Ratio of AT guns to attacking Panzers and the fate of Uber tanks.

[JasonC]

I begin to see another problem you are having, kip. You see 6600 Russian ATGs in higher level units, and think they must overwhelm the mere 20 PDs with a depleted 50 tanks apiece. In other words, your problem is you think the German AFV fleet was only 1000 AFVs. It was more like 7500 AFVs.

And you seem to think the Russian "unequal numbers game" was due to their huge luxury reserve of - 6600 ATGs in independent units. Instead of seeing that "unequal numbers game" in their 25,000 AFVs.

By your own mental picture of German armor, just think - the Russians could also put 300 T-34s opposite those 12 Panthers. Oops, no they couldn't. The Germans did not have only 20 PDs, with only 50 tanks apiece. They had 40-50 mobile divisions with 100-150 AFVs apiece, plus 50 odd independent armor and StuG battalions around 30 (plus or minus 15) apiece.

[kipanderson]

JasonC,

I will bother to post up more data, I was not going to but I will, from equally high quality sources as my previous data. They will cover the number of Panzer divisions, and if you wish to count tanks, the number of individual Panzers on the Eastern Front, all the German High Commands own assessment of its own numbers, even in German in an original document. And, yes, they will agree 100% with my numbers, that’s because that is one of my sources for my numbers.

I will also explain why TM30-430 is lot more than a theoretical doctrine paper or what ever you seem to think it is. Plus one or two other points.

After my next post, in few days time, leave it alone, you will only dig yourself in deeper, all my views come from source material that is, quite literally, of the very highest quality by world standards. Much of it open to all who know where to look, some I am very lucky to have found hidden in archives. The way I do things is read source material, then form views based on that source material, hence I have sources to justify everything. Of a quality that can only ever be equalled, not surpassed.

Also, all sane people have now moved on to the CMBB forum, so no one cares any more, even if they ever did. But I will post in a few days.

All the best,

Kip

[JasonC]

Don't be silly, of course I am not going to "just give it a rest" in deference to your unstated and supposedly all-seeing wisdom. By all means, present your evidence.

My count for German mobile formations specifically in the east on at the begining of 1944 is 31 mobile divisions (out of 47 on that date for all fronts). I also count 56 independent battalions - 39 StuG, 6 Tiger, 5 Nashorn, and 6 Marder. My estimate of overall German AFV strength then is 7500-8000, from these data points - 7700 late summer 43, ~8000 early spring 44, 9150 summer 44.

I would be especially interested in the - to me conspicuously missing - specific AARs of whole Panzer division or larger German attacks stopped by trucked in higher level AT units alone, sans Russian armor. Cases of German PAK fronts specifically stopping large Allied armor attacks in the early to mid war period of "cavalry tactics" I assume are well known (e.g. Rommel vs. Sedan counterattacks, Knightsbridge), and I can even think of a French version (Fr. lt. mech after loss of own tanks vs. southern Belgian Pz drive).

Since you envision scores of Russian (reserve, higher level, concentrated) ATGs within range of the same attacking Panzer company at the same moment, you should be able to find any number of cases like that. So just quote them.

Here is how I think the Russian AT assets above division level were actually employed. They were assigned to corps or army HQs, mostly regiments to the former and brigades to the latter. Those HQs then assigned them in regimental strength to threatened areas, with a typical toughened section receiving up to a brigade of added AT to one rifle division in the line, roughly doubling the light and medium towed gun strength in that division's sector. Some would be held back at corps or army level to react to events, naturally.

Nothing like all were in the line all of the time. 1/5 to 1/3 of the overall frontage could be stiffened in that manner, with the balance off the line at any given moment. Operationally, a corps or army commander would consider assigning a regiment or brigade of AT to a given rifle regiment or division as a "cheaper", defense minded alternative to assigning one of his independent armor regiments or brigades to the same sub-unit instead.

One man's opinion...

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JasonC:

[snips]

Which you can find in the AARs over and over.

Kip has been citing his sources in this discussion, which will doubtless cost me money for more books. Could you post a reference to these "AAR"s, please?

All the best,

John.

[JasonC]

I mentioned AARs of a French gun front, and German ones in France and North Africa. Those other theaters first -

French gun front vs. PD - http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/1940/mai/12mai40west.htm

E.g. see May 12-14 and Pz Reg 35 of 4 PD cuts through 1ere le Mech's tanks, very successfully (3 PD helping, attacking side by side). Then on 15 May -

"As both tank-regiments reach the road Ernage-Gembloux heavy french artillery and hidden AT guns attack and cause heavy losses. The tank of the CO of P.R.35 is hit wounding the crew. The I./P.R.35 is stuck between road and railroad and loses nearly all heavy tanks to AT fire. The 4./P.R.35 loses all Pz.IV. A young Lt. disembarks and takes out a enemy AT gun with a handgrenade and takes one prisoner. Minutes later his tank is hit by a silent AT gun killing the driver. The tank of the brigade commander is destroyed as he approached to help. The infantry links up to the tanks and breaks into the defense line of the enemy but here they are stopped by heavy enemy defense fire...Tanks lost on 15.5.1940: 9 Pz.I, 9 Pz.II, 6 Pz.III, 8 Pz.IV, 2 gr.Bef.Wg. Tanks operational: 113 Pz.I+II, 20 Pz.III, 4 Pz.IV."

The following day the division goes over to local defense and rests. A case of a French gun front stopping a PD after tanks had failed (the French lost hundreds of tanks in the previous 3 days).

Arras battle is 21 May by 7 PD, one of the most famous actions of the war and I assume well known. Rommel's gun front destroyed 43 tanks and turned back the counterattack.

Knightsbridge I also assume is well known. There were days of similar fighting involved (collectively "the Gazala battles", a portion of which was "the Cauldron"), from the end of May to mid June, of which the climax was the failure of "Operation Aberdeen" on 5 June, when 150-200 British tanks were lost in uncoordinated attacks on German PAK fronts. German armor from 15 PD then cut up an Indian brigade (10th, from 5th Ind. Div.) with a counterattack.

In Russia, I am reading Glantz and these German unit narratives from Kursk -

Kursk - http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/avenue/vy75/data.htm

the German units narratives in particular (3), as the Russian ones there have little beyond unit locations.

Examples of the narratives in these files, and how I am analyzing them -

for 7 PD, 5 July "The div began its attack ay 0225 on a wide front with heavy arty support fire. The Donez was quickly crossed by the assault battalion in the face of heavy Soviet arty fire (soon

abated) and heavy fire from infantry weapons. Resistance slowly withdrew toward the E. At 0430 the leading assault elements reached the Nish Olschanez--Dorogobushino road.." Comparing Glantz's narrative, on the 5th the front line division has 3 battalions overrun and one regiment of the second line RD is committed to help out. 6 July "Panzer Assault Group Schulz (KG Schulz) attacked eastward through Batrazkaja Datscha and broke the second Soviet defense line (reinforced by "many tanks") at and 1.5 km N of Hill 209.6, thereby enabling the successful attack of the 106th ID on the right...On the division left, KG Glaesemer and PzGp von Oppeln (6th PzD) stormed Generalowka at 1645, despite tenacious Soviet defense supported by strong artillery and effective air support. Thirty Soviet tanks were reported destroyed in Rasumnoje...Glaesemer reported the presence of Russian "Artsturm" (Su-122) assault guns 4 km W of Krutoi Log; six were claimed to be knocked out by Tigers."

Tank losses for 5-7 are 10, 14, 36 giving 60 all told, but only 24 by the end of the 6th. Initial strength was 11 Pz II, 43 Pz III long, 12 Pz III 75mm, 37 Pz IV long, 1 Pz IV short, 5 Command tanks. It also reported 12 76.2mm SP AT (marder), and the 3rd company, 503 Tiger battalion was attached to the division, which would mean 135 AFVs initial strength. No enemy tanks are reported on the 5th, strong ones on the 6th with 30 kills claimed. The 24 AFVs lost by then are only 18% of initial strength. Comparing Glantz one sees ~100 Russian AFVs sent to this unit's sector on the 6th, including some SU-122 as the Germans reported. By Glantz's narrative, the second line RD is penetrated in one regiment's sector, but the reserve armor has arrived and the overall fight of reserves is joined. 4 additional RDs are sent to the sector, two guards and 2 regular, from adjacent armies.

7 July 7 PD reports are scanty, continued fighting in woods, no forward progress, heavy expenditure of tank main gun ammo - clearly bogged down. Tank losses hit 44% of initial strength by the end of this day. 8 July they are defending the objectives taken the day before against Russian counterattacks, with 94 GRD IDed as involved - one of those sent by the 7th, according to Glantz. Back on their heels. A second Tiger company and an additional artillery battalion are sent to help. They are well and truly stopped, needing reinforcement themselves to hold the ground taken.

My summary - they were not stopped by the initial defensive system, which produced 2 hours of intense anti-infantry fire by arty and MGs in the German narrative but was overcome rapidly. The initial RD was penetrated with a loss of only 10 tanks on the first day, some of them to mines. The 2nd line was reinforced by armor, and a running tank battle followed, both sides losing heavily, but the Germans taking the immediate objectives. By then full divisions of infantry reserves had arrived as well as the tanks, and the Germans were halted and dueling all day. Tank losses mounted, they went over to the defensive, and the numerous fresh Russian infantry counterattacked.

This does not look like the PAK front initial repulse cases. It looks like a main force engagement with reacting reserves after a successful initial break-in. If kip thinks it is atypical or peculiar to Kursk, he is welcome to show it. I think it is not.

For instance, the Korsun relief operation shows a similar pattern, with successful initial advances, stalling out after a few days as armor reacts, and then failing (3rd Pz Kps from 4 Febuary to 7 February). Compounded by thaw in that case, however. The best AAR source on that fighting is Nash - http://www.angelraybooks.com/books/casemate/0036cm.htm Glantz also has a translation of the Soviet staff study of the overall operation.

Other examples of initial break-in success then armor clashes are Zhitomir in late fall 1943 and the 1945 Hungarian adventure. Find me any unit histories that show the reverse, immediate repulse of whole PD level attacks by dense PAK fronts along the initial defense line.

As for other cases of successful initial break-ins defeated by reaction reserves, there are clear late war examples in the west, many of them well known. Lehr in Normandy - http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/100-13/st-lo_2a.htm - see pages 37-46. Salerno - http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/salerno/sal-germancntr.htm - see in particular pages 62-71. Mortain - see page 462 and following of the green book Breakout and Pursuit, also page 486 and following subsequent fighting in the same area. The Bulge as a whole is a larger scale example.

I hope that helps.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

When it comes to the number of Panzers and Panzer divisions on the Eastern Front at any one time, happily, the information is readily available. All the information below comes directly from German records. The first scan is self explanatory, the later ones dealing with numbers come from the books of Thomas Jentz. In his books he explicitly states that he has inferred nothing, all the stats come straight out of German records and that he even tries to format the information as the original document.

First, German assessments of their own forces in the spring of 43.

At the bottom of the image you will see a total of 22 Panzer Divisions and around 1300 Panzers. The number in brackets is for panzers in theatre but not operational. For more detail on the number of operational Panzers on the Eastern Front in 43, look below.

For the number of Panzers on the Eastern Front in May 44, see below. Note, once again it is the number of operational Panzers that counts. Also, you can see that once again the number of Panzer Divisions, including Panzergrenadier Divisions, is in the low twenties. The other formations, such as Tiger battalions, would be attached to the Panzer Divisions.

As all the above sources make clear, an assumption of between 20-25 Panzer Divisions with around 45-50 operational Panzers in each divisions, was about the average. Of course, 45-50 is only the average in a very wide range of possibilities.

Some will be asking “why only count actual Panzers, what about all the other AFVs.” The reason is that both the Germans themselves, and the defending Soviet forces were only really concerned with counting AFVs that may be used in attack. You could call them “offensive AFVs”. Things like Marders and other defensive AFVs could not be used to take the initiative. They would be used to defend against Soviets attacks, not to attack in the first place. The Soviets were concerned with choking off Panzer Divisions so as to maintain the initiative. However, if you wish to include the StugIIIs as offensive AFVs then their numbers are given below. The average total number of operational Stugs and StuHs is 590.

Now, why is TM 30-430, the manual form which the information on the tactical use of Soviet AT battalions was taken, a lot more than just a theoretical doctrine paper? There are a number of reasons. The most obvious is to look at the Handbook on USSR Military Forces as part of a series. The first in the series to really hit the standards one would now expect from a manual produced by the modern Threat Support department of the DOD was Handbook on Japanese Military Forces published in the spring of 44. The next in the series was Handbook on German Military Forces published in January 45, in fact a bit late to make any real difference. However, if we take the Japanese volume it is worth considering what its purpose was and on what it will have been based. Its purpose was to help train and inform US military personal so as to improve their combat effectiveness against the enemy. So as to help them achieve their objectives with minimum casualties. It was not a theoretical paper; it was practical book to help in real situations. It will have been based on captures documents and real world experience; they will have used all the sources open to them. It will have been the mother of all after action reports on how the Japanese actually do things. The same goes for the German volume. Its aim was to help American service personal in real situations. The idea that the authors of the Handbook on USSR Forces did not ask this very question of General Gehlen, “is this how it actually happens, this is how the Soviets actually do things?” is not credible. The manual was to prepare US forces for what may turn into a hot war against the new potential enemy.

Also consider the manual from the stand point of General Gehlen and his staff. They will have been collating all this information so as to help the German army in its war against the Soviets. So as to help the German army achieve the best possible result. The idea that it was simply a regurgitated version of soviet manuals without any reference to what actually happened is, again, not credible. So from the German point of view it was also the mother of all after action reports on how the Soviets did things.

Lastly, the material produced by General Gehlen has recently been tested for its validity by the Research Institute for Military History in Potsdam, authors of the Germany and the Second World War books, and found to be of as high quality as it was always credited with.

When it comes to the graphics in the extract I posted earlier, the maps in TM 30-430 sometimes have no scale, and when they do it is only to draw attention to one particular feature. However, if one looks at the other maps, it is clear that all are drawn to scale, they are not out to confuse. That the maps in the section on AT units should be any different is highly unlikely. From the narrative in the posted section it is also clear that the fig34. the Firesack would indeed fit very happily in 2km CM map.

Then there is the matter of an After Action Report for some major German armour action. As it happens, the most recent Soviet General Staff Study I read deals with just such a matter. Again, Soviet General Staff Studies are very good examples of AARs, but scaled up and filtered. They are based on the study of all sources of information on given battles and analysis of what actually happened.

The following extract relates to the fighting in the Sandomierz bridgehead resulting from the L’vov operation. The L’vov operation took place in late July 44 and resulted in a bridgehead across the Vistula a couple of hundred km south of the more famous Destruction of Army Group Centre battles. The following gives a good enough idea of what was going on.

“The fighting on the Sandomierz bridgehead was very intense. While

repulsing continuous counterattacks by large enemy tank and infantry

forces, the 1st Ukrainian Front's forces continued to fight to enlarge the

bridgehead. The enemy counterattacked from the Shidluv and Rakuv region

on 11 August with forces from the 3d and 16th Panzer Divisions. This

German counterattack apparently had the aim of cutting our forces advanc-

ing on the Vistula River's western bank in two. Although it failed to achieve

the desired results, the German command did not cease its attempts to clear

our forces from the Vistula's western bank. Having regrouped his forces, on

13 August the enemy launched an attack in the region west of Stopnitsa and

further north, employing four panzer divisions (the 1st, 3d, 16th, and 24th)

and one panzer grenadier division. As a result of the six days of fierce fight-

ing, the German tank grouping suffered heavy equipment losses and halted

its attacks. Forces from three panzer divisions launched the next large-scale

German attacks from the Ozharuv region.”

The next section comes from the “conclusion” chapter where there is a summing up of lessons learnt. The small part dealing with AT artillery is clear.

“ Around 10,000 guns and mortars were available for artillery support of

the L'vov-PeremyshI' operation. The presence of this mass of artillery

weaponry reliably supported forces at all stages of the operation. It should

be noted that, as a result of the fighting by the reconnaissance and forward

detachments in the 3d Guards and 13th Armies' sectors, it was necessary to

introduce substantive corrections into the plan for the artillery offensive. In

these armies' offensive sectors, the artillery had to change its combat for-

mations and carry out the artillery preparation against the enemy's second

defensive belt. The change in the artillery's combat formations was carried

out on time, and the artillery supported the forces when they penetrated the

Germans' second defensive belt. The plan for artillery support of the com-

mitment of the tank armies into the penetration was also substantively

changed. In view of the fact that the tank armies were committed into the

penetration in a completely different situation than foreseen by the plan,

principal attention was focused on the support of the tank and mechanized

corps by mobile army units and on solid support of their flanks.

The artillery played an especially great role in the repelling of counter-

attacks by enemy tank groupings in the Zborov region and in the battles for

the Sandomierz bridgehead. The timely movement of antitank artillery

brigades and regiments forward into the 'Koltuv corridor' had great significance in protecting the flanks of the 3d Guards Tank and 4th Tank Armies

as they entered the penetration. In the Sandomierz bridgehead, the artillery

also executed its main mission of fighting against counterattacking enemy

tanks. “

I am not sure there is a great deal more that can be said. Above what they are saying is, “yup, AT doctrine and the use of separate AT units was fine, not one of the things to change.”

The numbers of separate AT units and type of guns was discussed way back in the thread. The numbers of German “threat” or offensive AFVs has been dealt with. The question of the tactical use of separate AT regiments had been dealt with, TM30-430 makes clear that the densities were typically one 24 gun regiment to a 2km frontage, to which one would have to add a few guns from supporting infantry units. The following passage, although relating to very start of the war, also gives a clear and unambiguous view of Soviet thinking on density, from the Dunn book.

“In the early months of the war, Russian antitank guns were spread evenly over the front in

a thin defensive zone, six to nine guns per km in a depth of 2 or 3 km.15

There were too few guns at any point to stop a German panzer attack. The

shortage of guns was partly responsible, but a doctrine of spreading the guns out

at the front rather than concentrating them in large numbers at likely points also

was faulty.

In reaction to the threat posed by massed panzer attacks, the Russians had

formed independent antitank brigades. On April 24, 1941, ten antitank brigades

were formed with two regiments each with 24 76mm guns, a battalion with 12

107mm guns, two battalions with 12 85mm guns, an antiaircraft battalion of 8

37mm guns and 36 machine guns, and an engineer mine-laying battalion. The

ten antitank brigades were assigned to the three border military districts in June

1941. The antitank brigade provided an antitank gun line for 5 or 6 km of front

with from 20 to 25 guns per km, three to four times the density achieved by

spreading out the guns evenly.”

I could also quote passages that say densities of 6 to 9 guns per km were far exceeded in practice and so on…

The Soviets estimated that two thirds of German panzers destroyed, were destroyed by towed AT guns. All of the above helps to explain why.

All the best,

Kip.

[Andreas]

Ugh agh ugh.

Another thread moved. w00t!

[SgtMuhammed]

Bored Andreas?

[dieseltaylor]

Very interesting information. Thank you Kipanderson for taking the time to provide the source information.

A recent thread led to this

MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS

IN THE

BATTLE OF KURSK

which details their similar thinking in respect of mobile mine laying regiments.Ties in very nicely with ATG groupings.

Thanks guys

[Andreas]

Originally posted by sgtgoody (esq):

Bored Andreas?

nah, just trying to spice forum life up a bit

[MikeyD]

My head is spinning from trying to follow the various points in this thread.

Anyone want more anecdotal accounts?

In Jentz's 'Tiger Tactics' I believe he had several accounts of Tigers doing infantry support suffering under a veritable (as opposed to virtual) hail of anti-tank fire of all sizes (including AT rifles), with hits sometimes exceeding 100. Circumstances often dictated the poor Tiger had to stand its ground with the men on the front line -- if the Tiger tried to withdraw to better positions the panicky troops would often withdraw with it.

Granted, a Tiger sitting on the front line would probably draw significantly more attention than most other tanks, and we don't know if the account was considered notable because it was unusual or because it was typical. But it seems to indicate the number of anti-tank assets employed in a typical defensive scenario could be raised significantly without crossing the line of believability.

I vaguely recall way back at the beginning (either during the Beta or when the game first came out) someone decided to place a VERY large number of anti-tank rifles into a test scenario. Maybe a proper Battalion's worth from a 1942-3 TO&E (maybe someone else recall this test). What they lacked in punch they certainly made up for in volume. And their density on the battlefield was EXPONENTIALLY higher than is usually seen in a typical CMBB scenario.

[dieseltaylor]

What was noticeable - by its absence was the mention of mines in preventing the overun of the AT and infantry at Kursk.

To give a flavour of the extent of the value -

As the German forces approached the Soviet Second Defense Belt, they encountered the protective minefields laid in advance. In addition, the Soviet engineers of the Mobile Obstacle Detachments intensified their activities in laying mines on the German routes of advance. On July 6, engineer units of Central Front laid more than 9,000 mines, in addition to destroying some 16 bridges. During this day of fighting, 88 German tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces were stopped in these minefields -- 65 of them in minefields laid during the battle. Clearly mines continued to be an important factor in the battle.

Gen. Model recognized that the Soviet minefields and strong defenses had prevented a quick tank-supported breakthrough. He considered that the original plan of reaching Kursk quickly with a tank-led spearhead was now impossible. To penetrate the Second Defense Belt would take four or five days of slow, grinding attacks and would require a heavy expenditure of men, materiel, and munitions.

Once the German attack entered the Soviet front line company strong points, the tactical concept was to eliminate the Soviet positions one by one. Each strong point was an essential link in the chain of interlocking fire -- each company strong point depended on its neighbors to lay down a curtain of fire across its front. Thus as soon as they captured one strong point, the Germans planned to "roll up" the neighboring strong points from the flank. The Soviets, of course, were well aware of the German tactics and, as Section G indicated, attempted to forestall them by:

? Deep defensive belts rather than thin lines

? Providing defense in depth: eight defense belts

? Masses of artillery and antitank guns

? Reserves for counterattacks at every echelon

? Extensive use of mines

There is about a hundred pages of analysis so a few brief excerpts is all you get. For the real deal go here

http://www.geocities.com/armysappersforward/

and scroll down.

You will see also an article on Hobart and his funnies - very interesting.

[rexford]

Following site has breakdown of hits on damaged Panthers by gun size, most hits and penetrations of Panther flank armor at Kursk seem 76.2mm field guns (or tanks?):

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/bookshelf/losses/losses6.html

45mm hits and penetrations occurred.

[Andreas]

Some more food on this matter. German studies looking at operations surrounding the Fester Platz Tarnopol desaster in March/April 1944 (Fricke) and the Panzeroperationen Doppelkopf and Caesar in August 1944 (Niepold) mention the rapid deployment of independent AT units on the Soviet side.

I would argue that these two case studies are providing the AARs of Panzerdivisions that, if not stopped, are finding it very difficult to deal with the Soviet Pakfronts in front of them.

Panzerverband Friebe, consisting of an armoured element of 8.PD, most significantly its Panther Abteilung, failed to break through a defensive line consisting mostly of infantry and PAK. No own losses are given, and the Soviet losses claimed are 25 PAK/light guns, and 3 T34s. Interestingly, Friebe in his AAR writes that the denial of a Tiger Abteilung was one major reason why his attack failed. Because his unit by itself was too weak to broaden the breakthrough, it was constantly threatened from the flank.

A repeat occured on the 14th April, when what then had become Gruppe Friebe, reinforced by armoured elms of 9th SS failed in attacking "a strong infantry and AT defense supported by artillery." (KTB AOK 4. Pz Armee). On the day, the strength of Gruppe Friebe is 12 Tigers, 21 Panthers, 38 Panzer IV, and 27 Stugs. A total of 98 AFVs.

[Moon]

I have a nice little booklet called "Kursk 1944" from the polish military history publisher Bellona here (ISBN 831109184-6), and in it the average density of AT guns per sqkm is given for the various fronts around Kursk. I won't copy all of it here, but just a few figures (the figures are "avg. no. of AT-guns per sqkm - 45mm to 76mm):

Central Front

48th Army - 12.4

13th Army - 23.7

70th Army - 8.3

65th Army - 6.1

60th Army - 3.8

Voronezh Front

38th Army - 3.5

40th Army - 11.3

6th - 9.0

7th - 10.1

There are also figures including howitzers (listed as 76mm-203mm) and mortars (which are obviously even higher, e.g. 91.6 per sqkm for the 13th Army - compare with above).

Hope this is interesting.

Martin

[Andreas]

Well, I have now scanned a map and the AAR by Oberst Friebe, written after his failure to break through. I have only scanned the first part of the AAR, not the bit where he shifts the blame (rightly!) on Balck and Raus.

Gefechtsbericht über den Einsatz des Panzerverbandes Friebe in Richtung Tarnopol am 25. Marz 1944

Die Hoffnung des Verbandes und die Absicht des XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps, nach dem Einsatz von Brody dem Verband eine Atempause zu gewahren, erfüllte sich nicht. Bei einer Besprechung beim XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps am 24.3. 1944 um 16.00 Uhr erhielt der Verband den Auftrag, am 25. 3. früh aus dem Raum Jeziema im Zuge der Rollbahn auf Tarnopol durchzustoßen, hierdurch der dort eingeschlossenen Besatzung Entlastung zu bringen, nach Möglichkeit ein Versorgungsgeleit durchzuschleusen und bis zum Abend hinter die eigene HKL zurückzukehren. Die Bitte, dem Verband hierzu noch die im Abschnitt Jezierna eingesetzte Tigerabteilung 507 zu unterstellen, wurde vom XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps - anscheinend aufgrund der Lage im Gesamtabschnitt des Korps - nicht erfüllt. Jedoch wurde zugesagt, daß die bei Jeziema selbst eingesetzte Tiger-Kompanie dieser Abteilung durch begrenzten Vorstoß von Jezierna nach Osten zunächst dem Panzerverband den Austritt aus dem Raum Jezierna öffnen sollte und daß sie femer nach Durchstoß des Verbandes in Richtung Tarnopol die Sicherung der Rollbahn etwa bis halbwegs Tarnopol übemehmen sollte. Am 25. 3. 1944 um 5.45 Uhr tritt der Verband planmäßig von Jezierna im Zuge der Rollbahn in Richtung Tarnopol an, voraus als Stoßkeil die Pantherabteilung, dahinter das Panzergrenadierregiment mit 1 Bataillon rechts der Straße und 1 Bataillon links der Straße. Infolge des vorausgegangenen Vorstoßes der Tiger bis auf die Höhen 2,5 km SO Jezierna erfolgte der Vorstoß des Verbandes zunächst ohne Feindberührung. Lediglich aus der Nordflanke machte sich bald Artillerie und Flakfeuer bemerkbar. Auf der Rollbahn selbst wurde Verminung in größerem Umfange festgestellt. Im weiteren Vorgehen im Zuge der Rollbahn stieß der Verband auf jeder die Rollbahn querenden Hohenrippe auf ausgebaute Infanteriestellungen, die äußerst stark mit Pak besetzt waren. 4 solcher Pakstellungen mußten in hartem Kampf durchbrochen werden, wobei etwa 25 Pak beziehungsweise leichte Geschütze vernichtet wurden. Mit Anäherung an den Raum Tarnopol nahm der Feindwiderstand zu. Auch die zunehmende Flankierung, vor allen Dingen durch Pak, aus der Nordflanke deutete darauf hin, daß der Gegner von Norden her gegen die Rollbahn Kräfte heranführte. Dies zwang, Kräfte des Verbandes zum Schutz der Nordflanke nördlich der Rollbahn stehen zu lassen. Am späten Vormittag stand der Verband mit Masse westlich des Waldes 4 km W Zagrobela und damit anscheinend vor der stärksten feindlichen Stellung. Der Wald war stark mit Pak und Panzerbüchsen besetzt, femer befand sich in ihm eine Anzahl Panzer, die schwer zu fassen waren. Starkes Granatwerferfeuer und in zunehmendem Maße Artilleriefeuer leichter und schwerer Kaliber griff zusammengefaßt und gut liegend von Osten und Norden, schließlich auch von Südosten in den Kampf ein. Die Masse der schweren Kaliber schien aus dem Raum ostwärts des Sereth-Abschnittes zu kommen. Es verdichtete sich immer mehr der Eindruck, daß der Verband vor der letzten, am stärksten ausgebauten Stellung stand, die zur Abwehr etwaiger Entsatzversuche von Tarnopol errichtet war. Auch feindliche Schlachtflieger griffen den Verband an. Der Angriff auf diese Stellung erschien, insbesondere auch mangels jeder eigenen Artillerie, sehr verlustreich, wenn nicht gar aussichtslos. Es wurde daher der EntschluB gefaßt, den Verband unter Belassung von schwachen Teilen vor der feindlichen Hauptstellung nach Süden umzugruppieren und den Angriff nördlich Janowka vorbei auf Zagrobela zu führen. Infolge des Ausfalles der wichtigsten Führer (Regimentskommandeur Panzergrenadierregiment und Bataillonskommandeur des Schwerpunktbataillons gefallen) und des gleichzeitigen Ausfalls der entsprechenden Funkstellen verzögerte sich diese Umgruppierung. Sie war etwa gegen 12.00 Uhr beendet. Die inzwischen angesetzte Aufklärung in der neuen Angriffsrichtung ergab, daß der Verband auch hier vor sehr stark ausgebauten Stellungen lag. Dazu machte sich in zunehmendem Maße der Feinddruck in der Nordflanke nördlich der Rollbahn und jetzt auch von Südwesten her bemerkbar. Es war klar, daß ein Durchbruch aus der jetzigen Bereitstellung auf Tarnopol nur unter weiteren hohen personellen und materiellen Ausfällen und erheblichem Zeitbedarf möglich sein würde. Die Zeitberechnung schon vor Beginn des Tarnopoluntemehmens hatte ergeben, daß der Rückmarsch hinter die eigene HKL spätestens etwa zwischen 13.00 und 14.00 Uhr erfolgen mußte, wenn der Verband einigermaßen kampfkräftig zurückkehren wollte. Zahlreiche Panzer und SPW lagen in dem morastigen Gelände fest und mußten geborgen werden. Die Fortsetzung des Angriffs auf Tarnopol hatte dies bei dem notwendigen Zeitbedarf unmöglich gemacht. Ich stand vor dem Entschluß, den sicherlich sehr schweren und verlustreichen Angriff zu führen oder das Untemehmen abzubrechen.

Here is the accompanying map. The Soviet resistance lines can clearly be seen in the centre (black arrows are the German advance, 4-digit numbers are the time, the zick-zack lines are the Soviet positions)

Friebe's command was of course not a full Panzerdivision, and most importantly lacked heavy artillery. He could also have broken through the last position, but then he would not have been able to return, in his assessment.

Ironically, the fear of the establishment of a strong Pakfront was one of the reasons for the hasty cobbling together of the relief attempt of Tarnopol on March 25th, and the failure to wait for the assembly of a stronger force.

Pakfronts also feature highly in the failure of 9th SS and Friebe to break through to Tarnopol on April 14th, when it all ended.

In a different theatre, half a year away, rapid deployment of AT Brigades was also used by 1st Baltic Front under Bagramyan to deal with the German attacks to reopen connections to AG North near Schaulen (Siauliai). The first order was to integrate divisional artillery into the first line of resistance of the infantry battalions. The next thing was to bring in four AT Brigades (three from STAVKA reserve, probably the 8th Gun Artillery Division). This deployment was noted by the Germans, who commented on the high number of ATGs destroyed.

1st Tank Corps was used in the battles and taken out of Front Reserve, but the 19th was put into Front Reserve. Here is an interesting quote by Bagramjan: "Special consideration was to be taken by him to build up a strong AT defense, in order to destroy the massed tank attacks together with the 3rd Air Army." from his recollection of his order to Gen. Skornjakov, who took over 5th GTA (then with 17 tanks) when Solomatin was wounded. Bagramjan ends his account of operation 'Doppelkopf' lavishing praise on his AT gunners.