Nashorn and Marder- endangered species?

[Bigduke6]

On 73 Easting, I think it is fair to include in that list of U.S. advantages: Overwhelming technological edge. M1A1 with thermals against T-62/72 in crappy visibility, but also with the American having access to every collection asset from sattelites down to Special Forces on burst data links, while the Iraqis have goat herders and the public telephone, is not exactly an example where two groups of equally armed men went at it, and the better combatants won.

The technological gap was more like a phalynx versus a U.S. Civil War infantry brigade, or even better, one of those British rifle-armed forces that killed everything in its path in one of the African Wars.

I would say that whopping technological gap also had a big influence on U.S. combat efficiency in a reverse way: if all of the U.S. force is firing, and 75 per cent is actually scoring hits, that's a pretty fair description of a force that doesn't consider itself under effective return fire. The Americans shoot up plenty of targets on firing ranges, and given the technological and organizaitonal gap, the Iraqis were not a whole lot more dangerous than the pop-up targets at NTC.

Ok, moving on to assault guns. Here's a thought: maybe the reason the Nashorns aren't doing so well is because they're mucking big targets in the CM engine, and that gives the T-34s returning fire an "excessive" area to shoot at, as opposed say to a hull-down Pz-IV or Panther or something.

Another factor could be the relatively high density of forces in most CM encounters, and so (IMO) flanks often being much more solid in CM, than was actually the case in the real deal. Also, higher unit density means units stay hidden less long, courtesty of the borg.

So, if a Nashorn can stay invisible at more than a kilometer and get flank shots on T-34s, a normal crew is going to score. The CM engine and a generally high density of units in most scenarios work against that.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Smart weapons actually can reach 50% kill rates per shot, no conventional weapon ever has.

Mr. Picky was thinking about pointing out that the operational success rate of the Squid (the most extremely successful dumb weapon I can think of) towards the end of WW2 was about 50%. But then, as it's a Squid, that's really six shots.

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the distribution of kills by fighter pilots, again discounting inflated claims, if there were no skill involved at all there would still be a large range of achieved kills.

This is an excellent point, and one that I think needs to be rammed home. In a past life, I was analysing spots-per-car (and it could equally well have been kills -- with modern direct-fire weapons, it's target acquisition that is the hard part) for simulated recce vehicles in a variety of scenarios run through one of Fort Halstead's big, detailed battelgroup simulations. We varied sensor fit, weather, and probably other things I don't remember. Regardless of scenario, it was very strongly noticeable that there was great variation between the performance of the best-performing car and the median car. Sometimes the median performance was zero, but significant numbers of spots were still made. I called this the "Lucky Alphonse" effect -- typically, a small number of top-performing vehicles scored most of the spots. In the simulated case, unlike real life, it is known that there is absolutely no variation in the skill levels of the different performers -- they are all statistically identical. Yet "Lucky Alphonse" still appears, just by random variation.

All the best,

John.

[Guest Mike]

Jason wrote:

As for famous last stands, um, the Spartans and their allies got stomped, as did the Alamo'ers, and no it didn't do much of anything for the rest of the war in either case. Might have inspired the courage of a few on their own side with sympathetic romanticism, but the first war had to be won by the Athenian navy and the second by the regular US army.

The death of Leonidas and his 300 ensured that Sparta would actually fight - which was reasonably important at Plataea, which could jsut as easily have cost Greece it's independance if lost.

[Dook]

Thermal sights no doubt provided an advantage at 73 Easting, but the advantage didn't really matter. USMC M60 tanks without thermals, 120 mm guns, DU ammo, and composite armo suffered even fewer tank losses against Iraqi heavy divisions that fought back.

At the NTC, engagements between M1-equipped US units and the T-72-equipped OPFOR almost always result in a victory for the OPFOR.

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by Dook:

At the NTC, engagements between M1-equipped US units and the T-72-equipped OPFOR almost always result in a victory for the OPFOR.

Yes,but IIRC, the Opfor is the best of the best when it comes to Soviet doctrine. Being better than most Opfor units themselves.

Kind of like taking Panzer Lehr Division made up of instructors against a new American armored division never before in combat. Results would be as you said, "almost always result in a victory for the Lehr (OPFOR)."

[Mad Russian]

Krautman

Member

Member # 15973

posted March 08, 2006 10:51 AM

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Panther Commander: can you benefit from TRPs when the vehicle has already moved? What about when it just rotated?

Greetings

Krautman

The TRP's are only good if the unit(tank, ATG, HMG,assault gun, tank destroyer, ATR, etc.) using them has not moved. To my knowledge rotating doesn't affect the value of the TRP.

[ March 09, 2006, 04:57 PM: Message edited by: Panther Commander ]

[JasonC]

On the hypothetical "Kind of like taking Panzer Lehr Division made up of instructors against a new American armored division never before in combat", funny it was put that way.

In July 1944, a reduced Lehr was moved from the British sector (where half its armor had already been lost) to the US part of the front and launched into a counterattack, straight into the US forces pushing toward St. Lo. It began its counterattack at night, with about 50 AFVs, a mix of Panthers, Panzer IVs, and Jadgpanzers. With panzergrenadiers along of course, some riding, some dismounted, some in SPWs behind the tanks.

They ran right through the US front line positions - of IDs not an AD - and then found themselves in the middle of roughly 4 regiments of US infantry forces. Plus elements of 2 TD battalions, and by the end of the day, a combat command of a US armor division. Despite the easy initial break-in, Lehr got clobbered. Panthers lost to M-10s, not just trading off (occasionally happened) but outright, frequently clean.

Initial ranges in the hedgerows were frequently as short as 200 yards. At that range, the US 76mm had no difficulty penetrating the Panther turret front. US TDs regularly got first shot, as they were defending, open topped, and frequently directed to the site of the German armor, while the Germans were attacking, buttoned up to avoid artillery and small arms, and had no idea where the Americans were.

US Shermans also participated, both from a battalion attached to the IDs and from the CC later on. They did relatively poorly compared to the TDs but the former held their own. One company from the latter got shot up by Jagds after the initiative passed to the US, when they pushed an advance too far themselves. The Americans made ground, net, in the teeth of the attack, which at best slowed them down for one day on a portion of the attacked front. Lehr lost roughly half the armor committed to the attempt.

Skill differences were simply not that large, and the Americans were not that green. Bazookas and TDs stalking in hedgerow country beat Panthers. A Panther is an awesome tank on defense at 1.5 to 2 km, picking its shots and showing only its nose. But you can't attack that way. As soon as you push companies of them into the middle of an enemy defense, their sides show themselves, and they are just another medium tank. If the defenders outnumber you in pure manpower terms and refuse to panic just because you've driven into their midst, you can easily have the worst of it. Initiative is overrated, and defense quite strong.

Fundamentally, the attack was made with completely inadequate odds. The Germans counted on skill and tank quality, but vastly underestimated the American forces in the area and hit so widely themselves that battalion size groups hit regiments, instead of the other way around. The result was an uneven knife fight, in which the edge went to the side with superior tactical intel and to simple numbers.

The outcome was not exceptional. Panther led attacks failed in similar fashion at Mortain and in the Lorraine. The ill fated Panzer brigades gave particularly poor accounts of themselves. German armor was tough on US tankers when it stayed on the defensive, but their doctrine was to use it to attack whenever they had sizable amounts of it. Which usually got it cut to pieces quite rapidly, with little to show for it.

[John Kettler]

I agree that 73 Easting was greatly helped by the various technological advantages the U.S. enjoyed, which I'm well aware of, having worked on some of it myself and my father on other parts, but I believe that technology wasn't the deciding factor at 73 Easting. What it really came down to, IMO, were crew quality and training, unit cohesion, leadership, fitness and fatigue states.

The U.S. all volunteer professional force, thanks in large measure to years of NTC cycles and later in theater exercises, was trained to a fare thee well in modern warfare in general and desert warfare in particular, against a crack

OPFOR with a complete mastery of the terrain on which it fought, so much so that multiple drubbings were the norm for units arriving for training there. The perceived advantages of NTC type training were so signal that other countries are now building their own equivalents. When you train against such a high grade opponent, you either get good in a hurry or keep losing, and the latter was unacceptable. I know, too, in the late 1980s the U.S. had begun to grasp that it had to, as much as possible, deal with tank crews as entities to be kept intact, rather than slots for various MOSs, for on such unthinking teamwork under stress does victory in battle depend.

I submit that such a force spoiling for a fight is in a much better combat posture than one that has been fighting for years, in antiquated, poorly maintained equipment, with men held in place by threats against themselves and their families, which then finds itself in a wholly new and terrifying realm of combat, against a first rate foe who doesn't fight in the way expected, and then fights only after weeks of heavy aerial and artillery bombardment, with supply lines so heavily interdicted that food and water are hard to come by. The Iraqis were expecting us to walk into a meatgrinder, only to find themselves flung headlong into a chipper!

The U.S. enjoyed lots of advantages at 73 Easting and elsewhere, but had our troops been in the same

training, maintenance and fatigue/fitness state as the Iraqis, the results would've been quite different. And I remind the readers that we pitted our best gear, in some cases pulled right out of Germany, against worn out monkey model tanks not even as good as vanilla Soviet T-72s, let alone T-80s. IOW, we stacked the deck. Big time. DU armor vs. maybe siliceous core, DU ammo vs. steel or maybe tungsten if lucky, thermals vs.

active IR, factor of two ROF difference for main guns, etc.

This, though, is exactly what the Germans did with their Tiger tanks. The best crews were handpicked to serve in them, on the not unreasonable theory that if the "natural killers" were given powerful weapons and superb protection, too, they would wreak havoc. The M1 was our Tiger tank, albeit vastly better in all categories, notably mobility.

The heavily armored hoplite Spartans at Thermopylae were absolutely Tiger tanks against unarmored, wicker shielded Persian line infantry armed with short spears and swords. Even against the mighty scale armored Immortals the Spartans had significant advantages in both offensive and defensive weaponry. Their sacrifice not only bought time for the Greeks to organize for land combat, but set the stage for the crushing decisive victory at Salamis, an event any number of historians deem to have saved Western civilization.

And it was precisely while the Alamo tied up Santa Ana's troops, attention, resources and time that the Texians were able to gather their Alamo enraged forces, ultimately whipping Santa Ana at the Battle of San Jacinto, forcing him to cede Texas.

I agree that Chennault's P-40s (crewed by highly motivated, well paid volunteers) had a plane for plane firepower, protection and dive speed advantage, but it was only by rigorously exploiting those few parts of the envelope in which the P-40 held the advantage that the AVG was able to do what it did. Attempts to turn with the Japanese fighters were invariably costly to the AVG. The early warning network, system of dispersed bases, and Battle of Britain like high likelihood of getting back pilots who bailed out

helped, too.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Panther Commander:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Dook:

At the NTC, engagements between M1-equipped US units and the T-72-equipped OPFOR almost always result in a victory for the OPFOR.

Yes,but IIRC, the Opfor is the best of the best when it comes to Soviet doctrine. Being better than most Opfor units themselves.

Kind of like taking Panzer Lehr Division made up of instructors against a new American armored division never before in combat. Results would be as you said, "almost always result in a victory for the Lehr (OPFOR)." </font>

[Krautman]

John Kettler, you mentioned flash- and smokeless propellant being used in WWII. What about today's forces? The muzzle flash of a modern assault rifle or a tank cannon seems pretty bright (at least in those action movies); do modern armies use these kinds of propellants? Would the flash be even brighter if they didn't?

Greetings

Krautman

[ March 11, 2006, 04:26 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

[76mm]

Lots of discussion of 73 Easting as being a real battle--isn't this the engagement where many of the Iraqi tanks were loaded on tank transporters, etc.? If so it demonstrates US superiority in C-cubed and technology, not combat acumen.

[Dook]

76mm, not sure which battle you're thinking of, but it's not 73 Easting. 73 Easting was a real battle - the Iraqis were in prepared positions and the US cav troop came over a dune and found themselves facing a significantly larger force. You might be thinking of the infamous "Highway of Death," the shoot-up of the Iraqi columns as they fled Kuwait City. Air power, not armorm, did most of the damage there though.

[John Kettler]

Krautman,

Good question, but I don't know the answer for modern weapons. People like M1A1TankCommander, oren_m, etc. should be able to give you what you need. I agree that the tank firing signatures are large, but it takes a lot of oomph to accelerate a projectile from zero to, say, 1600 or even 1800 m/sec.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Panther Commander:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Dook:

At the NTC, engagements between M1-equipped US units and the T-72-equipped OPFOR almost always result in a victory for the OPFOR.

Yes,but IIRC, the Opfor is the best of the best when it comes to Soviet doctrine. Being better than most Opfor units themselves.

Kind of like taking Panzer Lehr Division made up of instructors against a new American armored division never before in combat. Results would be as you said, "almost always result in a victory for the Lehr (OPFOR)." </font>

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by Krautman:

John Kettler, you mentioned flash- and smokeless propellant being used in WWII. What about today's forces? The muzzle flash of a modern assault rifle or a tank cannon seems pretty bright (at least in those action movies); do modern armies use these kinds of propellants? Would the flash be even brighter if they didn't

Greetings

Krautman

Few things are accurate in action movies. Tanks for instance, rarely blowup on battlefields, and are in fact at times hard to identify as being knocked out. They always blowup in the movies. I mean, you have to see the effects of the hero, don't you?!

[John Kettler]

Panther Commander,

While visuals in action films are almost invariably over the top (see the "thermonuclear" "knee" mortar detonations in "Wind Talkers" as an excellent case in point), the available main gun firing footage of M1A1/2s, Challenger 2s, Leopard II A4s, LeClercs, etc. indicates large, hard to miss visual and thermal firing signatures. The much smaller thermal bloom from the old 105mm M68 used to be enough to cause the Maverick IIR seeker to break lock, so 120mm fire must be enormous by comparison, given the vastly higher velocities, larger bores and enormous propellant quantities involved.

I think the kill assessment problem is very forked, depending on what's being hit. A modern

MBT fitted with automatic fire suppression systems, protected ammo stowage, blowout panels and the like might be hard to assess, but we know

from both Gulf Wars that ex Com Bloc MBTs hit by DU tend to blow up and burn spectacularly when hit, with turrets blown clean off by ammo detonation being fairly common. Even if the turret stays on, the fire is impossible to miss.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Panther Commander:

Lehr did well enough to be specifically targeted by the US for a heavy bomber strike. That should tell something about how the US felt about their skill and abilities.

That is rather an indication of where they were (astride the US breakout route), instead of what they were. Heavy bomber strikes were employed against 89th Infantry Division during Totalize and the garrison of Walcheren. Neither of which I have ever heard being described as somehow outstanding in their skill and abilities.

All the best

Andreas

[John Kettler]

Andreas,

I'd have to call your response a very effective counterargument, one with which I'm compelled to agree.

The purpose of the heavy bomber strikes, which at St. Lo I believe used relatively light bombs in order to avoid wrecking the ground so that vehicles could still move, was to basically shatter the defense by causing so much havoc, disruption and casualties that no coherent defense could be mounted by the stunned survivors in the impact zone. ISTR a report from a German division commander who lost 40% of his combat strength in a single heavy bomber strike there, rendering his unit combat ineffective and with something like one working radio in his CP.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Andreas]

That maybe the famous case of Bayerlein talking about the attack. It is important to remember that he appears to have been a bit of a drama queen though, and while casualties were heavy, the bombers actually hit the Fallschirmjaeger on the left flank harder. Ritgen (Westfront 1944) appears to be a more reliable source there, and according to him Panzerlehr regained a permanent frontline by midnight without reinforcement, despite the chaos and the losses, and it took another major effort by the US forces to break through on the 26th. On the evening of the 25th they had only made it half-way through the bombing zone, and they were not just help up by cratering.

I would be interested in the US view of things.

All the best

Andreas

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Panther Commander,

While visuals in action films are almost invariably over the top (see the "thermonuclear" "knee" mortar detonations in "Wind Talkers" as an excellent case in point), the available main gun firing footage of M1A1/2s, Challenger 2s, Leopard II A4s, LeClercs, etc. indicates large, hard to miss visual and thermal firing signatures. The much smaller thermal bloom from the old 105mm M68 used to be enough to cause the Maverick IIR seeker to break lock, so 120mm fire must be enormous by comparison, given the vastly higher velocities, larger bores and enormous propellant quantities involved.

I think the kill assessment problem is very forked, depending on what's being hit. A modern

MBT fitted with automatic fire suppression systems, protected ammo stowage, blowout panels and the like might be hard to assess, but we know

from both Gulf Wars that ex Com Bloc MBTs hit by DU tend to blow up and burn spectacularly when hit, with turrets blown clean off by ammo detonation being fairly common. Even if the turret stays on, the fire is impossible to miss.

Regards,

John Kettler

Excuse me. I was discussing WWII and didn't get that in my post. I agree that the signature of a big gun is bigger than a small gun and that in today's world where the rounds are so much larger that a penetration has a much greater chance of achieving a catastrophic hit.

My comment was aimed more towards look at the action adventure films and see how much flame there is comment. Hollywood does EVERYTHING for effect.

I have stood right next to M-60A1's firing at night and CEV's with their 165mm guns as well. They make plenty of light with which to read your evening paper by...

As you alluded to, those were the old 105's and I would imagine that the new 120's make an even brighter signature.

[John Kettler]

Andreas,

My sleep deprived brain tells me you're right. The name Bayerlein does sound right. Your characterization of him tickles my funny bone, but OTOH how much more dramatic can things get than having the sky rain bombs and everything around you explode? If he didn't get hit as hard as the nearby FJ,

then I really wouldn't have wanted to be where they were.

Panther Commander,

Your clarification changes everything. Will see about finding you a link to the report to Eisenhower based on interviewing American troops about their relative perception of their own gear and weapons vs. the Germans. Regarding small arms, Steve produced an example in which an MG-42

some 200 meters away and whose location was roughly determined couldn't be found despite lots of eyeballs, some with binos. Believe this is the result of not only propellant, but the German tracer design which didn't ignite until a couple of hundred meters downrange, specifically to make it hard to spot the gun's location.

Regards,

John Kettler

Regards,

John Kettler

[ December 15, 2006, 09:00 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[undead reindeer cavalry]

it's hard to spot anything unless you have time to look for it. you don't spot a Tiger firing from 500 meters if you don't expect it to be there. it's just the same still today with all the fancy equipment.

i don't think allied bombers in Totalize targetted the 89th infantry division as such. didn't those ~1000 bombers at least initially target just those villages on path of Allied units? much could be written about how various units performed in Totalize, but it would certainly make me a Nazi fanboy par excellence. better just drink some vodka, it's Sunday after all.

[ March 12, 2006, 01:50 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

i don't think allied bombers in Totalize targetted the 89th infantry division as such. didn't those ~1000 bombers at least initially target just those villages on path of Allied units?

That's my point, they did not target 89th in Totalize, or Panzerlehr in Cobra, or 70th on Walcheren.

All the best

Andreas

[John Kettler]

URC and Andreas,

Am working from memory here, but I believe the control method in Cobra at least was to simply draw a box on the map covering the designated target zone, mark it visually on the ground in some manner (seem to recall landmarks were involved; couldn't be seen because of smoke and dust once the bombs started hitting) and make sure the troops were X hundreds of yards back from the target area with recognition panels out. If you were in the impact box, you were screwed. Ditto if you weren't and the bombers dropped short--as happened. Twice.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Andreas]

There is a map with the box overlay in Ritgen (op cit). For Totalize the bombing plan was far more complex, as can be seen from the map in Reid 'No holding back'.

But in both cases it was a targetting of German resistance in the main path of the advance regardless of which unit was there.

All the best

Andreas