Calling All You Tactical Grogs...

[Wunsche]

Since this board has proven to be an endless source of fascinating historical information for me, can someone enlighten me on three questions:

1. Preparatory artillery barrages. I have read that in 1944 and 1945, the Soviets managed to mass something along 300 guns per kilometer and fired barrages ranging between 45 minutes and 90 minutes. What does this mean? Did the artillery target specific areas, hit it for ten minutes, shift fire to another area for ten minutes? Did each battery obliterate a certain area for the whole barrage? Did these barrages creep from the frontlines to further back during the period of the bombardment?

2. It appears the Soviets used their armor (except at the Seelow Heights) to exploit breakthroughs created by the infantry - typically they were used six to nine hours later. In CM terms, does this mean infantry overwhelming infantry that has been bombarded? Or do they have local infantry-supporting armor? And how does infantry create a breakthrough against other infantry? Again, it seems my common CM belief of combined arms or armor forces rolling over prepared defensive positions seems to be flawed.

3. It also appears that the Soviets launched infantry reconnaissance battalions prior to major offensives to figure out the German defenses. Would this again be pure infantry versus infantry? And what would the frontage be on such an attack? The odds? And how determined would such an attack be?

Again, playing this AWESOME game has caused me to ask all these questions about things I assumed but never really understood. Please enlighten me.

[86smopuim]

Bump to say I too would be inrterested in an answer, especially to #1.

[zukkov]

well since no smart fellers have answered your questions yet, i figure i might have a go...

1) ya see, the russians would get some guns together. sometimes a few, sometimes a whole lot. it just depended on whether they had a few or a whole lot at the time. then some smart feller in the back would decide where to point them guns. then they would fire at one thing for awhile until that smart feller in the back decided it was time to fire at somethin else. then they'd fire at another thing for awhile until that smart feller told 'em to stop. then they'd stop for awhile until the smart feller decided it was time to fire again. it kinda went that way for most of the war. if the smart feller got killed or somethin', they'd just replace him with another even smarter feller. kinda makes you wonder why they just didn't use the smarter feller in the first place, huh?

2)ya see, the russians used their armor kinda like their artillery. some smart feller.. a different one than the artillery smart feller, and a little closer to the front, but still kinda in the back too... some smart feller would decide it was time to move the tanks somewheres, hopefully important, but not always. and them tanks would go there, sometimes quick, sometimes slow. well, unlessen the enemy stopped em from goin there, in which case that smart feller would decide whether they should send some more tanks to go there, or just go somewheres else. it pretty much went that way for most of the war. if the smart feller got killed or somethin, they'd just replace him like they did that artillery smart feller...

3)ya see, the russians used their recon fellers kinda the same way they did the tank fellers and the arty fellers. some smart feller... even closer than the tank smart feller, but not all the way up with the fightin' fellers... would decide he needed to know what the enemy was up to. so he'd send some not so smart fellers up ahead to figure out what they was doin. then they'd come back and tell him. but sometimes the enemy wouldn't let em, in which case the smart feller would decide whether to send some more not so smart fellers up ahead to figure it out, or just say ta hell with it and send the armor fellers up there anyway. it went that way for most of the war. if the smart feller got killed or somethin... yep, you guessed it.. they'd just replace him like they did the other 2 smart fellers. the only problem was if they run out of smart fellers somewheres down the road, but i don't guess that happened....

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Wunsche:

Since this board has proven to be an endless source of fascinating historical information for me, can someone enlighten me on three questions:

1. Preparatory artillery barrages. I have read that in 1944 and 1945, the Soviets managed to mass something along 300 guns per kilometer and fired barrages ranging between 45 minutes and 90 minutes. What does this mean? Did the artillery target specific areas, hit it for ten minutes, shift fire to another area for ten minutes? Did each battery obliterate a certain area for the whole barrage? Did these barrages creep from the frontlines to further back during the period of the bombardment?

The artillery density got higher, up to one gun per meter at the start of the Berlin operation. The barrages were quite complex, and would engage all enemy defensive and firing positions, aiming to destroy gun and MG emplacements, and annihilate the infantry. They shifted target quite a bit during the preparation.

Originally posted by Wunsche:

2. It appears the Soviets used their armor (except at the Seelow Heights) to exploit breakthroughs created by the infantry - typically they were used six to nine hours later. In CM terms, does this mean infantry overwhelming infantry that has been bombarded? Or do they have local infantry-supporting armor? And how does infantry create a breakthrough against other infantry? Again, it seems my common CM belief of combined arms or armor forces rolling over prepared defensive positions seems to be flawed.

Special breakthrough armour regiments, equipped with heavy tanks (first KV, then IS), or SP guns (SU-76, IS-122/152 or ISU-122/152) were used to directly support infantry breaking into the defensive positions. These were independent regiments (really battalions, if you compare them to the German units) that would be attached on an 'as-needed' basis. After the breakthrough was achieved, fully mobile mechanised and cavalry/mechanised formations would be inserted into the breakthrough. These could be either tank armies, mech corps, tank corps, or cavalry/mechanised corps. Their goal was to thrust as far as possible into the German rear, especially later in the war no longer caring about creating pockets. These formations would primarily be equipped with T34 and Shermans.

Originally posted by Wunsche:

3. It also appears that the Soviets launched infantry reconnaissance battalions prior to major offensives to figure out the German defenses. Would this again be pure infantry versus infantry? And what would the frontage be on such an attack? The odds? And how determined would such an attack be?

These would be infantry versus infantry, probably supported by direct fire elements, such as guns, ATRs and machine guns. The attack would not be determined in trying to gain and hold ground, but determined enough to cause the Germans to open up with all their defensive fire elements. Intel officers would oversee the attacks from dug-outs in the rear, with maps into which they would enter any newly discovered or shifted German firing positions. The Germans used a lot of 'silent' MGs, i.e. HMGs that were ordered not to fire at targets of opportunity or even during raids and probes, but were kept hidden for full-scale assaults. These could really mess up the Soviet infantry's day, so it became extremely important to get them to speak, so to say.

If, as in Bagration, or the L'vov Sandomierz Operation, these reconnaissance battalions found the forward trenches empty, or easy to take, they would do so, and dig in there. In both cases this led to parts of the barrage being cancelled.

The frontage of such an attack would be very narrow, as little as a few hundred yards. A full battalion in the attack had not more than 500 yards frontage anyway, in a full-scale assault, so these attacks may have had less than that.

The odds - well, that really depends, and there can be no general answer to that.

A

Originally posted by Wunsche:

gain, playing this AWESOME game has caused me to ask all these questions about things I assumed but never really understood. Please enlighten me.

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks, Andreas. This is more or less what I had assumed, but it's nice to have it spelled out. Anybody else?

Michael

[Lady Roxanne]

Yes, a couple very nice posts here. Thanks, Andreas, for taking the time to give us that information; and thanks also to Zukkov for the good laugh.

[zukkov]

ya see, i knew if i gave a dumb answer, some smart feller'd come along and give a good 'un. god bless those smart fellers!

[Andreas]

BTW - the reason I only saw this now is that those are not really tactical questions, they are operational. When someone says 'tactical' on this board I think of questions along the lines of 'How do I use the SU-76 against the King Tiger?' (answer: very carefully).

[Juju]

Originally posted by zukkov:

ya see, i knew if i gave a dumb answer,

I may be have been dumb, but I enjoyed it nonetheless. Essentially, you're even right.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The frontage of such an attack would be very narrow, as little as a few hundred yards. A full battalion in the attack had not more than 500 yards frontage anyway, in a full-scale assault, so these attacks may have had less than that.

Speaking of frontages and unit densities, I wonder what was the record set by Soviet troops?

I have read that when 30th Guards Rifle Corps prepared for an offensive at Tali 25 June 1944, its three divisions along with one tank and one SP regiment where deployed on an area only 2 kms wide and 1 km deep. :eek:

[Andreas]

Doesn't sound that unusual to me, for the time period, but certainly could be the record holder. Similar densities were reached in the Iassy-Kishinev Operation in late August 1944. I had described this operation here.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Doesn't sound that unusual to me, for the time period, but certainly could be the record holder. Similar densities were reached in the Iassy-Kishinev Operation in late August 1944. I had described this operation here.

That post is one of my all-time favourites.

The main difference between Iasi-Kischinjow and Kotka-Kouvola operations is that Soviets managed to eventually advance only 8kms in two weeks with the latter...I hope that Mr. Glantz will present the operation in his "Forgotten Battles" -series soon.

[ July 20, 2003, 01:40 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Keke:

I have read that when 30th Guards Rifle Corps prepared for an offensive at Tali 25 June 1944, its three divisions along with one tank and one SP regiment where deployed on an area only 2 kms wide and 1 km deep. :eek:

Remember that by this time many Soviet infantry divisions were beginning to be severly depleted as a matter of course. Could that have been the case here? If so, that may not have been as heavy a concentration as it first appears.

Michael

[Nippy]

I still can't get over the whole "300 guns per 1Km" thing. Seeing as how 1km = 1000 meters, try sticking 5 132mm rocket spotters (320 tubes) on a 1000 by 1000 map and see what happens. :eek:

[Keke]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Remember that by this time many Soviet infantry divisions were beginning to be severly depleted as a matter of course. Could that have been the case here? If so, that may not have been as heavy a concentration as it first appears.

Nope. 30 gv.sk was just refitted before the offensive, so each of it's divisions had personnel approx. 9000. One of the divisions (63th) was kept in reserve though, and it didn't join the attack until two days later.

[Andreas]

If it was the central breakthrough sector, then I would have thought it likely that 30th GRC was rebuilt to anywhere above 75% of strength levels. This means you have 18 battalions (assuming they all have their three regiments present) milling about in the area. Plus the 40 or so tanks (probably much less) from the two attached AFV regiments.

Is there some more info about this offensive available online?

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

If it was the central breakthrough sector, then I would have thought it likely that 30th GRC was rebuilt to anywhere above 75% of strength levels. This means you have 18 battalions (assuming they all have their three regiments present) milling about in the area. Plus the 40 or so tanks (probably much less) from the two attached AFV regiments.

With 80% strength, the divisions would have about 8500 personnel, and I think that's pretty close. All the regiments and their battalions were present. In fact, 27th Tank regiment and 397th SP regiment were just the units attached to 45th GRD only, and most likely there were more available to the Corps. At least when Vyborg (Viipuri) -operation started 9 June 1944, the Corps had 2 Tank brigades, 1 Tank Regiment and 3 SP regiments attached.

Originally posted by Andreas:

Is there some more info about this offensive available online?

Unfortunately not. You may find some minor info in English with a search word "Tali-Ihantala". Some day I may put a site up, which deals with the 'forgotten battles' of 1944 between Finns and Soviets.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Nippy:

I still can't get over the whole "300 guns per 1Km" thing. Seeing as how 1km = 1000 meters, try sticking 5 132mm rocket spotters (320 tubes) on a 1000 by 1000 map and see what happens. :eek:

If the defenses are in depth, and considering that the attacker wants to attack rear areas as well and prevent reserve movements with barrages, then it wouldn't be just 1 km deep. And that 300 guns would include mortars and regimental 76mm batteries - a bit different from 320 rockets falling in on the first minute!

[Lindan]

Originally posted by zukkov:

well since no smart fellers have answered your questions yet, i figure i might have a go...

1) ya see, the russians would get some guns together. sometimes a few, sometimes a whole lot. it just depended on whether they had a few or a whole lot at the time. then some smart feller in the back would decide where to point them guns. then they would fire at one thing for awhile until that smart feller in the back decided it was time to fire at somethin else. then they'd fire at another thing for awhile until that smart feller told 'em to stop. then they'd stop for awhile until the smart feller decided it was time to fire again. it kinda went that way for most of the war. if the smart feller got killed or somethin', they'd just replace him with another even smarter feller. kinda makes you wonder why they just didn't use the smarter feller in the first place, huh?

2)ya see, the russians used their armor kinda like their artillery. some smart feller.. a different one than the artillery smart feller, and a little closer to the front, but still kinda in the back too... some smart feller would decide it was time to move the tanks somewheres, hopefully important, but not always. and them tanks would go there, sometimes quick, sometimes slow. well, unlessen the enemy stopped em from goin there, in which case that smart feller would decide whether they should send some more tanks to go there, or just go somewheres else. it pretty much went that way for most of the war. if the smart feller got killed or somethin, they'd just replace him like they did that artillery smart feller...

3)ya see, the russians used their recon fellers kinda the same way they did the tank fellers and the arty fellers. some smart feller... even closer than the tank smart feller, but not all the way up with the fightin' fellers... would decide he needed to know what the enemy was up to. so he'd send some not so smart fellers up ahead to figure out what they was doin. then they'd come back and tell him. but sometimes the enemy wouldn't let em, in which case the smart feller would decide whether to send some more not so smart fellers up ahead to figure it out, or just say ta hell with it and send the armor fellers up there anyway. it went that way for most of the war. if the smart feller got killed or somethin... yep, you guessed it.. they'd just replace him like they did the other 2 smart fellers. the only problem was if they run out of smart fellers somewheres down the road, but i don't guess that happened....

funníest thing I've read all day!!

[JasonC]

A typical Russian prep barrage would open with all guns firing for just a few minutes (like 5 or 10), then particular targets being engaged by assigned battalions for the bulk of the barrage period, and at the end all guns firing again for a brief period.

During the bulk of the barrage period, each battalion has targets it is supposed to deal with within the planned time. But exactly when within that time is basically up to the firing battalion. They have some ammo allocation and some target list, and the length of the whole barrage is meant to be enough for each to fire on a succession of positions, adjusting between and not wearing out the gunners completely, etc.

Rockets, if available, would fire at the begining and/or ending periods only. The lightest tubes might or might not be firing in the middle part of the barrage, depending on the target "hardness" (since their main role against dug in guys is just to make them duck or stay in their dugouts). Often the light stuff (e.g. divisional 76s) would fire a rolling barrage ahead of the infantry, during the attack rather than beforehand.

What are the targets? The final fire is directed at the forward infantry positions, because its job is to keep heads down as you own infantry actually advances. The initial fire is at well located positions, expected to be manned - you are trying to catch them napping. The assumption is after the first few minutes the defenders are pretty well under cover. It still makes sense to keep shooting, but only in tight patterns over small targets with high calibers. You are trying to destroy heavy weapons especially with that part of the barrage.

Where do the 100-300 guns per km totals come from? They come from adding up all the guns in an army and dividing by the width of its attack sector. An army might have 6 rifle divisions and a couple of tank corps (which are division sized), plus dozens of attached arty "regiments", attacking on a frontage of 20-30km. A third to half would be heavy stuff (depending on how many higher echelon independent regiments were supporting the attack), another third 76mm, the rest mortars.

They would be shooting many km deep into the defending position. During the middle portion of the barrage, every located enemy battery would be targeted, every HQ, every reserve position. Harassment fire would hit chokepoints like bridges, and near sections of roads.

An in depth defensive system has front and reserve lines in some staggered checkerboard, with platoons up front, company reserve and weapons positions, and typically the same again for a "back" battalion and regimental weapons, with supporting batteries perhaps incorporated or perhaps an additional layer. So there can be 4-5 lines of strongpoints to address.

A realistic prep barrage against a defense that shows two levels of depth might involve 2 or 3 battalion "shoots", each consisting of 3 FOs 120mm or larger with the same aim point and a "target wide" order, all rounds used. If the defense sector is 1.5 km wide then definitely use 3 such battalion fire groups. All set to land on turn 1. The spots those aim at will tend to be thoroughly plastered. But you can't cover every spot, just the wide areas you suspect will contain defenders.

Then have 76mm guns use "fire plan" shooting, to land at the 5 minute and 10 minute marks, (15th minute as well if you like), with large areas shot at by 2-3 FOs and again using "target wide", and small ones just hit by a single battery with the normal "tight" sheaf. These are supposed to keep defenders from rallying easily, and pin MGs etc right in front of the advancing infantry, helping those close in to finish them off.

Allocate 1-3 82mm FOs in addition (the 9 tube variety for "line" infantry, 6 tube variety for mobile troops), and use those opportunistically with called fire. Infantry heavy weapons and a few on map 76s and 82s can help with direct fire at the point targets the artillery hasn't already dealt with - there will always be a few.

You can easily wind up using 15-30 FOs representing 50-150 firing guns. Half the barrage is going deeper than you will show on a CM battlefield. This is basically how Russian infantry formations attack. They might occasionally have modest levels of armor support, SU-76s or T-34s, which when available act much like the on map 76s, overwatching and taking out MG positions.

Russian mech units, in contrast, relied on much larger amounts of armor, with infantry accompanying them in relatively small numbers. As in a company of infantry per company of armor, tank riding, scouting etc. Infantry makes the enemy open up, but tanks do the killing. Light mortars would still be there, with an anti-gun mission. The tanks provide their own "rolling barrage", replacing the 76s.

Prep fires might not be used at all, or 120mm mortars might hit a few spots with single battery "shoots", or rockets might fire a pattern over the whole area to suppress the defenders right before the attack. (After the ground was taken, supporting infantry would man and defend it, with 76mm guns on map and registered 76mm and 120mm TRPs etc).

As for infantry battalions used to "recon" a defense, what that means is infiltrating as close to the defenders as possible, often at night, and trying to ID his exact positions. Patrols look for gaps between enemy strongpoints and get to whatever good terrain they can, lying quiet until dawn once they get someplace useful. If possible, a whole battalion will be inserted "inside" the enemy defense system, in company sized groups. (German accounts are always complaining about how good the Russians got at this, from 1943 on).

In woods or urban areas, you can try it even in the daytime. The emphasis is on stealth, that is why armor is not used. Arty might fire diversion missions, make noise, and try to keep some defenders heads down while it is happening, but doesn't seriously try to break the defenders. The infiltrators report enemy positions for arty fire missions, and can isolate bits in daytime with their organic MGs. Defenders have to counterattack them or withdraw, or it becomes easy to kill the men bypassed.

I hope this helps.

[Florian Gross]

UNBELIEVABLE

[PiggDogg]

Florian,

What in particular is "unbelieveable"?

Cheers, Richard

[Wunsche]

As usual, you guys have proven not only to be a priceless source of information, but more than generous in taking the time out to post great replies! Thanks.

[JasonC]

What would realistic opposing forces look like in such a Russian infantry formation attack, using the guns to smash through? Say the date is September 1943.

The Germans might have 1800 points, good quality (veterans unless noted otherwise), something like -

1 veteran company

2 added HMG-42 (4 total)

2 wooden bunker with MG

6 crack LMG

2 crack sharpshooter

2 75mm infantry guns

2 81mm mortars

2 20mm flak

2 105mm FO

1 81mm FO (6 tube version)

5 TRP

15 trench

20 wire

7 AP minefield

The defense is split between infantry, heavy weapons, off map artillery, and fortifications. In manpower terms there are 225 men, 8 points spent per man. The ammo available includes 120 105mm, 100 75mm, 200 81mm, plus 200 20mm, 1000 MG, and 600 squad shots.

Then the Russians attack with 3600 points, low quality, with 2:1 point odds and over 4:1 manpower odds, as follows (all green unless noted) -

2 green battalions, 43B type (includes 2 82mm FOs)

1 pioneer company, with 1 flamethrower

6 82mm on map mortars

4 76mm on map ZIS-3 divisional guns

6 conscript 122mm FOs (prep fire)

5 conscript 76mm FOs (fire plan, rolling barrage)

2 green 120mm FOs (concentrations)

A third of the attacking Russian force is artillery support. Most of it prep or planned fire, but with mortars used for called fire, or direct LOS fire at point targets (for the on map ones). A few 76mm and 45mm guns fire direct at bunkers, MG nests, and trenches.

Overall, the force fields 1000 men. They are green but well armed, and deadly if they can get to grips with the limited numbers of defenders. The arty support is very strong overall but relatively inflexible, and a large portion of it consists of the lighter 76mm and 82mm rounds, which aren't terribly effective against entrenched men.

The Germans' main problems are to survive the bombardment and to stretch their available ammo over many attackers and many minutes, keeping them broken up or at arms length. The Russians' main problems are to direct their preplanned barrage sensibly despite limited intel, and then to keep moving through all the obstacles and delaying MGs.

A lot of the war looked like that.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Keke:

The main difference between Iasi-Kischinjow and Kotka-Kouvola operations is that Soviets managed to eventually advance only 8kms in two weeks with the latter...

I think the comparison to the break through at Valkeasaari is more appropriate. After all, by Tali-Ihantala the offensive had been on for 10+ days, the Finnish army had fought a 100km rear guard action and lost Viipuri.

The only real difference is the brunt of the Iasi-Kischinjow was directed at two AK and the first day saw the near destruction of two divisions while the Viipuri Offensive was directed at the Western half of the Isthmus (IIRC one AK) and the Valkeasaari cambit shattered but not annihilated only elements one Finnish division. By the end the Iasi-Kischinjow operation was the end of AG South Ukraine while the Finnish army survived the Viborg-Petrozavodsk operation relatively intact.

The Finnish army had massed its reserves at Tali-Ihantala during the 10 day rear guard action. And after Tali-Ihantala the Red Army tried to push through across the bay of Viipuri to the West of Tali-Ihantala and across river Vuoksi at Vuosalmi to the East of Tali-Ihantala in an effort to splinter and consume the Finnish defensive forces.

The front line during the summer of 1944

EDIT: added the pictures links. Damn it.

http://personal.inet.fi/private/hovi.pages/sa-int/karttajatkosota.html

The front line during Winter War

http://personal.inet.fi/private/hovi.pages/sa-int/talvisotakannas.html

Glanz's book on the siege of Leningrad brushed past the subject of the summer offensive against the Finns in a couple of paragraphs and Tali-Ihantala is referred to in a single sentence. Unfortunately.

I hope that Mr. Glantz will present the operation in his "Forgotten Battles" -series soon.

Me too.

EDIT 2: According to Soviet sources there never was a Kotka-Kouvola operation. in his siege of Leningrad book Glanz however indicates the Red Army intention was to "push inland" but the attack was "rebuffed".

[ July 21, 2003, 02:40 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]