The Morale Model is RETARDED...

[Hensworth]

I figured it out when you posted the second instance where you supported an assault with fire from mortars and Tigers.

I'm unable to watch your video, but my guess is you have your suppressing units set to area fire in an effort to keep them firing when the target goes to a generic marker.

That's fine and dandy until such time as your own grunts are moving in. Then you should definitely switch to targeted fire so they'll stop once their own guys get too close.

Your troops aren't getting spooked by the enemy fire, they're getting spooked by friendly fire. This would indeed happen typically about 20m from the targeted unit, because that's where blast radii from HE and beaten zones from MGs start taking effect.

Running through your own MG fire is no problem, incidently, because the path of small arms rounds isn't modeled.

[flamingknives]

Proximity to the impact point is a problem, especially at night. Cannister fire will rout squads straight off, and it's pretty hard to spot.

[Broompatrol]

John,

You had the misfortune of quoting a 'journalist' who didn't know enough about the subject he was writing about to know how to present the information. While the points in the Time article are essentially correct, the context they are used in is misleading.

Ketosis is not the process of using muscle tissue for food, so you used the wrong word. Wiki's description of Ketosis is accurate. It is possible that some of the Brit's experienced ketosis, but unlikely because once you reintroduce enough carbs ketosis ends. They were merely starving.

If you really care, I can tell you how many calories are contained in the blood, muscles, organs and fat of the body and how it gets used. But its hardly germaine to the topic. Suffice to say the poor lads on the ground in the Falklands on both sides really had a miserable time and endured more than I think could be expected of any soldier considering what was at stake.

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Wicky,

Are you saying I used the wrong word, misemployed the right one, or what? I went with the term I'd heard used on several occasions. This article describes the concept I was trying to convey.

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,946350,00.html

Regards,

John Kettler

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Broompatrol:

It is possible that some of the Brit's experienced ketosis, but unlikely because once you reintroduce enough carbs ketosis ends. They were merely starving.

With the possible exception of some of the special forces blokes in the long-duration OPs (some of whom were too weak to stand unaided when finally extracted, IIRC) I doubt that any of the British forces in the Falklands went especially hungry. Resupply was never as far as I know interrupted, and British infantry should always be carrying a day's food, and possibly three (though the Royal Marines certainly used to train to make a 24-hour rat-pack last 3 days). Also, the compo Arctic rations were issued, which have the honking great calorific content required for physical activity in cold conditions. Nobody should have been short of blood glucose, either -- the compo ration packs at the time came with plenty of dextrose tablets and boiled sweets, it being known from combat experience that troops in action need sugar but often can't eat anything bulkier than sweeties. I think the little green tubes of delicious sweet condensed milk had just been discontinued by then, but there might have been some of those around too, probably the only ration item worth trading your oatmeal block for.

Jason has mentioned the superior morale of the British infantry as a decisive factor, and there can be no doubt that it was. At the time, British Army training classified "administration and morale" as a single subject for instruction; the business of maintaining troops' morale was regarded as intimately tied in with the provision of such banal items as adequate rations, regular mail and dry socks. It was also, as it still is, a principle of leadership that officers were to put the comfort of their men before their own. Contrast the success of the British logistic effort with the Argentine, and the attitudes of the leaders on each side to their men, and much of the difference in battlefield performance is explained, even disregarding the fact that the British were highly-trained professionals and the Argentines largely freshly-inducted conscripts.

The Falklands are cold, treeless, and dotted with sheep, in which respects they strongly resemble British training areas such as Woodbury Common, in which the Marines and Army had spent years practicing battles fought "on the side of a hill, in pouring rain, where two maps meet". In many ways, the Falklands was precisely the war the British ground forces had been practicing for over the previous thirty or forty years.

All the best,

John.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by GreenAsJade:

(I do agree with Redwolf's beef about the actual orders the AI gives when panic happens, but it really doesn't affect gameplay that much... it's irritating at worst).

Some do, such as:

Exhaustion you get after after sneaking you didn't order and where a "heads down, no move" should have been ordered instead.

AFVs showing sides (but not from real fleeing).

AFVs ruining hit chances by backing up the second they fire.

Infantry crawling towards the enemy. Might happen but not the way it goes there where they even crawl up hills towards the enemy. Of course you get the exhaustion on top.

Now, all of the above CAN sometimes be realistic, but the way and frequency they are given at in CMBB/CMAK is far too great, so my point is that just "cancel all orders, heads down, stay put" would overall the better thing to do in the game. It also doesn't mix well with things like the super-slow turn rates (about half of real life for some vehicles) and the exhaustion rates during what CMBB/CMAK call "sneaking". The CMBO sneaking+crawling was better anyway. Of course the run wasn't.

[Squatdog]

Goose Green was the battle with the weakest fire support, and the lesson re-learnt from it was that you need adequate gunner support to make a successful attack without excessive casualties.

The initial assault on Mt Longdon was conducted with NO artillery support and decisive action lead by Ian Mackay and Stewart Mclaughlin (as well as the charge lead by Major Kizely on Tumbledown) was carried by the Guards or Paras overruninng the enemy positions with fixed bayonets in a classic infantry action.

The problem with the battle at Goose Green was that it was largely politically motivated and originally intended as a RAID, but gradually morphed into a very poorly thought-out assault on an extensive enemy position outnumbered TWO TO ONE, with inadequate support.

If the Paras remained as indifferent to small-arms fire as you seem to believe in their attempts to close with the enemy, then I should like to know what explanation you have for the times and distances involved.

1- Because they were advancing over a substantial distance against an enemy who outnumbered them two to one, who were in prepared positions and outgunned them greatly.

2- At no point did the Paras BREAK AND RUN due to morale failure which theis WHOLE THREAD is about!

[Squatdog]

1) Your infantry was running across open ground and was 'alerted'.

So what?

2) Your infantry was out of command radius for its platoon HQ - black line, not red, joining it to platoon HQ.

According to John Kettler, being in command isn't much of a factor unless the HQ section has a morale bonus.

3) Your infantry ran across the firing path of one of your own HMGs which put them into 'panic' and forced them to the ground.

They were in the vague vicinity of some machinegun fire from a tank for THREE SECONDS, which caused no casualties, yet caused them to panic.

4) Your infantry was then blasted by canister rounds, either from your tanks or from the enemy, video is too poor to tell which, which broke them and forced them to rout.

The infantry was supported from pointblank range by three tanks, one of whom fired a single shell when the enemy popped it's head up.

Infantry do not like having canister fired at them

Infantry do not like 200m sprints across open terrain.

Infantry do not like being hosed down by HMG fire from their own side.

[Squatdog]

LMAO@ketosis creeping into this thread...I guess the British troops were using the fore-runner of the Adkins diet or Dan Duchaine's BodyOpus regime?

[John Kettler]

Squatdog,

As far back as the CMBO Beta Demo, friendly fire wasn't. I say this from the perspective of someone who carefully set up a base of fire with HMG-42s and hammered away therewith to suppress the defenders of a small stone building, preparatory to launching a textbook Panzer Grenadier assault, with the troops debussing practically on the doorstep. The whole thing came unglued when my halftracks were mysteriously hit and disabled and my Panzer Grenadiers knocked about by what I rapidly determined to be HMG-42 fire I had failed to turn off before racing in with my 251s. I still carried the objective, but I learned a bitter lesson about the proper handling of support fires.

Judging from the comments of those who've seen your video, you made my mistake and then some, and wound up paying a terrible price. This is to be expected, for CM mercilessly punishes mistakes, and being backshot(?) by your own supporting fires, while out of command, definitely falls under that rubric.

Broompatrol,

Appreciate the clarification, but what's the correct term for when the body starts eating itself by converting muscles and organs to energy?

John D Salt,

Judging from the MoD film I cited, things were not good at all on the ration front during the yomp.

Are you treating the Paras as regular troops or as SpecOps in your reply? Based on the MoD film. I'd

say they fell in the latter category.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Guest Mike]

the bayonet attack by B company 3 Para was made at night and surprised the 1 platoon of Argentines on "Fly half", who never-the-less fought on.

At least 1 section of British charged straight past some Argentines, encountering no oppositin until they opened up from behind! (as an aside I was once in an enemy party for some Ghurkas and they did this too in a dawn attack - they went straight past my little foxhole & I "shot" them from the rear - if it had been for real & I'd held my nerve it would have been a massacre. In another time on the same exercise a M-113 pulled up about 10 yards from me without seeing me, with all the troops sitting on top - one grenade & it would have been very messy!)

When another platoon and engineers arrived to reinforce the defender things got quite sticky for hte Brits.

A counter-attack by Argentinians almost reached the aid post - being stopped by 5 men - the fittest of the wounded. but hte British were forced to withdraw from "Fly half" leaving their dead behind.

Of the Argintinian platoon originally on the feature 21 out of 46 remained with the unit.

total casualties British 17 dead, 40 wounded, Argentinians 31 dead 120 wounded 50 prisoners over the course of the whole battle.

Classic infantry action? Maybe, but the British were forced to retreat by not more than equal numbers - 4 platoons or Argentines vs B company 3 Para.

[Squatdog]

Did the British forces panic and run in the face of enemy fire?

[Squatdog]

The whole thing came unglued when my halftracks were mysteriously hit and disabled and my Panzer Grenadiers knocked about

The problem is that the section in the video was ROUTED and incapable of action for the subsequent six turns despite not taking a SINGLE casualty and only being under ineffective fire for THREE SECONDS!

Are you treating the Paras as regular troops or as SpecOps in your reply?

Elite Light Infantry in the same mould as the Royal Marines(who have the longest training duration in NATO as far as I know).

[McIvan]

Well, taking fire from behind will do that. Six minutes to regroup is nothing in real life terms, although it's an eternity on the CM battlefield.

[Squatdog]

But being ROUTED and fleeing uncontrollably despite not having a single shot fired in their direction, not taking a single casualty and only being under ineffective friendly fire for three seconds???

[Soddball]

Originally posted by Squatdog:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />1) Your infantry was running across open ground and was 'alerted'.

So what?</font>

[John Kettler]

Squatdog,

The lower the quality of the men to begin with, the more run down they are, and the worse their morale state, the more important HQs become. For assaulting across open ground, unless maybe with veteran or better, you need not just troops in red line range, but preferably under the command of an HQ with morale, combat, and command bonuses. The first is for withstanding counterfire without breaking, the second for improving fighting efficiency, and the last allowing more tactical dispersion while still staying in command. This enhances survivability by forcing the defender to spread fires more. Stealth doesn't matter much when attacking across the open, guns blazing!

In CM, men are very sensitive to any fire delivered from the rear. Thus, if your men were already alerted, then came under fire from the rear, while out of command, I don't have a major problem with their reaction. Remember, all they know is that they're being shot at from front and rear at once. They don't know, as you do from your uniquely informed position, that the fire from the rear is friendly, and it's even worse once IDed as such. All they know is they're being shot at while exposed and on the move. Alerted men are already somewhat "windy" as you may recall.

If you read combat accounts, sometimes a single shot is all it takes to paralyze as much as a company. This sort of thing happened repeatedly during the invasion of Grenada and drew considerable criticism in consequence.

Likewise, you can read accounts from Vietnam in which the grunts went to ground and stayed there once the first hostile bullet cracked unless and until taken in hand and led by their officers and noncoms. See, for example, GUNS UP!

Marine sniper Carlos Hathcock and his spotter, alternating time on the rifle, kept an entire NVA company pinned down for an afternoon, until nightfall finally allowed the Americans to withdraw, having badly bloodied the NVA with one headshot after another. And that was frontal fire with one bolt action rifle, admittedly in expert hands, against men behind downed trees and armed with AK-47s. Unfortunately for the NVA troops, the engagement was outside their effective range, but still dangerous to the Marines from volume of fire and the AK's heavy bullet and its ability to penetrate cover.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Axel]

Listen to the people that know about this stuff Squatdog, for the record i always do the same mistakes

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

John D Salt,

Judging from the MoD film I cited, things were not good at all on the ration front during the yomp.

What was the title of the film?

It's not fun eating nothing but compo for weeks on end, but I doubt that anyone ever missed a resupply.

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Are you treating the Paras as regular troops or as SpecOps in your reply? Based on the MoD film. I'd

say they fell in the latter category.

The simple definition is that they aren't special forces unless they come under Director, Special Forces. The paras at the time came under D. Inf., and still do, apart from the bn re-roled as "rangers" (IMHO a bloody silly name, as the term "ranger" has never previously had SF connotations in British usage, and if the clowns in MoD had had the slightest feeling for tradition they could happily have resurrected the name of, say, the Raiding Support Regiment, even if they felt obliged to change its non-PC motto, "Quit you like men").

All the best,

John.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

In many ways, the Falklands was precisely the war the British ground forces had been practicing for over the previous thirty or forty years.

All the best,

John.

False bravado or not, when some of us were at Wainwright in 1988 talking with British soldiers in the Mad Dog Saloon and asking wide-mouthed if any of them had been to the Falklands, one squaddie piped up with "Good little exercise, that was." Nothing I've ever read has caused me to doubt he was in earnest.

It may interest some of you to know that the first Modern ASL module will feature actions set in the Falklands. Can't say more due to a NDA but I think any ASL fan with an interest in that theatre will like what he sees.

[Vark]

I think that the use of battles in the Falklands, to justify a 'theory' of how men react under fire is fraught with potential problems. The Paras took so long to achieve their objectives, at Goose Green, because of numerous factors which cannot be replicated using the CM engine. Here are some examples.

1. D company took nearly an hour and a half to reorganise itself, in the dark, after their initial contact with the Argentinian defences.

2 Colonel H. Jones' plan was aggressive and bold but overly complex. It did not take into account the 'enemy has a vote' concept and limited his company commanders in their use of initiative. This meant that at Darwin Hill and Boca House the advance was stalled for hours when Colonel H. Jones was pinned down and eventually killed, on Darwin Hill

3. Artillery support was meagre due to lack of ammunition, faulty guns (105's) and a delay between adjusting fires, due to an enforced system of radio relays.

4. HMS Arrow, which was to have provided the initial fire support was unavailable and the plan depended on her firepower and star shells lighting up the battlefield.

5. The decision to centralise fire support, off to a flank, greatly limited the effectiveness of the SFMG's and the Milans had no night vision capability.

Personally, I am sick to death of having my advancing troops crawl across crest lines instead of just ducking behind them, when taking fire. My personal favourite, being a 251 driver (Veteran) who decided it was better to drive over a crest for 100 metres (in view of the anti-tank gun) rather than back down the slope some 10 metres. However many times I selected reverse the computer ignored me. Result, one dead veteran driver, though how the hell he managed to become a veteran, given his tactical incompetence is a mystery to me.

Bottom line, CM is a game whose flaws (much sited in previous posts) often mean the preclusion of real world tactics. Still, it's a good game that has provided me with many happy hours of entertainment.

[jtcm]

In relation to the original incident which started off this thread (and which looks like it was more complicated than Squatdog's description): do tanks fire canister, area fire, even when friendlies are within the danger cone ?

[Squatdog]

So the infantry was already starting down the road to routedom. That they were running across open ground means that there is no natural cover and thus all the penalties of attack affect them.

They were advancing in DEAD GROUND protected by enemy fire against a supressed, depleted section who couldn't even attack them until they were at pointblank range!

The MG fire 'from the tank' to which you refer was not from a tank. I know the gun noises in the game. It was from an HMG42. Tanks don't mount that kind of MG.

Thinking back, the fire was actually from a halftrack and a dismounted MG42.

In your judgement, the fire was ineffective. I viewed the video. I consider an HMG42 and a canister shell to be extremely effective weapons. Bear in mind, too, that they were shot at from behind. Incoming fire from outside the front arc has a more significant impact. Try a flanking manoeuvre on infantry in a battle and see what happens.

LOL...the machinegun fire lasted for less than THREE SECONDS and didn't cause a single casualty, yet resulted in the section panicking and none of the three tanks fired their main armament until after they were routed and were engaging a trench over a hundred metres ahead of the advancing section!

The section then panicked and ran out INTO THE OPEN and in full view of the enemy and routed nearly all the way off the field, yet STILL didn't take any casualties.

Then why did you need a full platoon of infantry and two tanks? Why didn't you just area-fire him with HMG42 for 2 minutes until he upped and ran away? Then you could have shot him in the back as he fled. You were deliberately risking your own soldiers for a worthless objective and they paid the price.

LMFAO!!!!!!

All I can say is 'wow'...

What I did was tactically sound.

I advanced a full platoon in staggered formation protected from enemy fire by dead ground, supported by an overwatch of two machineguns and assisted by tanks firing from close range. The platoon had a numerical superiority of over three to one and the enemy was effectively suppressed.

This was in order to take the first of a series of enemy postions, provide fire against the remainder and cover the flank of the 3 tanks as they moved up.

I had suppressed the position for FAR more than the two minutes you recommend, with 2 MG42s and 3 tanks firing over open sights at pointblank range and suppressed the main enemy position with mortar and offmap artillery fire.

(the following two sections passed their Dungeons and Dragons saving throw and easily overran the position)

[ May 15, 2007, 06:51 PM: Message edited by: Squatdog ]

[Squatdog]

Marine sniper Carlos Hathcock and his spotter, alternating time on the rifle, kept an entire NVA company pinned down for an afternoon

Unsuprisingly, a SNIPER is capable of pinning down an entire company, but unless this occured at pointblank range and caused three full sections to panic and run (mysterious without causing a single casulty) this example has no relevance whatsover.

[Squatdog]

Remember, all they know is that they're being shot at from front and rear at once.

In the original example, the fire was coming from the rest of their platoon and a LMG, both of which were firing before they advanced and were in FULL VIEW of the attacking sections for the duration!

[ May 15, 2007, 07:39 PM: Message edited by: Squatdog ]

[John Kettler]

John D Salt,

It has been a long time (nearly two decades) since I saw it, but it was an MoD produced film debriefing the ground combat side of the Falklands Campaign. I saw it through my local chapter of the I.P.M.S. (International Plastic Modelers' Society) and remember being astounded that despite being classified Restricted or somesuch, with no declassification markings in evidence, we got to see it as civilians. I was given to understand that strings had been pulled to make this happen, and that was was done by special arrangement. ISTR that the title was of the general form Falklands: Campaign Debrief or Falkland Islands Campaign: Lessons Learned, something like that.

Have perused the MoD site but so far have found nothing even close to what I saw.

Regards,

John Kettler