Russian war economy & attrition vulnerabilities

[JasonC]

A thread on the tips and tricks forum has spun out of that subject area, and rather than compound the problem by continuing to post massive history screeds there, I thought I'd start a new thread here.

The occasion for the comments below was an article on Russian econ mobilization for the war that Adam Lloyd sent me in private email. I thought others here - including participants in the tips and tricks "sneak attacks" thread, which has veered off into all of this - might also be interested. (Adam got the email already).

It is interesting, though cast at a pretty high level of generality, and marred something less than total candor. Several things nevertheless stand out.

1. It really is amazing that the whole rail network didn't break down completely between June 41 and January 42. They were moving, as the article puts it, what amounted to an entire industrial nation thousands of miles to the east. Trying to keep supplied and re-equipped an enourmous army at the front, which also needed redeployment by rail several times on a significant scale. And moving everything needed to equip replacement forces as large at those at the front, mobilize them all from all over creation, and then dump them opposite the points of greatest threat. Oh, and just for icing, also move 25 divisions from the far east to the west in time for the battle of Moscow. While the Germans were grabbing 40% of the rail line length and a lesser but not insignificant portion of the rolling stock. That loadings rose 50% in the first year despite those losses and that confused multi-faceted emergency effort is amazing. That only 50% more loadings were necessary to achieve all of those operational tasks is equally incredible.

2. The almost throw-away line in the article about women's contribution to the rear effort rings true. They doubled their available labor force almost immediately. The Germans were ridiculously slow on this score. The US and UK made significant changes but did not fully utilize this resource. There is a human cost to all of this, though, revealed inadvertently in the comment about 8th graders made available in industrial plants. Obviously they also simply worked harder.

3. The whitewash in the article is about food and agriculture. That is where so much of the manpower had to come from. Replanting 9 million acres in the east and sending 2.4 million animals to them no doubt helped, but that is hardly the Ukraine, and the withdrawal of millions of working men from the countryside must have had - and did have, I know from other sources - a catastrophic effect on farm output. The article mentions the first priority given to soldiers and after them to workers in the industrial centers.

It understates the ruthlessness of that policy and its effects. Men join the army and women went to the war plants because otherwise they'd starve. The civilian ration outside those sectors was on the order of 1200 calories per day. A 105 lb woman on a diet might live on that for a few months. The article mentions supplimenting ag production with small plots for vegetables and potatos. That reveals an appalling situation, where only outside work (or connections) in addition to the officially allowed ratio would enable anyone to get enough calories to maintain body weight.

Lend lease foodstuffs eventually supplied most of the needs of the actual army. That let internal ag production feed the workers in the cities - in 1941 even those were fed none to well. It was not enough to prevent widespread famine, which killed the old, the infirm, and in the countryside poorer children, in large numbers.

4. One other fact I've learned recently surprised me with its importance and general lack of coverage. It concerns Russian military manpower needs and how they were met during the period of victory and the iniative, particularly from the late summer of 1943 through fall of 1944. Russian losses were still extremely high in those years. The loss rate fell when they went to the offensive, but only by about 1/3rd. They were still losing millions per year in permanent military losses, and several times that number passed through the sick or wounded rolls.

So, where did they get the men to replace them and keep the army strong, despite the losses the Germans managed to inflict in the long defense period? It wasn't the size of the annual classes that did it. The population was only about twice that of Germany, and counting losses and conquered areas that falls to more like 3/2 times. They were only getting around half a million from ordinary demographics. And it wasn't that they had a deep barrel they hadn't already reach into - as the ag production disaster shows, they were already drawing manpower from the countryside to well below danger levels.

The surprising answer is that fully half of the new military personnel came from liberated areas. Internally the staff called them "bonus soldiers". When they cleared the Donets, they'd get a flock of Donets residents to draft. Same with eastern Ukraine, then with white Russia, then with western Ukraine. They looked at losses sustained to re-take an area as "damped" by the new recruits that renewed control of that area would make available. They also scarfed up partisan bands and re-integrated them into the formal army as they advanced.

What is surprising about this is not that it happened - once it is mentioned it seems obvious enough - but how important it was and how little coverage it gets in discussions of the war. The Russians did not have a bottomless well of manpower. If they hadn't regained territory, their enourmous loss rate would not have been fully made good, and their manpower strength over time would have declined (though they could have kept a good weapons mix, absent a higher rate of equipment losses than they sustained).

Which means a more sensible defense that kept the bulk of the ground while inflicting higher losses would have tired them out. If in addition the Germans had a much higher replacement rate, sufficient to cover their own (lower) losses, the Russians would not have kept the initiative indefinitely. Not at the op tempo they actually used, anyway. They would have had to conduct their offensives on a much slower time scale after say the end of 1943, because they would have needed to husband manpower and allow time for new age classes, plus wounded and sickness recoveries, to replenish the ranks.

The point is, the Russians did very well on the mobilization side by pulling out all the stops and more - by running civilian life well into the "red zone" (of famine I mean). And they did not have endless attritionist resources, even doing so. They were more vulnerable to an improved attritionist performance on the German side than many casual, journalist level readers of war histories suppose.

I hope this is interesting.

[stikkypixie]

Thanks for the post, it really made me appreciate the efficiency of the soviets in organisation on the one hand, and the tremendous effort their civilians had to make to keep the war effort going :eek: . It also made aware of the importance of lend and lease, cause i always thought the US only send a few tanks...

[Andreas]

The point about *cough* 'recruitment' *cough* in newly liberated areas is very important. Training these new soldiers in what often was an incredibly short amount of time (I think it was just six weeks or so that were effectively available between the end of the spring offensive and the beginning of the L'vov Sandomierz offensive operation in 1944, in 1st Ukrainian sector) requested a massive effort of Soviet rear organisation, who not only had to outfit these chaps, but also train them.

I believe, but am not that well informed about it, that newly liberated former POWs were often just given a rifle and told to come along, and that partisan bands were absorbed into the army.

Hopefully Grisha will be along shortly to expand a bit on it. I am away from all my sources at the moment.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The point about *cough* 'recruitment' *cough* in newly liberated areas is very important. Training these new soldiers in what often was an incredibly short amount of time (I think it was just six weeks or so that were effectively available between the end of the spring offensive and the beginning of the L'vov Sandomierz offensive operation in 1944, in 1st Ukrainian sector) requested a massive effort of Soviet rear organisation, who not only had to outfit these chaps, but also train them.

Hmmmmmm.... a quick note: given the amount of civilian casualties the USSR sustained during WWII I just wonder how many of them died while pressed into service by the Red Army after they had been liberated but were subsequently listed in the civilan ledger.

Not wanting to be revisionist or anything like that but the new recruits had to come from somewhere and the civilian death toll in the USSR is known........

[Grisha]

Not sure how instructive this is, but I certainly found it interesting. Forces used in the Yassy-Kishinev operations of August 1944 were roughly 50% conscript, having been levied from the recently liberated areas. What struck me further was the relatively light Soviet losses in that operation, but the collapse of Romanian forces probably had something to do with that (not excluding Soviet strategic, operational, and tactical deception which were very good that summer). It should be pointed out that assault formations for some main sectors were exceedingly deep (echeloned), and this may have been a response to the caliber of rifle troops being used.

[K_Tiger]

Im not 100% sure if its right, but i saw some years ago a documentation about Russia and they sayed, that the country, till today, never fully recovered by the losses they take in the war and after it true Stalin and "Friends"...

As example they statet also, today lifed 800.000 more Women in Moskau than Males.

Hope its from interest.

[JasonC]

High portions of "bonus troops" were also involved in the late stages of Bagration - at the Vistula line - in drive in the north that pushed AGN back to the sea there - and in the first attacks into east Prussia. There were significant numbers of "bonus troops", but not as high as a portion of the forces engaged, in the late 43 fighting in the Dnper bend and Kiev sectors.

Yes they were mostly conscripts. Some formed up without formal training, but most seem to have had under 2 months worth. However, a portion were former partisans, and some of those had been regular soldiers in 1941 that went partisan when the front swept past them, or had been infiltrated on purpose to coordinate partisan activities between the two dates.

So there was some uneven experience, if not much in the way of prior discipline or control. At any rate, not all the forces of late 1943 and especially 1944 are regulars. There would be plenty of conscripts and greens. On the German side of the line, you'd see quite a few greens after the summer of 1944, as the rear area comb out wave hits (including navy, Luftwaffe, service troops etc), trying to repair the damage done by Bagration and France.

[Grisha]

K_Tiger,

There is a belief among some historians that the Soviet Union never recovered psychologically from the war. The deep impression left by the German invasion drove the USSR into ruin with an obsession to be prepared for the next invasion. The economy couldn't handle a permanent wartime state, finally caving in just a decade ago. There was an attempt at military reform in the last years before the fall, rehabilitating Svechin and his defensive-minded strategy, but it was too late already. So, I guess the lesson of post-war USSR is that if you let fear rule your life, it will eat you up in the end.

[Joachim]

Originally posted by JasonC:

... And they did not have endless attritionist resources, even doing so. They were more vulnerable to an improved attritionist performance on the German side than many casual, journalist level readers of war histories suppose.

Von Mellenthin states that in early '43 the Soviet armored spearheads were no longer always followed by human waves, pointing out a shortage of manpower (from which he deducts an elastic defense could have won the war - but this is not the point here).

Gruß

Joachim

[Michael Emrys]

Some of my readings, though I don't know how far they can be relied on, have indicated that especially in the last year or so of the war an increasing proportion of the troops were being drawn from the Asian republics, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, etc. I wonder if Greg or Jason can comment on that.

Michael

[ October 02, 2003, 06:03 AM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[JasonC]

I don't think the central Asians story is true. The population of the central Asian republics of the USSR was tiny in the 1940s. A few million each in places that now sport 20-40m population. A fair portion of even those were colonizing Russians.

Russia expanded into its east and south in the 19th century when railroads made that possible in much the same way the US expanded into its west. The regions were quite sparsely settled before that. The primitive local economies in hostile environments could not support large populations.

The demographic revolution in central Asia parallels that in the 3rd world generally, and did not commence until the 20th century. It did not really take off until much later. While central Asians did serve in the Russian military in WW II, they were at most a few percent of the force.

Incidentally, the so-called "Siberians" in the battle of Moscow were also overwhelmingly Russians from central European Russia, who only served in the far east. They weren't born there.

I think the myth of Asians originates in German wartime propaganda, which called the Russians "Mongols" and played on romantic historical associations, themselves largely mythical, about Germanic warriors saving Europe from steppe barbarians. There wasn't the slightest factual truth to that "line". It was pure ad copy.

Edited for a typo...

[ October 02, 2003, 11:57 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Scarhead:

Von Mellenthin states that in early '43 the Soviet armored spearheads were no longer always followed by human waves, pointing out a shortage of manpower (from which he deducts an elastic defense could have won the war - but this is not the point here).

Joachim

I think this is typical von Mellenthin. He is good at making observations, but crap at drawing conclusions from them. It could also be much improved training and junior leadership, or a total change in doctrine. But of course, reliably v.M. plumbs for the explanation that fits in with the general view of the Wehrmacht world about the Red Army. He does that throughout his book, and he is in good company with some of the other German ex-officers who were on the Marshall project. Raus comes to mind. von Mellenthin is strongest when he describes the decision-making process on the German side, and weakest whenever he infers anything about what went on with the Soviet side.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I don't think the central Asians story is true. The population of the central Asian republics of the USSR was tiny in the 1940s. A few million each in places that now sport 20-40m population. A fair portion of even those were colonizing Russians.

Makes sense to me.

I think the myth of Asians originates in German wartime propaganda, which called the Russians "Mongols" and played on romantic historical associations, themselves largely mythical, about Germanic warriors saving Europe from steppe barbarians. There wasn't the slightest factual truth to that "line". It was pure ad copy.

I think you are right. Whenever the reference to non-Russians would turn up in my readings, a warning light would come up in my head, but I had no definite information one way or the other. My guess is that whatever sightings were legitimate were the odd unit composed of Asians which were then extrapolated into the whole "Yellow Peril" thing.

Michael

[JasonC]

I've looked into it a little more, and what I've found confirms the impression. The total non-Russian population of the Russian territories (Tatars to Yakuts) is even at present only around 8m. In central Asia it is 50m, but the population was less than half what it is today even in 1959, and a higher portion of it was Russian.

If you look at all the numbers, a very conservative upper bound for non-ethnic Russian population in 1944 would be around 30m, with more like 15-20m much more likely, and as low as 10m not outside the realm of possibility. Poor desert and forest regions cannot support large populations in pre-industrial conditions.

My estimates of various tribes in the war period -

Kazaks 3-5m

Krygiz 1m

Turkmen 1-2m

Uzbeks 4-5m

Tajiks 1-2m

Tatars 1-2m

Baskirs 1-2m

Churash 1m

Other Urgic 1m

Other Turkic 1m

Yakut, other Siberian less than 1m

Worrying about a Mongol horde in WW II was like worrying about a western invasion by hordes of Mohawk and Sioux Indians from the US. I'm sure some US Airborne had the haircuts for it and maybe even the warpaint, but that is a costume not demographic reality.

[Spook]

This part of Jason's initial post is what I consider as the most intriguing:

Originally posted by JasonC:

So, where did they get the men to replace them and keep the army strong, despite the losses the Germans managed to inflict in the long defense period? It wasn't the size of the annual classes that did it. The population was only about twice that of Germany, and counting losses and conquered areas that falls to more like 3/2 times. They were only getting around half a million from ordinary demographics. And it wasn't that they had a deep barrel they hadn't already reach into - as the ag production disaster shows, they were already drawing manpower from the countryside to well below danger levels.

The surprising answer is that fully half of the new military personnel came from liberated areas. Internally the staff called them "bonus soldiers". When they cleared the Donets, they'd get a flock of Donets residents to draft. Same with eastern Ukraine, then with white Russia, then with western Ukraine. They looked at losses sustained to re-take an area as "damped" by the new recruits that renewed control of that area would make available. They also scarfed up partisan bands and re-integrated them into the formal army as they advanced.

What is surprising about this is not that it happened - once it is mentioned it seems obvious enough - but how important it was and how little coverage it gets in discussions of the war. The Russians did not have a bottomless well of manpower. If they hadn't regained territory, their enourmous loss rate would not have been fully made good, and their manpower strength over time would have declined (though they could have kept a good weapons mix, absent a higher rate of equipment losses than they sustained).

Which means a more sensible defense that kept the bulk of the ground while inflicting higher losses would have tired them out. If in addition the Germans had a much higher replacement rate, sufficient to cover their own (lower) losses, the Russians would not have kept the initiative indefinitely. Not at the op tempo they actually used, anyway. They would have had to conduct their offensives on a much slower time scale after say the end of 1943, because they would have needed to husband manpower and allow time for new age classes, plus wounded and sickness recoveries, to replenish the ranks.

A "traditional" view of the inevitable German defeat on the East often seems that by Germany not taking Moscow and its rail net in 1941, from there onwards it was but a matter of time.

However, the above quotes provide the alternate postulation that if, instead, Germany was able to hold the majority of its Soviet territorial gains while also avoiding large operational disasters like for Stalingrad in 1942-43, then perhaps even then it was really not such a foregone conclusion.

But even on the basis of attempting a "static front" that would impede the Soviets worse than the Germans on a strategic scale (due to minimal Soviet agricultural resources), there are still some added factors as what could have tipped the scales one way or the other:

1) Soviet leadership. The Soviets, while not yet having comparable tactical and grand-tactical prowness as their German counterparts in 1942, still had generals who could make things "interesting" at the operational level. Even here, no guarantees at Soviet success as evidenced by Zhukov's failure at Rzhev 1942, but regardless a potent card to play if opportunities presented themselves. That the Soviets weren't shabby at gathering battlefield intel is also an intangible.

2) Impeding Soviet resettled industries and logistics. That the Soviets extracted as much industries as it did and moved them to the Urals was certainly epic. The unanswered question then remains: could the German Luftwaffe "interdicted" this more effectively than the actual case? The Germans didn't have a strategic air arm per se, but could the Germans still had marshalled enough air striking power with what it did have to seriously disrupt the remaining Soviet rail net or hamper at least a few of the resettled weapons productions factories?

3) Lend Lease. As noted earlier, Lend Lease was critical in providing some key logistics, foodstuffs to feed the Soviet armies, and keeping the overall Soviet populace from sum starvation. Could German interdiction efforts been more effective or reinforced, like a greater concentration of U-boats in the Barents Sea? Would Allied naval abilities still been enough to counter even this in the 1942-43 period?

4) Winning over the occupied regions. What if, instead of pursuing the brutal "lebensraum" policies that alienated the occupied non-Russian peoples, the Germans instead applied more "hearts & minds", at least for a longer initial period? The Ukranians strike me as one such massive lost opportunity as a people who, having no particular love for Stalin, could've been tapped to provide much more added manpower for ground forces arrayed against the Soviets than actually the case. That Hitler would have reconsidered on his wasteful outlook is EXTREMELY unlikely, regardless it still remains a tantalizing "what if."

Anyway, the above again are some factors as could've played into Germany's chances to maintain a static front and wear out Stalin's will, though their individual impacts could be quite variable. And there certainly could be other factors to consider beyond these.

[ October 03, 2003, 11:48 AM: Message edited by: Spook ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Spook:

4) Winning over the occupied regions. What if, instead of pursuing the brutal "lebensraum" policies that alienated the occupied non-Russian peoples, the Germans instead applied more "hearts & minds", at least for a longer initial period? The Ukranians strike me as one such massive lost opportunity as a people who, having no particular love for Stalin, could've been tapped to provide much more added manpower for ground forces arrayed against the Soviets than actually the case. That Hitler would have reconsidered on his wasteful outlook is EXTREMELY unlikely, regardless it still remains a tantalizing "what if."

This was recently discussed in soc.history.war.world-war-ii and the argument that convinced me was that this was a non-starter. For it to have any chance of sucess whatever would have meant that from the very early days of Barbarossa, considerable logistic effort would have to be diverted from supporting the German army to feeding the huddled masses. This means that Barbarossa grinds to a halt even earlier than it did historically.

Then suppose you do get the Ukrainians on your side, what do you do with them? Germany is already having problems arming and supplying the men it has in Soviet territory, what's it going to do with another 3 or 4 million even assuming that it gets them? Until 1943 Germany's problems are less to do with manpower than material shortages. If you have several million Ukrainians sitting around doing essentially nothing for two years that you nevertheless still have to feed, you are worse off not better.

I would agree that that is a brutal, ugly, inhumane answer. But then, it was a particularly brutal, ugly, inhumane war that they fought there. The Thirty Years' War was no picnic for the unfortunate people who were forced to play host to it either.

Michael

[Spook]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

This was recently discussed in soc.history.war.world-war-ii and the argument that convinced me was that this was a non-starter. For it to have any chance of sucess whatever would have meant that from the very early days of Barbarossa, considerable logistic effort would have to be diverted from supporting the German army to feeding the huddled masses. This means that Barbarossa grinds to a halt even earlier than it did historically.

Then suppose you do get the Ukrainians on your side, what do you do with them? Germany is already having problems arming and supplying the men it has in Soviet territory, what's it going to do with another 3 or 4 million even assuming that it gets them? Until 1943 Germany's problems are less to do with manpower than material shortages. If you have several million Ukrainians sitting around doing essentially nothing for two years that you nevertheless still have to feed, you are worse off not better.

Noteworthy, Michael, but the fallacy harbored here is of the Germans having to feed all of the occupied peoples. Was not the Ukraine the USSR's "breadbasket"? Could not the Ukranians feed themselves, as well as perhaps others like the Belorussians if left to their own devices?

Did the occupation of France, Norway, Denmark, the Balkans and the Low Countries significantly detract from Germany's overall logistics because the Germans ended up having to feed the peoples of the noted occupied countries? (Perhaps it might've in some cases.)

No, Michael, I'm rather more of the mind that it was Germany's inclination to take from instead of dole out to the occupied regions, including the USSR's seized provinces. And by doing that, perhaps that helped augment German ground force supplies in the short term. But in the long term, it only fomented extensive partisan activity which probably ranged wide, which in turn required no small measure of German security to provide cover against.

Thus the "brutal, ugly, inhumane answer" was likely far more self-defeating in the end. As it was for Napoleon's efforts in Spain, even if not directly comparable.

Would instead a German stance of "leave alone", neither taking nor giving in the USSR's occupied regions, been also an unacceptable logistical burden to allow? If it was, then instead that just adds to an argument of a major attack on the USSR truly being ill-conceived until warmaking resources were better marshalled. Germany certainly wasn't nearly as geared up for attritional war as it could've been in 1941.

To say nothing of the German failure to wage strategic air war in the East Front in a way as would've mattered, or isolating the USSR from Lend Lease.

I'm still of the mind that IF the Germans kept the occupied peoples of the East Front relatively "indifferent" (if not receptive), then for the long term German military fortunes there would not have been any worse.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Spook:

Noteworthy, Michael, but the fallacy harbored here is of the Germans having to feed all of the occupied peoples. Was not the Ukraine the USSR's "breadbasket"? Could not the Ukranians feed themselves, as well as perhaps others like the Belorussians if left to their own devices?

Er, no. In order to feed people, the grain, produce, meat, etc. has to move from where it's grown to where the people are. That requires logistical resources that the Germans simply didn't have.

Then there is the matter of non-food supplies needed by people in order to survive, coal being high on the list and being also logistics intensive. In short, to maintain the captured peoples at anything resembling a standard of living that would cause them to not resent and rebel against the invaders would take most of the transport in the theater, I am told.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Spook:

Did the occupation of France, Norway, Denmark, the Balkans and the Low Countries significantly detract from Germany's overall logistics because the Germans ended up having to feed the peoples of the noted occupied countries? (Perhaps it might've in some cases.)

Entirely different situation. There was no particular shortage of transport in the West at the time of the German conquests, which in any case went so fast that serious shortages of foodstuffs and other commodities did not develop until long after the fighting was over. In fact, the next year, 1941, saw the Germans stripping Western Europe of trucks and other vehicles in order to try to increase the motorization of the Wehrmacht. Due to the ensuing lack of transport and lack of fuel for the remaining vehicles, shortages and hunger did exist in the West, the most grievous being in the Netherlands during the winter/spring of '44-45. The latter case was also largely due to what was effectively a German blockade of the area, but was tied to a lack of transport.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Spook:

...I'm rather more of the mind that it was Germany's inclination to take from instead of dole out to the occupied regions, including the USSR's seized provinces. And by doing that, perhaps that helped augment German ground force supplies in the short term. But in the long term, it only fomented extensive partisan activity which probably ranged wide, which in turn required no small measure of German security to provide cover against.

There's no doubt that the Germans engaged in massive looting of everything they could get their hands on at every level in the conquered countries, or that it did nothing to increase their popularity.

Where we disagree is that I am not convinced that a more humane policy would have noticably improved Germany's chances of winning the war. If Barbarossa is halted further west than was the case, than they get pushed back westward even sooner than was the case, and Stalin gets all those fresh recruits sooner and in better condition because they haven't been on a starvation diet for 2-3 years.

Michael

[Spook]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Spook:

Noteworthy, Michael, but the fallacy harbored here is of the Germans having to feed all of the occupied peoples. Was not the Ukraine the USSR's "breadbasket"? Could not the Ukranians feed themselves, as well as perhaps others like the Belorussians if left to their own devices?

Er, no. In order to feed people, the grain, produce, meat, etc. has to move from where it's grown to where the people are. That requires logistical resources that the Germans simply didn't have.

</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Spook:

...that just adds to an argument of a major attack on the USSR truly being ill-conceived until warmaking resources were better marshalled. Germany certainly wasn't nearly as geared up for attritional war as it could've been in 1941.

That much we agree on. With the benefit of hindsight you could go further and say with perfect verity that it was ill-conceived for Hitler to begin the war at all. Hitler's whole strategy depended on winning quick victories before his enemies could complete their rearmament because Germany could not hope to outproduce them or match them for manpower. The problem with that strategy is that any delay anywhere along the line, such as occurred in the Battle of Britain, is liable to initiate a cascade of reversals which once begun may not be possible to stop. That is, in fact, what happened.

When the Soviet resistance did not collapse in seven weeks (or whatever Hitler had predicted), Germany was faced with the kind of war it had little or no hope of winning at all, a prolonged war of attrition.

Michael

[Spook]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

That much we agree on. With the benefit of hindsight you could go further and say with perfect verity that it was ill-conceived for Hitler to begin the war at all. Hitler's whole strategy depended on winning quick victories before his enemies could complete their rearmament because Germany could not hope to outproduce them or match them for manpower. The problem with that strategy is that any delay anywhere along the line, such as occurred in the Battle of Britain, is liable to initiate a cascade of reversals which once begun may not be possible to stop. That is, in fact, what happened.

Yes, and in multiple ways. Not only did Germany lack in reserves of aircraft and trained pilots to press on the Battle of Britain in 1940, but also lacked in available submarines. Adm Donitz said he needed about 300 U-boats to "isolate" Britain at war's start, which MIGHT have been an overestimation. Regardless, he started the war with less than 60.

[Spook]

(OT: BTW, Michael, you ever hear from Chris Genna? No luck on my end.)

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Spook:

I hope you'll pardon my belaboring this, Michael, and I suspect this is not a subject easily answered. If you have references to clarify, I would appreciate. But this is one such matter where I now need some quantification to discern an answer for myself.

Yeah, sources are a problem. I just went back over the relevant thread in shwwwii to see if any hard figures were quoted or references given and couldn't find much. The arguments I found most compelling there, and have paraphrased here, were by Louis Capdebosc. If you aren't already familiar with that newsgroup you might check it out. John D. Salt posts there from time to time.

Michael