Sneak Attacks - are they worth it?

[Wisbech_lad]

Kammak, you say:

Post WWII warfare was, and will continue to be, fought with existing forces without regard for any industrial capacity of the belligerents. Nations must enter a conflict with a strategy that can win with the forces in uniform.

Chinese civil war, Iran-Iraq war, Afgan war, Eritrea, Vietnamese war (from both sides) Algerian war, Korean war, Tamil Tigers, all involved industrial mobilisation, (both of material and manpower) beyond the existing forces in uniform. Heck, the Japanese economy was kickstarted by the US mobilisation for Korea. I think you will find the USA ended Vietnam with completely different equipment than they started it with.

Arguably Mao's concept of total war far better describes how to win a post WW2 conflict than manouevrists. The wars that just involved the starting forces mostly ended inconclusively (56,67,73 ME, '65 Indo-Pak, '79 China-Vietnam, '62 Indo-China, GW1, all ceasefires)

OK, I'll give you '71 Indo-Pak (which created a whole new country, Bangladesh) and the Falklands. But '71 Indo-Pak was basically India intervening in a Pakistan civil war, once the Pakistan army in W. Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was cut off in a hostile local population, they saw the game was up.

Attrition as the sole strategy for victory can win, but at loss rates, even for the victor, that can no longer be tolerated by any population. To espouse attrition as the primary strategy for a western nation is about the same as declaring total neutrality - you will never get an administration (or a population) to support a war waged under attritionists themes

I thought attrition was the primary strategy of western nations now? Massive firepower to destroy the other side, before you run out of smart bombs. If you can't, don't even start the war in the first place...

As for attrition loss rates not being acceptable by any population - Afganistan, Vietnam, China, Bangladesh (lost 300,000 in the civil war), Iran. It's amazing how high an attrition rate a population will accept, if they believe it is the route to freedom, or defending something they believe in.

[Los]

"Afganistan, Vietnam, China, Bangladesh"

Yet in all four cases you mention countries under totalitarian, despotic or otherwise very tightly controlled rule where the people don't have much of a say in their governments (or ruling class') policy. Well, that is if they want to live. The alternative to fighting to the death is, well, death anyway.

Los

[Bil Hardenberger]

Kammak, I just wanted to pipe in and say that I agree with you 100%. Your responses are well reasoned and thought out, and the fact that your beliefs mirror mine almost exactly doesn't hurt, eh?

Are you military, you sound like it at times?

Bil

[Kammak]

RE:"Chinese civil war, Iran-Iraq war, Afgan war, Eritrea, Vietnamese war (from both sides) Algerian war, Korean war, Tamil Tigers, all involved industrial mobilisation, (both of material and manpower) beyond the existing forces in uniform. Heck, the Japanese economy was kickstarted by the US mobilisation for Korea. I think you will find the USA ended Vietnam with completely different equipment than they started it with."

If you want to call limited drafting full mobilization of a nation's economy, then yes you are right. I consider industrial warfare to be its WWII incarnation, with projections about tons of shipping produced per month, number of AFV units per month, etc....which hasn't been a factor in any war since WII.

Korea did not involve mobilization of the US economy by any stretch of the imagination, one of the many reasons it is called the Forgotten War. The bulk of the gear used by UN forces was WWII surplus.

Vietnam likewise involved no major industrialization on the part of the US, and in fact had little direct impact on the nation...which is why Abrams re-structured the US Army afterwards so it *couldn't* fight without significant reserve call ups in the future.

Another factor is that many belligerents are incapable of producing machines of war - so they have no way to "ramp up" production once a war starts. Once the cash runs out for arms purchases, unless they are a client state of a superpower they are left with at-hand forces.

That the major powers continue to develop and produce new war machines is not the same as saying they are involved in an industrial war of attrition. There have been steady advances in armor, aircraft, and personal arms throughout peace and war...that doesn't equate to a nation being fully mobilized for attrition warfare.

"I thought attrition was the primary strategy of western nations now? Massive firepower to destroy the other side, before you run out of smart bombs. If you can't, don't even start the war in the first place..."

Its not the primary strategy of the USMC, USN, or the US Army. I can't speak for other nations. That the USAF continues to hollar about how it can win wars with airpower alone by blowing up stuff from 20,000 feet is a constant embarrassment to the rest of the US military community, but I wouldn't call it the national strategy of the US!

"As for attrition loss rates not being acceptable by any population - Afganistan, Vietnam, China, Bangladesh (lost 300,000 in the civil war), Iran. It's amazing how high an attrition rate a population will accept, if they believe it is the route to freedom, or defending something they believe in."

Well, in those cases the losses were acceptable to the *Leaders*, but I doubt the followers were as happy about it. So yes, it is a fully valid strategy for despotic regimes where the masses have no political franchise. For western nations, not so much, in my opinion.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Kammak:

It was his intervention that drove Guderian south instead of continuing to Moscow. It was his intervention that halted the forces in front of Dunkirk. His influence was omnipresent throughout the war. And invariably his opinions were counter to the manuever-minded commanders.

I don't have time now to read through all of this, as free drinks are waiting.

Just a quick comment. von Rundstedt agreed with Hitler on halting at Dunkirk. Halder did not. IOW the responsible commander on the ground was in favour of it. There were also sound military reasons for not attacking the encircled Brits, one of them being that evacuation was a long-shot project.

In relation to sending Guderian off south, it has been claimed (amongst other places in Hoth's "Panzeroperationen", IIRC) that Guderian himself made a strong effort to have his Panzergruppe 2 sent south. So here is a "maneuver-minded" commander in accordance with Hitler's view.

Just some food for thought on the matter.

[JasonC]

"Beria sueing for peace"

Had authority to in the first few days, when I agreed already there was command shock. Didn't have it later, when there wasn't. There was some momentary civilian panic in Moscow early in Typhoon, which the NKVD stamped out quickly. When there was dithering at a CC meeting Stalin tore up the speaker's notes and just started dictating new orders about moving secondary things, the high command staying, measures for capital security, declaring a state of seige, yada yada. Not command shock stuff.

"Moscow was a critical vulnerability"

Repeat it all you want, it won't make it so. They were prepared to continue fighting even if they lost it. There is no reason to think they wouldn't have. There is not reason to think they would have been less effective, even, with a million men around Kiev as a bonus. The French took Moscow when they invaded but they didn't keep it through the winter. It probably would have been much the same. Nothing you've said shows anything that would improve German positioning for the winter counteroffensive. Which is inevitable at some point, if you plan for a short sprint yourself, and fail to destroy the enemy army.

"It was his intervention that drove Guderian south instead of continuing to Moscow."

It was Halder (chief of the army general staff) who insisted on the southern operation, just as it was Halder who called the halt to clear the flanks on July 13. He was willing to send one Panzer group toward Moscow but not 2. If Moscow was ordered as well, he wanted to divide Guderian's group, to free half of Hoth's for an emergency relief operation in the north, at the juncture with AG North around.

This would have been a dissipation of forces indeed, and possessed the merits of neither proposal (Moscow with 2 entire panzer groups, or Kiev with 1 plus north consolidation). Naturally Bock wanted Moscow, it made his AG the main effort. AG South wanted Kiev, also naturally. Guderian protested any division of his group. He offered his resignation and sought a private meeting with Hitler. At it, he was willing to go south if it meant keeping his group united. The half measure version of Moscow was scrapped.

Hitler heard one thing from his CAGS, who was in formally in charge by pure military chain of command, and another from his lower level commanders. The AGCs were divided according to how either decision impacted their own command. If Hitler had done nothing Halder would have had his way. His intervention kept Guderian's group together and thereby strengthened the Kiev drive, prevented Guderian from resigning, and as a consequence nixed any half-measure split-group attempt toward Moscow. That Moscow with both groups was not going to happen was not Hitler's intervention, but Halder's prior decision.

You can if you like argue that Hitler should have listened to his mobile group commanders and overruled his CAGS, reversing Halder's decision entirely. But that is not calling for him not intervening in the matter. Guderian wanted his superior 2 levels up overturned. He threatened his resignation trying to *get interference* from Hitler, not to prevent it. Hitler did not want to overturn his CAGS and saw merit in Halder's arguments. He got Guderian to settle for keeping full command of his united group. His position in the matter was one of brokering a dispute between Guderian and Halder. Guderian by reputation and personal "pull" got far more than his position in the army hierarchy entitled him to, he just wasn't running the entire German army.

"invariably his opinions were counter to the manuever-minded commanders"

Oh horsefeathers. Hitler backed Guderian in the whole creation of the armor force. Guderian was a colonel commanding a motorized signals unit when Hitler saw him on maneuvers. Hitler picked Manstein's plan for France against half a dozen less ambitious proposals, and rapidly promoted him, until he had the critical front command, AG South, in the critical period of the war. He clashed with Manstein repeatedly, did not agree to a Stalingrad breakout, and fired him over the Dnepr bend disagreement in the fall of 1944. In between Manstein had to fight for authority but did so successfully, and got his decisions implimented.

"had manuever-minded commanders in many of his higher commands"

They were recognizably junior. They had armies, not army groups or CAGS positions. Bock was for Moscow as in the theater of his AGC, but not "maneuver minded". He also practically resigned at the height of Typhoon and the transition to defense in front of Moscow - out for a month "for reasons of health", that if you read the history were clearly nerves. Halder was not a maneuverist. Kluge, Bock's replacement, was no maneuverist - he is the one that got Guderian fired.

"That there were still many older generals skeptical of manuever loitering around Berlin at the time only helped him to justify his opinions to himself."

This is starkly contrary to the actual facts. The older generals were not merely "loitering around Berlin", they also held the CAGs, AG, and most of the army level commands. They continually clashed with the maneuverists, none of whom had more than an army. Hitler continually intervened alright, *on the side of the maneuverists*, to varying degrees from occasion to occasion.

The maneuverists went over the heads of the older generals to Hitler, and half the time he gave them what they wanted (e.g. Manstein's plan for France), a quarter of the time he gave them part of that they wanted (e.g. Guderian keeping his job and his group, but going first to Kiev). You won't find a case of a subordinate of a maneuverist senior commander going over said commander's head to Hitler and being supported there through the Moscow crisis in late 1941. What happened then, is that Hitler lost faith in his older generals and took many of the CAGS functions on himself.

"The German initiative was lost once they stopped directing the action and started responding to it - halting the advance on Moscow"

So in your opinion the Germans lost the strategic initiative on July 13th? That is when Halder first called a halt to clear flanks. (Guderian also had no motor oil, was 200 miles ahead of the infantry, and halted on the near side of the Dnepr loudly complaining for replacements and repair time).

In my opinion they didn't lose the operational initiative until the failure of Typhoon in December, and didn't lose the strategic initiative until Uranus in November 1942.

"re-directing forces to counter a "failed" Soviet thrust"

That is not what the Kiev operation was. It was exploiting an operational mis-placement of the enemy that left an entire army group "en prise". The Russian right in the south was anchored on the Pripyet marshes. When Guderian cleared Smolensk he was 200 miles east of where that anchor tied into the marshes and past the level of the marshes themselves. He was thus on an open deep right flank of the Russian forces in the south. There was nothing but air between him and Kiev, and thereby the destruction of a Russian AG. No marshes, no Russians to speak of, nothing. That is why a month's driving was able to destroy a million men.

This is operational use of maneuver, quite offensively, to destroy enemy forces. It is not a reaction to a Russian anything, except a boneheaded placement of forces resulting from the outsized success of AG center and the slowness of Russian reaction to that new development. (I.e. that they hadn't pulled back level with the front in the north, or created a new refused right flank for their southern forces on the line Kiev-Orel or whatever).

"By the time the battle of Kiev ended, the Germans were exhausted"

Why? Why on earth? Weren't the Russians "exhausted"? They had been through far, far worse with 10 times the losses. Why were the Germans more tired than the Russians? Because they weren't getting any replacements, that is why. Why weren't they? Because the Germans were gambling on rapid victory with a force stock instead of a force flow. This was so stupid they were exhausted in just 3 1/2 months of highly successful warfare. If you can't fight for 3 months without getting winded, you've got a problem.

They should have had the replacement tap set in the "on" position the day they went in. Then they wouldn't have been "exhausted" by 3 months of cake-walk fighting, compared to what the Russians had just gone through. In case you hadn't noticed, the Russians didn't get exhausted until May of 1945, if ever. Fighting a state as huge as Russia without being prepared for a war longer than 3 months was folly. Maneuver-overpromise induced folly.

"few replacements for the Germans. The initiative was lost."

Operationally they still had Typhoon. Strategically, Russian losses were so high that they still had the initiative in 1942 - because the Russians had only 1/3rd the tank fleet they started the war with, etc. But yes they lost the initiative because they had no replacement stream - i.e. through *attrition processes*, and despite maneuver successes at the operational level. Maneuver successes in operations are no substitute for attrition preparedness at the strategic level. That is the lesson, and it counsels relegating maneuverism to the lower levels as a valuable force multiplier, *not* gambling on even more rapid victories over states as powerful as Russia without mobilizing, with only 3 months of "wind".

"Objectives are not locations on maps."

They sure can be.

It comes out. They talk a good game for a while, then movement rears its head. The idea is supposed to be to seize a critical vunerability of the Russians, induce command shock and paralysis, and knock Russia out of the war. But since there is *no evidence* getting to Moscow will do this, and therefore *no evidence* the objective of winning the war by command shock is achievable, they re-write the objective down to "seize Moscow". That they might actually do. But it is also inessential. It only helps if it has all sorts of other effects that are the actual objective of the operation (shock etc).

"Nope. Maneuverism seeks to achieve victory in the most economical way."

No, it pretends that things it can achieve might actually result in victory via a magical process, generally referred to as "collapse".

When the things achieved win, it calls them maneuverism even when they are directed at the destruction of enemy forces (e.g. BEF in Belgium) rather than seizing a political, "prestige" objective (e.g. Paris). When on the other hand doing the same thing doesn't win (Kiev), they claim the only maneuverist thing would be going for the prestige objective (Moscow), and that doing exactly the same thing they call maneuverism in France isn't maneuverism in Russia.

Rather than having content, they want it to be a free floating signifier that means "anything that works". If it fails, then not being "something that works", it obviously couldn't have been maneuverism. So Barbarossa wasn't maneuverism. Capturing a million men in a giant Cannae by catching them out of place wasn't maneverism. Only things that win wars are maneuverism. If the same thing is done that fails elsewhere and is denounced as hidebound attritionist thinking, that just means each enemy is different. What it actually means is that what counts as maneuverism shall change from case to case, such that maneuverism shall always be inviolate and perfect. Which is academic sophistry, not military strategy.

""Watergate lost Vietnam" spiel, I think the weakness of that argument is so obvious it doesn't merit a response."

In other words, it is true, news to you, and you don't have an answer to it, so you will just sneer at it instead. Right back atcha buddy.

"I'm not German, didn't fight there, and never owned it"

Of course, successful maneuvers don't count as maneuverism unless they win wars.

Kiev was operational maneuverism at something close to its finest. It is silly that teachers of maneuver theory deride it instead of trumpeting it as a success for their own doctrines, as an operational force multiplier.

"you'll see the light."

Ah yes, the inability to even imagine that someone actually disagrees with you, unless it be out of ignorance. I've read and studied them all, and Hitler made boneheaded decisions (many of which I've discussed at great length on this board), and some good ones, and other German officers including manuever icons also made bonehead decisions, as well as some good ones. You actually state that Hitler is the only "piker", as though the rest were all infallible geniuses. News flash - no, they weren't, they made mistakes themselves, even the Manstein's. You don't have to take my word for it, some of them are objective enough they admit them themselves.

"immmediately dropped by every major power after the war"

Hardly. It was used by the US in every conflict since, except minor cases like Grenada and Panama, and recently Iraq II. It was used by the Chinese, NVA, FLN, Iran, etc. And there is nothing piss-poor about it, it works most of the time it is tried. It is not a strategy of exclusion either - it is often tried because of its reliability when many other things might also work.

E.g. Iraq I, which was firepower-attritionist from the word go. 40 days of bombing, Marines not invading but straight up the coast road frontally, VII corps directed straight at the RG main body seeking decisive battle. The only concession to maneuverism was the 24th Mech's end run, which worked as an operational force multiplier in a basically annilihation battle strategy. Notice - shooting a lot at the enemy, even charging straight at his main body, does not necessarily result in high losses for you. If you have the firepower for it, it results in high losses to him and quick, decisive victory for you.

"When talking about any conflict involving a nuclear power, industrial warfare is completely irrelevant."

Horsepucky. It was relevant in the Korean war. Wars between nuclear states do not instantly and automatically escalate to general nuclear exchange. But that does not mean they are never protracted affairs, or decided by logistical and firepower resource depth.

"Attrition as the sole strategy for victory can win, but at loss rates, even for the victor, that can no longer be tolerated"

Horsepucky. There is nothing inherently more expensive about attrition *inflicted* on the enemy than maneuver. It is simply a slur. When maneuver fails to deliver a victory, it gets pretty darn expensive, when you *lose* the long war that then results through unpreparedness. E.g. Germany vs. Russia. Iraq I cost us practically nothing in losses. When attrition is used successfully by a superior power, it does not result in high losses. When maneuver is used unsuccessfully, it is at least as expensive as attrition.

Nowhere is it written that maneuver always succeeds. Oh, I forgot, the sophistry is supposed to be "if we win quickly and cheaply that counts as maneuver; if it takes a long time and results in high losses it is a failure to impliment maneuverism properly". Which is just absurd question begging and not military analysis.

"you will never get an administration (or a population) to support a war waged under attritionists themes."

Horsefeathers. Truman did, Johnson did (the people didn't quit any more than ARVN did - they picked Nixon not McGovern - the US congress quit after overturning the 72 election via Watergate), and Bush pere did against a power so weak it was inexpensive.

Other nations have also found plenty of support for long campaigns. Indeed, the US can't afford to intervene anywhere, even with a manevuerist strategy, unless it is prepared for a long guerilla or resistence period afterward. Without high strain or losses, certainly, because nobody we've defeated is up to challenging us by such means. But going in maneuverist does not mean e.g. we don't still have men in Afghanistan.

"It is a theory that matches the political, economic, and ideological realities of the times"

In other words, if there is a hair out of place it doesn't count as "maneuverism" because "maneuverism" always succeeds. If anything fails, it is insufficiently maneuverist because it did not adapt enough to the realities of the time. Quod Erat Demonstratum. And as I said in response, if your strategy requires perfection to succeed then your strategy *sucks*. Because fully a third of all military decisions, made by *anybody*, *will be* mistakes. And if you strategy can't accept, disgest, and accomodate that reality then your strategy is not adapted to reality.

Which means, until maneuverists accept the mistakes of maneuverists (e.g. losing in Russia by not being prepared for a long war) as their own, admit its sometime failure as a grand strategy, they are just splitting academic hairs and not talking about the real world.

Lastly, guys, we should probably move this to the BB forum rather than tips and tricks. This is not, after all, primarily about CM how to's anymore.

[David Chapuis]

I am really enjoying this little debate - I find it quite interesting. Especially with words like "horsefeathers" & "horsepukey" making an appearance - lol

[Kammak]

"This is starkly contrary to the actual facts. The older generals were not merely "loitering around Berlin", they also held the CAGs, AG, and most of the army level commands. They continually clashed with the maneuverists, none of whom had more than an army."

There's that sarcasm that you fail to comprehend again. Sorry, I'll try to speak in simpler terms. Yes Kluge disagreed with Guderian, he was actually a big enough trog to "challenge" Guderian to a duel. And I'm glad to see you finally agree that Germany was not maneuver-warfare run rampant. As I stated earlier, the bulk of the German army did not embrace maneuverism, which you now agree with. The bulk of the general staff and higher commands were put off by the rampant advances of the panzer forces. Hitler, despite green lighting the formation of the panzer forces, consistently put the brakes on them in operation despite the pleas of the maneuverist commanders to continue. Did he occasionally side with them, yes. Was he committed to a maneuverist-mad drive across Europe, and that is what destroyed him, far from it.

The claim that Guderian wanted to drive south instead of continuing on to Moscow is directly addressed and refuted by Guderian himself, so no real value in bring up that point.

"Why on earth? Weren't the Russians "exhausted"?"

Look at a map. Exhaustion favors the defenders. Internal lines and all that logistical stuff ring any bells? The Germans had been campaigning, the Russians had been falling back. The muddy season works against the advancing force and favors the static defender. Yes the Soviets were exhausted, but its not a zero sum equation. They both were spend, but the Germans still hadn't captured Leningrad or Moscow and were still required to maintain the offensive. Advantage Russia.

"In other words, it is true, news to you, and you don't have an answer to it, so you will just sneer at it instead."

No, I sincerely mean that it is so weak an argument it doesn't merit rebuttal. Right up there with an astrologer saying we lost because Mars was ascending. It is that silly of an argument.

"Horsepucky. It was relevant in the Korean war. Wars between nuclear states do not instantly and automatically escalate to general nuclear exchange. But that does not mean they are never protracted affairs, or decided by logistical and firepower resource depth."

Please try reading AND comprehending my posts before setting up false fronts. It would make this much simpler. I never said wars between nuclear states instantly and automatically escalate to nukes. So why would you falsely insert that claim and then argue against it? What is the word for that kind of debater..."s" something....?

Attrition warfare based on industrial output and higher exchange ratios has not been the US strategy for any war since WWII except Vietnam under Kennedy/LBJ. Even then it was not industrial warfare, but "lets see how many we can kill and call that a win".

The Gulf War was definitely a mixed bag, but to claim it was total attrition-oriented is fallacy. The Marines and JFC were supposed to be the holding force, pinning and drawing in reserves that would be bagged by the sweepers to the west. That the Marines acheived dramatic breakthroughs ahead of schedule is wonderful, but to claim that was the plan all along is just wrong. Compared to the fully mechanized army units, the Marines had limited operational mobility, so they were best suited to the "ordinary" fight. They were far from the main effort, and their results were unexpected, unanticipated, but luckily still capitalized on.

However, great attention was paid to maneuver warfare theory in trying to determine Iraq's operational and tactical gaps and surfaces, and attacking those gaps before and during the ground war. CentCom didn't charge into Kuwait with full force intent on destroying every unit they encountered. Many Iraqi units *were* disrupted and did collapse immediately. They weren't destroyed by smart bombs or even dumb bombs, nor by direct fire for the most part. They were destroyed morally.

The greatest failures to use maneuver theory in the Gulf War have more to do with issues of sychronization, command push, and heavily centralized execution. The primary drivers behind that are the USAF and to a lesser extent the army high brass. Did it work in Iraq, yes. Is it the best way to prosecute a war, a lot of bright folks don't think so. Despite your opinion that maneuver warfare demands perfection, it actually recognizes and encourages action, even incorrect, as opposed to inaction. That is why mission orders and decentralized execution as pillars of the theory - it recognizes that the lower commands hold the "ground truth" and are better able to react to it than higher commands. Anethema to the air power folks, because they want to win the war by themselves, which requires massing air assets and using them independant of the ground forces. Thus Marine air, designed as an integral component of every USMC fighting command for close air support, gets stripped out and placed under the JFACC to fight the "coordinated" air battle. Not a good solution.

But for more examples of attrition-oriented failures, look to Somalia. The initial phase, under the Marines (manuever warfare proponents) went it to fulfill the mission of bringing aid to the civilian population. They looked at the ground truth, saw the warlords were a definite "surface", so they parlayed with them to create a cease fire to accomplish the mission. Aid got to the civilians, there was relative peace in most areas the Marines operated in, and not very Marines got shot.

Exit the Marines, enter a new set of commanders, and they scuttle the cease fire, pick one warlord as the big man on campus, then seek out to destroy the others. TF Ranger comes in to hunt down and capture "the bad guys", that months earlier had been assisting the Marines in deliverying aid.

A great example of maneuver warfare theory being applied to a non-standard situation. The goal was delivering aid to civilians. The Marines analyzed the unique situation, determined its relative strengths and weaknesses, and executed a plan accordingly. No raging street battles, no captured helo crews, just Somalis downing well need foodstuffs and Marines not getting shot at.

A great example of an attrition oriented plan failing - Israel and the Palestinians. Bomb goes off in Haifa, Israel sets out to kill some Palestinians. Rinse and repeat forty, sixty, a thousand times....Killing the enemy ain't working, because Israel isn't addressing any strategic issues, other than attriting the bad guys. Classic failure of a pure attrition strategy.

Dien Bein Phu - great possibility for a battle of annihilation...we'll camp out at some place that is of limited strategic value, wait for the bad guys to surround us, then kill em all. Only the French don't have US airpower, so instead of Khe Sanh they get the battle now synonymous with utter failure. No strategic issue involved there other than killing Viet Minh bad guys, and it backfired.

But suppose the French did have enough firepower to kill 'em all...what did it accomplish? Were all the radical vietnamese insurgents dead? No. Did all the vietnamese now want to embrace Cosmopolitan France as their true master? No. Would they have ruled indochina with ease, peace and properity now? No.

Attrition without consideration for the ultimate strategic issues doesn't work. OK, maybe it does work occasionally...people win the lottery too. But it doesn't make the lottery a sound investment strategy.

There are better ways to fight and win wars. Just because you can't always model it in a computer game, doesn't mean it doesn't work in real life. (Deltalogic's "Blackhawk Down" would probably always outsell "Parlay with the Warlords" every time. But it was still a better strategy.)

[Kammak]

One more example - the Phoenix project in Vietnam under the US. Forget about blowing up main force units, selectively target and kill VC insurgents in the villes. That is the closest any program came to the CAP Marines project in the I Corps zone. It went to the root of the insurgency issue, which was security for the peasants. If the vietnamese farmer, who doesn't give a hoot what is going on in Saigon, can work his rice fields, feed his family, and a have a good chew in peace, he won't contribute to the VC effort. However, the US battalion that does a sweep today and is gone by sundown doesn't protect him against the VC squads that come at night, store weapons and ammo in his hooches, and take rice taxes. They will kill him or his family on the spot if he doesn't comply. Whether the US forces killed 20 or 40 bad guys earlier doesn't affect this little situation one bit. But that situation, going on all over the countryside every evening, drives the insurgency. CAP Marines and Phoenix went to the heart of the issue and worked to secure the peasants from the VC, and it worked. It worked big time. It scared the hell out of Ho and Giap. By destroying the insurgency at the local level, the only option the North would have is conventional invasion, and they didn't want that against US regulars.

Unfortunately these programs were either scuttled or of such small scale, and against Westmoreland's grand visions of battlefield annihilation, that they never got the attention they deserved or the resources they required for total success.

But they are additional examples of an intelligent analysis of the situation resulting in focused efforts to address the unique strategic issue. CAP Marines in every ville, or a ten fold increase in phoenix teams would have been far more beneficial than all the arclight raids put together.

[JasonC]

The insurgency didn't work. It was defeated. What wasn't defeated was NVN. But it was prevented from winning through conventional invasion, after US ground forces had left, via US air, in 1972. That was all ARVN needed to hold.

After that the North didn't try again until the air was shut off by Congress. Ford begged for authority to use it again, in 1975 when they did try, and Congress said "no". So conventional columns of massed Soviet armor overran SVN in a few weeks. Guerillas didn't - the guerillas were dead.

Before debating Nam you have to learn the basic facts of the case. "Oh sure, it was a conventional invasion in the end, but guerillas created the political conditions for it". No they didn't. They destroyed the Johnson presidency, sure - with plenty of help from Johnson. But every Dem candidate in 68 was for negotiation rather than withdrawal.

Nixon and the Repubs were for Vietnamization. When elected he did it, gradually enough that ARVN held. In 72 the peaceniks got the Dem nomination calling for withdrawal and lost in a landslide. The draft had ended, and the mass demonstrations with it. US losses in 72 were 600 men. There were under 20k US servicemen in country, down from 550k when Nixon took office. Air remained, and broke the NVA conventional invasion attempt in the spring of 72.

Then the plumbers got caught. Nixon resigned. Ford pardoned him, incurring the left's hatred. In 1974, peacenik Dems took absolute control of both houses of Congress, able to override vetos etc. They wanted the North to win, so it did. None of which was written in anything in 1972. The war was not lost in 1972, and the insurgency did not break the political ability of the US, through the presidency, to support SVN.

When asked about the war in 1972, the people supported Nixon's policies not McGovern's. In 1974 they were asked something else - do you want the country still to be run by the crooks or not? And they said "not". A million innocent SVNese died because the two questions were linked, that is all.

The moral is not maneuverism and Marines rah, it is don't break into Dem HQ and if you do don't get caught and if you do don't lie to cover it up and if you do don't tape it and if you do don't release said tape and if you do don't resign. Not when a million innocent lives are on the line.

[JasonC]

Centcom clearly IDed the Iraqi center of gravity as the Republican Guard. Not as a gap or as a vunerability, but as their main pillar of strength. It then directed its main effort, VII corps, straight at the RG seeking decisive battle.

It prepped the field by fire to annihilate as much Iraqi heavy weaponry as possible before going on the ground, but the main effort was directed not where the Iraqi's weren't, but straight at where they were. The battle was to unfold under favorable conditions due to pressure elsewhere to draw off reserves (Marines and allies), and via 24th Mech shutting the door behind the RG. But the basic plan was straight left cross by VII corps, aimed right at the enemy main body. With the threat and intent of annihilating said main body by sheer weight and firepower.

This is classic decisive battle doctrine, and is definitely not looking primarily for gaps and going for those gaps, hitting where the enemy isn't, expecting the decision to be achieved by maneuver (if e.g. 24th Mech had been the main effort), or anything like it. Firepower believers in the AF and heavy armor decisive battle types in the Army ran the show.

Iraq I was overdetermined because we had them every which way from Sunday. A maneuver strategy would also have worked, they were that outclassed. But there was no reason seen to risk one, when a firepower based strategy promised certain victory in a short span of time. Everyone involved was surprised just how cheap it was, but nobody expected the Iraqis to be able to stand in front of VII corps and live. Rightly. They never had a prayer. Without the slightest razzle dazzle required.

[jrcar]

Kamak well done on all this, JasonC frequently drowns his opponents in a morass of words, as only a scholar can.

In short Kamak is saying:

Maneuver warfare and Information warfare are separate concepts (then add Network Centric Warfare...) - correct.

Maneuver warfare presupposes attrition (ie the break in battle and the destruction of the enemy center of gravity) - correct.

JasonC appears to be lumping maneuver warfare theory and information warfare theory together. This is wrong.

JasonC also claims the decisive action part of maneuver warfare (which by its nature is attritionalist) as the correct attritionalist approach, ignoring the maneuver that was conducted to get there.

In short consider a series of enemy strong points stretching from your position to the enemy rear.

Attrition warfare would have you attacking EACH and EVERY position one (or maybe 2) at a time until you got to the end.

Maneuver warfare attempts to identify those that you need to attack to win, then decisively attack them (which includes physically assaulting them, or conducting information warfare against them).

The other way to look at it is which positions can you ignore.

Ref Moscow it was always my understanding (from several books) that Stalin almost DID sue for peace as the Germans surrounded Moscow and that the Soviet leadership WAS paralysed (this is mentioned in two books I have read on Zhukov).

Jason I respect your scholarship, but it in the years that I have been reading this board your hit rate is only a little better than 50/50.

In this case I think you fundamentally do not understand maneuver warfare doctrine as it exits now (your comments appear based on the early "fundamentalist" work).

Unfortunately I rarely get time to post.

I am an ex army intel officer who is still involved in all this.

Cheers

Rob

[David Chapuis]

As I stated before, I find this discussion quite interesting. I have been reading Blitzkrieg – From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (Deighton), and came across some information that is related to this discussion – so I thought I would post it.

Deighton has this to say about Fuller and Hart in reference to their theories after WWI.

Liddell Hart firmly rejected the brainless human battering-ram tactics of General Haig and his fellows and reintroduced the notion that battles are won by ideas. There was always an indirect approach, he argued, always an unexpected place or unexpected way to hit the enemy. His book The Strategy of Indirect Approach exemplified such ideas in a history of warfare that started with the Greeks and Persians. . . Hart was chosen to revise the British infantry training manual, and , like Fuller, he used German tactics as his starting point. He added many ideas of his own, stressing the advantage of reinforcing success rather than sending aid to where the fighting was hardest. Turn opportunism into a system he advised. . . Boney Fuller was unconvinced by the indirect approach theory, calling it “the strategy of evasion.” . . . it was Liddell Hart who extended what were essentially tactical movements . . . into the philosophy of “the expanding torrent,” which spread disorder up through the army commanders to the enemy government.

The book then talks about a few other theories and then says this (although I cant tell if it is referring the all the theories - including Fuller's and Hart's - or just the other minor theories):

These writings were more often used in support of vested interests than as a basis for rational discussion. And the theorists were too ready to go to extremes in their writings so that predictions became fantasies set in a science-fiction world.

I also found interesting that Fuller rejected Hart's "Indirect Approach" when his "Plan 1919" would have seemed to use the "Indirect Approach" The details of Fuller’s “Plan 1919” are described in this book as:

Fuller’s ideas had come to maturity in March 1918, at a time when German infiltration tactics were threatening British Fifth Army rear areas. Divisional, Brigade, and Army HQs were ”panic stricken”; chaos spread through the whole command system as it lost contact with the fighting troops. [Fuller predicted that] using tanks and close air support, the Allies should have no great problem in attacking the HQs of the enemy’s commanding generals. Deprived of its “brain,” the enemy front line would collapse within “a matter of hour.”

Sounds like the same argument/discussion that is going on here.

[ October 02, 2003, 02:45 AM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

[JasonC]

No, I am not confusing information warfare with maneuver warfare. I am also not attacking the idea that maneuver warfare creates valuable force multipliers for operations and tactics aimed at decisive battle and destruction of the enemy force.

It seems to me several here are misinterpreting my area of agreement with maneuver warfare, but within limits, as a creator of operational and tactical force multipliers, for a misunderstanding of maneuverism. I deliberately accept part of the doctrine and I consciously reject another part. This is not a failure to understand the doctrine. It is a disagreement with the part of it I reject, and only with that part.

I say maneuverism becomes unsound when it is extended beyond a creator of operational and tactical multipliers, to replacing the strategic goal of destruction of the enemy force with a faith in deep objectives, the "shot to the brain", command shock, etc. And that was there in maneuver warfare from quite early on.

It is not the whole of maneuver. Going to Kiev is a maneuver. It is a maneuver aimed at destruction of enemy forces. It does rely on placement etc to bring about decisive battle under favorable conditions. With this I have no quarrel.

But maneuverism as presently preached, and the extremes of faith in it clear back to WW I, do have a quarrel with it. These extremes view destruction of the enemy army as optional, and something to be avoided if possible, as inherently difficult. Even though Kiev was certainly a maneuver and not a straight ahead frontal attack, they denounce it as a mistake, because it was not aimed at deep objectives.

The enemy's fielded forces are surfaces, one is supposed to instead aim at gaps. This is a metaphor extending from sound tactical techniques of breakthrough and exploitation (reinforce success). Extended to the strategic scale, it counsels going after the "soft systems" in the enemy rear, including C3I, rather than the maneuver elements, conceptualized as "harder" targets. Moscow rather than Kiev.

The connection of the above to I-war concepts, is that I-war strives for the command paralysis effects sought by one use of breakthough by maneuver elements in the past, by modern means that reach into the enemy rear. Including deep firepower strikes, intel ops, E-war and jamming, etc. I-war does not in itself counsel that friendly *maneuver elements* be assigned this task. It may use them, or it may not.

But maneuver directed at creating favorable conditions for decisive battle to destroy the enemy army in the field, is one use of maneuver. And maneuver directed at avoiding the need for such a battle, seeking decision instead by seizing deep objectives, disarticulating the enemy force, and destroying its "soft system" supports, supply lines, C3I etc, is another.

You may say that one can seek the latter tactically, to set up conditions for the former, perhaps at a higher echelon level. I've got no problem with that. When instead one reverses that relationship, our dispute *begins*. That is, when even destruction of enemy forces is treated largely as a way to get to his deep objective rear etc. Which it certainly can be.

Modern maneuverists do not "get credit" for things all agree on - the fight is over a specific difference. Does the idea of systems besides the army acting as truly *decisive* targets, extend all the way up to top level conduct of the war? And can one rely on it to win the whole war quickly and cheaply, without needing to destroy the entire enemy field force?

Can one plan an entire war - not a single campaign, battle, or tactical fight - on the idea of decision through seizure of deep objectives and destruction of soft systems (aka the "shot to the brain")? Or is such a plan, while imaginable, too risky to be sound, because decision need not follow even from operational successes aimed that way? Must one instead always be prepared for enemy resistence to continue until all his fielded forces are destroyed, and direct ones primary effort at achieving that destruction?

That is the dispute. The opponents of modern maneuverism are not against all types of maneuver. We refuse to stand in the idiot box the modern maneuverists have so thoughtfully provided for us, in which they get credit for any fighting in sequence or flanking or prior isolation of a target, and we get to be mindless frontal assaulters.

We agree with many of the classics of earlier maneuver theory, on using maneuver to achieve operational and tactical force multipliers. But that is what we see such techniques as. Not a rival way in which decision can be achieved, but as an aid to achieving decision in the traditional decisive battle manner. We expect decision to follow from a high enough ratio of friendly to enemy fielded forces remaining, and not to follow *reliably* from anything else.

And we do not think the fielded forces of the enemy need be the hardest target set. We deny that implicit estimate in most maneuver theorizing. On the contrary, it may be an easier target in many respects.

The target density is higher, the enemy stands relatively close to friendly forces, his foremost elements are the most vulnerable to many on few match ups. Above all, he must strive to maintain the physical integrity of a defensive system or he creates abundant opportunities to use maneuver multipliers against him (cutting off elements, disrupting combined arms, eliminations in sequence by assymmetric means, etc).

He has a lot of work to do just to stay alive in front of and within easy reach of your whole army, and one can interfer with his successful execution of that work with abundant means.

[JasonC]

jrcar - glad to hear you are right fully half of the time... (j/k)

[ October 02, 2003, 12:46 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[David Chapuis]

quote]It would include acknowledging that maneuver warfare is about *shock firepower* and necessarily, involves *movement* of shock-based forces. (That is afterall, how they work.)

[JasonC]

Wow. Adam makes a manful attempt to clarify the point in dispute, and instantly a key term he used is misread to mean something entirely different from what he intended.

Shock as Adam was using the term is in contrast to ranged fire. It does not refer to command shock, aka psychological effects. It refers to making a tight fist of armor and moving it through the enemy, vigorously. "Shock action" in the pre-modern era meant "charging", running through the enemy position and daring him to remain there. It's opposite was ranged fire, standing off and plinking.

Adam's point was that as originally conceived, maneuver sought decision by shock action, not by ranged fire. It often aims at weak points because where the enemy is thinnest, he is most vulnerable to concentrated attackers driving right over him. Fire action, in contrast, naturally picks the spot where the enemy is thickest, because that presents the best target for area fire effects.

Since the English word "shock" appears in both contexts with different meanings, this is an unfortunate bit of confusion complicating the issue rather than sorting it out. In German, the term "shock" Adam is referring to would be "Sturm", as in a storming party in a seige, aka assault.

Shock vs. fire and maneuver vs. attrition are not equivalent distinctions. They can mix and match. If you employ fire merely to pin an enemy, to make him duck while you scoot past to objectives deeper behind him, then fire is being used to further maneuver (e.g. the Luftwaffe helping the Meuse crossing at Sedan). If you take an entire army corps and run straight into the enemy main body intent on destroying it by concentrated shock action, you are employing shock in an attrition strategy (e.g. VII corps in gulf war I).

Naturally the opposites, as Adam intended, are also possible and perhaps even more thematic. I.e. Using a "schwerpunk" to defeat scattered enemies in sequence along a single thin line of cleavage to bring about a breakthrough, is a clear and thematic tactical maneuver use of shock (e.g. an number of classic "breakthrough" battles in the Blitzkrieg period). Using fire on the enemy main body simply to inflict as many losses on him as possible is clearly employing fire action in an attrition strategy, thematically (e.g. Verdun as Falkenhayn's "Gericht" aka "Place of Execution").

I agree with Adam that maneuverists must accept a stable meaning and stick to it, avoiding sophistry by slipperiness of referents and resulting lack of content. But I don't think they have to wed themselves to shock action.

Certainly shock action against scattered bits of the enemy, in sequence, is a key maneuver technique at the tactical level. But the dispute isn't over the tactical level.

It is over the strategic level, and whether the enemy army can be, not defeated in sequence - which would be a use of maneuver as a force multiplier that I'd have no problem with - but in large part avoided, while still winning via attaining other objectives (spatial, command, etc).

[ October 02, 2003, 05:42 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[David Chapuis]

Adam makes a manful attempt to clarify the point in dispute, and instantly a key term he used is misread to mean something entirely different from what he intended.

Thank you for clarifying that for me. Now that I re-read his post, it does make more sense the way you describe it.

I created the other thread in the CMBB forum, and mentioned "firepower shock", but I also mentioned that he might not be meaning the same thing I was. Is their a more common phrase used for what I am calling "battlefield shock"?

[Kammak]

"Kammak appears to have fallen into the "anything that is avoiding strength can be maneuver warfare" trap himself, when he uses Marines handing out food whilst in a state of peace with warlords in Somalia "a great example of maneuver theory". No it's not. It's a great example of what can be accomplished under peaceful circumstances."

Nope. No trap. The mission was "deliver aid to the civilians". The on scene commanders had great leeway in determing how to go about it. The Marines saw the warlords were a definite surface...so instead of attacking them, attriting them, and attempting to destroy (which wasn't the mission at all) they engaged them in the process and succeeded in accomplishing the mission.

They went into a disaster area filled with armed gangs and thugs, and had two basic choices - attrite the armed thugs as an enabling action to get food to civilians, or recongnize their power, admit they are a surface, and deal with them accordingly. They got food to the civilians in the most economical, "cheapest" way. No dead Marines, no dead Somali's, just civvies getting food and aid.

No trap, just an intelligent analysis of the situation, instead of a "We've got guns, they've got guns, lets shoot more of them before they shoot more of us" solution.

It ended a hell of a lot better than the following "strategy" of wiping out the bad guys which turned into a national embarrassment.

As I said in my first detailed post, Maneuver Warfare is not revolutionary, just a culmination of basically good ideas from the past several hundred years of warfare.

If you need to twist that into something weaker to give you something to argue with, whatever.

The whole issue is kind of moot. Maneuver Warfare IS the doctrine used by the US Army, US Navy, and US Marine Corps, and thus usually implemented by the NCA and Joint Chiefs. Deal with it. Calling folks that disagree with you "idiots" just shows you to be very unhappy little men in front of computer screens.

I'm outta here anyhoo. Thanks for the nice remarks to those that posted them!

Regards,

Kevin

[JasonC]

David - "command paralysis" is often spoken of as the desired end state of dislocation tactics. But they are thinking of the effect on the HQs, their inability to solve the military problem presented to them, and the ability of HQs to reach their units effectively. Not a "parallel" effect on every subunit, causing each individually to stop responding to command. That is usually spoken of just as "panic".

[JasonC]

Notice he left out the air force, which continues to direct and to win the nation's wars. And still believes with Petain that "firepower kills".

Incidentally, the heavy side of the army only backs "maneuver" by reading it sophistically enough to support platform on platform attrition thinking whenever that seems appropriate, and then just sees it as appropriate whenever snake-eaters aren't enough and the heavy metal is required.

The navy could care less about any of this, and regards its own mission as (1) defeat of enemy fleets in being, (2) sea control, (3) power projection ashore by deep strikes - along AF thinking lines. <p>

Maneuverism as meant by the true believers remains a Marine and army light forces hobby-horse, but a largely academic one. In reality, they are turning into FOs for the firepower arms.

Anybody who thinks the debate is over because a few manuals have been printed and military academics mouth the stuff, is smoking something.

[jrcar]

JasonC to your reply to me... far above

LOL that is a good comeback I know I'm not always right... and I have appreciated a lot of what you write... but I think you tend to drown it in verbiage, and then drown discussion in more verbiage. I for one can't be bothered. I do things, not right about them... but I accept both are required.

I have a bias in thought as both an Army Officer, and a PSYOPS trained intel officer. My training and experience shows that maneuver, and information warfare, does work. But it is not the only tool to use.

Attrition warfare does work, and sometimes it the only thing that will, but it is expensive.

Army also believes firepower kills! Maneuver warfare does not say don't kill anything! Just be selective about what and when, and make sure you are doing it for the right purpose.

I sense you are concerned that we may slip back into a 7 Years War approach (on the French Brit front) with lots of maneuver, but little action... the problem that I've seen is the opposite where everyone was concerned with taking the next hill.... why? "Because the enemy are on it" without thought to the larger plan. that latter approach is more dangerous.... I've seen Airforce ATO's that try to hit every target... why ... because its a target and you hit targets. We need to get out of this mentality, it is costly and irresponsible.

Cheers

Rob

[JasonC]

jrcar - fair enough. But I am worried about a rather different set of problems. I am worried about commanders going to NCAs and saying "sure we can do that, and we only need an eyedropper and 3 buff snake-eaters. It'll take a week."

And I am worried about what happens the first time we lose 50 Strykers in one engagement.

And I am worried about soldiers in Afghanistan told to "go light" and believing it so thoroughly they have nothing capable of destroying a mud hut beyond 200 yards.

And I am worried about men less heavily armed than indigenous forces with HMGs, RPGs, and 82mm mortars having nothing to escalate with shy of an F-16 - then trying to talk the pilot into lasing the right pimple of a rock on the side of a mountain the size of K-2, because nothing else can handled an ordinary HMG in an ordinary bunker. Combined arms means a full range of weapons to deal with every sort of target.

I am worried when an instant snatch and grab by specialist light infantry using helos and soft-skinned vehicles becomes "attrition" if it fails. With the only friendly armored vehicles within 500 miles driven by ambivalent Pakistanis.

Be mobile, be deployable, be sensible about targets - by all means. But give the light guys some weapons with *range*, shy of calling in the fast movers. And some penetrating power. And have some not-so-light guys ready on call for back up.

And don't leave the guns home, bring them. If it has to be mortars, make them 81s with smart terminal IR homing rounds, not dinky 60s with plain HE. (Read Afghan AARs sometime - they are fighting with a lighter weapon mix than we had in Korea).

Give the infantry .308 sniper rifles in every squad, so they can do something at 1 km if they have to. They don't need full sniper school but they do need to be able to shoot.

If a Javelin is too heavy then screw new tin can fleets and get us an ATGM that is truly portable. OK their use against buildings and bunkers\ - the troops will do it anyway. If it isn't too heavy, then bring them into the field instead of leaving them back at the base. We've got grunts humping AT-4s around - 200m range and unguided, for all the world like we never progressed past the zook - just to have something that will KO a mud hut.

Range range range. And vision equipment. And comm equipment. And everyone trained in FO work (GPS makes that feasible). CB radar and similar enemy locating sensors. Push smart firepower forward and down, to the eyes that know where the enemy are. You want recon pull? Give the men with the mikes fire massing authority. When light forces work that is why, not the maneuvering.

I don't think modern defenses with modern weapons are good places for classic breakthrough thinking. Only the hopelessly outclassed are. Look at our own doctrines and capabilities. Would you try a narrow sudden break through against an American defense in depth, backed by mass-able smart over the horizon fire? I sure as heck wouldn't. Kill the recon screen, sure. Attrite by fire from range, sure. Cram a Stryker or LAV riding schwerpunk under an MLRS strike - no thank you.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Give the infantry .308 sniper rifles in every squad, so they can do something at 1 km if they have to. They don't need full sniper school but they do need to be able to shoot.

...

Range range range.

Hmm, just rent out some Canadian snipers. That ought to increase your range to about, oh, 2400+ metres.

[JasonC]

I'm sure the best in the trade do that sort of thing routinely, ours or yours. But I am thinking about what every rifle squad should be able to do, not specialists in only a few places.

If that is 1.5-2 km rather than 1-1.5, great. Right now too much of their firepower is 200-500m (GLs, AT-4, 5.56mm unscoped). Instead with scoped .308s, 7.62 belt-fed MGs, ATGMs, smart 81s up one echelon - they'd be able to reach beyond the AKs and RPGs and deal with located light enemies with practical impunity, without needing to call an F-16 to do so.