Sneak Attacks - are they worth it?

[David Chapuis]

In two very recent CMBO games, I was able to sneak a large force (one time a third of my total force, the other time 2/3rds of my total force) into the rear of the enemy. However, neither time resulted in me getting a clear advantage, actually I think it ended up hurting me more since I was without a combined force for so long. The problem that I ran into both times, was that once I found the enemy, I merely engaged them from the rear just like I would have engaged him from the front. I was able to kill a few soft units both times, but the effect was not what I would consider to happen in real life. In real life, I would imagine the troops that were suddenly attacked from the rear would have an extreme morale hit, and many would just surrender, even to a smaller force (e.g. Rommel's great inf exploits in WWI - he captured a couple thousand troops with merely a company because he was in their rear and it shocked them so much they just surrendered). However, in CMBO, they just turn and start firing at you, like they arent too concerned about being surrounded.

So do I just stink at sneak attacks, or have other people found similar results. Either way, I guess I am going to give it up, and just go back to convential engagements.

Although I might try sneak attacks with a very small force, just to find some unsuspecting soft units.

[Redwolf]

I think you misinterpret the real life effect.

Surprise is not the overriding factor, although it is probably there. And in CM you get a morale bonus from attacking from where the friendly map edge is, IIRC.

Real-life enveloping, especially when done deep (= outside support from main force weapons) is targeted mainly at higher HQs, artillery, supply and blocking reserves from joining the fight that your main force fights with the enemies already in the area. None of that is present in CM or is gamey, waiting at the map edge of a known reinforcement point is uncool.

What you can do in CM is enveloping for gaining better and more fire positions on the enemy. In this case all your units, main force and enveloping detachment are supposed to be in mutual support. Your units don't have to be in LOS of each other, but in LOS of the same targets. Fire from multiple direct has a much better effect for the same volume of fire. In real life you also need more space to place you weapons, in CM you can see and shoot through your tanks.

Enveloping would also have the enemy fortifications face the wrong way, which doesn't work for CM foxholes and trenches which are 360 degrees protection. CM bunkers are a joke to start from so you don't gain much in that respect either.

[xerxes]

For armor, attacking from the side/rear is a huge advantage. I suspect you're talking about infantry. The key is to catch the enemy in a crossfire. Infantry taking fire from two directions break and run very quickly.

[David Chapuis]

For armor, attacking from the side/rear is a huge advantage. I suspect you're talking about infantry.

I'm not just talking about inf. I am talking about enveloping his whole force and then attacking with a substancial size force from the rear. I did it on two separate occasions, and both were rather disappoiting (especially after taking so long being sneaky all the way around the map with a big force :mad: ).

Both games, I was able to get behind his reserves (consisting of tanks and some support weapons), but it had little effect. The first time I had a platoon of inf about 20m from two tanks, but he had turned one facing each direction. He knew that I was sneaking somewhere because he had not seen enough of my force. Before I could get that slow piat within firing range he decided to retreat to the west (i was coming from the north). The second time, I had a zook and an entire platoon of US paratrooper attacking a stug and they just got slaughtered. Zooks suck anyway, and this guy couldnt hit a broadside, confused stug at 20m, and those ignorant VET paratroops let the stug drive right by them and shoot off his NGW without even throwing one gammom bomg. ARRG!

The key is to catch the enemy in a crossfire. Infantry taking fire from two directions break and run very quickly

I am aware that fire coming from two directions causes inf a morale hit. And that seems logical. However, and this is my main complaint, when your a force becomes envoloped, I think they should take an ever larger morale hit, but I dont think they do.

I think you misinterpret the real life effect. ... Real-life enveloping, especially when done deep (= outside support from main force weapons) is targeted mainly at higher HQs, artillery, supply and blocking reserves from joining the fight that your main force fights with the enemies already in the area.

Maybe I do misinterpret the real life effect. However, from what I have read & what I imagine, being enveloped by enemy, whether on the front line where CM battle does take place, or around the higher HQ's would still cause a lot of panic - in fact significantly more than just recieving cross-fire from separate directions would cause.

I have read of more than just a couple accounts where units completely envoloped surrunder - both front line and rear units. And these are battalion size forces, sometimes in prepared defensive positions. So that is what makes me think companies/platoons actively engaged with a force in front of them, would have take severe morale hits if they discovered almost equal size force cresting a hill behind them, where their reserves should have been.

Surprise is not the overriding factor

and I am not saying it should be. I am mostly talking about being cut off. with no place to retreat.

What you can do in CM is enveloping for gaining better and more fire positions on the enemy

But it seems that there should be more of an advantage than just having improved firing positions. If that is the only benefit in CM, then there really isnt much point of doing what I did. And that is the point of what I am asking, and of this thread. I separated my forces into two groups, which has great risk, and proceed in a stealthy manner into the enemies rear. This long separation of forces meant that my one force that was engaged with the enemy took greater casualties than it would have if I had not separated my forces. The end result was no greater than if I had just flanked the enemy. Actually it was worse, because my forces were separated from each other. IMO, The effect should have been greater at least in a morale sense, because with a flanking move, the enemy still has a place to run to. With an enveloping move, he is trapped.

But since CM doesnt really model 'trapped', as far as I can tell, and since the "all-knowing commander" problem prevents me from systematically destroying one group without the other knowing what is happening to its friends, I think that I will stop enveloping and just stick to flanking.

That is, unless somebody can describe how an enveloping move has worked really well for them.

[Michael Emrys]

Getting behind the enemy works really well if you time it right. First you have to have already been pounding them pretty heavily so that they have taken casualties and their morale is precarious. Then, when they spot your units in their rear, they break and run. If you get a sizable enough force in their rear and place them properly, it is then like shooting fish in a barrel, since the enemy will not usually stand and fight, but wants only to rush off the map.

It's really hard to pull this off though. I've only done it less than a half dozen of all the games of CM I've played. If you get there too soon, you risk having your flanking force discovered while the enemy still has fight left in him. In that case, you just might be the one who gets cut off and ground up. More likely though you will get there too late, after the enemy has already begun his withdrawal, and most of his force will escape the bag.

Michael

[tar]

I'll add some of my random musings on this topic.

To a small extent, this effect is modeled in CM by the friendly map edge. Forces preferentially retreat toward the friendly map edge when they break or rout. In that case, having troops there makes it more likely that you will be able to shoot down fleeing troops or have them surrender to you. I think Michael Emrys is describing this effect.

Now one could argue about whether having someone astride your axis of retreat should make you more nervous. One could make a good case for this reducing the global morale -- but CM does not have this particular effect implemented.

One could also argue about the surrender mechanics and thresholds in the game. I've often been astounded at how well three or fewer enemy soldiers will hold out in the face of overwhelming opposition.

As far as the general surrender of larger formations, I think that much of that effect is on a time scale a bit longer than the typical CM battle. In fact, most captured troops are the result of negotiated surrenders of beseiged or surrounded forces. It is often quite difficult and dangerous to try surrendering in the middle of a firefight. You are likely to just get shot in the heat of battle.

So perhaps that should be more of an effect in operations. If you have troops behind the new front line, there should be some chance that they will surrender, rather than infiltrate back to friendly lines. That would make envelopment a much more serious threat at the operational level.

Finally a few thoughts about why being attacked from the rear should have negative morale effects: You are isolated from a) ammunition; food; c) reinforcements and d) don't have a place to run away to. Clearly a) and don't apply to CM battles. I think a) is reflected in the operations, but don't know for sure. , c) and d) are not modeled except to the extent that troops still try to run toward the friendly edge of the map.

[David Chapuis]

M Emrys,

So do you think it is worth trying to do deep enveloping maneuvers, as opposed to strong flanking moves? My recent experiences make me think that flanking moves will work better almost everytime.

Actually, the first time I did that, it was just meant to be a flanking move, but since the enemy wasnt on that flank I just kept going until I got behind him.

[vbfg]

Every now and again I'm prone to stack the odds totally in my favour in a QB against the AI. Maybe I'll pick a battallion of infantry for the AI and give myself 6 or 7 T-34 platoons with no infantry support at all. I did this last night and not for the first time I noticed that I was well behind where th enemy *must* have been without having seen him yet. Not unusual, he opened up on the tanks and buttoned them and they just couldn't spot.

When I do this, purely for the stress relief of kicking ass you understand, often the only way to flush them out is to reconnoitre by fire. This seems to have a huge morale effect on the infantry, and they often just leg it as they did last night. Not just the troops under direct fire either, it could be a whole company or more.

Infantry that I haven't spoitted, haven't fired on but have got behind and whose friends I'm firing on does seem to get up and run under certain conditions. Maybe it's a question of having enough firepower behind them that they can do nothing about...

[tar]

Actually, a flanking move is more likely to be useful, assuming something like a linear defensive setup.

As was noted already, getting behind is pretty much the same as a frontal assault, but from the other direction. On the other hand, a flank attack againsts a linear deployment lets you bring concentrated firepower against only a small part of the enemy at once, overwhelming each section of the line in turn as you "roll up the flank".

This is similar to the naval warfare maneuver of "crossing the T", since it maximizes your firepower at the point of contact while minimizing the enemy's. A pure rear assault doesn't look any different than a frontal attack, once the troops have turned around.

I would have to agree that, perhaps, attacks from the rear are not quite as unsettling in CMBB as they would be in real life, except insofar as they affect the higher command levels (i.e., if you really disconcert the other player.)

[istari]

I have to agree with Cpl Dodge about the morale effect not being modelled properly... but I would add the caveat *for some troops*.

Looks like both Dodge and I have read Rommel's "Infantry Attacks", describing the astounding number of Italian or Romanian prisoners he collected again and again by appearing in their rear where not expected. On a Combat Mission battlefield, Rommel would have been annihilated several times over, because those troops would have turned and shot his heavily outnumbered mountain infantry to pieces.

My caveat has to do with perhaps adding more morale qualifiers by troop type or experience - I know trying to model by nationality opens a Pandora's Box.

For example, low quality standard infantry historically have paniced when enemy troops appear to the rear. Yet airborne troops (whether Allied or Fallschirmjaeger) were specifically trained to fight surrounded, and so would not expect such a great morale hit.

Just a thought, but I do want to support the original poster in his perception that the effect is undermodeled for your run-of-the-mill standard WWII soldier.

Istari

[Monty's Double]

Rommal, pah? Now O'Connor, there was a real expert in surrounding the enemy while being outnumbered ten to one. Boy, this Hobby Horse sure is fun to ride....

[David Chapuis]

Originally posted by Adam_L:

Istari,

Rommel surprised the hell out of them, and they were at gunpoint. Of course they surrendered.

Rommel did surprise them, but they weren't always just at gun point. The way I interpreted the situation was that the units surrendered rather quickly and without much fight because they found enemy units where they should not have been. That was the issue more than being at gun point.

But there are lots of accounts as well of well dug in troops being attack from two sides at once, or even from all around, and beating off attacks. Troops simply don't give up unless there is a real and tangible threat to their lives in the current situation. Soviet doctrine often recommends platoon strongpoints be made 360 degrees so that when supporting positions on the flanks collapse, the men can easily occupy a perimeter and hold out.

I never said that the troops should just surrender. My theory is that troops who get envoloped should take a severe moral hit (with differences for experience/type of troops, eg paratroops/etc), more so than they recieve now for getting cross-fire from two different positions.

Istari's comment here sums up my point well:

On a Combat Mission battlefield, Rommel would have been annihilated several times over, because those troops would have turned and shot his heavily outnumbered mountain infantry to pieces.

[JasonC]

Armies do not lie down and die because somebody drives around them. It is a maneuver theory booster's myth.

The advantage of hitting an enemy from the flank is usually that you engage only a small slice of the enemy at a time. This can translate into local odds, even for a smaller overall force. It works if the enemy is deployed thinly back to front, otherwise its effect is limited.

The advantage of hitting an enemy from the rear is that he cannot receive reinforcement without fighting through your force and cannot reposition his forward forces easily. A typical way of exploiting that is to sit down in cover, cover his exit routes with MG fire lanes, and call down artillery on his now fixed positions.

Supposedly great morale effects from flanking or encirclement are not shock, surprise, morale only effects caused by the mere positioning of a threat. Such effects are occasionally seen, but it is the tactical threat of processes like those explained above that cause the fear, not the mere location of the enemy.

When Rommel got an infantry company behind some Italians in WW I, they did not panic and surrender because they were emotionally ill disposed to grey-clad people behind them. It was mountain terrain, and WW I, against Germans.

That means an era of tactical defense dominance, where moving in the open under enemy observation was nearly suicidal. In mountains means once someone is on a height behind you he sees all the previously covered routes to and from your positions. Against an enemy with a monstrous heavy arty arm.

You are therefore pinned in place (until nightfall, perhaps). The artillery fire will come long before then, and against WW I Germans that probably means 210s (if you are lucky only 150s). It will take a while to arrange, but if you aren't able to move and don't have friends behind ready to come free you, they have that time. The surrounded Eye-Ties simply could see all of this.

They knew what would happen if they tried to get back out in daylight - they had seen friendly units MGed in the open. They knew what would happen if they remained located and pinned for the hours necessary to arrange a 210 barrage - they had seen the fragments left in caved in trenches where they replaced a unit destroyed by artillery fire.

So they gave up. It is like seeing a mate in 4 on the board - you don't have to wait for the 210s to arrive or until after you go over the top and the MGs cut you to ribbons. That those things were always available to the other side - that, to continue the chess analogy, the whole struggle took place on a file with enemy rooks doubled - was simply understood by all concerned. It was practically an environmental variable.

If you don't have the rooks, the combination doesn't work and they can just laugh at you.

If you do, apply it the way it actually generated the fear. Cover the open areas and sit tight, while calling for a fire mission.

As for panicking a *StuG* by "surrounding" it with a platoon of airborne, um, whew. Where do I start? AFVs are not scared of infantry. Infantry are scared of AFVs. Infantry may still be able to kill AFVs, but as David against Goliath.

When infantry gets close to an AFV it simply drives away, turns, and shoots at them from a safe distance. Orientation is irrelevant, unless it gives a momentary flank shot to an infantry AT weapon that needs one.

If you want to "surround" an AFV, put a heavy AT weapon (another tank, an ATG, etc) with long range somewhere with LOS to clear ground behind that AFVs present location. If that AT weapon can't see everything (few locations can), then cross its sight area with that of another such AT weapon on the other side of the AFV.

Then it is "trapped by fire", in the sense of unable to move out of the box you just created, without drawing heavy AT fire. It can still try to duel its way out. Or other units can try to remove one of the blocking AT weapons.

The effect of trapping an AFV by fire is not on morale but on mobility. You then avoid spots the AFV can see from within its box. When it has no targets it is impotent. Or if you have a superior AFV that can withstand its fire if you approach from the right aspect, use the fact it can't get away to challenge it frontally and kill it.

[Michael Emrys]

Sorry, I missed this when it was posted.

Originally posted by Cpl Dodge:

M Emrys,

So do you think it is worth trying to do deep enveloping maneuvers, as opposed to strong flanking moves? My recent experiences make me think that flanking moves will work better almost everytime.

No, I think you are right. As I tried to indicate, a deep envelopment is hard to pull off in CM unless you have a large advantage in the force ratio, especially in armor.

Flanking moves are good in that they allow you to concentrate a lot of firepower on one end of his line while the opposite end is unable to contribute anything to the battle unless he either has a reserve or can pull something out of the line and move it to answer you.

By concentrating on his flank, you can roll up his line one section at a time. But you really need to have enough forces in hand to pin and hold the rest of his line in place. If he has a reserve, a strong and credible feint away from where you intend to make your main effort is called for to draw them away from your schwerpunkt.

Once you've gotten him worn down and his global morale has reached a fragile point, his discovery that you also have forces behind him may be the factor that will push him over the edge to rout.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by tar:

On the other hand, a flank attack againsts a linear deployment lets you bring concentrated firepower against only a small part of the enemy at once, overwhelming each section of the line in turn as you "roll up the flank".

This is similar to the naval warfare maneuver of "crossing the T", since it maximizes your firepower at the point of contact while minimizing the enemy's.

I couldn't have put it better myself. In fact, I didn't.

Michael

[David Chapuis]

When Rommel got an infantry company behind some Italians in WW I, they did not panic and surrender because they were emotionally ill disposed to grey-clad people behind them. It was mountain terrain, and WW I, against Germans.

That means an era of tactical defense dominance, where moving in the open under enemy observation was nearly suicidal. In mountains means once someone is on a height behind you he sees all the previously covered routes to and from your positions. Against an enemy with a monstrous heavy arty arm.

You are therefore pinned in place (until nightfall, perhaps). The artillery fire will come long before then, and against WW I Germans that probably means 210s (if you are lucky only 150s). It will take a while to arrange, but if you aren't able to move and don't have friends behind ready to come free you, they have that time. The surrounded Eye-Ties simply could see all of this.

They knew what would happen if they tried to get back out in daylight - they had seen friendly units MGed in the open. They knew what would happen if they remained located and pinned for the hours necessary to arrange a 210 barrage - they had seen the fragments left in caved in trenches where they replaced a unit destroyed by artillery fire.

What you describe here is not a very good representation of what I have read concerning Rommel's WWI exploits in both Italy, the Balkans, & the west front (wwi west front). Although I do admit that it has been almost 2 years since I read the account, so maybe the problem is my memory - and since it was a library book I dont have it available at the moment. IIRC, Rommel's accomplishments were not from surrounding troops and waiting for them to realize they were in a hopeless position. Far from it. Rommel's accomplishment came by showing up were the enemy did not expect him to be - sometimes behind them, sometimes on their flank, but often right in front of them. And the enemies did not always just throw down their arms - like they did in Italy. Often they just paniced and ran away. However, you never see this in CM.

That being said, let me clarify again that I am not just talking about troops surrendering. I am talking about troops taking significant moral hits when an enemy force is spotted in an unexpected location - for CM concerns this is in their rear.

Nor am I talking about shooting down already paniced troops. I was wondering if CM models the panic I have read about often in every war, when units suddenly appear where none was expected to be. Apparently it does not.

As for panicking a *StuG* by "surrounding" it with a platoon of airborne, um, whew. Where do I start? AFVs are not scared of infantry. Infantry are scared of AFVs.

Actually, I do think in real life a Stug crew would panic if they were the rear units in their force (as this stug was), and suddenly a platoon of inf with bazooka support appeared in its rear. I dont think it would calmly turn around and start pulverizing the inf. A real life example - I just finished a book about on the Veitnam Eastern offensive of 1972. A entire NVA armored force was halted when the lead tank was shot at by a pair of south vietnamese marines with a NAAW (sp?) when trying to cross a bridge. those NAAWs were pratically useless against those tanks, but since the NVA were not expecting resistance, the tanks paniced and retreated - long enough for reinforcements to arive and blow the bridge. (btw, I do own that book, and would be happy to provide more details, but dont have time right now).

Again, it doesnt have to do with being surrounded, it has to do with being in an unexpected location - which IMO would be the rear of a CM map. I have read of numerous accts of similar situations - yet these events would never happen in CM.

[Walker]

There may be another aspect to consider in the deep penetration discussion: what your (human) opponent sees and the conclusions he draws from what he sees. So I spot three Infantry? markers in my rear. Maybe there are other units that weren’t spotted yet. What do I do? Nothing? Send out a recon mission, a jeep, an armoured car, a platoon? Say I spot 8 units in the distance, moving behind and towards my positions? Is it a split platoon with an extra team? Is it two full platoons with a third a couple of moves behind? Do I send a company off to ambush them?

I’m not saying we wouldn’t know how to deal with the problem. I am saying you’d have to do something, and that something will involve pulling units out of their presumably good defensive locations or committing part of a reserve force and reducing the number of men facing the ‘real’ front.

I agree with the many good points presented above, except for the original grumble that attacks from the rear do not cause enough despondency amongst the attacked. Personally, I feel extremely despondent even if it’s just small force that unexpectedly appears behind my lines. It deprives me of the certainty that a specific part of the map is ‘mine’, with all the complication of no longer knowing for sure that certain areas and routes are out of enemy LOS, with the irritating need to reposition or guard some of my heavy weapons, tanks, spotters, unhiding them in the process. Plus the morale hit to the ‘higher command levels’ tar already mentioned, i.e. to me the player, for letting it happen in the first place.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Cpl Dodge:

That being said, let me clarify again that I am not just talking about troops surrendering. I am talking about troops taking significant moral hits when an enemy force is spotted in an unexpected location - for CM concerns this is in their rear.

Nor am I talking about shooting down already paniced troops. I was wondering if CM models the panic I have read about often in every war, when units suddenly appear where none was expected to be. Apparently it does not.

Wait until we get to CM4. This is supposed to cover the early years of the Blitzkrieg when the kind of thing you are talking about was more common. I think Jason is right about well-trained and disciplined troops not bothering too much about being surrounded, unless the condition carries on longer than a CM game allows, say for 24 hours or more. Panicking at an early stage of the fight was usually something that poorly trained and inexperienced conscripts or overaged reservists did, especially if they were uncertain why they were in a war in the first place, as was the case with some of the weaker formations of the French army in 1940.

Michael

[David Chapuis]

Originally posted by Walker:

I agree with the many good points presented above, except for the original grumble that attacks from the rear do not cause enough despondency amongst the attacked. Personally, I feel extremely despondent even if it's just small force that unexpectedly appears behind my lines. It deprives me of the certainty that a specific part of the map is 'mine' with all the complication of no longer knowing for sure that certain areas and routes are out of enemy LOS, with the irritating need to reposition or guard some of my heavy weapons, tanks, spotters, unhiding them in the process. Plus the morale hit to the 'higher command levels' tar already mentioned, i.e. to me the player, for letting it happen in the first place.

See I have a problem with this. You say that you – the human player – get disturbed and take a ‘moral hit’ when you see enemy units in an area that you thought should have been yours. I agree with that part. But, unless I am misunderstanding, you don’t think that your units should be affected when enemy units starting shooting at them from what should be a ‘friendly area’. That doesn’t make any sense to me. Certainly if you find that disturbing to some degree, the actual units fighting should too. In CM, those units will react just as if they were being attacked from the front. If the enemy’s initial fire doesn’t suppress them, they will simply turn towards the enemy and start shooting back. That is what I have a problem with.

I think Jason is right about well-trained and disciplined troops not bothering too much about being surrounded, unless the condition carries on longer than a CM game allows, say for 24 hours or more. Panicking at an early stage of the fight was usually something that poorly trained and inexperienced conscripts or overaged reservists did,

I don’t think that it is true that only poor quality troops get panicked when they find an enemy where they don’t think he should be. From what I have read, everybody takes a ‘morale hit’ at times like this. However, veteran troops can recover without breaking, whereas poorly trained or poorly lead units will often never recover. For example, in Last Parallel: A Marine's War Journal (Martin Russ), Russ – a US Marine who was a veteran of the war at this time – explains how he was on a patrol into NML and got ambushed. The ambush only killed one or two people with the initial bursts, but the greatest effect of the ambush wasnt the initial casualties, but the initial panic that hit the group. Russ describes the sheer terror that left him, and I assume every other marine in the patrol, incapacitated for some time (I cant remember exactly how long - another library book). Eventually - he attributed it to his rigorous training – he was able to function and began to return fire. Now this was an attack from the front, not the rear, but the group of high quality troops took a substancial moral hit, but was able to recover quickly.

So to summarize my point:

1) Troops that encounter the enemy in an unexpected location will take some sort of ‘moral hit’

2) Troop experience will not determine ‘if’ a unit takes a moral hit, but to what degree and how quickly it will recover

3) In real life, it is not based so much on position of the enemy, but on finding the enemy where you don’t expect him – in CM terms that translates to the rear of the map

4) CM does not model this at all, even though it does model cross-fire effects and fanaticism effects (surely fanaticism is more rare in combat that becoming panicked by an unexpected enemy - even of much smaller force size).

[ September 18, 2003, 01:56 AM: Message edited by: Cpl Dodge ]

[Walker]

Cpl Dodge, I agree with you ! I think what you’d like to see is a morale hit on the units attacked from behind caused simply by the fact that they were ‘surprised’. I’m sure a commander on the ground would be worried when confronted with an enemy force sneaking up on his positions from behind, and that his units would not be especially happy about the situation either. So I DO think a surprise attack from behind should cause more dismay! But how could the AI be programmed to handle ‘surprise’??

I would assume that the AI is simply not up to the task. How could it distinguish between a surprise attack from behind, i.e. from the ‘wrong’ map side, and a carefully prepared ambush to wipe out a platoon sneaking up from behind? In both cases you have units being fired at from a ‘friendly’ side of the map. Maybe the morale hit for units caught facing the wrong way is not severe enough, I don’t really know. It sure would be nice if ‘surprise’ could be factored into the equation, but I can’t see how this could be done.

I was trying to say that the impact of an attack on the rear of a position is not limited to a morale hit on the troops directly involved, that the benefits for the attacker are more far-reaching than that – the defender is forced to adjust his position to meet the new threat, and suffers a period of relative disorganisation. He might lose his covered retreat paths, have to reposition mortars, guns, spotters, withdraw infantry from their hiding places etc.

So I was trying to point out that if you manage to sneak a force behind the enemy you may not get anywhere near the full benefit of real-life surprise, but you should be able to exploit the temporary disorganisation your manoeuvre has caused. So I’d have to say yes, sneaking up from behind is worth it, provided you don’t expect the enemy to flee in terror just because they are being attacked from an unexpected direction, and provided your sneak attack is combined with other measures designed to exploit the fact that the opposition has been caught on the wrong foot.

[JasonC]

Dodge, in your own example it is taking fire that causes casualties that leads to break. That is already modeled, it is called the morale system. As you say, in that case it wasn't even from the rear but from the front.

The incident is simply recounting the elementary experience we see all the time in CM - squad takes fire, 1-2 men down, rest panic. Nowhere does the incident related imply men always panic under fire, let alone that they panic without being under fire just because somebody walked around them.

As for Rommel, "I then had to decide whether I should roll up the hostile position or break through in the direction of Hevnik peak. I chose the latter. The elimination of the Italian positions followed once we had possession of the peak." That is Rommel talking, about his experiences in the Bavarian Alpine Corps in the Caporetto offensive.

Notice, he did not rely on troops to his right or left in the front line being surprised by his arrival and throwing up their hands. He relied on possession of a mountain peak in their rear. Once he was on it and they were cut off, their routes out covered by his MGs, they indeed surrendered.

Rommel was not alone and neither were those doing the surrendering. The offensive penetrated *15 miles* into the Italian rear, isolating *4 divisions* in the front line positions. Rommel got his medal because *6000* of the men that then surrendered did so to his command - because he was on the peak behind them, blocking their way out.

"The elimination of the Italian positions followed once we had possession of the peak." Not, "once we said 'boo' and they dropped their rifles".

[tar]

As far as "surprise" goes, Walker is correct that the AI is just not up to. This goes not only for the AI in CM, but even for more sophisticated AI systems in research.

In order to be surprised, the AI would have to be able to form expectations. In other words, instead of just reacting to events or following its own plan, it would have to have a model of what it wants the opponent to be doing, or at the least some notion of what the opponent's plan is. It is only when you are able to generate expectations, that you can be surprised.

The only way you could get the Tac AI to be surprised would be if the higher level controller -- either the Strat AI or the player -- could provide a plan along with expectations of the likely enemy reaction. Unless there were some way of communicating these expectations, or else (much harder) deriving them from the plan, you wouldn't have surprise. You couldn't differentiate between a situation where the enemy snuck around you or one in which you expected the enemy to come a particular way and prepared for him. Some of this maybe could be addressed with the effects of fire coming in from the "rear".

Unfortunately, until the borg spotting issues get sorted out, having a strong effect like this could lead to gamey issues of having astoundingly coordinated long-range cross-fires against units just to exploit this morale vulnerability. Much more so that would be reasonable in reality.

Of course, even if one had an AI sophisticated enough to try to track enemy movement and deduce a plan from it, there wouldn't really be any benefit to framing expectations unless the expectations provided some reasonable benefit. In that case, one should get a morale boost from seeing things that were foretold, since that gives one the feeling that "things are going according to plan."

Given the current state-of-the-art in AI, you won't really have surprise available for quite some time. The dislocation effects on morale will just have to be borne by the player for the time being.

[JasonC]

I am sure he can find a better case than that in the whole course of Rommel's WW I experience, from France to Romania to Italy. But it does not change the basic fact. It is not mere appearence behind somebody but the forseen tactical consequences that lead to important morale effects.

This is not the only case, or even era, in which maneuver theory has blown out of proportion the actual effect of "indirect approach" and its real mechanism. You read them discussing cases like Napoleon vs. Wurmser in Italy, and the talk as though Fiorella's division arriving behind the Austrian left led to some kind of morale collapse. Actual tactical accounts of the battle make quite clear it did not, and the Austrians formed a refused left smartly by using their reserve line. Yes they then retreated; no there was no rout. And the reason for the retreat was the threat to their now exposed "hinge" by Marmont, not any imaginary unnerving created by there being Frenchmen behind them.

Or take Chancellorsville in the ACW. Did Jackson appearing on a flank just cause collapse? No. His entire force hit XI corps, one of the greenest in the Union army, and crushed it in a many on few. But there was fierce fighting, Union forces rallied and counterattacked, etc. They got an advantage from the disposition of forces but no instant decision. If you compare Shiloh it is clear an unexpected direction alone counted for very little, as a similar opener had nothing like the same sequel.

Or take the huge pocket fights in Barbarossa, one of the clearest cases of a successful "multiplier" by encirclement in military history. Surrounded Russian forces fought for 1-3 weeks typically. Hundreds of thousands of casualties were experienced on both sides. Surrounded forces are obviously at a serious disadvantage, and over the course of a week or more of attempted breakout stocks of ammunition must run low, and command and unit cohesion can easily be lost (e.g. when sub-formation A tries a night breakout, resulting in a mass of stragglers even if it works).

Eventually hundreds of thousands surrendered in these instances, but not instantly and not because somebody drove around them. Instead it came after they could not fight their way back out despite a week of trying, ammo was exhausted, the ring tightened around them, with no way to avoid continued artillery pounding or to reply to it in kind, etc.

Armies don't evaporate because you drive around them. It is an old, innaccurate wargame illusion plus a bit of maneuverist "victory without fighting" salesmanship. Flanking or encirclement can and do create large favorable force multipliers, which combined with other tactical factors can bring relatively easy victory against surrounded or flanked or surprised enemies. But it needs other things to work. It works precisely by letting those other things work better, and by preventing many things armies rely on from working for the other guy.

[David Chapuis]

Originally posted by Adam_L:

Maybe Dodge is thinking of this one:

This takes place with Rommel winding around and showing up in the rear of some Rumanians defending a tree line on a hill, with Lieb's detachment and Hugel's Platoon attacking forward into it. The defense was well prepared from the front but not at all from the rear.

Actually, that isn’t what I was thinking about. Nor is JasonC's account - although I can see why he would think so since I wrote this earlier (which is more in line with what JasonC is referring to than the occurance I had in my head):

e.g. Rommel's great inf exploits in WWI - he captured a couple thousand troops with merely a company because he was in their rear and it shocked them so much they just surrendered

The ‘Rommel feat’ I was thinking of (and again, I must remind you I don’t have a book to check my facts – I hate that, but it is true) was when he surprised a group of Italian infantry in their rear. IIRC they were marching (somewhere - I think to teh front). Correct me if I am wrong, but the long and the short of it is that Rommel sent a person forward with a white flag and asked them to surrender, and they did. I don’t recall the size of the group, but I thought it was greater than a company. I also thought that Rommel’s forces didn’t even fire a shot – just caught them so off guard that the surrendered. Well that is the way that I remember reading it, but I could be mistaken. And btw, it wasn’t from the book Rommel wrote – it was a biography – I don’t remember the name of it.

The other ‘Rommel feat’ I was thinking of, which isn’t quite as powerful of an example, was about Rommel's first tour on the Western in WWI. I know he lead some men into the British (?) trench system and fought off some troops. Then a large force was heading his way, and he realized he couldn’t retreat because his men wouldn’t clear the wire before being spotted. So he decided to attack, and he routed this larger force. Again, IIRC, they didn’t give much fight because they were kind of shocked and routed quickly.

[ September 19, 2003, 03:10 AM: Message edited by: Cpl Dodge ]

[David Chapuis]

I went back and tried to make sense of my grumblings, and I see that my argument has twisted, turned, and evolved in so many different directions it is hardly meaningful – even to me. Therefore I am going to try to hedge this down something more concise.

I know I have a think skull, but every once and a while a little light shines in. And what you (the people that are in general disagreement with me) are saying does make sense. But I also think that some of the things I have said are correct too, especially in regard to units becoming paralyzed to some degree (based on leadership/training/etc) when encountering situations they just were not expecting.

I also disagree with some things - this for one:

But it does not change the basic fact. It is not mere appearence behind somebody but the forseen tactical consequences that lead to important morale effects.

I really do hate to disagree, because I know that you are so much more knowledgeable about this, however ...

Let me start by saying that I wouldn’t call myself a ‘maneuver theorist’, but apparently I am a ‘battlefield shock theorist’. Perhaps I am misinterpreting the information I read, but it seems like often - not always – maybe not even the majority of times – but more than just rare circumstances –the mere appearance/position/breakthrough of an enemy will shock a unit (from squad size to division size) so bad, it will just disintegrate. And not because of a rational thought process based on a changing tactical situation. Based on an uncontrollable fear that takes over and continues unchecked.

I hate posting that without some references (other than the not-too-confident references listed before in this thread). But do you really think I am way off base? It seems like in almost every war account I read, this ‘battlefield shock’ will rear its ugly head somewhere.

[ September 19, 2003, 02:52 AM: Message edited by: Cpl Dodge ]