Info on T34 add-on armor

[Melnibone]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Barnstables...

Why do you keep calling him that?

[Bigduke6]

Poor attention to detail. Mea culpa.

Bastables, that was my error, I apologize for spelling your name wrong, I can understand how it would be irritating, for which I apologize again. I disagree with some of the stuff you write, but I had no intention of insulting you personally. As it appears, I did, for which I apologize a third time.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Barnstables,

Before I get going on the technical side, I challenge you to produce documented instances of even a marginally significant number Soviet women forcibly conscripted to work on a T-34 assembly line, and so producing shoddy products. I say you invented that.

Boris Kavalerchik, magazine Voenno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, issue No. 1, 2006. Detailing the issues of T34's in 1942

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Barnstables,

On the technical side, yeah well, needing capital overhaul, and actually failing as a result of not having capital overhaul, are two different things.

It was from what I can tell routine after about a month of offensive operations in a typical tank army for the tank fleet to "require" capital overhaul front to back. They all had travelled more than, say, 250 kilometers in substantially off-road conditions.

Did that stop offensive operations? Did the entire tank fleet suddenly grind to a halt? Did the Germans, just about ever, recover ground captured by a major Soviet offensive operation?

Yes German 1942 counteroffensive operations met Soviet spearheads with only penny packets of T-34 protecting Infantry and horse drawn arty. Counter offensives were so sucessful that the major item not retaken was the kursk bulge....

And pretty much every opeational pause post 1943 was dictated by a combination of logistics, mechanical life of the Soviet tank fleet, and German risistance.

[ November 26, 2006, 06:00 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Barnstables,

I say the overwhelming attitude of all workers in Soviet war factories was, essentially: We are making the tools so our soldiers can kick the German murderers out of our country. I say this made perfect sense, since the best status a Soviet citizen could have under the German occupation was slave with no rights.

Presume you're ignoreing the "slave" labour that the NKVD used in heavy industry totaling 50% of it's pool of to put it midly concripted labour. The other 50% the NKVD put to work on the farms.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Barnstables,

I would add there are plenty of anecdotal reports of T-34/76 that made it all the way to Berlin and Prague, so assuming a T-34 would inevitably fall apart into a useless pile of scrap metal at kilometer 251 is counterfactual.

There are anecdotal reports of T-34 bearly making 50KM. The mean in 1942 was 250 or less KM. What your trying to muddy the issue with is anecdotal or what in statistics is called outlier phenomnena. It's irrelvent to the point that Soviet doctrine was based on planning for 250km of the majority of their tank fleet.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Barnstables,

In some ways, the fact T-34/85 turned out to be more "reliable" than earlier marks of the tank doesn't make any sense.

But of course, there are also good reasons T-34/85 has a better maintenance record than the earlier marks: an additional crewman, and more of them operated on a better road net. But even more important was, obviously, by the time T-34/85 was fielded, the Soviets were advancing. Ground they captured they practically never lost, therefore,

a busted T-34/85 eventually got fixed. Prior to Autumn '43 busted T-34/76 frequently got captured by the advancing Germans.

Things like that affect maintenance numbers. I would argue this is a big reason why the Soviets managed to push the practical operational range of their vehicles past the 1,000 km. point by late 1944: Sooner or later, by that time in the war, the Germans always lost the battlefield, and they lost it catastrophically enough so that removal or even destruction of captured T-34s was not possible.

No issues with the T34 were underdevloped V2 engine by the time the T-34-85 arrived it was reliable enough for the fleet to reach on 1800km mean use. In 1942 it boiled away it's oil in 145km and the engine would require a replacment at 200 to 250km. I'm a shall we say less than intrested in what yoiu think as these figures are from the Soviet militaries own sorces.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Along those same lines, I wonder how it is possible to characterize the Soviet Union as an agrarian nation, when literacy was in the 70 -80 per cent range, at the war's beginning they fielded the T-34 and KV-1, and the country was AFAIK the second largest producer of steel in the world.

For the same economic indicaters that classify WW I Austria-Hungery, Germany, Russia, Italy, Ottoman Turkey. WW II Russia, Italy, China ect.

Low GDP per head of population and in Russia's case 50% or so of the population conducting farming or subsitance life style(1940s). AKA a standred economic measure in use for several decades. (1996 Harrision).

[ November 26, 2006, 05:03 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Barnstables,

s of the offensive.

I would say the T-34 did the job it was designed for. There is an important distinction here - there is a big difference between what the engineers design for, and the operational planners design for. The T-34 fit the needs of Soviet operational technique, and that was sufficient. So what if the vehicle design specs weren't met.

It did matter because Soviet doctrine had to plan around 250km tank range for 3 years of war because of the limitation imposed by the equipment, where the original requirement was 1000km. Youre attempting to make a specious argument that doctrine came before the limitations of the T-34 range came about.....

Soviet doctrine finally got the range of the Panther/late midwar PIV 1500-1800km in mid 1944 with the T-34-85.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Barnstables,

But of course, there are also good reasons T-34/85 has a better maintenance record than the earlier marks: an additional crewman, and more of them operated on a better road net. But even more important was, obviously, by the time T-34/85 was fielded, the Soviets were advancing. Ground they captured they practically never lost, therefore,

a busted T-34/85 eventually got fixed. Prior to Autumn '43 busted T-34/76 frequently got captured by the advancing Germans.

This is very tenditious, the mean mechanical lifetime's of AFV are Cetrius parabus (sp?) of war aka all other things being equal.

[Bigduke6]

Bastables,

That certainly is quite a barrage of comments you cranked out.

Boris Kavalerchik, magazine Voenno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, issue No. 1, 2006.

Wow. That's one impressive source.

Just by the way, have you actually read the article? Or were you just cribbing from the Dupuy Institute?

Me, I was only able to find the Dupuy Institute's review of the article. In that article, from what I could see, and there wasn't word one about women forced laborers working in a 1942 T-34 plant. Inexperienced - yes. Untrained - yes.

But forced, Shanghaied, enslaved, chained to the lathe, welding at the point of the gun - negatorre on that Good Buddy.

That was the assertion I called you on. I maintain the workers in T-34 plants were overwhelmingly patriotic and proud they were doing the job they did. Calling people like that "slaves" may be fun for you, but AFAIK there are zero grounds for your assertion.

So I kinda still think you maybe in your enthusiasm for debate just made that up that bit about slave women T-34 factory workers. But it sounds good, I'll give you that.

A linky to Kavalerchik's article itself would be a fine way to force me to take back that nasty insinuation of mine. This is what to search for in Russian: Военно-Исторический архив.

I wasn't able to get a hit, but maybe your Google Foo is stronger than mine.

Presume you're ignoreing the "slave" labour that the NKVD used in heavy industry totaling 50% of it's pool of to put it midly concripted labour. The other 50% the NKVD put to work on the farms.

Gee, that kind of makes me wonder, where was the slave labor in the coal coal, oil fields, nickel mines etc. etc? Seeing as, according to you, half the NKVD's slave labor pool was in heavy industry, and the other half in agriculture? 50 + 50 = 100 per cent, so where did the NKVD get slave laborers for ore extraction? Or was that another 50 per cent?

No issues with the T34 were underdevloped V2 engine by the time the T-34-85 arrived it was reliable enough for the fleet to reach on 1800km mean use. In 1942 it boiled away it's oil in 145km and the engine would require a replacment at 200 to 250km. I'm a shall we say less than intrested in what yoiu think as these figures are from the Soviet militaries own sorces.

Well to take your last point first, seeing as you are so interested in Soviet military sources, I was wondering if you had find time to READ THE ACTUAL OPERATORS' MANUAL FOR THE 1942 T-34 TANK I so graciously posted a link to a bit higher in this very thread.

As to boiling away the oil, two little questions:

1. Just what was in those cool barrels Soviets carried around on the back decks of their WW2 medium and heavy tanks? There were three. Why three, do you think?

2. Last I heard, diesels are designed to burn at last a bit of motor oil. So don't you think your assertion Soviet tanks were crappy, because they burned motor oil and U.S./German tanks did not, is a bit apples and oranges. After all, U.S./German tanks ran on gasoline.

It did matter because Soviet doctrine had to plan around 250km tank range for 3 years of war because of the limitation imposed by the equipment, where the original requirement was 1000km. Youre attempting to make a specious argument that doctrine came before the limitations of the T-34 range came about.....

Didn't I ask you how far you thought a Tank Army could operate away from its supply railhead? If I didn't, I'm asking you now.

And since I stand to gain wisdom and insight, maybe you could tell me, if the operating range of the 1942 T-34 were increased to say 500 or 1000 kilometers, how much more operational mobility would that have translated to for the Soviets?

This is very tenditious, the mean mechanical lifetime's of AFV are Cetrius parabus (sp?) of war aka all other things being equal.

Close but no cigar, it's "Ceterius paribus".

But frankly, I don't really understand what you're driving at. First you say the 1942 T-34/76 sucks, and then you say T-34/85 was just as reliable as a MarkIV. Are you arguing a sea change in Soviet manufacturing technique? After all, according to you the operational range of a T-34 increased from 250 kilometers to 1,800 kilometers - that's a seven-fold reliability increase - over the course of 14 to 16 months. Same engine, same drive train.

Are you actually contending the quality of the Soviet personnel responsible for T-34 maintenance remained unchanged from 1942 - 1944?

One of the most basic truisms of WW2 is that the big countries got better at war by practice. Quod erat demonstrandum, don't you know?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Close but no cigar, it's "Ceterius paribus".

Spelling, spelling, everywhere.

It is either 'Ceterus Paribus', or 'Ceteris Paribus'.

The online economics dictionary seems to think it is the former.

Whatever

All the best

Andreas

[tankibanki]

I thought "agarian nations" was kind of funny.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Bastables,

That certainly is quite a barrage of comments you cranked out.

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Boris Kavalerchik, magazine Voenno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, issue No. 1, 2006.

Wow. That's one impressive source.

Just by the way, have you actually read the article? Or were you just cribbing from the Dupuy Institute?

Me, I was only able to find the Dupuy Institute's review of the article. In that article, from what I could see, and there wasn't word one about women forced laborers working in a 1942 T-34 plant. Inexperienced - yes. Untrained - yes.

But forced, Shanghaied, enslaved, chained to the lathe, welding at the point of the gun - negatorre on that Good Buddy.

That was the assertion I called you on. I maintain the workers in T-34 plants were overwhelmingly patriotic and proud they were doing the job they did. Calling people like that "slaves" may be fun for you, but AFAIK there are zero grounds for your assertion.

? </font>

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

[QB] Bastables,

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />No issues with the T34 were underdevloped V2 engine by the time the T-34-85 arrived it was reliable enough for the fleet to reach on 1800km mean use. In 1942 it boiled away it's oil in 145km and the engine would require a replacment at 200 to 250km. I'm a shall we say less than intrested in what yoiu think as these figures are from the Soviet militaries own sorces.

Well to take your last point first, seeing as you are so interested in Soviet military sources, I was wondering if you had find time to READ THE ACTUAL OPERATORS' MANUAL FOR THE 1942 T-34 TANK I so graciously posted a link to a bit higher in this very thread.

As to boiling away the oil, two little questions:

1. Just what was in those cool barrels Soviets carried around on the back decks of their WW2 medium and heavy tanks? There were three. Why three, do you think?

2. Last I heard, diesels are designed to burn at last a bit of motor oil. So don't you think your assertion Soviet tanks were crappy, because they burned motor oil and U.S./German tanks did not, is a bit apples and oranges. After all, U.S./German tanks ran on gasoline.

</font>

[John Kettler]

Red Army Studies has an issue of VIZh which deals specifically with tank reliability, overhaul and combat repairs. I believe some of you will find the following index numbers of interest:

8,65,79,185,391,392, of which 8 and 79 would seem to be particularly pertinent.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

[

But frankly, I don't really understand what you're driving at. First you say the 1942 T-34/76 sucks, and then you say T-34/85 was just as reliable as a MarkIV. Are you arguing a sea change in Soviet manufacturing technique? After all, according to you the operational range of a T-34 increased from 250 kilometers to 1,800 kilometers - that's a seven-fold reliability increase - over the course of 14 to 16 months. Same engine, same drive train.

[/QB]

I sort of guessed you had issues with comprehension when you missed the T-34 being made proof vurses PaK 37 was from experience in spain. Never mind the other wilful mis readings through this.

All these midly insulting calls to prove it seem to be based on you creating arguments from me and then proceeding to attack them. That's fine.

I'm not saying anything, I'm pointing out operational ranges of the T-34's throught their life time during the war. The T-34 was desgined for a range of operational travel and it never achived it until 1944 where it exceeded it and then possesed the range of Panther's and late PIV's.

You wanted examples you wanted sorces I've indicated them, If you're so worried about appering a fool just go off and read them as opposed to arguing in a internet message board vainily hanging on by switching over to being insulting..

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by Bastables:

I sort of guessed you had issues with comprehension when you missed the T-34 being made proof vurses PaK 37 was from experience in spain.

Except of course it wasn't. It was upgraded to 45mm armour because the suspension could handle that much - having started at 20mm, then gone to 30mm they found that it could carry 45mm - it was "simply" a mater of putting as much armour on as they thought it could take on hte basis that more is better. they tested it against their own 45mm guns, not against the 37mm - of which they had plenty as they bought them from Germany in the late 30's and developed the 45mm from it.

But even testing against 45mm was not the REASON for uparmouring - it was to find out what the up-armouring would cope with.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bastables:

I sort of guessed you had issues with comprehension when you missed the T-34 being made proof vurses PaK 37 was from experience in spain.

Except of course it wasn't. It was upgraded to 45mm armour because the suspension could handle that much - having started at 20mmm, then gone to 30mmm they found that it could carry 45mm - that's all! </font>

[Bigduke6]

Goddam Andreas. That was a typo, but I'll leave it in the message to demonstrate my oh-so-human fallability.

Since you have enough time to dust off your Latin, maybe you might take a look at that OB I sent you, hmnh?

[Bigduke6]

Bastables,

Well, since you are declining to RTFM yourself, the operators’ manual says:

Operating radius off-road: 250 km.

Operating radius on-road: 300 km

Standard motor oil expenditure: 13 grams/horsepower hour.

Note that the manual gives horsepower at 400 HP at a standard 1700 RPM. Maximum RPM is 2050. Minimum idling RPM is 600.

In other words, if the vehicle is running at half standard horsepower, i.e., 200 HP, for one hour, then it should burn roughly 2.6 liters of motor oil an hour. (200 x 13/100).

TRIVIA: Standard issue engineering equipment – 1 x sapper saw, 1 x sapper axe, 2 x sapper shovels.

Here are some of the oil/engine checks the driver is supposed to make before operating the vehicle:

- Leaks in fuel and oil system

- Leaks in drive train and gear exchange

- Play in control levers

- Cooling fans clear of debris

- Lubricant levels

- Air cleaner

Fueling issues:

Add kerosene to winter diesel if temp is under 20 below

Always fuel through straining filter with flannel cover

Maintain at least 20 liters of oil in crank case/engine; if less, cease operation.

A comment: With a 40 liter motor oil capacity, and the ability to burn up to 3 liters an hour, that meant that the tank could operate roughly for one extremely intense day, or maybe a week of standard off-road movement and combat, before motor oil levels got low enough to start risking engine failure. As they say, YMMV.

That is why the third oil drum one sees strapped on the back of a T-34 contained not diesel fuel, but motor oil. So that question you don't need to avoid answering any more, I just answered it for you!

TRIVIA: On-board basic load included 20 x F-1 hand grenades and 30 signal rockets (10 each white, red, and green), plus one flare gun. Cool!

Ok, back on subject, more things the driver should do:

Driver/mechanic is specifically responsible for:

Fluid levels

Motor hours accounting

Fluid expenditure accounting

Top off before and after combat

TRIVIA: To crank the tank, under normal circumstances the driver uses a hand pump to push air into a compressor, which helps kick over the engine when you hit the starter. (Thus, less power demanded from the battery.) As we saw recently in Budapest, once the engine is operating the compressor recharges automatically, so that later if the battery is completely dead or disconnected, you can still start the engine using the compressor. Thus the Soviets beat the cold morning/dead battery problem. Better than jumper cables, huh?

Ok, now for the “the Americans drove it 300 kilometers and it died” report. This well-known report is traced to a Soviet intelligence report of what the Americans at Aberdeen Testing Ground concluded, after checking out a 1942 T-34. The text is all over the Internet, here’s one example:

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/4635/library/russian_tanks/evaluation_of_russians_tanks_at_aberdeen.htm

Engine-wise, the U.S. conclusion on the T-34 was real basic. The air cleaner sucked (hah!) which let far too much dirt into an otherwise excellent engine.

So, what did the Soviets do? Shoot workers for manufacturing crappy air cleaners? Produce more T-34s and accept that they wouldn’t last long, as the air cleaners were effectively working on the German side? Instruct the NKVD to arrest any one raising dust around T-34s? Demand Switzerland force German to water its fields before the Soviets would agree to invade?

Unfortunately, nothing so drastic or entertaining as any of that. The Soviets made getting the goop out of the air cleaner by the driver mandatory every 250 kilometers or 10 hours of operation, whichever came first. Lucky driver.

Belarusian Joke: If you want your cow to produce more milk for less hay, the way to do it is to milk your cow more, and to feed her less hay.

Cleaning the air cleaners was a real pain too, apparently. The driver had to wash the wire wool mesh of the cleaner in a kerosene bath (no throwaway filters there) then replace the oil in the filter itself.

So, I can see how during intense operations that particular maintenance check definately fell by the old waysideroo, and especially in the dusty part of summer (which of course there is not so much of in Russia) you could get busted T-34s wholesale before the drivers got around to cleaning their air filters.

I can also see how the Aberdeen folks just drove the tank until it stopped, as their goal was to see how long it would run, not how long it would run if they hassle with the air cleaners like a good Soviet driver/mechanic was supposed to. But if some one out there has info on what maintenance the Americans did on the T-34 before driving it into the ground, I sure would like to see that, I don't know.

But the Soviets were telling their own crews in 1942 that the T-34 tank basically is good for 250 kilometers, and past that if you don't top off oil and do a major job on the air cleaners, you're asking for a break-down. But by that same token if you do the checks like you're supposed to, then there are other planned checks/routines at the 500 and 1,000 mark. In other words, do the maintainance, and there is at least a chance it will run past 1,000 km.

Of course, these maintenance issues in any case weren't stemming from crappy tank assembly resulting from conscripted Soviet female factory workers fumbling about the Nizhniy Tagil plant ripping their nylon stockings, breaking their fingernails, and dropping wrenches on each others’ painted toenails.

This was not an issue of the actual tank being dramatically worse, in terms of oil consumption, than its design. As a short attempt at RTFM shows, that's what the tank was supposed to do.

Rather, as you can see from the op manual (or would see, were you to deign to read it), oil consumption was pretty durn impressive, and the engine itself was high-maintenance.

But it wasn't like the Soviets somehow expected it to be less. The assumption from the get-go was the engine is built to drink a whole lot of oil, by Western standards any way. And the maintance though time-consuming and dirty wasn't technically difficult: keep pouring buckets of oil into the engine, baby the air cleaners, etc.

And obviously, if the Soviet command could manage to get each T-34 an extra drum of motor oil and the drivers a maintenance day about once a week - which it would seem to me would be easy enough once the Lend Lease trucks got to the Red Army en masse, i.e. by Spring/Summer '44, what with the Germans having lost the initiative and usually on the run - then pushing the operating distance of a T-34 way up there past 1,000 kilometers becomes realistic. You're getting the fleet and operators enough time and materials (lubricants) to allow engines to run past the point where they fail if you don't do the maintenance: apparently, about 300 kilometers.

My contention is that the T-34's operating radius, throughout the war, had far more to do with the Red Army’s ability to maintain the tank, than a sudden transformation of the T-34 from a piece of junk to a reasonably reliable vehicle, over the course of a little more than a year.

That's my interpetation based on my imperfect knowledge of the vehicle, anyway.

Now, did you or didn't you read the actual Voenno-Istorichiskiy article?

[JasonC]

Um, just a simple but apparently overlooked point of terminology. "Operating radius" means how far the tank runs on a full tank of gas before it runs out of said gas. That is all. It is the max distance between fill ups.

Doctrinally, tanks were supposed to laager every night to refuel to full, and to pull maintenance. In practice, since a tank's combat lifetime from the time it entered the front line area until the time it was knocked out by enemy action was frequently on the order of 72-96 hours, this was often dispensed with.

Live tanks would laager after a whole period of action to both refuel and perform maintenance, as well as make minor repairs caused by non-lethal hits and artillery fire etc.

In breakthroughs, T-34s were indeed pushed until out of gas or broken down, especially before mid 1943. Part of the issue was doctrinal, more of it was organizational - the CSS elements (trucked, not tracked, and often undersupplied themselves) regularly simply failed to keep up. This was a key factor in the Manstein's Kharkov counterattack e.g., with the leading Russian tank "corps" down to battalion or even company size in runners, that late in the Russian offensive.

In the post Kursk offensives, rolling starts in different regions and full tank armies hitting by echelon, relieving the stalled or hitting next to them etc, mitigated this tendency (when one brigade halted another punched, when one corps stalled out and another pressed 20 miles south, etc), and CSS improved through the rest of the war as more motor transport became available etc.

[Bigduke6]

Well I stand corrected. I thought "operational radius" meant "How far the tank will go given your army's maintenance and supply standards, before it breaks down or runs out of some critical liquid and has to stop."

Still, one thing this little exercise has taught me is that if you're operating a pack of T-34s, running out of motor oil is almost as big a log head ache as running out of diesel. Hence the oil drums on the back deck.

[John Kettler]

Didn't find the version of the APG evaluation link that I remember from Russian Battlefield (no idea where it went, but plenty of evidence from myriad cites referring to it), in which I remember a specific discussion indicating that the tanks sent for evaluation were the very best the Soviets had to offer. I did, though, find this old but useful thread on T-34 vulnerability

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=print_topic;f=16;t=017927

and this, which goes into considerable detail on fuel types, capacities, oil storage, etc. The comment on how to kill the T-34 via engine compartment hit is interesting, too.

http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=82&Itemid=43

(roots around a bit)

Eureka! Not only did I confirm the top quality of the T-34 given to the U.S., but a found a bunch of other good stuff (and a couple of laughs) in this thread. Be sure to check page 2 as well.

http://www.matrixgames.com/FORUMS/tm.asp?m=1103864

Regards,

John Kettler

[ November 27, 2006, 11:27 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[pamak1970]

Nice post bigduke6 and good information.

The operational radius is still defined as Jason said

The essential part is that preventive maintenace is going to add much more miles in actual practice compared to tests where You drive the machine till it breaks down.

I would be curious if Your manual has specific time points for common tasks like cleaning filters ,oil replenishment and things like that.

As an additional information , i found the next link which gives some interesting data about the modern M1 Abrams

from US army logistics management college

http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct99/MS441.htm

"Abrams main battle tank reliability improved approximately 25 percent between the original vehicle and the second block improvement. Additionally, maintainability improved threefold. When originally fielded, the M1 Abrams tank demonstrated 304 mean miles between combat mission failures. This increased to 403 for the M1A1 and to 419 for M1A2. The fact that reliability grew at all is phenomenal because each successive block improvement made the tank much more complex, thereby introducing many more opportunities for failure. Even more significant than reliability improvements, maintainability in terms of maintenance man-hours per operating hour decreased from 2.67 for the original M1 to 0.85 for M1A2."