stalingrad vs. other city battles

[coe]

I'm puzzled a bit by the inability of the Germans to have taken Stalingrad - I understand there was a question of improper weapons (rifles) and possibly training too but comparing to other city battles - Aachen, Berlin, those were much shorter...in Aachen the casualties were much less and supposedly the Americans weren't experienced as the Germans were in city fighting..- is it because in the other city battles the cities were surrounded and in Stalingrad, the Russians just kept feeding people in?

C.

[PFMM]

Interesting, I am under the opposite impression.

I thought that it inevitable that the Germans would have taken Stalingrad. They had complete control of the battle in the city, and had developed tactics and units dedicated to fighting in just such an environment with notable success. I think the city was about nine tenths cleared by the time the Soviets launched their offensives.

As to Aachen, didn't the Allies suffer casulties in the order of fifty thousand in a matter of weeks? Gave them quite a shock if I remeber.

[Mike Summers]

I'm no grog, but IMO the Germans should have bypassed the city and moved on. Although there was a significant industrial base there for the Soviets, simply laying siege to the city could have been sufficient. The Germans should have attacked the Russians armed forces, and not their city. They lost an entire Army by not understanding that point.

Again, I'm no grog, but that is my layman's understanding of the deal.

[coe]

actually no according to wikipedia - about 5000 casualties on both sides over 20 days...

[JasonC]

Nonsense, as to the Aachen claim.

Yes there was a broader Aachen battle that was a serious fight. It was the location where the northern US drive stalled logistically, and coincided with the westwall defenses. The heavy fighting took place outside the city to surround it, and especially in the forests to the south (Hurtgen etc). The fight for the city proper, on the other hand, was remarkably easy and fast and used remarkably few forces, which inflicted lopsided losses on the disorganized and hapahard defense.

It took all of 2 infantry battalions about one week to take Aachen proper. It had already been nearly surrounded by heavy fighting outside the city - the real Aachen battle - which required piercing the westwall in two places, dealing with repeated German counterattacks, etc. But inside, once attacked, it was not particularly hard. The two battalions involved lost about 500 men, over 80% of them just wounded. They took all of 75 KIA. Comparing it to the fight for Stalingrad is, well, you decide.

Here is a link and a quote -

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/MOUTGabel.htm

The two battalions of the 26th Infantry (plus attachments) that bore the brunt of the fighting in Aachen lost 75 killed, 414 wounded, and 9 missing in securing a city defended by over 5,000 enemy troops. For the U.S. Army, the true bloodbath of the 1944 campaign was not an urban operation, but rather the battle of the Huertgen Forest.

The Germans, on the other hand, lost virtually all of the troops committed to Aachen. Over half of the total surrendered, despite Hitler's admonition that they were to fight to the last man. A small number probably succeeded in exfiltrating, but the rest were killed and wounded. The German cause did not gain much from the sacrifice of these troops.

That's Aachen, next a comment on the original question.

[JasonC]

As for Stalingrad, the Germans initially attempted to take the city in a coup de main. The Russian defenses west of the city were poor, they were indulging uncoordinated and large scale infantry counterattacks. The Germans broke through and sent mech forces into the southern extremities of the city, hoping to take most of the place before it was fully remanned.

They were stopped around the railway station. Russian forces outside the city were withdrawing into it, but holding the main hill overlooking the city. The Russians made the decision to defend in the city despite its being on the far bank of the Volga - the conventional decision would have been to defend the river line. The troop total was already an army.

Now, at this point the Germans could have given up and decided to go around, perhaps. But the overall operational situation needs to be understood. The southern offensive had diverged. The northern flank was along the Don river, not the Volga. It was the operational shield for the southern flank driving into the Caucasus, to cut off Russian forces there and get to the oil at Baku and Maikop.

The Don has its nearest approach to the Volga a short distance west of Stalingrad. All operations beyond the Don were at the extreme limits of German logistics support. The rail lines had to be changed over the German gauge, and the front had move so rapidly this had not moved appreciably yet. From as far away at the Donets bend, everything was coming by truck convoy, a distance about 200 miles. The distances to forces in the south were far greater.

The Russians continuously held the Don river eastern bank to just northwest of the city. The chord between the Don and Volga formed a front line oriented east-west, in which the Germans held the southern position and the Russians the northern.

What is the main German objective now supposed to be? East of Stalingrad you can get to a swampy delta region then the Caspian. It is possible to "turn" Stalingrad from the south if the Volga is forced between the city and the delta. But this is an operation beyond the Don, then beyond the Volga, where the main logistic route is a single Russian gauge railway. The Russians are on their side of the Volga in strength.

Operationally, the mission is to protect the Caucasus wing, and to destroy whatever Russian forces can be destroyed.

Now, if the armor sent south were not sent there, and only one, northern prong were used to exploit the whole fall, then one might look at another approach. You could drive east north of the Don, instead of using it to shield your flank cheaply. This isn't as promising as it sounds because there are numerous smaller tributaries to be crossed one after another. It is out of the question if half the armor is hundreds of miles farther south.

The Russian decision to defend the city looked like a mistake, dictated by prestige. It looked tactically very hard for the Russians - how are they to keep their men supplied? Well, they can expect to do so as long as they have a connecting line to the "chord" force north of the city, between the Don and Volga.

So the next thing the Germans tried was driving to the Volga north of the city, into its northern suburbs. They thought this was effectively making a pocket, given the difficulty of working across the Volga. After the Germans reach the shore, the Russians do not withdraw or give up, but instead continue to send reinforcements to the west bank.

Ok, so now take the heights overlooking the city, putting the whole of it under continual observation and artillery bombardment. Perfectly sensible, but a hard fight. Less sensible perhaps, the forces in the southern part of the city continue trying to grind their way north, parallel to the river. This is mostly a result of units with frontage routinely attacking what is in front of them, but it was wasteful from an attrition efficiency point of view.

Ok, now the city is half surrounded, but staying alive from night ferries. At this point the Germans could have backed off, tossed in shells at leisure, or looked to the chord area and Don front for a more appetizing target. (A "left face" in other words, northward).

But they have already been sucked in by now. They control sections of the Volga bank, and giving them up will allow resupply to the Stalingrad force. The control the whole southern portion of the city, up to a few hold out snipers and occasional night infiltrations. What is keeping these buggers alive? Those dang ferries. So next, they get the bright idea of driving to the Volga at multiple points to cut the defenders into sections, and also to plant artillery on the river heights, to blow up anything trying to cross.

And that means driving through the factory districts in the densest part of the town, which becomes a meatgrinder.

They do basically take the town, however. The Russians are hanging on to a few scraps of fortified "balka" along the west Volga bank (which is "reverse slope" to nearly everything), and whatever they can sneak deeper each night. But most Russians sent into the city have long since been slaughtered. Their artillery park across the Volga has grown, discouraging crossing ideas.

All of the above takes about 2 months. What the Germans do not suspect is that the Russians are not only sustaining the attrition, but also building very large reserves opposite the Don flank, and others south of the city and west of the Volga, between the Stalingrad effort and the far south effort. Arguably the biggest single German mistake is allowing the second of those to still be around. They screen the sector - a long section of empty steppe - with motor patrols. Later the axis minors get these.

The Germans don't lose the battle within the city, they lose the battle outside the city by being too fixated on the fight for the city. But the origins of that fix are first logistical (making e.g. a major operation well across the Volga too, seem practically impossible), then getting roped in to a sequence of seemingly sensible opportunities.

A few staff officers, some of them quite senior, saw dangers and recommended keeping armor out of the fight in reserve - others later recommend falling back to the Don bend. Generalized cockiness is the main thing against them. The Germans think the Russians are on their last legs, because they have just royally pasted them from six months, again. The high command doubts the Russians have enough to maintain continuous positions anymore (an illusion fostered by the empty sector between Stalingrad and the Caucasus front e.g.).

When it turns out they actually have entire tank armies and a front or two up their sleeve, with thousands of uncommitted T-34s, the command shock on the German side is initially total. They had contempt for Russian operational "play" before then, if grudging respect for tactical tenacity. Then got a lesson, but could not believe it was happening. It went against everything they had been saying to themselves about how dumb the Russians were, for years.

[John Kettler]

coe,

To properly understand the magnitude of the "rabbit" the Russians pulled out of their hat, please see Walter Kerr's THE SECRET OF STALINGRAD.

Also, the History Channel recently had a Battlefield episode on Stalingrad. Five points really stood out in the tests and studies.

Stalingrad's "brick" buildings were actually made from vastly tougher brick sheathed reinforced concrete, which following the initial blast were practically immune to bombardment, since the blast dissipated though all the openings made by the initial attack. The Mill was shown on camera, and it, despite a plethora of holes large and small from bombs and shells, not only withstood the battle, but 60 years of brutal weather with interior structure fully exposed. Basically, the buildings acted as an enormous sponge for German ordnance.

The German combat uniform, even with a greatcoat and whatnot,rare at Stalingrad in the winter, gave up heat far more rapidly than its Russian counterpart, leading to lots of cold weather casualties.

By putting a little gasoline in their weapon lube, the Russians gained a major cold weather combat advantage over the Germans, whose weapon actions wound up stiff and hard to work.

German efforts to combat the shocking discovery that men who simply died for no apparent reason in the cold had died of starvation backfired when the issuance of meat paste killed off more men by causing phospate? levels to crash.

The Russians would've been in really bad shape from dysentery, tularemia, typhus, etc. had a brilliant microbiologist not been brought in to combat them. So effective was she that she was a state secret and was described as "being worth three generals."

JasonC,

Another cogent analysis! Are you sure you're not a reincarnated general? Your command of the subject is impressive.

Regards,

John Kettler

[coe]

hmmm still that doesn't seem to account for the enourmous casualties from fighting that both sides suffered lets say compared to the Americans and Germans in Aachen or perhaps even Kharkov? It appears that combat casualties were huge....

For example, if it were the Americans fighting the Soviets in the Urban environments in Stalingrad would it have been as casualty intensive (from teh fighting part alone)? or were they using different tactics.

[coe]

I guess for instance, the tractor works or Pavlov's house...I'm puzzled why the latter was able to hold out so long...I presume if the Americans were attacking it, they'd flatten it with HE and more HE and then have tanks fire at it from standoff range.

[realest]

Originally posted by coe:

I guess for instance, the tractor works or Pavlov's house...I'm puzzled why the latter was able to hold out so long...I presume if the Americans were attacking it, they'd flatten it with HE and more HE and then have tanks fire at it from standoff range.

Thats part of what has already been posted here. The way the buildings were engineered and built allowed them to take horrendous punishment and remain standing. The design wasn't on purpose as the city was built years before the battle ever occured even before the war started, the design was for ease of construction by highly unskilled labor. The communist liked to keep idle hands busy, that way they didn't have time to plot their own new governments.

The Germans tried everything they could to pulverize the city. If you read the engineering text about the seige you will find that most archetects can't believe that much ordinance was used and that much of the city still intact. Matter of fact, you can go to the city now and in the older parts still see where they just rebricked the holes and were done.

Concrete and Steel compliment each other tremendously. They even have some original areas still standing. After over 60 years and riddled with holes, these structures still stand. Entire floors blown out of them, yet they still stand supported by the exterior walls.

Their own construction allowed them to hold on to constant cover and concealment.

[coe]

engineering text?

really? I would surmise it also might be the equipment the germans used too... it seemed the most mobile assets were 75mm with alot of 50mm...I do recall American accounts in Aachen using 150mm guns

[Wicky]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

German efforts to combat the shocking discovery that men who simply died for no apparent reason in the cold had died of starvation backfired when the issuance of meat paste killed off more men by causing phospate? levels to crash.

Medicine at the battle of Stalingrad- Royal Society of Medicine, Robert Kaplan MB, Feb 2000 - PDF

Edit: http://www.ccmtutorials.com/misc/phosphate/page_07.htm

[ February 07, 2007, 04:59 AM: Message edited by: Wicky ]

[JasonC]

Nah, the Germans had plenty of heavy artillery at Stalingrad.

As for Pavlov's house, the 38 bazillion other apartment buildings or offices or factories that had a handful of surivivors to a reduced platoon in them, but were leveled and everyone in them killed, are not mentioned in the dispatches.

They survived because the Germans did not know where they were, half the time. They hide in cellars by day, sometimes left completely, re-infiltrated by trenches and through interior mouseholes, above ground at night, through the sewer lines. They flat hide half the time when German infantry went by. Another third of the time they fired a few bursts when they saw them in the streets and decamped.

Plenty of small units doing this all over the city were IDed, surrounded, and killed. When a few weren't, they became heros and propaganda was made from their successes.

The specific house was better than most because there was a wider area of open ground around it, making it less approachable and more readily defended. It was also close enough to the river that men could sneak to it each night, and artillery from across the Volga could hit the square in front of it.

Taking every block once is a nice, finite job. Taking every block 10 times from a whole succession of waves of infiltrating defenders appearing behind you, is another matter.

[coe]

interesting where did you find out about it? I was under the impression it was constantly occupied... did this kind of reinfiltration stuff happen in later city battles (e.g. Berlin, Budapast, Aachen) or were there better techniques. It appears that in Stalingrad the German lines were a bit porous (then you add sewer movement).

Would you say that loss rates were average for city operations during WWII. (this is before Soviet Counteroffensive)? I'm under the impression that it wasn't and that both sides fighting in the city could have had less casualties while still fighting intensly.

Jason, also might you know of any maps of the Koltov Corridor, I'm just curious as to where it exactly was and since it was long how the germans were making it a corridor and how the russians were keeping the end of the corridor open (the side that goes into the german rear) because if it truely was a corridor heavily lined on both sides then you would just have to put something at the opening to cap it (temporary solution) because it sounds like in the corridor that the sides were pretty tough to crack and it was the opening at the very end of the corridor that was key.