CMBB op idea--thoughts JasonC et al.?

[John Kettler]

We know, from various historical accounts, that debates raged practically to the start of the Kursk

offensive over whether it would be better for the Russians to preempt the German and attack, or to first, as Zhukov said, to stand on the defensive, let the Germans bleed, then counterattack the now depleted Germans. Seems to me this might make for a most interesting operation.

JasonC has already done a ton of work on a Ponyri op, and that might form the basis for one trying to go the other direction. The Russians would still have extensive fortifications at the start, but would come charging out, either catching the German forces in the assembly area, as happened to some during the historical counterpreparation, or meeting the German attack headed their way.

Theoretically, this would also allow us to test Dupuy's QJM tested argument that the margin of Russian victory at Kursk lay in the massive field fortifications and mine belts; that had the Russians used those same armor and infantry forces offensively in mobile warfare, the Germans would've won.

That's my idea. What do you think of the conceptual op?

Regards,

John Kettler

[Shmavis]

It seems to me that an attack would be a disastrous undertaking, since the Soviets didn't have the tactical numerical superiority to ensure victory over the German forces arrayed against the Kursk salient. At least, they didn't during the first week of July 1943. Some might say they never achieved tactical dominance throughout the war. It was at the strategic level that the Germans couldn't compete. I guess it all depends on how historically accurate you would want the scenario to be.

[Other Means]

While I love a massive tank fest as much as the next man, the idea that you'd abandon a prepared gun line for an attack on a concentrated enemy is nonsense, as consistently proved by the British in NA, pre-Monty.

If the idea is to prove that the Germans in 1942 were far superior to the Soviets at manouver warfare, it is a bit redundant as it is not, AFAIK, in doubt. The Soviets themselves knew this - that's why they built the massive trap that was Kursk.

[Other Means]

TBH, I'm unaware of the debate you raise. Do you mean within the Soviet staff or from historians?

[Shmavis]

Yeah, I believe there was a fierce debate within the STAVKA about whether to defend, bleed the Germans, then counterattack, or just pre-empt the German summer offensive with their own.

EDIT: Where's my turn, eh? Just kidding!

[ May 22, 2006, 08:36 AM: Message edited by: Shmavis ]

[Bert Hamoen]

To Shmavis, about your sig-line:

Schuyler Jackson didn't understand the bible-guy at all; he wasn't talking about his physical safety when he took out his bible. Everybody (including christians) know life here on earth isn't forever !

P.S. I know this is not directly related to any of the CM games !

[Shmavis]

I would suggest you read A Blood-Dimmed Tide by Gerald Astor for the full quote. Or I could just post it...

"I was never religious and I lost any feeling for it right after the battle of the causeway. During a break I was sitting with a guy whose brother was a priest and his sister a nun. He was always talking up religion. He never cursed and his one sin was he chased women without a pause. He took his Bible out and told me, 'This is what saved us.' The words were no sooner out of his mouth then a treeburst shell snapped his neck. I've been an atheist since then."

[JasonC]

JK - The Russians attacked in the north a week after the Germans did. It was called Operation Kutuzov - the Germans called it the Orel offensive. Within 48 hours, AG Center broke off the Kursk northern attack, and sent half a dozen PDs from it - or standing by to reinforce it in a few cases - north trying to contain the new Russian offensive, with only partial success. They fought the eastern prong to a standstill but never fully stopped the northern one, and had to evacuate the Orel salient in consequence.

The point being, we do not need to reach for hypotheticals to see what happens when the Russians attack, and pick their point of attack. The chosen points of attack most certainly would not be the forward deployment areas of concentrated Panzer corps.

It has always seemed amazing to me that Kursk is so picked over but practically no one seems to even know Kutuzov exists. I'm trying to remedy that as far as CMers are concerned with another large scenario pack, which I am currently working on.

It was followed by several others - south in the Donets, then opposite Kharkov where AG south attacked in Kursk, after it was stripped of most armor to meet the others - and smaller secondary operations straight west, from the southwest face of the Kursk bulge and from north of the Orel one - through the remainder of the summer. These rolling offensives ran the German armor reserves around, and eventually ran them out of them, in an operationally significant sense, anyway.

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

I'll be the first to admit that I'm not well read on Kutuzov, but I guess what I'm really wondering is what the forces in the Kursk salient proper would've been doing had first STAVKA, then Stalin by direct order, not decided to first ride out the German attack? I get the attacks from both flanks of the salient, but had the Russians attacked first, what do you see as the likely actions of the two Fronts in it?

Do they, for example, sit tight for a day or two noisily demonstrating, after which the attacks on either side jump off? Are they part of a general attack? Do they function as a swing reinforcement

group in support of whichever sector's making better progress? Do they attack the flank of a given German effort to stop a drive from one side or the other of the Kursk salient? Seems to me there are numerous intriguing possibilities inherent in a Russians preempt scenario, even without explicitly addressing the historical Kutuzov attacks. I certainly salute you for your

game design efforts regarding them, though. It's just that the op idea I had was not the same as doing Kutuzov.

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

If the Russians decide they want to pre-empt instead of waiting out the German attack first, then they probably don't put all of Steppe Front behind the Kursk bulge. They initiate Kutuzov in mid June or on July 1. They attack in the Donets basin a week or two after Kutuzov starts.

If the Germans send the AG center armor to the north face of the Orel bulge, then Central Front inside the Kursk one attacks northward. They did historically, they were just so weak from the German offensive period they did not contribute all that much to Kutuzov. The German AG Center armor has interior lines inside the Orel salient, but must defend against concentric attack from 3 directions.

As for the German forces south of the Kursk salient, they have several options. They can try to attack north across the base of the Kursk salient, but without a northern arm coming south to meet them, since that armor has been diverted to defensive roles. There would be fewer Russian reserves in front of them, but all of them earmarked to stop only them.

Or they can remain on the defensive, in which case the Donetz stuff presumably diverts some of them. At some point the Voronezh front takes action offensively if the Germans in the south do not. If those haven't been diverted elsewhere or used up, however, the Russians would have a bad time of it and be back on the defensive in that sector soon enough.

The Germans have a better chance of containing Kutuzov in this scenario. But they might still be driven from the Orel salient, by similar attrition processes as actually occurred. Their armor reserves are presumably not driven nearly as low, however, since they start with twice as much and fight under somewhat more favorable conditions. On the flip side, getting full use of the AG South armor requires some specific commitment of it. If it is relatively inactive in July, the Russians have better engaged odds by a different mechanism.

It is clear in retrospect the decision to defend first with a full Front centrally positioned and in reserve (Steppe), and then counterattack on one flank a week into the German offensive, is vastly superior to pre-empting. But if they had had less confidence in their ability to stop massed German armor used offensively than they historically did have, they might easily have thought it too risky, compared to hitting first themselves.

The basic assessment that the Germans would attack at Kursk was obvious enough on the map that all of Zhukov, Vatutin, and Malinin (Central front chief of staff) saw it. Malinin's recommendation was for pre-emption in the Orel salient, and formed the basis for Kutuzov as it was actually launched. Vatutin's recommendation to stand on the defensive first with reserves in depth was the one actually adopted. All involved show excellent appreciation of the strategic issues and possibilities. Vatutin won the debate because he deserved to win it - his planning was superb. By April 2, Stavka was convinced and everyone was on the same page.

The contrast with German side planning is striking. So is the outcome of the two offensives. Tactically, the Germans did rather well in their own southern attack and in their defenses against the eastern prong of Kutuzov. It is extremely revealing that failure of one arm of the German plan doomed it, while success of one arm of the Russian one ensured success in clearing the Orel salient.

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

Thansk for the lucid explanation of the possibilities. While I certainly agree that the Russian commanders knew how to analyze a map and effectively exploit what they saw, witness the "impossible" movement through the Kingshan Mountains during August Storm, I think it also helps enormously to be reading the German opord before most of the German commanders (Lucy Ring) and to be reading the pertinent Enigma decrypts (Cairncross at Bletchley Park).

Regards,

John Kettler

[Andreas]

By April 2 1943 the Germans did not know what they were going to do, so I doubt that any intel on what they were going to do existed.

Regards

Andreas