in Moscow in 43

And even if we did, I'm seriously doubting that it would have had any serious success at all. That is what Im aiming at.

You mean if the soviets had managed to shatter all their remaining reserves for no gain? Yes that would put quite a dent in their plans.

But realistically the very best the germans could achieve would have been to take Obojan and lop of the bottom of the Kursk nulge, creating a new frontline on the Belgorod-Prokhovorka-Obojan-Sumi line, destroying large parts of 38 and 40th Army that would earn Manstein some kudos from OKH, but it would hardly save the german situation on the eastern front.

Yes, but dont you see that that is exactly what the Germans were after when they launched Zitadelle in the first place. This was no "lets advance to Moscow" type offensive. This was a desperate attempt to lock the front. By attacking and defeating the soviets at Kursk, the Germans hoped to eliminate the risk of a Soviet autumn/winter offensive and at the same time shorten the front to free units for the west. A stalemate was what they wanted. This is what Im talking about when I say that I see a possibility for the Germans to snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat.

But what would they really achieve by such a 'stalemate'? Their strategic situation, both in the east and the med would be at least as bad and possibly worse. Their Front would not be shortened, large parts of their forces that were historically used to plug the defence of the Reich would be locked in combat trying to cut off and destroy a tiny part of the forces in the Bulge. And the soviet units earmarked for the counteroffensives would be in much the same state as they werte historically.. Unless of course the soviets start repeating the Rotmistrov counterattack, which is the operational equivalent of playing Russian Roulette with two maxim machineguns.

[coe]

Tried finding this info, but can anyone tell me why the northern pincer kinda went no-where as opposed to the southern one?

Conan