The Blitz myth?

[A.E.B]

I think that the truth behind Blitzkreig, and why the Germans choose that path when every other nation - even those who experimented like the UK and the USSR - was based on what each nation saw as being necessary for a future war.

Britain of course understood that - and a colonial empire required it - the navy was its main defense. As long as the British Navy was undefeated, Britain could survive any disaster that occurred on mainland Europe. The UK experimented with mobile tank and support forces in the 1920s, but financial reality forced a compromise tank corp. The navy came first.

France feared a repeat of WWI and tried to build better fortifications, forgeting that the Germans had developed a counter measure to the forts of 1914 (Belguim also relied on a fort). So convinced were they that 1940 would be a repeat of 1914 that they fell into the German's trap. France also wasted resources on a navy that achieved almost nothing prior to France's surrender and the rise of Vichi.

Russia was a special case. In many ways Russia, freed from a aristocratic officer corps by the mass murder of the civil war, was initially inovative and experimented with new tactical doctrines. How much the secret cooperation between the Russians and the Germans taught each other is unknown, but was probably considerable. Sadly Stalin's idea of leadership was to cut the head of any organisation that could potentially threaten his power, and the army and its innovators lost their heads. Also, the early Russian lead left them with a hugh tank corp and air fleet, but a high percentage of it was technically obsolete by 1941.

Germany on the other hand decided to repeat what they had tried in WWI, only this time they would do it better. First they neutralised the USSR via diplomacy so they could deal with France without needing to face the Russians as well. They took the breakthrough plan of 1913 and updated it for armour. And, unlike 1914 when the Germans were stopped outside of Paris, this time Paris was abandoned and Germany achieved the victory denied them in 1914.

But Germany had also learnt another lesson from WWI: that Germany could not sustain a long war. In 1918 the Germans were starved to capitualition without any part of Germany being occupied by foreign forces. So Germany planned for a short war based on fast moving breakthoughs by panzer and motorised units. If they planned to start another war, they had no other choice.

This is why to my mind Germany never fully mobilised the war economy until 1942 when it was to late: in their hearts they realised that if it came to that, even fully mobilised Germany would most likely lose a long war. So like the high-stakes gambler Hitler was, Germany bet everything on its improved force of panzers and planes to smash the enemy before they could react.

At its core Blitzkreig wasn't new: combined tank and infantry assaults supported by ground attack aircraft as mobile artillery had been tried in WWI with limited success. But now the techology had come of age.

There are two ways to defeat an enemy - destroy all of its armies, or occupy all of its political and industrial centres. This fact was known ever since organised states chose to wage war on each other.

It was possible to destroy army after army and still lose if you failed to occupy the enemies heart, their centre of gravity. Hannibal proved this in the Second Punic War when he destroyed several Roman armies almost to a man: he still lost as he did not take Rome, so Rome simply created more armies.

The other way is to strike for the heart - the capital. The French did that under Napoleon, but the Russians simply burnt Moscow, kept their army intact, and fell on the French when winter forced the retreat.

Germany understood this, and thus they planned to combine Hannibal with Napoleon, and destroy the Russian armies in the field and take the capital, all in 3-4 months.

The first German plans for a theoretical invasion of Russia were actually quite accurate. However the poor Russian performance in the Winter War against Finland and the negative reports from Germans of the Russian forces in Poland fed on Nazi ideas of Racial superiority to lead to a constant downgrading of Russian capabilities.

The other reason for this downgrading was that if intial German estimates were correct, then the German planners realised that they had insufficient forces to carry out the plan.

So in the end German planners converted the real Russians into Russians their available forces could defeat on paper.

A.E.B

[von Churov]

The Blitzkrieg was not a myth!!!

That was something really revolutionary for the time. Have you ever read the newpaper articles of the time? Well, do it! And you'll see of how the Western press was stunned by the German aproach, how surprised they were by what German have called the Blitzkrieg. Allied HQ's were not filled with amateurs, but with professional soldiers who spent whole their lives trying to find the way to reveal opponnents thoughs and intentions and to prevent them. Those were men trained (and paid too) to think fast, to make decisions fast, and to act fast. Yes, they were!

But, something gone wrong. The fall of France!!!

It was not the numbers of Panzer that they were surprised with, or their technical superiority. Remember, the bulk of German PZ forces consisted of PZ II's (20 mm gun, or much better said :20mm Heavy Machine Gun), and early Pz III's (equipped with 37mm gun) none of them capable of knocking out some of the heavy(for the time) French "Chars". The majority of French tank loses in Spring 1940 were inflicted not by the Panzers but by German AT and field artilery.So what's the role the Panzers did in the Blitzkrieg? Well, there is another point of how to stop an enemy tank. Simply, leave it without an ammo and fuel, and it will stop moving, and it will stop firing. And will surrender eventually.

PANZERS WERE NOT USED TO BREAK THROUGH THE ENEMY LINES!!!

It's like trying to take down a medieval knight with a dagger. If you aim straight for the heart you will break your blade on the plate of his body armour and you will be helpless. It's much better approach to come as close to the enemy as possible and try to find a weak spot between the plates of armour. And that's where you push your dagger through. Right into the soft flesh underneath the armour!!!

So, according to that simple "doctrine" panzers didn't puch a holes.

It were Infantry divisions who were used to do that. Panzer divisions simply exploited the breaktroughs. Basic purpose of Panzer Divisions, as defined by German doctrine, was exploitation of breakthrough success, not the breakthrough itself. Having had them used to break through the fortified enemy positions they would have been slaughtered by enemy's AT guns, and artilery undisturbed by own infatry and artilery fire.(A broken blade)

So, eventually, the Pz Division would have been too weak and worn out to proceed forward even if it managed to break through. Tank needs four things to fight: 1.Ammo(this is obvious, but...) 2. Fuel 3.Rested crew 4.Maintenance. After the hard battle on breaking the enemy's fortified line it would have had none of the four.

So it's on the infantry to make the hole.

How it's done?

One of the basics of German TACTICS was to have sufficient assault reserves kept at hand, and after the inital attack finds the weak points in enemy's position these reserves were to be used to punch through the weak spots.

These moments of finding a soft point are the moments of crisis for both sides. (getting close to the enemy and finding a hole in it'a armour)

As defined by the German tactical doctrine:This is just the right moment (the crisis),to kick in with assault reserves. Not too early, or they will be worn out too soon before the decisive breakthrough is made; nor too late, or enemy will be given time to react and to bring its own reserves to consolidate the crisis and to corke the hole.

So, after the hole is made is when the the Panzers were used. They were to run through the bathered enemy positions into their soft rear.( the soft fleash uderneath the armour).

Keep in mind that the front area was 100 km deep.

It's the infantry in the first few kilometers, protected by the trenches, foxoles, shelters, antitank ditches, barbed wires, minefields and the strongest possible artillery and AT fire of course, and god know what else comes with in the main defence line. (It wold be fool who spends his precious armour against this.)

It's the artillery in the next few kilometers of enemy's front depth. Unprotected by an infantry and everything that goes with the main defence line they are the perfect targets for fast advancing Panzers. So after the Panzers followed by motorised Panzergrenadiers break through, the few of the enemy's artillery batteries that they meet along their way are their first victims. Rearward points of enemy resistence are not to be engaged, they are to be bypassed and left behind to be delt with advancing infantry.

The next layer of front depth is occupied by HQ's, supply depots, communication centres and reserves assembly zones. A dream come true targets for any Panzer division. The flanks of such wedge shaped breakthroughs are anti-tank protected not by the Panzers but by Panzer Divsion's AT Batteries (Panzer Jager Abteilungs). The tanks were spearheading the wedge.

So, eventually the panzer were doing rampage in the enemy's rear, cutting off the communications, capturing the HQ's, capturing the supply depots, taking and holding the important junctions and bridges (thus preventing the enemy of reinforcing their defence) and so on, and so on.

As a result of this the enemy defence left without a daily ammo and any other supply, without reinforcements, without a leadership (due to captured HQ's),with communication breakdown, and with enemy behind the back (cutting off the line of retreat) falls an easy prey for advancing infantry on the main defence line.

So, we come to that another way to knock out an enemy tank. Left without a fuel and ammo, disorganized and diordered with no clear picture of enemy's position and advance, they are more likely to surrender than to fight. And so, you have knocked out an entire enemy tank unit without a direct shot fired.

Simply! Isn't it?

You dont have to be a genius to invent it, but you have to be something to implement it.

It really seems so logical in the first view to use something strong and armoured (Panzer) to strike into something strong and armoured (fortified position). But you have to think of tanks as Germans did to do the opposite-to strike the soft point with your hardest part (By this I don't mean the sex, any similarity is purely coincidental, ha ha ha). And what Germans though of Tanks? The answer could be found in Guderian quotation: "the tanks engine is as much the weapon as its gun is" The movement.

If you think of it you will notice that the German tank had the weakest armour protection of all sides in war, ( Italians are out of competition in this category. Well, they weren't much in the war anyway.)but had the greatest mobility of all. (Here I dont take into account Tigers, because they were used in special purposes and were not a part of regular Panzer Regiments in the divisions, but rather were part of special Schwere Panzer Abteilungs- heavy tank batallions. As of Panther, they had a similar role in the begginig, untill they were produced in larger quantities, and still they mobility were more advanced that their armour protection).

So, according to German view the tank is not an armour, but a gun and an engine. Firepower and the spead rather than a portable fortress.

FIRE AND MANOVEUR!!!

So, that's what the blitzkrieg was about. Kick with your dagger right into the soft point and try to make as much damage as you can. And enemy will bleed out and it will fall an easy prey for you.

Remember that it took Guderian several day before he punched a hole at Sedan, but once a hole is made the progres was as fast as tanks could go. The rear was soft!!!

Than, remeber that at early June 1940 Kleist failed to break through the French defence at Peronne because he used the Panzer divsions forward aganist the prepared enemy positions. At the same time, Guderian punched a hole into enemy's fortified postion at Rethel by using infantry to do that, preserving the tanks for the advance afterwards. And it wasnt because Guderian was reluctant to use them , but Guderian KNEW HOW to use them in a best way.

So, blitzkrieg was not a myth, but it was a mythically innovative and revolutionary for the time.

[JasonC]

"could you show me how they were being irrational?"

The target is the fielded force of the enemy army. That is a target that makes perfect sense if you are attempting to win by achieving a superior odds ratio, by higher enemy losses than friendly losses.

For a higher enemy loss rate to translate into a superior odds ratio, there is one additional requirement. Your ratio of replacements to the enemy's, has to be at least within the reciprocal of the loss ratio achieved. Logically.

That is, enemy force at time 2 equals enemy force at time 1 minus losses plus replacements. Friendly force at time 2 equals friendly force at time 1 minus losses plus replacements. Own side losses low say 1, enemy losses high say 10, will lead to a rising odds ratio, if and only if, that effect is not swamped by the replacement ratio difference in the other direction. If the enemy replacement rate is also 10, and your own is 0, you lose.

Logically, to commit to defeat of the enemy by destruction of his fielded forces, you need to drive enemy replacement rates down and friendly replacement rates up, in addition to killing the force in front of you more than it kills you. Otherwise, you can achieve 10 to 1 kill ratios and accomplish nothing.

The target "enemy fielded forces" can only be rendered decisive by also paying attention to replacement rates. Your own, especially, must be driven through the roof.

You might target something else (shot to the brain style) and expect to win by some other means, without caring about replacement rates. But if you make the target the enemy army, as the Germans did, expecting to win through progressive tilting of the odds in your favor through battle impact, then you commit to keeping your replacement rate in the running with his - or you just lose.

The Germans destroyed an army of 4 million men, and were outnumbered afterward by more than they were at the start. If they had mobilized anything, there was no reason for this to happen to them. There is no way the Russian economy under drastic assault had 10 times the potential of the German one, which was its equal in prewar industrial capacity and in eventually peak armaments output. And it would have needed it, to indefinitely withstand 10 to 1 loss ratios inflicted upon the Russians.

Not mobilizing the economy, and targeting the enemy armed forces, were strategically incompatible choices. Targeting the enemy armed forces means committing to exchanging them off on whatever terms you can achieve in battle. It commits you to material struggle, to total war. There is no reason whatever to enter such a struggle with a timer set against you.

People continually reiterate that the Germans "knew" they couldn't win a war of attrition against Russia. They thought it, they did not know it, because it isn't true. At 5 to 1, 10 to 1 exchange ratios in battle losses, you bet they could have. If the Germans had 5000 more medium tanks by the end of 1942, how are the Russians supposed to hold? Less than half that number would have turned the Stalingrad counterattack into Mars II.

But they wanted to win quickly and cheaply. If wishes were horses - what does "want" have to do with grand strategy? If you win in 20 minutes, the replacement rates do not have time to add up to any meaningful amount. But no sane man can look at 11 time zones, decide to target the enemy army, and think it will certainly be over in 20 minutes. You might hope it, I suppose. But you neutralize the clock, or get it running in your own favor, by also driving up your replacement rate.

The old Prussian doctrine, down from the age of Napoleon, that the fielded forces of the enemy are the proper target, requires scrupulous attention to odds and their progression through time. The Germans kept this first and threw out the second. It made their grand strategy an incoherent mish mash. And it lost them the campaign against Russia.

When the WW I Germans targeted enemy fielded forces, you can bet they also instantly ordered total mobilization, reserve formations in the front line, full call ups and rear area personnel comb outs, maximum shell production. They were logical men. The Germans of WW II did all the same things - by 1944, when they were too late to help.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by von Churov:

The Blitzkrieg was not a myth!!!

That was something really revolutionary for the time. Have you ever read the newpaper articles of the time? Well, do it! And you'll see of how the Western press was stunned by the German aproach,

That's where I stopped reading. Anyone else care to tackle this, or shall we just leave it on the bottom of the bird cage where it belongs?

[von Churov]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by von Churov:

The Blitzkrieg was not a myth!!!

That was something really revolutionary for the time. Have you ever read the newpaper articles of the time? Well, do it! And you'll see of how the Western press was stunned by the German aproach,

That's where I stopped reading. Anyone else care to tackle this, or shall we just leave it on the bottom of the bird cage where it belongs? </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by von Churov:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by von Churov:

The Blitzkrieg was not a myth!!!

That was something really revolutionary for the time. Have you ever read the newpaper articles of the time? Well, do it! And you'll see of how the Western press was stunned by the German aproach,

That's where I stopped reading. Anyone else care to tackle this, or shall we just leave it on the bottom of the bird cage where it belongs? </font>

[von Churov]

Right but what the analyst were doing?

Why they didn't pay attention to what the Germans were cooking up? :confused:

Why nobody warned the allies what was underway?

Or they did but no one listened to them, because no one believed that such a thing is possible.

But you're right to the point...Germans did not invent something knew (and that's what I wrote in my first post on this topic, but you didn't read it anyway), all they did was an EVOLUTION of old Moltke and Clauzevitz ideas. But, the Implementation of the approach was the REVOLUTIONARY one. It's the technical advancement of military that enabled them to do it! :mad:

What I'm trying to say that it was not the series of misfortunes and lucky strikes that led to succes of Blitzkrieg. It was really something new for the time, not the idea itself but it's implementation according to the newest achievements in military tecnics of the time.

Brits had Fuller and Liddel Hart before the Germans had Guderian, we agree on that, but (here's the surprise) it was not the Brits who applied the Blitzkrieg but the Germans.

Again, it was not the idea, it was an approach what was REVOLUTONARY.

Try to imagine several ARMIES moving forward in an assault of a MOBILE warfare, including PANZER ARMIES (or groups, which was theri initial name). Such a formation was unknown to mankind before. 150 to 200 thousand of men equipped and trained to break through, to fight and to coordinate its actons behind the enemy lines.

Sounds a bit messy, but the Germans manage to organize that mess in a perfect war machine.

The other major nations military analysts (we come to them again) would have proved that imposible if they were asked to comment that prior to the initiation of WWII.

But Germans proved it possible (and whaths more, very effective too) in a flash of a lightning.

So, if it was not revolutionary, why nobody found a cure for that before late 1942?

Surprise works for first few months, one cannot be surprised forever.

Or the ones were thunderstruck???

Please read what I wrote initially.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by von Churov:

[QB] Right but what the analyst were doing?

Why they didn't pay attention to what the Germans were cooking up? :confused:

Talking through their asses. There were few "military analysts" then the way there are now. No one in the west really cared to talk about it in the news - no one really thought another war was likely, nor particularly knew what form it would take.

invent something knew (and that's what I wrote in my first post on this topic, but you didn't read it anyway), all they did was an EVOLUTION of old Moltke and Clauzevitz ideas. But, the Implementation of the approach was the REVOLUTIONARY one.

Do you even know what "revolutionary" means? In one breath you say "nothing new" and in the next you say "revolutionary". Revolutionay means something new.

How was their implementation revolutionary?

It's the technical advancement of military that enabled them to do it! :mad:

Which technical advancements? Tanks? Everyone had tanks. The French and British had arguably better tanks - certainly Matilda II was the King Tiger of its day, though slow and underarmed. Aircraft? They used them in World War One. The infantry section? WW I. Submachine gun? WW I. The light machine gun as the nucleus of infantry fire and maneuver? WW I. What revolution?

What I'm trying to say that it was not the series of misfortunes and lucky strikes that led to succes of Blitzkrieg. It was really something new for the time, not the idea itself but it's implementation according to the newest achievements in military tecnics of the time.

Still not seeing it. Which ones?

Brits had Fuller and Liddel Hart before the Germans had Guderian, we agree on that, but (here's the surprise) it was not the Brits who applied the Blitzkrieg but the Germans.

Again, it was not the idea, it was an approach what was REVOLUTONARY.

How so?

Try to imagine several ARMIES moving forward in an assault of a MOBILE warfare, including PANZER ARMIES (or groups, which was theri initial name). Such a formation was unknown to mankind before. 150 to 200 thousand of men equipped and trained to break through, to fight and to coordinate its actons behind the enemy lines.

And the Germans did this in 1939? And this was something new in history? Cooper seems to tell us the infantry actually did the lion's share of the work in Poland.

Sounds a bit messy, but the Germans manage to organize that mess in a perfect war machine.

Perfect? They went to war without enough trucks, ammunition or gasoline, with a hastily expanded army still bound to thousands of horses, lacking in heavy bombers and tied to an industrial machine made of cottage industries which had little interconnection and no ability to sustain a prolonged war effort - even if they had declared a total war effort, which they never did until circa 1943. That same year 1 million German women worked full time as hairdressers instead of in industry. Strategically they had no vision, as well explained in the other posts.

The other major nations military analysts (we come to them again)

Name one.

would have proved that imposible if they were asked to comment that prior to the initiation of WWII.

But Germans proved it possible (and whaths more, very effective too) in a flash of a lightning.

More like a flash of incompetence on the part of their enemies. The Polish refused for political reasons to withdraw to natural defensive terrain, and weren't helped much by the stab in the back from Russia, as well as a lack of British or French help.

So, if it was not revolutionary, why nobody found a cure for that before late 1942?

See the other posts.

[A.E.B]

On the total mobilization of the German Economy for the war effort.

I have seen many people claim, not just JasonC, that if Germany had mobilised it's economy earlier, then Germany may have succeeded where it failed.

Obviously having thousands of more tanks and planes and submarines would have helped, but could Germany have actually produced all of these extra weapons.

Or would all of the critical shortages in strategic materials have merely been brought forward?

Germany between 1936-1939 was already straining the economy with its rearmament programs. Many of the rearmament plans - Z plan for the Navy for instance - had a target date in the 1940s as the time when Germany would be ready for war.

Poland revealled that the Panzer and motorised divisions were incomplete and lacking in required materials. The SS, later to get the best of everything, was forced to scrounge captured arms as the Army didn't have weapons it could (nor wanted) to spare.

The attack on Poland started the clock running on the race to find enough strategic materials to keep the German war industry running. It was a race Germany started losing from day one.

With Britain and France in the war, Germany was now limited to those resources that existed within her borders, or what neighbouring nations were willing to supply. Germany had iron and coal, but had server shortages of everything else.

Supplies were obtained from Norway, Finland, Sweden, and German allies. But Germany was also forced to make up shortages of raw materials for allies like Italy (a strange parrallel to the drain on Germany Austria-Hungry became in WWI). Czech factories and resources stolen from Poland assisted, but Germany faced shortages that made a full scale mobilisation difficult if not impossible.

Strangely it was shipments from the USSR that helped Germany support and expand its forces for the invasion of the low countries and France, and then the fighting in the Mediterranean. If the Russians had not maintained these constant shipments to Germany, Barbarossa may well have been impossible.

A strange parrallel again to the support Britain and the USA gave to the USSR later in the war: a Russian lend-lease plan almost for Germany.

What did Germany lack in 1940?

1. Oil: oil came from Romania and Hungry, and also from the USSR. Italy relied on Germany for its oil.

2. Rubber - only available naturally from the far east. The sythentic oil industry also produced rubber.

3. Tungsten - necessary for machine tools as well as APT.

4. Aluminium - until the invasion of France and the creation of Vichi eased this problem.

5. Tin.

6. Opium and other items needed for medical drugs.

7. Horses - Germany was reliant on the horse but all during WWII wastage was greater than reproduction.

Germany also needed to feed itself - part of the rational for invading the USSR was to capture the Ukranian grain belt. The USSR also supplied Germany with grain until Barbarossa.

So Germany was in a quandry. It had limited stocks of strategic resources, but full mobilisation would rapidly exhaust those stocks. Later German conquests made more materials (even forced labour) available, but during the period between the fall of Poland and the invasion of the USSR Germany faced a crippling resourses budget.

It is possible that if a man like Speer was in charge then, rather than men like Goering and Todt, that Germany would have been in better shape. But I doubt it had the capacity to create and support 10-50 more divisions before Barbarossa.

And late German mobilisation is partially a mirage anyway. Speer increased production in many cases by simply producing whole units - like a tank, truck or fighter plane - at the expense of producing spare parts and maintenance equipment. This lead to a percentage - increasing as the war dragged on - of German military hardware being OOS due to a lack of spares.

I have pictures of German tank repair depots captured by the Russians in 1943 full of Pz IIIs and IVs all lacking road wheels after striking mines. Tanks were kept in service by cannibalising other tanks.

These shortages was also the reason why Germany incorporated so much captured material into its military, a practice not copied by the allies.

If you want a good idea of what Germany lacked, the cargoes carried by Submarines from Japan to Germany are a good start. These subs carried tin and opium and rubber!

My view is that between 1939-1941 Germany mobilised to the extent that was prudent. Converting all those civilian factories to military production, and building new factories required resources that were in short supply. German didn't mobilise its women folk, but instead choose to utilise millions of slaves instead.

Could Germany have increased its production in 1940 if it fully mobilised? Yes, but not to the degree needed to win.

If the USSR had gotten spooked by a fully scale German build up and stopped the shipments, Germany was also in trouble.

A.E.B

[JasonC]

Sorry, the claim that the German economy was bottleneck limited by resource scarcity does not remotely hold up. They produced vast quantities of war material in 1943 and 1944, under worse conditions for it than they had in 1941 and 1942. Oil did not limit military operations seriously until the hydrogenation plants were destroyed by air attack, which did not happen until mid 1944. Aircraft production was not seriously limited by bauxite supplies at any time. While there were occasional shortages of alloying metals and the like at 1944 levels of armaments output, substitutes were readily available for modest concessions in engineering quality.

The German economy was management limited. Large construction projects continued through 1941. After that, civilian industry had to curtail long term investment but continued to receive the bulk of heavy industrial output. Only 40% of German steel output went to military purposes as late as 1942. They never fully mobilized their own population for labor. Foreign workers in Germany and forced contributions from other countries made minor additions to overall German output, on the order of 5-7% for each.

A single year's economy "growth" (really, front-loading of one's income stream at the expense of distant times) under full mobilization is larger than all such effects combined. And the diversion of effort from other areas to armaments, which are only a fraction of overall output, easily dwarfs both. Armaments output rises 4 times when you focus on it, not a few percent. Because it is a narrow portion of overall output under non-mobilized conditions, it is easy to expand it. Workers and plant-time and commodity raw materials (steel, energy, etc) simply shift from other industries to war related ones, and output soars.

As for food supply, Germany imported all it needed from the low countries, Denmark, and France. In the Ukraine, they got no more out with massive looting than the had received in prewar trade. The war simply destroyed production there, and the shortfalls that resulted when they took out the formerly exported amount anyway, caused widespread famine in the middle of Europe's best breadbasket farmland.

There is no reason whatever the German output curve couldn't have made the accelerated it in fact achieved over the course of 1943 to mid 1944 levels, starting from June 1941 instead of January 1943. The whole output curve would simply be moved a year and an half to the left. No increase in the absolute peak is required.

The Russians didn't make more tanks because they had a higher peak, they made more tanks because they got to theirs sooner - despite the Germans knowing about the attack six months earlier than the Russians did, and the Russians needing to evacuate 15 million workers and losing 40% of their industrial base to German occupation in the first year. "Firstust", not just "mostust", runs the adage.

In 1943, the Germans produced 11750 serious AFVs, compared to 3700 in 1941. Accelerating the output to such levels right after the decision to attack, or at the latest at the time of the attack, could easily have supplied 4000 extra AFVs by the end of the first year, and up to 8000 more by the time of Stalingrad. The German armor force would have at least doubled. The mix would also have improved - the average tank at the time of the battle of Moscow would have been a long 60 Pz III, and long 75s would have been abundant in 1942. Production focuses on the latest models, dragging the fielded fleet behind it.

As for manpower, the 1944 sweep outs produced enough men to man the borders of Germany after complete collapse in white Russia and France, despite years of intervening losses on the eastern front, and lesser ones in Tunisia, Italy, etc. It is true the full late 44 manpower reserve would not be available in 1941-2, some of them being underage, others still being needed for an intact Luftwaffe, and some being needed for economic production. But substantially more than actually served at the front in the east, were readily available.

There is no reason the Germans couldn't have fielded a portion of the millions mobilized in 1943 and early 1944 - which they historically did spare without output falling and with the Luftwaffe still a force in being - a year or a year and a half earlier. It would not have taken large amounts, even. There is no good reason for German infantry divisions to be light several thousand infantry apiece at the start of Typhoon, while the rear in Germany was fat with padding and luxuries. A quarter of a million men would have kept the force topped off throughout 1941, and half a million in each of 1941 and 1942 would have allowed significant expansion, including doubling the panzer portion of the force.

They didn't have these things because they didn't ask for them because they did not know they'd need them. In the late summer of 1941, two months after the attack, war plants in Germany were being shifted *away* from production for the army. Because they thought it was already over, that they had already won, that Russia could not possibly take the blows delivered up through the battle of Smolensk and survive. It had nothing to do with it being beyond their capacities. They did not exert themselves to their capacities. They asked the front line infantry to do more, and expected outright miracles from their panzer force. But the rear slept in confident expectation of cheap victory without serious effort or sacrifice.

[Michael Dorosh]

How many of those German "AFVs" were nothing more than armoured halftracks?

[A.E.B]

JasonC

Yes Germany could have increased its production in 1940, 1941 and 1942.

But what you have to realise is that they did so in 1943 and 1944 by completely ruining the economy.

Once Germany was in full war mode it lacked the resources to make other things. And I don't mean civilian cars: thinks like fertilizer and tractors for agriculture.

Economically German was starting to fall apart by 1944. Germany had survived in part by (a) robbing the rest of Europe of just about everything, and ( murdering millions of people and stealing their wealth.

Germany in 1944 was paying for its arms in Marks. Those Marks were paid to the workers. Thanks to rationing there was increasingly little to spent those marks on, so they went back into the Reichs bank and were used to pay for more arms.

It was an extraction economy at its worst. The needs of German industry stripped Europe to the point of starvation and collapse by 1945.

In the end the Germans were not only stripping the occupied territories of trucks and resources, they also took clothes and in one infamous case, toys from the Dutch to provide Xmas presents for German children, and bikes.

It was an economy based on theft that was running out of things to steal. Germany overran hugely productive areas of Europe, but were unable to do more that strip existing resources as they lacked the resources to exploit it properly.

That is why I can't understand the German push to the oil fields in 1942. Even if the Germans took the Caucasus it was impossible for them to get the oil back to Germany. They could deny the Russians by cutting the Volga, so why try to take what you couldn't utilise?

The Germans did achieve wonders - like dismantling the French border defenses for reuse in German defenses, but the strain of supporting the war effort was almost as destructive as the bombers were.

In 1944 25% of all German fighters produced crashed before they reached the operational units. Tanks left the factories, only to be stripped for parts to keep other tanks running. Every available tank and gun and plane and bullet was impressed into service. Every corner was cut. Everything was being run into the ground. It was simply unsustainable.

But this comes back to the short war question. If Germany had knocked the USSR out of the war in 1941 or 1942, all of the above was unnecessary. If you think you can win quickly, why trash your own industrial and agricultural base if you don't have to. Then you have time to properly exploit the resources of captured regions, install the needed roads and railways and ports.

This problem wasn't confined to Germany. England also ran its economy into the ground during the war and it too would have collapsed without outside help (Australian kept rationing until 1949, not due to shortages here but to help England).

The state of England in 1945 and its weakness to my mind shows what Germany would have been like if Germany hadn't been destroyed. England had - like Germany - massively increased its military production during the war. But by 1945 things were going bad rapidly: falling coal production, clapped out factories, the agricultural sector in ruins.

If Germany had ramped up production in 1940, it would have arrived at crisis point by 1944 at the latest.

The Germans realised this because exactly the same thing had happen in WWI. There is no point in having armies in the field if the home front collapses from the drain of total war.

A.E.B

[Mammou]

In 1944 25% of all German fighters produced crashed before they reached the operational units.

I have never seen this mentioned before. What is your source for that information? That is quite stunning.

Cheers,

Mammou

[von Churov]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by von Churov:

[QB] Right but what the analyst were doing?

Why they didn't pay attention to what the Germans were cooking up? :confused:

Talking through their asses. There were few "military analysts" then the way there are now. No one in the west really cared to talk about it in the news - no one really thought another war was likely, nor particularly knew what form it would take.

1. Well, you mentioned the analysts in a first place. I talked about newspapers as an objective testimony of surprise by the public in the West after the France have fallen in few weeks.

2. No one believed the another war is likely? They were in state of war with Germany for more than 9 months before Germans attacked. What they were excpeting for? Another Olymics on Magino/Ziegfrid line??? When you're in state of war with someone you plan how to defend yourself and how to attack your opponent. They must have had a some plans and they have failed.

invent something knew (and that's what I wrote in my first post on this topic, but you didn't read it anyway), all they did was an EVOLUTION of old Moltke and Clauzevitz ideas. But, the Implementation of the approach was the REVOLUTIONARY one.

Do you even know what "revolutionary" means? In one breath you say "nothing new" and in the next you say "revolutionary". Revolutionay means something new.

How was their implementation revolutionary?

Well everybody knew the theory but no one believed in it. No one exept Germans.

As you said: revolutionary means something new.

Well everybody talked about penetrating deep into enemys rear, making a decisive and fatal blow to him and leading to final decision. That's why idea is not Revolutionary.

But NOBODY EVER MADE IT!!! And that was something new. (Or you know some historical examples of this proportion?) That's why the implementation of the old idea was revolutionary.

It's the technical advancement of military that enabled them to do it! :mad:

Which technical advancements? Tanks? Everyone had tanks. The French and British had arguably better tanks - certainly Matilda II was the King Tiger of its day, though slow and underarmed. Aircraft? They used them in World War One. The infantry section? WW I. Submachine gun? WW I. The light machine gun as the nucleus of infantry fire and maneuver? WW I. What revolution?

May be you don't listen to yourself?

If all the prerequisites were there, as you claim:the equipment, the theory, the intention and will to do so, why there was no blitzkrieg in WWI???

Or there was something knew? But if there was something new, there is the revolutionary that you deny.

As of equipment,

You forgot radio! Equip all of these WWI pieces with radio and you'll get something really new.

For mobile warfare the radio is essencial.

Tanks? Yes. But tanks with radios. Penetrating deep into enemy's rear but still in command and still coordinated.

Planes? Yes. But planes with radios. Flying over enemy positions and being able to strike exectly where necessery, exactly when necessery, guided by ground observers.

Artillery? Yes. But Arty FO with a radios riding on leading tanks sending deadly and accurate artillery fire promptly and timely.

As you said, everybody had all of those, and everybody had a theory of blitzkrieg but still but still it was Germans who exploited it!!!

There's the point that you miss!

Everybody knew of it, and everybody (possibly) had a capability of doing it, but nobody did it.

After the battle all the generals know how? But it's the winner the one who knows it prior to the battle!!!

Eventually if Brits and French had better and more tanks than Germans, and they did, why they were defeated? They were superiour in numbers (we agree) and in equpiment (we agree) but still they were defeated. Probably Germans did something knew? Something that everybody knew about but no one knew how to do it. Exept Germans!

What I'm trying to say that it was not the series of misfortunes and lucky strikes that led to succes of Blitzkrieg. It was really something new for the time, not the idea itself but it's implementation according to the newest achievements in military tecnics of the time.

Still not seeing it. Which ones?

WWI Tanks had no sufficient radius to be effective in a role requrired for blitzkrieg.

They were no more than a weak infantry support fortresses.

WWI planes had no sufficient radius, nor sufficient load capability, nor sufficient speed nor any technical acpect to be useful for blitzkrieg. (Trying to imagine WWI Cammel made of wood and canvas strafing over the troops equipped with lots of MG 34's. He-he-he!)

Remember Stuka's impact on blitzkrieg, especially in the first few years.

Small arms. The core of German infantry squad

firepower in WWII was (one or two) MG 34 and MG42's weighting about 10 kg. (Now imagine WWI squad assaulting with Maxim HMG)

And so on and so on...

Brits had Fuller and Liddel Hart before the Germans had Guderian, we agree on that, but (here's the surprise) it was not the Brits who applied the Blitzkrieg but the Germans.

Again, it was not the idea, it was an approach what was REVOLUTONARY.

How so?

Read above.

Try to imagine several ARMIES moving forward in an assault of a MOBILE warfare, including PANZER ARMIES (or groups, which was theri initial name). Such a formation was unknown to mankind before. 150 to 200 thousand of men equipped and trained to break through, to fight and to coordinate its actons behind the enemy lines.

And the Germans did this in 1939? And this was something new in history? Cooper seems to tell us the infantry actually did the lion's share of the work in Poland.

Not all the German army did the blitzkrieg.

Infantry Div's had no sufficient equipnent for blitzkrieg, ant they fought more less just as Inf.Div's of WWI. But mobile Div's were those who really fought the blitzkrieg.Infantry leaped behind the Pz Corps' and was used to secure and clear the "kessels" (pockets) made by pincer movements of Panzers. If there were no PzC's there would have been no kessels and everything would have ended up in a trench stalmates as in WWI.

Panzer Corps was something new in war history! Yes the Panzer Army (group) was something really never-seen-before in the history!

Or you will try to argue this?

Sounds a bit messy, but the Germans manage to organize that mess in a perfect war machine.

Perfect? They went to war without enough trucks, ammunition or gasoline, with a hastily expanded army still bound to thousands of horses, lacking in heavy bombers and tied to an industrial machine made of cottage industries which had little interconnection and no ability to sustain a prolonged war effort - even if they had declared a total war effort, which they never did until circa 1943. That same year 1 million German women worked full time as hairdressers instead of in industry. Strategically they had no vision, as well explained in the other posts.

I agree on this one. Germans were strategicaly unprepared and maybe they were destined to lose the war from the very begninig. But that has nothing to do with Blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg is not a long distance strategy.

The other major nations military analysts (we come to them again)

Name one.

As you said, there were no analyst the way they are today. The analysts of the time were generals (or whole detachments) in supreme HQ's in charge of monitoring what enemy (as well as potential enemy) does and proposes the counter mesures. And those failed to meet the German approach.

I ask you a simple question, WHY?

would have proved that imposible if they were asked to comment that prior to the initiation of WWII.

But Germans proved it possible (and whaths more, very effective too) in a flash of a lightning.

More like a flash of incompetence on the part of their enemies. The Polish refused for political reasons to withdraw to natural defensive terrain, and weren't helped much by the stab in the back from Russia, as well as a lack of British or French help.

Poles were doomed. Nothing could help them even if there was no blitzkrieg.

They were no mach for the Germans. I'm talking about France and England.

So, if it was not revolutionary, why nobody found a cure for that before late 1942?

See the other posts. </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by von Churov:

So to sumarize:

1. EVERYBODY KNEW of theory of blitzkrieg, it was NOTHING NEW

2. EVERYBODY HAD EQUIPMENT required for blitzkrieg it was NOTHING NEW

3. Everybody declared war on everybody

4. Germans attacked

5. Germans did NOTHING NEW and uexpected in terms of tactics

6. Germans had NOTHING NEW to show in terms of war equpment

7. Germans beat the **** out of anyone they clashed with before late 42. And that was SOMETHING NEW and unespected "a bit".

What the hell happened to the world, or it was the Germans that something happened with.

A series of lucky strikes for Germans and of misfortunes for German enemies?

Common, German lost no major battle for three years of war. (The Russian winter counter-offensive just shows what happened to Germans when the Blitzkrieg stalled.)

Aproximate losses ratio of Germans vs. any other opponent durig the phase of German blitzkrieg was 1 to 3. Maybe even more. (I have no exact data at hand at the moment, but it doesn't matter at this point.)

They had effective war machine.

They had blitzkrieg to use.

Everybody knew about.

Everybody talked about.

Everybody had opportynity to use.

Nobody used.

Nobody knew how to use.

Nobody except Germans.

And that was their mastery, that was their art of war, that was their revulutionary use of something everybody knew about, and nobody knew how to use.

Well, I believe that no one ever wrote a song on German Blitzkrieg.

In my country they were occupators for 4 years. My grandfather and two of his brothers fought them for 4 years.

But I must do the hat down for German Blitzkrieg.

Great is the one that appreciates the decent opponent.

Whatever the Germans did in 1939 was evolutionary, not revolutionary.

Please provide your definition of "blitzkrieg" and then give a concrete example of it in action. I'll try and find my copy of Cooper tonight and provide some relevant quotes.

Allied newspapers, in time of war, calling the Germans revolutionary? Gee, could that be perhaps because they had a national bias and saw their own armies being utterly beaten in short periods of time?

[Wartgamer]

The Germans did ramp up weapons production for the invasion of the Soviet Union. But amazingly, they cut back on production in late 41!

Clearly they believed in another short term application of the Blitz that would produce another victory quickly.

They cut back on MG, rifle and mortar production in particular.

But this comes back to the short war question. If Germany had knocked the USSR out of the war in 1941 or 1942, all of the above was unnecessary. If you think you can win quickly, why trash your own industrial and agricultural base if you don't have to. Then you have time to properly exploit the resources of captured regions, install the needed roads and railways and ports.

Clearly the Germans were going for a short term war with the Soviets.

A better goal would be the securing of the breadbasket of Russia, capturing/denying oil to the Soviets and restricting any imports from outside sources.

The Germans should have concentrated all antishipping efforts from the Allies to the Soviets. Since they could not bomb factories in the US and England, sinking ships was just as good. The Germans should have got the Japanese to attack the Soviets and deny any supply from the Allies also.

The German air attack on England (with its loss of pilots/planes) was stupid. They should have either finished off England or not bothered attacking them after the fall of France. In reality, they could not do it and it would not have been worth it. They just wasted resources. By attacking the SU, they just put themselves into another multifront situation that would spell thier own doom.

[ June 01, 2005, 10:36 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Wartgamer]

The Germans wait till 44 to learn that diesel is easy to manufacture?

15. Effects of Fuel Shortages

a. When the amount of gasoline and oil was cut down by the bombing offensive against the oil industry, economies were instituted to save as much fuel as possible. Some was saved by the use of trailers. When a shortage of trailers appeared, trucks were joined together as tractors and trucks. By economies such as this, savings of fuel up to 50 percent were effected.

b. Up to mid-1944, only 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles were converted monthly to substitute fuels. The increasing bombing of synthetic oil plants caused the rate of conversion to be stepped up, but the effectiveness of such a conversion program was hindered by scarcity of conversion units and, to a large extent, by the amount of work entailed in installation. The minimum time needed to install a truck generator was 300 hours.

c. Finally, it was decided to use as much diesel fule as possible since it was easier to produce than gasoline. As early as 1 July 1944, Klockern-Humboldt-Deutz, Ulm, received orders from the Main Committee to increase its production facilities for diesel motors to the point where it could produce diesel motors for all RSOs, in addition to 2,000 to 3,000 per month to replace gasoline motors in other types of trucks. In late 1944, German technical experts were developing diesel motors that could be used in all trucks and half-tracks.

[ June 01, 2005, 10:09 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[llama]

Originally posted by A.E.B:

JasonC

Australian kept rationing until 1949, not due to shortages here but to help England

A.E.B

A.E.B.,

And in Britain rationing carried on even longer because of the food etc. that was going to support Germany. Strange times indeed.

Your discussion on the economic side of the war and the views you advanced I found very interesting and thought provoking. Thank you.

[JasonC]

Mike - none are halftracks. I counted gun armed turreted tanks, the assault guns, SPAT (Marders) and SPA (Wespes). There are 7150 SPWs on top of that, in 1943.

[JasonC]

"Every available tank and gun and plane and bullet was impressed into service"

As opposed to being left for museum displays? That is what the darn things are for.

You don't need to sustain it for 5 years if you win in 1942 or 1943. But if you fail to win in 1941 and 1942, and didn't mobilize the economy, "unsustainable" is the least of your problems.

Looting did not form an appreciable part of the German war economy. Not for lack of trying, but simply because wealth is not something lying around that can be grabbed. It is produced by work. The German economy had a sixth of world industrial production, and that is what supplied practically all their war material.

As for war finance, rationing, workers left with script that doesn't buy anything, it is a regular feature of war economy measures everywhere. The hardships it brought in Germany even at the end were absolutely nothing compared to what Russians endured. They didn't have to wait until after the war to starve. But they bloody well won.

[A.E.B]

Mammou

I'll check my Library on the weekend to make sure I am not confusing German figures with Japan.

This is a reasonable article, although some of the quoted texts may be questionable.

Losing Air Superiority

Basically the Luftwaffe suffered:

1. A lack of fuel

2. A lack of trained pilots

3. From planes like the ME109 series with narrow undercarriages

4. The need to conduct training and ferry fights at dawn and dusk, and then at night

5. Using "pep" drugs to keep exhausted pilots flying

6. Collapsing quality standards, in part caused by slave labour, and in part by using "ersatz" materials in production

All this led to crashes.

JasonC

"Every available tank and gun and plane and bullet was impressed into service"

As opposed to being left for museum displays? That is what the darn things are for.

By the end the Germans were almost taking material out of the museums.

Compared to the allies, the Germans recycled equipment that was obselete. They turned tanks into SPs, used 1940 French equipment in 1944, took Italian military hardware into their forces, used captured Russia artillery and mortars, and so on.

Nothing went to waste, even if finding parts and ammunition strained a already stretched logistics system.

The allies on the other hand rarely recycled obselete equipment back into the field armies, but instead replaced it with newer equipment. You didn't see BT-7s and A10 cruisers being turned into SPs and being fielded in 1944 (exceptions like the Bishop and Archer are well know because they were exceptions).

And the Russians were starving before WWII as well! All the major combatants with the exception of the USA basically ran their industrial and agricultural bases into the ground during WWII.

Britain was kept going by support from the USA that kept it afloat just long enough to see victory (1939-1945).

Russia was ramping up its industry pre 1941, but full mobilisation came after the German invasion (1941-1945). Russia also received some support via Britain and the USA (1-5% maybe, but it helped).

Germany ramped up production to full mobilisation later (1942-1945), but the cracks were already showing in 1944.

So all the European powers destroyed to a large degree their industrial and agricultural bases by mobilizing for total war. The difference for the Allies was the ability to draw on external support to keep them afloat. Germany had no external suppliers in a real sense.

If Germany had gone onto a total war footing in 1940, it had to win by 1942 or 1943 at the latest or it faced economic collapse.

Whether it could have won is a counterfactual, as you then face the question of whether Germany had the oil, the transport, even the roads and rail lines in the USSR to support all of those extra tanks and divisions.

You even face the question of whether a German push only on Moscow in 1941 could be sustained logistically, as now all supplies need to flow through one corridor rather than three (or two when you reach the Pripit Marshes).

A.E.B

[ June 01, 2005, 05:33 PM: Message edited by: A.E.B ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by A.E.B:

Basically the Luftwaffe suffered:

1. A lack of fuel

2. A lack of trained pilots

3. From planes like the ME109 series with narrow undercarriages

4. The need to conduct training and ferry fights at dawn and dusk, and then at night

5. Using "pep" drugs to keep exhausted pilots flying

6. Collapsing quality standards, in part caused by slave labour, and in part by using "ersatz" materials in production

All this led to crashes.

A.E.B

One other thing - few restrictions on tours of duty for those tired pilots. Rudel did 2,530+ sorties in 6 years of war - still lots of flying. Was ordered by Hitler personally to stop, but kept going, but nonetheless. Galland was finally promoted out of the cockpit - but the majority of pilots flew until they were dead. No 25/30/35 mission tours and then get to go home.

[JasonC]

AEB - its just horsefeathers. They did it, it is ridiculous to say they couldn't. They supplied a collapsing Russian front, North Africa then Italy, later France on top of it. They kept more divisions in the field than the 1941 Barbarossa force, regularly, supplied an armor fleet twice as large, mobilized 13 million men over the course of the war as a whole, and did all of the above under sustained and heavy air attack. None of the huge factors stacked against them in 1943 and 1944 were present in 1941. They failed in Russia because they did not try hard, no other reason. The only reason they didn't try harder is overconfidence, they didn't think they'd need to. It cannot be defended or rationalized away. It is one of the greatest unforced strategic errors in world history. Ten rounds of quibbling on an internet bulletin board can't change that, in the slightest.

[A.E.B]

Ten rounds of quibbling on an internet bulletin board can't change that, in the slightest.

Not if we come to the debate with positions that cannot be changed.

Horses don't have feathers, but it now appears many later dinosaurs did, so accepted truths - even ones based on the best data available - don't necessarily stand the test of time.

In 1943, 44 and 45 Germany churned out increasing numbers of planes and tanks. This was at the cost of transport, spares, recovery and service equipment, and eventual oil.

Ever notice how few bulldozers the Germans or even the Russians had in WWII. You see the Americans and Brits with them. The same goes for heavy recovery material - Germans used tanks to recover tanks for the most part.

This is due to production constraints - all the resources were producing tanks and planes, there was no spare capacity for bulldozers. The Germans relied on using humans to rebuild railways and roads and runways, and in many cases couldn't build new ones.

The Germans weren't stupid or lazy. Any German who had lived through 1918 understood what a sustained war effort does to a nation.

Germany also had many good economists who could explain that high expenditure on the military as a percentage of GDP reduces productivity over time.

Politically how many Germans where willing to support Russian style sacrifices when they were winning?

German had as many brilliant men working for it as it had dunderheads. German efforts to sustain the war effort in the face of every reverse until late 1944 was remarkable.

But Germany was like a man trying to juggle a huge number of balls. Every time a ball was dropped, there was no time to pick it up again.

Loose hundreds of transport planes on Crete - they can't be replaced.

Loose all of your tractors and bulldozers, use slaves instead.

Face a critical shortage of tungsten - use your machine tools till they break, then refurbish them with inferior materials and tolerate a reduction in equipment quality.

Loose your surface ships in 1940, to bad, there will be no more unless it is already under construction.

Germany didn't just need tanks and planes, it needed locomotives, trucks, heavy engineering equipment, rails and road beds, electrical generators, and so on.

The 3,700 planes coming of the factory floor each month at peak German production illustrates this - those planes lacked spares, fuel, pilots, ground crews and maintenance equipment, and were of poor quality. Those 3,700 planes achieved little.

Same story with the tanks. It was the fate of a large number of those tanks to be abandoned from lack of fuel or the inability to recover them from the battlefield.

In part the German miracle in increasing output in 1943-45 also comes down to being of the defensive. An army on the defensive uses less fuel and fewer spares than the armies moving 200 km a week in 1940 and 1941.

A.E.B

[JasonC]

Every major power participating in the war increased armaments output 4 fold or more by simply deciding to mobilize the economy for war - including Germany. Everybody knew what it involved and what it would reliably do, and did, for Germany no less than any of the others.

And we know exactly why the Germans didn't do this before, or as soon as, they invaded Russia. It has nothing to do with thinking it impossible to accomplish, or not knowing it would help produce vast quantities of additional weapons. It was purely because they thought they would win easily without doing so.

We have every member of the high command on record saying so, at all the relevant times. They thought they'd win easily before the attack. They thought they'd win easily after the first month of successes, and switched output *away* from army equipment. They thought they had already won after closing the Kiev pocket. They thought they had already won after taking Bryansk. They thought Typhoon was succeeding.

When it didn't, they were so surprised the men who brought the news and tried to adapt to the need to go on the defensive were uniformly sacked or resigned. Some had heart attacks. Then they weathered the winter, without fully mobilizing the economy for war. In the spring the Russians attacked and they defeated that attack easily, and thought all the previous problems were just winter and logistical overreaching, and the summer campaign would win the war.

When the attack in the south succeeded, they were convinced again that the Russians were practically out of men. When they pushed to Stalingrad, they thought the Russians were holding in strongpoints but unable to hold a continuous line with real forces anymore. When they finally took the city, which they did before the counterattack, they thought the Russians must be out of reserves. When the Russians showed otherwise, command shock was total, and the high command was paralyzed for about a week. In an uncomprehending, sputtering rage about their falsified estimates of the whole course of the war to that point.

They still hoped to spring 6th army from the trap without giving up ground. When it became clear it was instead a matter of immediate retreat to save the entire southern wing, and the relief had failed with 6th army lost, then, finally, they began making speeches about necessary sacrifice and total war and full mobilization. Which came as something of a surprise to everyone else, who did not understand they hadn't bothered to do so yet.

Defending it is just plain stupid. They screwed the pooch.