The Battle of Kursk: Myths and Reality

[Barkhorn1x]

(apologies if this was posted before)

http://www.uni.edu/~licari/citadel.htm

There is a tremendous amount of misunderstanding about how CITADEL progressed. This misunderstanding is fueled by oft-repeated, but false, descriptions of the combat that took place. Perhaps no other author has contributed as much to these myths as Martin Caiden. His book, The Tigers are Burning was published in 1973 and quickly became a bestseller, and was a "selection of the month" for various book clubs. Due to its popularity it was reprinted in 1980. It is fairly safe to say that the main, if not only, source of information on CITIDEL for western readers was Caiden's book. This is unfortunate, because although his book is exciting to read (it ranks with Tom Clancy's best thrillers), it is almost entirely wrong. It is so wrong, that I have seen it stocked in the "fiction" section of used book stores, which is entirely appropriate.

This guy pulls it together well I think.

Barkhorn.

[MikeyD]

Ooooh, the curse of 'popular' histories! Always willing to sacrifice a little accuracy (or some times alot) for the sake of a good tale. Even some of the most highly regarded sources (like Cooper's 'Death Traps') can have some real howlers that a decent 'peer review' reading would've easily caught.

Can anybody provide a couple examples of popular -though ahistorical- Kursk facts floating around out there?

[Wartgamer]

The story of Kursk really needed data from both sides. It was probably not till after the Soviet Union collapsed that real data could be weighed against what was 'known' up till then.

I wonder about reports of the German barrage being bigger than the Polish and French campaigns combined..

Ten minutes before the Offensive was to begin and the German artillery barrage was to open up, the Soviets launched their own bombardment with 600 guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers belong to Central Front which lasted for thirty minutes. The German response was slow at first but by 4.45am had grown in intensity. In fact the weight of shells fired during this bombardment was heavier than that fired during the whole of the Polish and French campaigns. A second Russian battery opened up but was ineffectual in disrupting German assembly areas and after the war Zhukov, analyzing the battle admitted that both fronts had opened up too early as German armor and infantry were still under cover. However some of General Model's troops were caught in the open and could not start their attack until 90 minutes after their scheduled start time. The Großdeutschland division had made the best progress advancing towards its objective of Oboyan forcing the Russian 3rd Mechanized Corps back to the River Pena.

[MikeyD]

Barrage bigger than...?

Hmmm, might be hyperbole (on par with that famously absurd line that the Jeep "won the war") but its been my impression the scale of the war grew exponentially after Hitler went into Russia. I frankly don't have a proper mental grasp of the scale of the Polish campaign - an affect of their not being an early war CM game for reference

[Wartgamer]

I believe the Germans fired off something like 2 million 105mm and 150mm arty rounds during Poland alone. I would guess that they also did up a likewise amount during France. It just does not seem correct that they could have fired off that many rounds in one opening barrage.

The Germans did move many units into the battle area including FlaK units. Theres a spreadsheet around somewhere.

[Wartgamer]

http://diana.gl.nps.navy.mil/~twlucas/Student%20theses/Turker%20PDF/09Chapter3.pdf#search='Kursk%20units'

interesting

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Barkhorn1x:

[snips]

Perhaps no other author has contributed as much to these myths as Martin Caiden. His book, The Tigers are Burning was published in 1973 and quickly became a bestseller, and was a "selection of the month" for various book clubs. Due to its popularity it was reprinted in 1980. It is fairly safe to say that the main, if not only, source of information on CITIDEL for western readers was Caiden's book.

Oh dear. I seem to have formed my opinions on Kursk entirely without the assistance of Martin Caidin, as I believe has every other wargamer I know personally.

Still, it's always nice to see people trying to win the debrief for the Germans sixty years later.

All the best,

John.

[Barkhorn1x]

Oh dear. I seem to have formed my opinions on Kursk entirely without the assistance of Martin Caidin, as I believe has every other wargamer I know personally.

Good for you. For me however, at the age of 14, the Caidin book was the only book in my library on the Eastern Front.

Still, it's always nice to see people trying to win the debrief for the Germans sixty years later.

Read the article first - THEN comment.

All the best,

Barkhorn.

[Barkhorn1x]

Wartgamer:

That link has the same Prokorvoka BS that the article I quoted talks about - but they do go on to say that the description of the battle losses is totally contradicted by the data in their tables.

Barkhorn.

[ June 14, 2005, 06:12 PM: Message edited by: Barkhorn1x ]

[JasonC]

And here is a bag of wet straw. (Whack whack. Whack). Isn't this profound? (Whack).

How about we demolish the real myths, the ones some people actually believe? Like the nonsense about Sicily (which diverted nothing), coupled with complete silence about Orel (which diverted 2 panzer corps instantly and stopped the northern attack - without which the southern was kind of pointless). Or the nonsense about entire Panzer corps that supposedly lost 4 tanks in a week (I exaggerate very slightly), but strangely had no runners left. Or the nonsense about the 14 kills per Tiger per hour anecdotes, when actually the average Tiger took about maybe 4 tanks apiece in the month, passing through the shop at least once to do so.

It was a big battle. The Germans destroyed more than they lost, but ran out of forces to continue. And lost the battle. Badly. And with it the war. Don't take my word for it, that was the assessment of the best leaders on the German side immediately after the event.

[Wartgamer]

So if people believe a myth, its a real myth? If I choose to not believe a myth, is it a false myth?

[Wartgamer]

Originally posted by Barkhorn1x:

Wartgamer:

That link has the same Prokorvoka BS that the article I quoted talks about - but they do go on to say that the description of the battle losses is totally contradicted by the data in their tables.

Barkhorn.

Yes its interesting. I would pay attention to the data.

The Germans lost too many tanks in the first few days. At an unacceptable 'exchange' rate to soviet tanks lost (mind you many german tanks were lost to minefields, ATG, etc). The Germans could not afford to lose at a 2:1 ratio ever.

Later in the battle, it was the Soviets chance to get bled. But they could afford it.

[Barkhorn1x]

Please read the article people - it's not tha that long.

The "Sicily thing":

Myth #7: Hitler called off CITADEL because the Americans and British landed on Sicily and the Germans needed to shift forces to the western front. This component of the overall myth of Kursk is undoubtedly due to western authors trying to increase the otherwise paltry contributions of the western allies in 1943. In actual fact, the German units on the southern face of the Kursk salient received new orders to renew their attacks several days after the landing on Sicily. Hitler called off CITADEL not because a couple of British and American divisions were attacking a strategically insignificant island in the Mediterranean, but because the Soviets had (1) blunted and stalled the German CITADEL offensive, and (2) launched their own massive offensives on the flanks of the German attack. These attacks soaked up reserves the Germans had planned on using to complete the destruction of the Kursk salient. Without them, the Germans were too weak to continue CITADEL and they began withdrawing their units.

...and the "Germans could have won thing":

It is doubtful that the Germans could have kept moving forward at all anyway. The north face had degenerated into static warfare before the Germans even got through all the defensive lines. On the south face, the Germans enjoyed some forward progress, but at a tremendous cost. Loses in AFVs, vehicles, and men were high enough to soak up a significant portion of the offensive power of the German armored divisions. Further, the attack had been launched with insufficient infantry forces. The salient that the armored units pushed forward could not be adequately protected due to a lack of infantry divisions. Thus, the German offensive was contained and stalled. Having the three SS Panzergrenadier divisions move forward after the battle at Prokhorovka would have made things worse, not better, for the Germans.

The larger quesition is WHAT exactly would the Germans have won if they won? The elimination of the salient would not have changed the strategic picture all that much. Citadel was an Operational level event on the German side - with little or no thought given to what needed to come next. The Soviets viewed it as part of the overall strategic picture however, as they went from a defensive stance in the salient - to the offensive elswhere - once the German thrust was blunted.

Barkhorn.

[Cogust]

I think the goal with the entire offensive was to cut off a large number of Russians and eliminate them with only light German losses, that would give the Germans close to numerical parity to the Russians which would mean that they could stalemate the entire East front for a couple of years until they could reach some sort of deal with the Western Allies.

Didn't happen though as the Soviets knew the German plans and prepared for them.

[JasonC]

"undoubtedly due to western authors trying to increase the otherwise paltry contributions of the western allies"

Bzzt. Wrong answer. German side historians have been peddling this for decades as support for the claim that the Germans won the battle (based on losses etc) and only called it off for other reasons. Zetterling for example. No desire to increase western reps is involved. Simply an intense dislike of admitting the Russians won.

[Dave H]

Let me get my facts straight:

Myth #4: Prokhorovka was the "death ride of the Panzers" because the Germans lost so many tanks.

Simply put, the Germans put a licking on the Red Army.

But wasn't it the Red Army that advanced after the battle, all the way to Berlin? I must have fallen victim to lots of myths. After reading this article I'm not sure I still believe that Germany surrendered any more. Help!! :eek: :eek:

[JasonC]

Here is another myth some people actually still believe - that the Russian defenses at Kursk were one continuous PAK front, hundreds of guns lined up for every kilometer. That the defense worked because it was so well prepared, waiting for the Germans, who could not attack so many defensive guns. The reality is the front was enourmous and the Russians were deployed in great depth. They knew the operational area the Germans would attack, but not the exact tactical points.

The AT network was a huge array of small cells covered by single batteries of ATGs, occasionally pairs of them. 45mms in the forward belts, 76mm in the later ones (including div arty positions incorporated into the ATG scheme).

The large figures frequently quoted for "guns per kilometer" originate in Russian staff studies that calculated such figures for local odds and effective concentration analysis. But they include mortars, which make up a third of the total (lots of battalion 82s, divisional and independent 120s), and indirect and HE chucker only artillery (regimental IGs, divisional and corps 122s, rockets, etc) for another third. Only about a third of the quoted totals are typically direct fire ATGs and duel use divisional guns incorporated into the ATG scheme.

In addition, that third are spread to a depth or 30 km, in divisional tiers, and frequently with double line positions (regiments up and back etc) within eac of those tiers, as well. At the points of attack on the first day, entire panzer regiments only encountered a few batteries of 45mm in the first line. Nowhere did the ATG network present any serious obstacle to the initial break-in.

The primary initial AT defense was not the gun network, it was the mine belts. Those held up the Germans for hours in places. And they created a paper-scissors-rock chain, tanks beat defenders without mines, mines strip tanks off, pioneers clear mines, effective HE from artillery messes up pioneers. For the first few hours. This bought time for shifting of immediate reserves and attrited the German tanks (especially important for heavies not otherwise easily disabled e.g. Panthers and Elephants), but nowhere stopped them.

Some Russian side accounts present ATGs as mobile reserves rushed to the exact sector of attack, instead of a continuous gun front. This was done but is misleading as a general statement (claiming they weren't "penny packeted" e.g). Only about a quarter of the ATGs present were in independent ATG formations, the rest were in the divisions and especially in the RDs. Those did shift to points of attack, but not always the right ones. In the north for instance the initial Russian assessment of the point of main effort was off by about one corps' deployment width (measured on the German side). The amount of them allowed the second line of existing ATG belts to be doubled, basically, where the reaction was correctly directed.

They also shifted minelaying detachments in front of perceived points of main effort, though those needed time to rebuild a thick enough field. While the Russians (and e.g. Glantz) emphasize their role, there are few German side battle narrative reports of serious losses to AT mines after the first few days, breaking through the initial belts. The Germans also shifted directions of attack in the south, frequently - mostly to clear flanks held up by maneuver elements, but having the incidental effect of making ATG and mine placement ahead of known axes less than fully effective.

The main process that stopped the attacks was simply the shifting of the deeply layered reserves in front of the attack points, and the arrival of those layers at the front. The force to space ratio soared in the attack sector in the north, for instance. Artillery fire also "counter-concentrated" there.

The northern attempt was on a relatively narrow front, the armor attacking essentially "in column". The first formation was a breakthrough corps, in effect, based on infantry divisions with some many attached assault guns they had PD levels of armor. Two full panzer corps were behind those. The second of them by depth never actually reached the front. It was deployed to add its weight by the end of the first week, but diverted by the Russian Orel counteroffensive. Essentially, the Germans had 2 corps worth of armor in two waves on the same narrow frontage. This meant the Russian reserves pushed up to stop the first were properly positioned, tactically, to stop the second as well. Which they did.

In the south, in contrast, the attack had 3 panzer corps worth of armor all on line, the rightward one somewhat separated from the others. The lines of advance were divergent from the start, shifted to parallel for 2 of them during the first phase, and diverged again later. The center prong did best, the others being halted from the flanks inward. Again it was waves of reserves that did the stopping.

The AD Kempf attack on the right in the south was not closely enough coordinated with the others, absent an immediate successful breakthrough. The reason for its use was clearly an ambitious hope the shoulder of the salient could be cut through and a deeper encirclement insertion made. It has some value as a diversion, causing confusion about the point of main effort, but in the end the Russian concentration of force in the decisive sectors in the south was superior to German concentration there, despite the Germans being the ones attacking.

The southern attack failed on the left quite early, with 3 PD being driven eastward and failing to clear the flank of PD GD from the second day. PD GD's initial attack was quite unsuccessful, the Panthers failing, unity of command distinctly lacking for the armor, and mines causing great difficulties. They still broke in successfully. But repeatedly had to hook to their left to keep their left flank clear, while major advances were made only "leaning" to the right. Attacks stalled on the left end of the southern sector well before the end of attacks in the center. The Germans were successfully defending ground already taken against large counterattacks.

An attack that originated with 6 corps of armor at its disposal was thereby pinched down to a single active corps, 1SS of course. It was obviously crazy to expect a single corps continuing its attacks to make any impression on the entire Russian army. Moreover, the depth of the Russian reserves allowed them, at the peak, to commit essentially an entire fresh tank army against 1SS.

It was not the outcome of the immediate tactical engagement that resulted, that halted the offensive, but the simple new piece of information that the Russians had another uncommitted tank army remaining, to trump the remaining active German corps. At that point, the only hope the Germans still had, was that maybe the Russians were out of reserves. (The front line army group was, there was just another one behind it).

German runners declined by half by then, so a depleted single corps faced an fresh full tank army. Tactically, they inflicted high losses on that army as it was committed, though losing more heavily themselves (in decline in runners) than is often admitted in German side accounts (which count TWOs instead, and wait a week). The reality is the remaining forces ratio at the point of potential continued attack was a few hundred German AFVs, practically devoid of running superior types by then, facing larger numbers of Russians even after the latter's losses.

You don't attack with negative odds with a single depleted panzer corps. Attacks expect to achieve superior odds by local concentration at chosen points. Panzer corps expect to launch major attacks while fresh, most tanks repaired, infantry battalions topped off with replacements. Not with both halved. And in coordinated thrusts along multiple axes to set up flanking threats, not a singleton straight ahead slog.

The attack was therefore completely defeated by the time it ended. Offensive concentration of armor had been defeated by defensive layered reserves simply sliding in front of them. A thin but deep force, not a thick continuous front, is what worked, because it gave the time necessary for this to happen. Every place the reserves proved sufficient reduced the scope of the offensive, until gradually there was no point left in continuing it at the reduced scale available. It was continued anyway, until the last defending reserves committed eliminated the last locations with so much as even odds, let alone local superiority.

[Barkhorn1x]

Good stuff JasonC.

Barkhorn.

[Barkhorn1x]

Originally posted by JasonC:

"undoubtedly due to western authors trying to increase the otherwise paltry contributions of the western allies"

Bzzt. Wrong answer. German side historians have been peddling this for decades as support for the claim that the Germans won the battle (based on losses etc) and only called it off for other reasons. Zetterling for example. No desire to increase western reps is involved. Simply an intense dislike of admitting the Russians won.

Yea, that was a bit of a red herring as I distinctly remember von Mellenthin claiming the same thing. Tonight I am going to look up what von Manstien has to say as well.

Barkhorn.

[A.E.B]

CITIDEL seems to be just the largest of a number of ill-thought out German counterattacks launched late in the War.

Even after reading the thoughts of the German planners themselves, it is often hard to understand what the aim - beyond fantasies like getting to Antwerp in 1945 with the Battle of the Bulge - of these offensives were.

It is almost as though the Germans were simply unwilling to await a defeat that would take years against a flexible German defense, and instead chose to waste irreplacable resources of men, material and machines for what appears to be nothing more than a temporary regaining of tactical - not strategic - inititive?

I have wondered whether the complete failure of German intelligence during the war contributed to this, and that the Germans really believed that the Allies were crumbling and, given a sufficient push, could be knocked out of the war by a limited local offensive when the vast national offensives of previous years had failed.

What Kursk, and the Battle of the Bulge, and the Counter attack in Hungary, and all the other little offensives mounted by the Germans achieved was to reveal what a shell the once-mighty German armies had become, and to hasten the end of the War by months, maybe years.

A.E.B

[JasonC]

"it is often hard to understand what the aim - beyond fantasies..."

They key thing to understand about this is that very few men on the German side fully understood the technical details of how and why they had been so successful in the early war period, from 1939 to 1941. A handful of mobile force leaders and a small portion of the most gifted officers.

Everyone else knew *that* it had worked, but not *why* it had worked. They had only a cartoonish understanding of the processes involved, and therefore of the "formula". But they believed their cartoon versions were the real thing, that the subject was not that complicated, that they fully understood how it had been done.

They had an extremely offensive minded doctrine about the use of armor, as a result. Armor attacked, that was its essence. They believed mass employment in multiple-corps level attacks was the only possible way to employ serious armor. So whenever they had any to speak of, they attempted another such attack.

You can find officers groomed by Rundstadt (not just Hitler and his cronies) with subordinates who have been attacking for a week without success, who then call it off having lost all but 30 AFVs in entire province, reprimanding those subordinates for lack of offensive spirit. Just mindblowing levels of offensive doctrine disease, "the offensive is the only decisive form of warfare" blah blah blah. (It still exists, you can find it in present US field manuals).

They hoped each one might be as outsized a success as May 1940 in France (the clear model for the Bulge concept), or as the 1941 attacks in Russian (Kursk was expected to be an army-killing "bag" like Bryansk). Even their leading theorists did not fully appreciate how much their initial successes had depended on correctable weaknesses and bad "play" by their opponents.

At the time of Kursk, though, you have to remember, no multi corps armor attack by anybody using correct doctrine had actually failed. (The Russians had failed repeatedly in such things, but usually through clear doctrinal errors). It seemed like armor created a pure offense dominance. Very few men were confident they knew how to employ armor correctly in a mobile defense - you could count them on one hand. And of those who had that confidence, they were divided as to whether attacking or defending in the summer of 1943 was the better "move".

The same division of opinion existed on the Russian side. Nobody had ever dared an opponent with multiply tank armies to take his best shot before, conceding the initiative. It was a ballsy move. The Russians didn't know if their breakthrough-defeating formula of depth would work, though they had sound theoretical reasons for expecting it to.

Nobody had ever deployed an entire army group in reserve before, without assigned frontage - any other army in the world would have regarded it as slightly insane. Everybody understood 2 up 1 back, but usually stopped practicing it at the level of reserve corps. But the Russians had seen how reserve armies railed in as a "second line" had prevented even achieved breakthroughs from losing them the war in a single campaign. So it seemed a natural piece of "insurance".

[MikeyD]

I've been of the opinion that when they failed to reach Moscow, failed to take Leningrad, and had Stalingrad wrested from their grasp the German army should've pulled up stakes entirely and got everyone back behind the Polish border ASAP. But 'national honor' dictated that they keep their hand in the bear trap (How many time has history repeated that scenario?). Besides mere survival, I don't have a clue what the German mission was in Russia after 42.

[Michael Dorosh]

I think after Dec 1942, you need to stop discussing what "the Germans" wanted, "the German mission", or "the German Army". By January 1943, it was all about Hitler. Everyone else was along for the ride. Hitler was the national head of state, the supreme commander of the entire military, and the head of the Army. The brilliant strategies at Kursk, Mortain, Ardennes, etc., were a result of his orders. Others may have done the strategic, operational and tactical planning, but I don't really believe anyone else had a say.

[Wartgamer]

Hitler wanted to keep as much of Russia as he could. He also wanted the Kursk attack by the way. But he kept delaying the attack.

Surprisingly, Stalin also wanted an attack pre-Kursk. His Generals sold him on the defense for Kursk. Stalin said he would wait but not for long.

Perhaps Hitler should have delayed the attack even further. This is certainly what some of his Generals wanted (some did not want an attack at all). If Hitler did wait, he may have got the Soviets to attack. This could have led to a defensive victory (The Germans being at a zenith in mobile power) and a chance to follow up with a counter-attack on the Soviets outside thier defensive belts.

Kursk in many ways is anti-Bltzkrieg.

[ June 15, 2005, 10:08 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[von Nev]

This is a great thread. I love dispelling myths with fact.

I still am amazed at the rhetoric arounds stats (kills/losses, etc) that "prove" the Germans won Kursk. The Germans tactically "won" numerous engagements and really did destroy huge amounts of Russian equipment and men but strategicly and operationally it was a huge loss and one that solidly placed the initiative in the Soviet camp for the remainder of the war. One has to step back and look at the overall situation on July 14, 1943, and assess which side achieved their goals.

If the German strategic and operational goal was to pinch off Kursk it was VERY far from the goal. In pure land terms they had to go roughly 200 km's to achieve their goal. They ended up 15% to 20% of the way to their goal. The northern attack was stopped cold within a week and the southern attack created a road to nowhere. In fact at the pace of the attack in the south they would have had to advance all the way to Orel to close the salient since the northern front was being threatened with encirclement and was withdrawing. Could they have continued to attack in the south? Sure, but at what cost and to achieve what? Let's assume they get to Kursk. What then? They still had a road to nowhere.

For those that believe the German goal was to destroy a lot of Russian forces to "balance" the front they failed here too. The losses the Russians incurred were not enough and the fact the Russians launched major counter offenses DURING the German attack (north towards Orel) and shortly after the calling off of the southern attack supports that claim that whatever losses the Russians took it did little to disrupt their counteroffensive timetables.

If the Russian goal was to absorb the offensive and grind it to a halt therefore maintaining the salient into the German lines and then launching a counteroffensive into the stalled German forces (especially in the flanks) I submit it achieved its goal. They probably lost more troops then they expected but they had no illusion as to the power of the attack that was expected. They did assemble 3 Fronts for the purpose of stopping the attack and dug extensive defensive belts deep into their rear. They had learned much from their defeats during the summer of 1942.

In grand strategic terms just the fact that the Russians occupied the entire Kursk battlefield (including the German starting points) and then some within a month is a glaring fact supporting the failure of the German attack. The Germans were expecting to be celebrating a great victory in the streets of Kursk by this point. It must have been a rude awakening for the "victorious" German soldiers that by August 23rd they were celebrating their victory fighting desperate defensive battles far west of Orel and south of Kharkov.