How did DIVISIONS deploy to fight?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

But also, local commanders (army level typically) avoided pulling them off the line into reserve, because the high command would instantly scarf them up and send them elsewhere, often on some grandious counterattack scheme. Give them frontage and they can't be pulled out without making a hole, which would mean a retreat, and therefore cannot be seriously entertained. To retain "ownership" of a PD, you had to give it frontage. And only ownership by the local (army) level would keep it earmarked for defensive use.

The echelons were fighting each other, because the doctrine on use of armor was overly offense minded.

This is quite an interesting point (especially since I am currently reading Niepold's 'Doppelkopf und Cäsar', on the armoured operations at the seam between AG Centre and AG North in August 1944), and one I had not thought about like that before.

With the Soviet ability to chew up attacking German armour in their Pakfronts, combined with the late-war weakness of the German infantry, a more defensive minded use of the armoured forces would certainly have been more useful than throwing them away at grandiose schemes.

Originally posted by jrcar:

Tero He makes some valid points. However, the German tendency of forming strongpoints both make and break his arguments. The distribution of regimental/divisional support assets was important. But the logic of massing both the infantry and the support assets into strongpoints made them easy targets for preplanned attacks. Just as the text book reaction to breakthroughs made them liable to fail because there was a way to device a counter plan well before the breakthrough was made.

"He who defends everything defends nothing". Yes strong points are easy to target, but they make the most efficient use of the manpower and heavy weapons. The alternative of spreading them out into smaller penny packets is even worse.

I can hardly imagine something worse than what happened to the poor chaps who were stuck in the strong-point of Leontina on the first day of Iassy-Kishinov. For all the effect they had, the Germans could have spiked the guns a week earlier. At 6pm on the 20th August, the 30th Guards Airborne regiment claimed 1,200 German dead, 250 POW (sic!), and 37 guns, 7 of them SP (the only German history of the operations uses the same figures - it states this was a two-battalion srongpoint). The historian acknowledges that the artillery preparation did most of the work, indicating to me that using a strongpoint defense when you can not compete with your artillery and airpower is a slightly dubious tactic.

I am not even starting on idiocies like the Feste Plätze idea. I think that there may have been an issue of lacking innovation at the Wehrmacht end, in trying to deal with the much-improved Red Army of 1944. Clearly thre strongpoint tactics worked extremely well in the defensive battles in 1942 - but faced with the Red Army of 1944, they seem to have been seriously outdated.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tero:

Yes it did! They were able to keep the mobile divs (and some inf divs) off the front line to provide counter-attack forces or launch new offensives.

In the Eastern Front the last great German offensive was the Kursk offensive. And for all their counter attacks AG Center and AG South could not hold their ground. Some even say both were routed.

I would be interested in what the offensives post-Kursk are as well. Local, sometimes operational counter-attacks happened more often, and could assemble hundreds of tanks (Zhitomir 1943, Baltics 1944, Stargard and Lake Balaton 1945 come readily to mind) - but they were never successful, beyond the tactical level, and such outcomes of operational significance that could be achieved never lasted long enough to matter.

[HarryInk]

I'm stunned at the length and breadth of the discussion that's flowed from my original question. Thank you to all who've participated thus far. I haven't had time to digest it all (having just returned to it after the initial few posts) but look forward to the next few days of looking it over.

I do make the point though that I was interested in all divisions - not just German ones - and particularly on the practical aspects for the Div General and his Chief of Staff in deploying the elements of a division for it's assigned tasks. So, JasonC's comments about having to manage frontage within the constraints of artillery range and exposure are along the lines of what I was thinking about. Equally, some early comments about how 2500 casualties could gut the combat component of a '12000' man div.

Anyway, time to settle down with my printouts and learn.

Cheers

Harry

[Andreas]

I think the one nation where things would be very different is the Soviet Union. Soviet divisions were really much more 'shallow' than western or German divisions, with a much higher infantry/support ratio. This meant that they were not as capable on a division-by-division basis.

Then again, it appears to me that for the Red Army, the division was really more a tactical formation, not intended to be capable of sustained independent action, but instead just filling a tactical role, with Corps commands taking on the role that divisional commands had in the German and western allied armies. Interesting to note in this respect that many (most?) divisions in the Red Army were commanded by Colonels. A rank rarely found in divisional command in the Wehrmacht (only towards the end of the war), and (almost?) never in charge of a US or British division.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Interesting to note in this respect that many (most?) divisions in the Red Army were commanded by Colonels. A rank rarely found in divisional command in the Wehrmacht (only towards the end of the war), and (almost?) never in charge of a US or British division.

Right. The most junior officer commanding a division in the US Army that I can think of offhand would be Brigadier General McAuliff of the 101st. Airborne at Bastogne, and that was only because the division's formal commander, Major General Taylor was unavailable at the time the division was hastily ordered into the line.

Michael

[Redwolf]

I've always regarded Soviet divisions and up as really more comparable to one level lower in other armies. The regimental support is low in all armies, but other armies pack something substancial into the division.

I think Glantz is doing that as well.

[JasonC]

I think you are overly fixated on one example of a particularly successful reduction of a German infantry strongpoint defense directly in the path of a massive operational offensive with extensive odds and preparation time. There is no doubt the Russians chose that example for study because it worked - but also because it was an outlier on the success side.

It is easy to see this must be the case, by assuming it is a perfectly ordinary outcome instead, and asking what the long run consequences would be. From the Russian offensive after Kursk to the end of the war is roughly 20 months or 80 weeks (I just mean the order of magnitudes, ignoring rounding error quibbles please).

Suppose the Russians have even 3:2 overall odds over the period (actually they probably had 2-3 to 1), and get even 1/3rd of their available force to concentrate in their breakthrough sectors for operational offensives (actually they often got 1/2 to 2/3rds). Then a force half the size of the entire German one is available for the offensive sectors alone. Now suppose they need 5:1 odds in those sectors to get the kind of reduction of weakened strongpoints the example is meant to suggest or sketch as a "how to".

Then a single operation, executed in a day or at most three days, should be able to destroy 10% of the German army. If they can do that with a week's prep, they destroy the whole thing 8 times over. If it takes a month's prep, twice over. This does not count anything the other 2/3rds of the Russian army manages to do, or the fact that those parts are preparing their own operational offensives while others execute. If you put in more realistic overall odds and achieved concentration numbers, it is 2-6 times worse.

There is no way the German force should be able to hold anything like a line even after being cut in half this way, long before it is fully wiped out. If such results were typical from the Kursk offensive period onward, a few such offensives should have shattered the German line utterly beyond repair, inside of 3 months.

Moreover, these excess losses should be recorded on the German side in lopsided break in fights where there is no reason to expect significant Russsian losses. After all, they are all by hypothesis well prepared attacks with 5 to 1 and upward local odds, on IDed strongpoints. Arty just smashes the German gun net, infantry infiltrates between the thin forward positions, or bear hugs outnumbered and isolated forward detachments with superior small arms. Why wasn't the whole thing over in 3 months, then?

Because it was not actually typical that the Russian arty prep annihilated all the German gun positions. That could happen and when it did the Russians trumpet it and hold it up for study. But it was an outlier success, not the day to day ordinary result. The terrain was not always so wooded that detachments from the Russian lead elements could get through the forward lines without serious battle, lapping around a limited number of hold outs and overwhelming any reaction reserves before they could do any good.

See, sometimes an attack with 5 to 1 odds could fail with significant losses, and little harm to the Germans. How? Suppose the German gun positions are not all fully IDed. Maybe some have moved recently. Maybe roving guns fooled Russian sound ranging. Maybe the partisan info they got came from German double agents. Maybe air recon spotted phoneys and missed real well camoued pits.

Then, maybe the terrain isn't mostly forest but is open with a river line, and a few bridgeheads across it in cover but on low ground. Maybe the German heavy weapons and MG net higher up blocks the exits from these - along with wire and mines. Without being easily located even when firing (sited to interlock sideways and therefore hard to see from directly ahead e.g.). So maybe they are bogged down a lot of places and the Germans have time to react.

Maybe the German radios are working and an Arko higher up, managing the battle along a wide front, grabs and parcels out a whole corps worth of guns to plaster bunched up rifle regiments in their crossing sites, in turn. Maybe the Russians get through only here and there, but a full 2 battalion reserve regiment with a company of StuGs counterattacks several of these in sequence before they know where they are, where their friends are, have dug in, or can raise division commanders or the Russian artillery.

Now, if a few of those turn into expensive fiascos, and many lie between, and a few are like the example you cite and smash the defending German infantry division - over the course of 20 months or 80 weeks, what would you expect? You'd expect losses on both sides. You'd expect the front to hold in some places and at some times, and crack in other places and at other times. Overall, the successes may accumulate because the failures just cause losses, they don't restore the ground or men the Germans lose when they lose.

So you get a ratchet effect on the strategic level. Not, however, because you have an irrestible monotonic steamroller smashing too weak German positions every time. That didn't happen. It took way too long, and the Russians lost way too much in the course of their offensive period, for that to be an accurate picture.

You can learn from outliers things to do, lessons to apply, and that makes them useful to study. That is the main reason armies trumpet them (the other, lesser reason is propaganda and its morale value, "it can be done"). But you can't extrapolate from them to get a sense of the usual case, or aggregate them straightforwardly to the operational or strategic level. They are too rare for that.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I think you are overly fixated on one example of a particularly successful reduction of a German infantry strongpoint defense directly in the path of a massive operational offensive with extensive odds and preparation time. There is no doubt the Russians chose that example for study because it worked - but also because it was an outlier on the success side.

I am not assuming anything, I offered it as an example. You are assuming it is an outlier, yet you have absolutely no evidence for that, at least any that you care to mention. Why don't you give me an example of German another strongpoint somewhere else that held out for days, or even completely defeated a 5:1 attack, in the time-frame we are talking about, instead of lecturing me on statistics that have no relation to the question at hand until you have shown it is an outlier. As we all know, the German side is much better known, so it should be no problem for you to show me where German strongpoint defense actually worked in 1944. I (and I am sure others) would be particularly interested in examples where it worked against a breakthrough attempt, instead of later during the pursuit operations.

'The Russians' (in this case Mazulenko in his excellent study 'Die Zerstörung der Heeresgruppe Südukraine') may or may not have studied Leontina, I would not know, because that is not what Mazulenko's work is about. He treats this event on one page of a 112 page treatise, with a fairly good map added. Hardly an overly extensive treatment for a key strong-point in the direct path of the breakthrough, and at the juncture of two large formations.

[JasonC]

So you pick it out as 1 out of 112 pages and particularly striking, and despite the fact that assuming it is normal makes nonsense of the length of the campaign and the relative losses of the two sides, still think it is normal? I've given you the basic argument against seeing it as normal - German losses should be much higher and Russian ones much lower, and the whole thing over much faster, if it were.

As for German infantry divisions stopping Russian attacks despite being thin in manpower, the first case that springs to mind is XX corps in the retreat from north of Kursk to west of Kiev, which I believe I've mentioned previously on this board (see the "history tidbits" thread). That is 43 rather than 44, and maybe you'd call it pursuit fighting.

You still get depleted German infantry forces holding off superior numbers of Russians again and again, with the typical pattern of occasional success and occasional failure, counterattack here and there but larger scale new threats emerging faster than those deal with old ones. All the while giving ground to be sure, as each position is turned or penetrated.

They do so without losing all their guns to counterbattery, (the corps park included 200 pieces 105mm caliber and above), and despite having enourmous frontages to cover with quite depleted units - by the end of the period some "divisions" within the corps had less than 1000 effectives.

[Tero]

Originally posted by redwolf:

I've always regarded Soviet divisions and up as really more comparable to one level lower in other armies. The regimental support is low in all armies, but other armies pack something substancial into the division.

I think it is quite the opposite. The Red Army regiments carried a bigger stick than they did in most armies. And that gave them the edge in tactical situations. For one their logistics were decentralized. Having the heavier assets assigned into independent formations allowed them to be distributed more freely according to the situation than would have been possible in a more conventional set up. If the heavy support was moved away the regiment would then simply switch to defensive, dig in and be reasonably well off given the heavier organic support they had available to them.

[Andreas]

I picked a noticeable example from 1944, if you have trouble with that, tough. You are free to provide your own noticeable examples from 1944. We have a lot of time, and about 200 more posts before this thread will be closed.

Noticeable examples from 1943 are, as we both know, an irrelevancy, because the Germans simply did not suffer 1,457,000 irrecoverable losses in summer and autumn 1943, as they did in June-Nov. 44, according to Ziemke (quoted in Glantz) - unless you want to pretend that the vast majority of these occured in the west and Italy, of course.

As for your mathematics - the Germans lost virtually all of AG South Ukraine (German loss figures of 250-260,000 reported by the Soviets are accepted by German sources - German records are not complete enough to piece all the losses together, but according to Glantz again, strength returns went from ~500k Germans down to ~200k Germans in the space of 9 days). Just before that, they had lost another 400,000 or so in Bagration, and maybe 100,000 in L'vov Sandomierz.

The vast majority of these men (and women) went missing. Which to me would indicate that there is an awful lot of space for strongpoints with 1,500 men to simply evaporate into historical nothingness in a very messy way. That is of course why the German records have such a hard time telling us about it - nobody knows, because nobody came back to tell. That phenomenon is called 'survivor bias' in statistics, I believe.

But I am sure that with the U of Chicago library that is at your fingertips, you will be capable of showing me that Leontina was an outlier, and that the standard story was one that would make the strategy appear a sound one. I look forward to hearing all about it. With sources please.

Because that 'basic argument' of yours is irrelevant. The war was not fought in averages. It was a short, sharp period of action in Byelorussia, Ukraine, Romania and also Normandy that broke the German back in summer 1944. Anything after that were the convulsions of a dieing beast. Still dangerous until it stops hitting out, but finished already. The law of averages did not apply, neither did it need to. The Soviets did not need to inflict an average of the casualties they inflicted from 22nd August to 1st September in Romania over the next 8 months. It was enough to do it once, in one week.

So of course these were not typical examples of combat. But they could have been the typical examples of combat when it really mattered . The places the Germans desperately needed to hold, at least for a time, to be able to cope, in the face of another Soviet offensive. After the steamroller hit 306.ID at Leontina, and a few other units elsewhere in the breakthrough sectors, AG South Ukraine was history. There was neither the need, nor the time, to fight another Leontina over the next 10 days. If strongpoint defense had worked here, the Soviet attempt to break through on a narrow front would have failed. AG South Ukraine might have been pulled back with comparatively fewer losses. Nowhere did I claim that this was everyday combat.

Your statistical method is far too high level to elucidate whether strongpoint defense was a good tactic to defend against the Red Army in 1944.

I'll wait for your examples then, shall I?

[ August 19, 2003, 03:57 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Why wasn't the whole thing over in 3 months, then?

The Germans tried it in 1941 and failed. Stalin was quite adamant not to replicate that.

The terrain was not always so wooded that detachments from the Russian lead elements could get through the forward lines without serious battle, lapping around a limited number of hold outs and overwhelming any reaction reserves before they could do any good.

I trust you are aware they used smoke, dug assault trenches up to the first line of obstacles. They also claim they owned the night.

The Finnish experience was the counter attack had to come before the Russians dug in, the breach in the line had to be local and the reaction had to catch the Russians on the move. In more than a couple occasions successful counter attacks were conducted and the attacking force then had to pull back to new blocking positions. The morale of the story is the Russian forces kept on a constant pressure that made the defending force actions much more critical. One wrong move would render the defenders situation unbearable.

See, sometimes an attack with 5 to 1 odds could fail with significant losses, and little harm to the Germans. How? Suppose the German gun positions are not all fully IDed. Maybe some have moved recently. Maybe roving guns fooled Russian sound ranging. Maybe the partisan info they got came from German double agents. Maybe air recon spotted phoneys and missed real well camoued pits.

The thing is they had them going along a 20-40 km front so any local reversed could be accepted if the plan as a whole was working.

If you take a look at last stages of the the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation you see the picture. After taking Viipuri the Russians conducted three consecutive attacks in sequence to breach the Finnish defences. All of them were made along a 20-40 km axis with the first attempt being in the center, the second in their left flank and the last one in their right flank.

So maybe they are bogged down a lot of places and the Germans have time to react.

True. But by the same token the reaction might be directed at a decoy breakthrough and shortly after the reaction was staged a crisis would errupt just far enough for the reaction force to burn a lot of fuel and time getting there.

Maybe the Russians get through only here and there,

That was the plan. But of course you knew that.

but a full 2 battalion reserve regiment with a company of StuGs counterattacks several of these in sequence before they know where they are, where their friends are, have dug in, or can raise division commanders or the Russian artillery.

By the time they finished with the last one they would be exhausted, low on ammo and low on fuel. And kilometers from the next hot spot. How long do you think they could sustain that before being worn down ?

Not, however, because you have an irrestible monotonic steamroller smashing too weak German positions every time. That didn't happen. It took way too long, and the Russians lost way too much in the course of their offensive period, for that to be an accurate picture.

Perhaps. But by the time AG Center collapsed the cumulative effects were in evidence. And that was what the Russians were after. Not the spectacular one time victories but the slow errosion of the German defences.

But you can't extrapolate from them to get a sense of the usual case, or aggregate them straightforwardly to the operational or strategic level. They are too rare for that.

Then again you can not jump in and out of scales as you see fit to make the figures fit your thesis.

[Becket]

Hey guys -- learning a ton reading through this thread.

Andreas suggested I might add this bit from the General Forum into this thread. Feel free to ignore/throw rocks and stones at me/etc.

Anyway, here's the issue:

An acquaintance insists that the German defeat in WWII by the Soviets was obvious to anyone looking at the map in June, 1994, and thus the D-Day invasion was unnecessary.

That seems to be poor logic to me. We know the Germans were mere kilometers outside of Moscow in 1941, in a terrible condition militarily (ammo and fuel reserves, etc.), and the Brits & US assumed they would fall. Yet, they turned the situation around and survived. It would seem the height of folly to assume, in June 1944, without the knowledge that the upcoming Bagration op would destroy Army Group Center, that Germany would be defeated without the US/UK invasion at Normandy. Yet my acquaintance also insists that Germany was "obviously spent" in June 1944, while the Soviets were "fresh" with a vast pool of resources to tap.

I feel very comfortable on my knowledge of the Soviet situation in 1941 -- the military was a shambles due to the purges and the presence of Stalin cronies like Mehklis and Kulik; the Siberians were admittedly fresh troops but they were still for the most part in the Far East defending against a potential Japanese attack; Zhukov used up all his reserves in the November battle for Moscow; and the bulk of the armored forces were antiquated and no match for the newer German tanks.

I think that the German situation in June 1944 must be deemed quite a bit better than the Soviet situation in Oct/Nov of 1941; however, this is where my knowledge breaks down. Thus, I seek the insight of the folks here to understand whether there is some viable argument that Germany was "obviously defeated" prior to the Normandy invasion in June 1944.

[JasonC]

Yes Andreas, we all know who won the war and when. What you haven't explained is why they couldn't manage to do it earlier, pretty much at will, any time from mid 1943 on. If the defense is so weak and the attack method so simple, such back breaking 10 day periods should have been there for the asking, much sooner.

No, I'm not saying they needed such periods continually to win the war. The obviously didn't have them and still won the war. I've explained why I don't think they could have them whenever they wanted - because they were outlier successes. It wasn't that they got them whenever they tried, it was that they got them occasionally (trying for a year or more), and when they did it was enough.

I've also explained that those outlier successes were enough to create the strategic ratchet that the Germans could not stop. When the Russians "rolled low", they took some losses but the situation was basically stable. When they "rolled high" (enough), half the German army disappeared. Roll enough times, win the war - while taking some losses to get there.

But that is different from a claim that the German defense was so weak that if the Russians looked at it, it'd fall apart. That no roll was involved. That any time they tried, they succeeded, smashing through and annihilating the defenders in their path. That is the claim I am arguing against (you are free to disown it if you like, that is your affair).

If the German defense scheme is simply stupid and all you have to do is put arty on their gun positions and mass a bit locally, then the Russians should have demolished them in the fall of 1943. They had the numbers by then. They had the artillery. The line had been static long enough to bring shells forward for it.

They did grab the initiative and they did move the line, and inflict serious losses on the Germans. But for some unnamed reason, the Germans didn't evaporate and the Russians lost rather a lot of people in the second half of 1943. How?

See, there is no mystery when the Germans are plain winning, early. (Except perhaps how the Russians mobilized so much so fast, to cover their losses and stay in the game). There is no great mystery at the turn of the tide - though some dispute about it, certainly. Basically depth of reserves counters offensive concentration of armor. And there is no great mystery in the finale, when numbers are high enough.

What is a mystery is how the attackers can have numbers, local concentration, better operational plans, sound doctrine, winning campaigns on the map going their way, all against a supposedly stupid defense that is progressively depleted and ridiculously undermanned in force to space terms, and still lose as many or more as they inflict and not blow the outnumbered defenders off the map.

What the heck were the Germans doing from mid July 1943 to say March 1944? They were losing the war. That is indeed the decisive period, there is no question about it. But they did not collapse the way they did in the summer of 1944, and the wonder of it is why not?

"The Russians weren't throwing Bagrations at them". Sure they were. The attack after Kursk defensive was massive. It retook the Ukraine, not exactly a small piece of real estate. "They weren't depleted yet". Some German IDs had under 1000 men by the end of September. Battalions ran 70 men and had a km or more of frontage. "The Russians did not yet have overall numbers". They had 2-3:1 by the time of Kursk, and it went up after that. "The Russians did not mass operationally". Sure they did. The staff studies show high concentrations for each of the post Kursk blows. "The Germans were in prepared positions". Only in AG Center, not in the south, where they lost the war.

How did AG South survive the year in 1943?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

How did AG South survive the year in 1943?

Because it was not 1944 - the Red Army was not quite 'there' yet. In the same way that the Wehrmacht that attacked into Russia in 1941 looked quite different from the one that attacked into Poland in 1939. Does the term 'organisational learning' mean anything to you?

Now, I take it that you will simply repeat 'it was an outlier', until I get bored and stop asking you for examples? That is the equivalent of putting your fingers in your ears and singing 'lalala I can't hear you'.

Where are your examples of successful strongpoint defense against Soviet breakthroughs in 1944 Jason? Come on, just one - if Leontina was such an outlier, you must be able to find one, with all those massive offensives going on. Or is this claim of yours of the same type as your bold claim elsewhere that the AARs of Panzers being stopped by Pakfronts don't exist? I.e. a claim born out of a strong conviction, and not much else?

[ August 21, 2003, 12:21 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[JasonC]

115 posts into a month old thread, I don't have time for you being pissy, Andreas. Get to the library yourself. And the Russians were plenty "there yet" in 1943. They won the war that year, in case everybody forgot.

But what exactly do you mean by "not there yet"? Did the Russians not know how to target German guns with their own guns? Did they not know how to lap around hold outs? These things are not rocket science. If a strongpoints always suck, how bad do you have to suck to fail against them with 5 to 1 local odds?

If I have the time I may track down a few 1944 examples for you. That they are there, I already know from the nonsense the opposite proposition makes of loss rates and length of the war. You'd find the same too if you bothered to look instead of the debator's pose, I am quite certain.

[Andreas]

Well Jason, asking for sources for your claims is now 'getting pissy' and 'debators pose'? Very disappointing, and quite a copout for someone who is so firm in his opinions. Thank you for confirming my suspicions though. You know what, I actually begin to believe you don't know that many AARs. Do you speak any German or Russian?

I already dismissed your idea that you can translate the single case statistics into the larger scale - so did tero. Again, you don't address this with one word.

The Russians, according to the MGFA history, actually won the war in September 1942. But again, that is strategic, and does tell us bugger all about their performance at the tactical level. And there I believe they spent the whole war improving. And yes, by 1944 they were better at hitting things. They were better at understanding and implementing force ratios, and co-ordinating combined arms.

The other factor is of course that the Wehrmacht of 1943 is quite a different beast from the one in 1944. But I am sure some high-level statistic from you will also disprove that.

If you don't have time to back up your statements, why do you post them? Always assuming you want to be taken seriously.

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

What you haven't explained is why they couldn't manage to do it earlier, pretty much at will, any time from mid 1943 on. If the defense is so weak and the attack method so simple, such back breaking 10 day periods should have been there for the asking, much sooner.

You are disregarding the fact the Red Army did not have the necessary resources to conduct these operations before 1944. And even then they could do one major operation at a time. They had to husband the resource well. IIRC the task for 1943 was to hold the line and break the Leningrad siege. If you look at the pattern they conducted the offensives in 1944 the instances they had two of them going simultaneously are few and far between.

I've explained why I don't think they could have them whenever they wanted - because they were outlier successes. It wasn't that they got them whenever they tried, it was that they got them occasionally (trying for a year or more), and when they did it was enough.

That theory of yours does not stand up to scrutiny. The different stages of the operation Bagration was run in sequence from North to South. If the Leontina attack was an outlier then you'd have to say it was both unique and and a fluke. I think it was neither. Between Andreas and me we have two similar gambits to a Soviet strategic operation: Leontina and Valkeasaari. The diffeneces in the defenders level of preparation and their reactions to the developing situation high light the almost identical, dare I say text book execution of the attack in both cases. This despite the 1000-odd km distance between the locations. The temporal proximity of the two is of significance.

I've also explained that those outlier successes were enough to create the strategic ratchet that the Germans could not stop. When the Russians "rolled low", they took some losses but the situation was basically stable. When they "rolled high" (enough), half the German army disappeared. Roll enough times, win the war - while taking some losses to get there.

Only it was not left to chance. The Red Army preparations were very thorough and their operational goals limited.

But that is different from a claim that the German defense was so weak that if the Russians looked at it, it'd fall apart. That no roll was involved. That any time they tried, they succeeded, smashing through and annihilating the defenders in their path. That is the claim I am arguing against (you are free to disown it if you like, that is your affair).

Your "roll" theory is lacking. The initial attacks on the strongpoints left the entire enemy front weak. What determined the outcome of the operation was the way the enemy could and would respond.

If the German defense scheme is simply stupid and all you have to do is put arty on their gun positions and mass a bit locally, then the Russians should have demolished them in the fall of 1943. They had the numbers by then. They had the artillery. The line had been static long enough to bring shells forward for it.

They also knew their way was too rigid and the Germans too resourceful for it to sustain any reverses. They had to plan carefully or else they would face even longer war. Kharkov anyone ?

But for some unnamed reason, the Germans didn't evaporate and the Russians lost rather a lot of people in the second half of 1943. How?

Why are you fixated on 1943 ?

What is a mystery is how the attackers can have numbers, local concentration, better operational plans, sound doctrine, winning campaigns on the map going their way, all against a supposedly stupid defense that is progressively depleted and ridiculously undermanned in force to space terms, and still lose as many or more as they inflict and not blow the outnumbered defenders off the map.

When was the last time you took a look at the said map ? How should they have conducted the operations ? They were driving the Germans off their soil systematically. By doing that they were shortening the front line allowing the Germans to concentrate their forces. The road and rail net got better the further West they got. They would lose the partisan disruption effects. They were in effect making things easier for the Germans and they simply had to bleed them dry before going for the jugular. They were trading time for space.

What the heck were the Germans doing from mid July 1943 to say March 1944? They were losing the war. That is indeed the decisive period, there is no question about it. But they did not collapse the way they did in the summer of 1944, and the wonder of it is why not?

Because Stalin was taking no chances.

They had 2-3:1 by the time of Kursk, and it went up after that.

The thing is you need at least 3:1 locally for any offensive to succeed.

"The Russians did not mass operationally". Sure they did. The staff studies show high concentrations for each of the post Kursk blows.

Hmmmmmm..... if you have 2-3:1 and you mass operationally then you'd either have 1:1 in places and 4-5:1 in the blows ? Or you have 2-3:1 all around ? Which is it ?

"The Germans were in prepared positions". Only in AG Center, not in the south, where they lost the war.

Leontina was where ?

How did AG South survive the year in 1943?

Because there were not subject to major operations then ?

[Grisha]

Just want to concur with Andreas and Tero regarding the development of Soviet operations from 1943 to 1944. The Soviet losses of 1943 were a result of front-wide activity following the failure of Zitadelle. Deception was limited to the operational level. As war experience was analyzed by the STAVKA in Fall/Winter 1943-44, it was decided that front-wide operations would be a losing proposition for several reason, many of which have been pointed out by Tero: contracting front, shortened supply lines for the Germans, more defensible terrain, more urban regions, loss of Soviet partisans. With this conclusion, the STAVKA went to the next step - strategic deception. Deception was now being orchestrated via operations but following a specific strategic plan, which was primarily crush AGC, then roll up the line southward as German dislocation compounded upon itself.

Losses were always high, because of German tactical skill and C&C ability. Deception created the means of defeating German abilities by allowing the Soviets to conceal scope of regrouping, and tactical-operational locations of main effort. Nonetheless, convincing diversionary attacks, and even operations, did require a serious sustained attack, and that led to losses under unfavorable conditions (and Soviet commands were never told if their assigned operations were diversionary - in other words, a commander didn't conclusively know if his operation was being 'leaked' to the Germans or hidden from them).

The combination of well-orchestrated deception from the tactical to the operational to the strategic with the development and refinement of the breakthrough and exploitation operations made it possible to penetrate the German lines at many spots, thereby collapsing whole gaping sections of the front as multiple small Axis pockets were quickly reduced.

[ August 22, 2003, 04:27 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tero:

How did AG South survive the year in 1943?

Because there were not subject to major operations then ?

I don't think that is quite correct - what was to become AG SU and AG NU was hit quite heavily following Kursk during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev (sp?), and again in the western Ukraine battles following the Dnjepr crossing. Nothing on the scale of Bagration or Iassy though, where months of relative calm were followed by short and very casualty intensive periods.

But there was also the matter of the flanks. Crimea and the Kuban needed to be cleared, and were, with the loss of 17th Army to the Germans.

I believe though that what happened earlier in 1943 put the fear of God into STAVKA, regarding over-extension. The failure of operations Star and Gallop following little Saturn and Uranus. The destruction wrought by Manstein on Soviet formations in the February/March 1943 battle for Kharkov sobered STAVKA, and lead to a more careful approach later in the war. As the Zhitomir battle shows, that was probably as well.

I am fairly convinced that the reason why AGs South and A were not destroyed in 1943 is a lack of Soviet logistical and operational capability and capacity to do so, combined with a higher proficiency of the Wehrmacht in 1943 than in 1944, and also the need to clear the flanks whereever the Soviets advanced, to avoid a repeat of the Kharkov desasters. It had little to do with German strongpoint defensive tactics, IMO. This is because the Germans were not given a few months to prepare anywhere. When they were pushed back from Kharkov they were situated in prepared positions, but very weakened following the offensive (yeah I know Zetterling says differently, but he seems to be a bit clueless about casualty effects). At the Dnjepr they simply had no time to dig in, and the famous Ostwall was probably even more of a figment of imagination than the Westwall. But before Iassy, the Germans had from May to late August to dig in and prepare. Little did it help them.

There were more workable defensive approaches in the Wehrmacht in 1944 though. Gen-Oberst Raus, commanding 4., and later 3. Panzerarmee, preferred an approach of retreating for 10km on the eve of a Soviet attack. This would slow down the Red Army because then they have to redeploy again, reconnoiter again, build another 10km of roads, new fortifications, new OPs, etc. Obviously, that is not the greatest solution, but a lot better than having everybody smashed or cut off on day one.

Schoerner in Kurland had a different approach, whereby a very deep zone of trenches would be created, on the eve of the attack 2/3rds of the troops would be pulled back, leaving only 1/3rd to face the initial storm. The aim was to keep the first trench (presumably regaining it through counter-attacks) at the evening of day one.

Both of the above approaches make good Maskirovka a pre-requisite for a successful Soviet attack. According to a German source, later a high-ranking Bundeswehr general, the Soviets were a lot better at deception and radio discipline later in the war than the Germans.

A similar approach may have been used by Busch commanding AG Centre at the time of Bagration. There it spectacularly backfired though, by allowing the Soviets to get through fairly easily in places.

Friessner in Romania may have had another, different approach. But he was behind a riverline, and had the political problem none of the others had, to defend Romanian territory. Which could be the reason why he kept everything in the shop window, so to speak. And lost it there.

I have no idea what Model did in North Ukraine.

Anyone wants a guess what this proliferation of approaches could tell us about the German attitude to share experiences?

[JasonC]

So Andreas didn't bother to actually look. I can tell, because it took me about 20 minutes when I got to the library. I went to Werner Haupt's standard operational histories, the Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-1945, to the AG Center volume, to the 1944 chapter that details the whole collapse in Bagration. But being an operational narrative instead of a snippy debating post, it bothers to cover the whole year, which did not begin on June 22 or end on August 10.

So you see immediately Vitebsk I and Vitebsk II, in January and February respectively, with German IDs holding off set piece Russian offensives successfully. On literally the first page of the chapter. Specifically -

5 January local penetrations wiped out by local counterattacks 9 January massive attack, no withdrawal, attack suspended 13 January the Russian try again, with 200 batteries supporting an attack on just 2 German IDs, repulsed, 17 January the Russians call off the operation. 6th Luftwaffe Field and 12th Infantry are the hardest hit, and are supported by the 519 s. PzJgr Abt.

The Germans send some of the units in the area elsewhere, as not needed to hold. The Russians try again in February - with 6 armies, and a 2:30 hour initial prep. 8 February intense fighting begins, by 12 February the Russians are through in some places but snow hampers exploitation, by 17 February the offensive is called off. The Russians took some ground in Vitebsk II but the Germans retain the city and immediate area, as a salient. 131st and 206th ID in one sector, supported by 2 Flak regiments, and 12th ID again plus the 20th Panzer in another sector, bear the brunt of the fighting this time around.

Bagration is of course a rout. There are no more than local, temporary holds. The biggest German success is getting the bulk of 2nd Army on the right (spared the initial hit, then cut from AG North Ukraine in a later stage) back to the Vistula more or less intact. There are still bits and pieces - 14th Motorized ID with 667 StuG attached prevent breakthrough in the 4th Army sector - but only for a day. Some local penetrations by the Russian's 65th Army were successfully counterattacked. The 296th ID held against the attacks on it, for a while anyway. But overall, Haupt in no way whitewashes the outcome, recording in his breathless style "28 German divisions with 350,000 men are destroyed east of Minsk!"

But the line reached by August 10 basically held until the following January. On 16 September the 1st Polish Army (the Russian backed set) try to force a crossing of the Vistula, but fail with 2000 casualties and the Russians call it off.

In the Courland fighting, there are periods of breakthrough and others of successful defense e.g. at Memel, where 58th ID and 95th ID hold out until the end of the year. 1st ID (east Prussia) is forced back but not destroyed when the main weight of the east Prussia operation hits it. By 21 October (the 5th day of that one) a blocking position of Flak and VS holds, long enough for 5th PD and HG PD to restore the line. Haupt records "the attack of 40 Soviet divisions was parried", although with loss of ground to be sure.

This was the most obvious source in the least promising period and location. On the first page of the chapter there was an example of IDs defending successfully. All you have to do is look at any reasonably operational history looking for the times they held instead of the times they didn't, and you see them.

Nobody is denying there were times they *didn't* hold, nor that stringing together a number of those, of sufficient scale, wins the war. But monotonic successful it was not. It is a simple and obvious point, one I would have expected anyone reading the histories to acknowledge.

[JasonC]

Tero says "the Red Army did not have the necessary resources to conduct these operations before 1944". Horsepucky. They had the resources to keep an entire army group in reserve for Kursk, and then launch major army group sized attacks after the defensive period of that fight, on not one but *both* flanks of the salient itself. And to push the resulting offensive clear to the Dnepr, take Kiev, and pocket German forces in the Dnepr bend. The Russians won the decisive battles of the war in 1943.

They had the resources to conduct attacks with high local odds, CB fire on main German gun positions, and infantry infiltrating between their strongpoints. Nothing in the example given says you need 100 IS-2s or 300 T-34/85s to overrun a lone German infantry regiment. The strongpoint defense is supposed to be stupid and easily destroyed by IDing the gun positions and hitting them with enough tube arty prep, and then hitting the gunless German infantry with high local odds.

Yes, by mid 1944 the Russians had odds ratios and equippage high enough that an uninstructed 7 year old child should have been able to finish the job. In 1943, maybe they needed the operational skills of a 14 year old pimply faced amateur wargamer. There is no question they outplayed the Germans operationally in either year, and in the transitional period from November 1942 to Kursk, for that matter. But what they didn't manage to do in 1943 was blow the Germans off the map, to annihilate their whole army. And if all it took to kill a German ID was a little prep fire and decent local infantry odds, they would have been able to, easily. It simply wasn't that easy, much of the time.

And sure they tried them over and over. They got some big successes before Bagration, too - just not quite as big. By any other standard, the post Kursk offensives were a huge success. The Germans did not exactly come out of the fall and early winter battles unscathed, either, though the front did stabilize a bit west of Kiev. The Russians tried in other places too, though on smaller scales sometimes.

You say, "not left to chance". Some Russian offensives that they thought were fully prepared with massive odds failed with high losses - particularly early in the war of course. Later, they tried many smaller ones, some of which worked and some of which did not, or made only limited gains. Their biggest ones, late, did tend to work. But they were not the only things they were trying. And the scale of the success varied. The post Kursk one retook Ukraine but the German forces - depleted certainly - basically survived. In Bagration they did not. In Courland they did not wipe them all out despite trying. In Crimea they basically did. The results of operations vary, that is in the nature of war. That is all my "roll low" and "roll high" comment means.

Why do I care about 1943? Because that is when the war was actually won. In 1944 is was a deterministic splat. In 1942 the Russians evened the strategic score, and there is indeed some interest in that, too. In 1943, the Russians beat the Germans. Obviously the decisive year is more instructive and more interesting than the aftermath. It matters what either side tries to do, which is not true e.g. in 1945.

As for "how should they have conducted the operations", it misses the point. I am arguing with Andreas that the German army was not a pack of idiot pushovers. If they were, the Russians would have blown them off the map in 1943, certainly. This is not a statement that they could have and would have blown them off the map if they had leaned a little to the left. It is a statement that they didn't for a reason - that the job was hard, because the Germans were not as weak as Andreas is portraying them.

He has basically presented the German 6 battalion division and its strongpoint defense system as a complete failure because it couldn't stop a Bagration style juggernaut 100% of the time. Which is silly. It kept the German army alive despite huge operational defeats for a year, against opponents who definitely were "there yet". If you hit a regiment with 300 T-34/85s after a 1000 gun prep fire, then yes you will get through it. That is not the same as saying "just put your guns on his gun strongpoints and lap your infantry around his forward positions, ta da, you will always break through in 1-2 days tops". The latter is simply not what happened. It makes nonsense of the length of the war and the scale of Russian casualties. It paints far too easy a picture, and renders the Russian accomplishment trivial.

Of course the local odds ratios are far above the global ones. When you have 2:1 overall the way you make it pay is to pick select portions of the front and get 5 or 10 to 1 there. As for the idea that AG South was not subject to major operations in 1943, um, huh? Of course they were. The Russian main effort in 1943 was in the south, from Kursk defensive and Kursk offensive to the Dnepr battles.

As for Grisha's comments, on German tactical skill and C&C ability, that is exactly what I am talking about. It existed. Andreas is effectively denying it as a factor. Everybody can see looking at the map that German strategic "play" was stupid in 1943 and 1944. They blow their reserves attacking at Kursk, and so don't have them to respond in 1943 late summer and fall. Dumb orders about pockets prevent saving numbers men. Manstein is sacked for trying to be rational about the Dnepr bend. Then all the armor of AG center is sent to North Ukraine just in time to leave it naked to Bagration. Russian operational "play" was clearly better, and they had odds. Nevertheless the Russians lost boatloads of men and stuff. How? Tactically, the Germans were not pussycats, that is how.

Did the Russians only attack on broad fronts in 1943? No. They concentrated quite a bit by anybody's standards except their own even more extreme 1944 ones. The odds ratios in breakthrough sectors in 1943 - or even for the Stalingrad counterattack - were certainly much higher than the Germans typically achieved in their own attacks. And many of these Russian concentrations were perfectly successful. If there were places the 44 operations were clearly superior it was not in concentration (adequate to excessive in both cases), but in smarter use of their exploitation phase opportunities, less (not no) exposure of the spearheads to counterattack deep in the German operational rear, etc.

The Russians did not lose a lot of men in 1943 - and even in 1944 - because they were dumb. They were winning the war, and their operational moves were superior to the German ones. The Germans were just awfully tough to kill tactically and extorted a high price. Only the most successful mismatches of the war - if those - killed more Germans than were lost doing it. This is not a sign that 6 battalion divisions and strongpoint defenses and the rest of the items in the German *tactical* defender's toolkit were stupid.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Nobody is denying there were times they *didn't* hold, nor that stringing together a number of those, of sufficient scale, wins the war. But monotonic successful it was not. It is a simple and obvious point, one I would have expected anyone reading the histories to acknowledge.

Nobody did claim 'monotonic successes'. You claimed Leontina was an outlier (i.e. you claimed exactly what you now say nobody ever did claim) and this is what the discussion has been about. After I have reduced my standards of evidence to the most basic level, just in order to get you to go out and put up some evidence, you have now found some examples, well thanks for looking. Obviously these examples are not on the same scale, so I will try and see if I can find something more about it. I'll get back to you if I am able to - not having a university library to back me up, it will take a bit longer.

But to be honest, I find your attitude wearing to the extreme. You are still trying to twist my words into something I did not say, and you are obviously miffed that I do not take your word as gospel, like so many others here do. The anger when asked for sources to back up your claims is astounding. What kind of an academic environment do you work in where this sort of attitude of yours is encouraged? The University of Jasonia?

The one being snippy around here is you. It is funny that you accused me of adopting a 'debator's stance' - have you ever actually noticed that it is you who is theatrically booming to the audience ('So Andreas did not...'), while I am trying to talk to you? Does it actually enter your head that asking questions, and challenging another person's opinions could be an attempt to exchange information and progress the debate? It does not appear so from here.

BTW - if Haupt is the best you have at your university, I'd put in a request for new books. Standard indeed - let's not say what kind of standard. But good enough for people who are monoglot, I assume. Beggars can't be choosers after all.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for Grisha's comments, on German tactical skill and C&C ability, that is exactly what I am talking about. It existed. Andreas is effectively denying it as a factor.

Oh yes? Where do I do that? Please do give a quote, or at least an interpretation of something I said that is credible, before making up stories.

Originally posted by JasonC:

I am arguing with Andreas that the German army was not a pack of idiot pushovers.

Well, we can settle this argument here and now. I don't think they were idiot pushovers. Where do I say that, or say something that could be interpreted that way?

Originally posted by JasonC:

[...] that the job was hard, because the Germans were not as weak as Andreas is portraying them.

Finally no slander. Instead a completely pointless statement. How weak am I portraying the Germans? Oh yes, I think they are idiots. I forgot. Thanks for telling me what I think Jason. You are ever so helpful.

[ August 22, 2003, 04:37 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[JasonC]

OK, Andreas, you ask for it, you get the reprise of the thread to date. I didn't post in this thread until well over half way into it. Before I said a word, this is what you said about German defensive ability in the second half of the war -

"the decision to remove the three battalions from the division was almost certainly the wrong way to go about things, because it saddled the Wehrmacht infantry with a force structure that no longer allowed it to contribute in any significant form to combat operations"

"The missing battalions had indeed gone somewhere. They were under birch crosses"

"you open yourself up to constant infiltration"

"Such a division 'lite' is a castrate"

"If you look at the number (and quality) of guns available by mid-war, I don't think there were enough to go round"

"not very convincing if you actually look at the effect it had on the ground"

"supply shortages were not uncommon from 1942 onwards"

"...counter-attacks to re-take lost positions. Obviously, you will have trouble doing that when you lack 1/3rd of the infantry. The other problem is that because of the lack of depth, any crisis moves up one level."

"whether Germany had the industrial capacity to fit all these divisions - I would disagree with someone saying that it did"

"If in 1942 even the elite formations could not be fully re-equipped for their losses, what hope for the infantry?" Later we had "a logistical nightmare" and bemoaned "the shortage of specialists." It was a regular Wehrmacht pity party.

Then you got personal "you can have a reasonable discussion with me, or you can go and screw yourself...you can continue your Wehrmachtworshipping admiration fest alone...I won't hold my breath though...You obviously need to grow up", prompting someone to tell you "You begin to sound like one of those Russians that claim one is a Nazi as soon as one criticizes the Red Army, and points out that the Wehrmacht was not such a dumb organization".

Please note, I hadn't even shown up yet. But I'm the debator. You never get pissy.

Still you felt "the move was a really bad idea. I don't really get what there is to argue about."

Obviously not. Despite some very patient explaining, by Keke, Cogust and later myself.

At one point you almost noticed that AG North held out a while - but quickly retracted it "parallels between the failure of the Red Army to deal AG North the deathblow they meted out to all other Army Groups, and the Red Army's failure to make short work of the Finns...I would not rate AG North's performance as a success. They just got lucky, and then that luck was wasted"

Of course there is an immediate rhetorical problem with the "everything was hopeless, forever" pity party line. Why the heck did it take so long, then, and why did so many Russians buy the farm? Another poster noticed this and quickly supplied the Standard Answer "the reason why Germany held out so long against superior numbers is that its forces were operationally superiorly led". The poor put upon Landser were lead by genuises, as we are all supposed to know.

You agreed, adding that "once the Soviets managed to get on a par with that operational capability from 1944 onwards, it was game over for the Germans". Thus brilliant officers of 1943 segue to the put upon Landser of 1944, as the Red Star rises into sentience, apparently for the first time.

But there is a problem. Anyone can look at a map, and the claimed operational virtuousity is simply not in evidence. Russian operational "play" is clearly superior. Way earlier. So, how did the Germans hold out so long against superior odds, again?

1. Their tactical doctrine was for ****.

2. They screwed up their organizations.

3. They had no manpower.

4. They had no guns.

5. They had no ammo.

6. They weren't allowed to do anything sensible.

7. They got dumber orders.

8. They faced superior odds.

9. They faced superior operational direction.

10. They were losing ground and the war.

They were "begging for a vicious kicking". Why oh why, then, did the Russians lose several times more men to these pity party pussycats? You quoted a figure for German losses in calendar 1944, but none for the Russians. (Some sources give Russian losses in 1944 as high as 5 million men).

Then there is the sheer comedy of it all. You introduced the example in question with the phrase (and I indeed quote) "I can hardly imagine something worse". You *introduced it* with the idea that it can't get any worse - and object to any suggestion that things were ever better.

Up to then the nastiest thing I had said was that you seemed fixated on one example. So you wanted any example, and I gave you one. But that is 1943, you objected, it has to be 1944 "Come on, just one - if Leontina was such an outlier, you must be able to find one, with all those massive offensives going on". I produce a half a dozen and you object to their being smaller than Bagration. One involved *6 armies*, another involved *40 divisions*, but those don't count.

But simply to be exhaustive, I just have to get in a few of the other screamers we've enjoyed. Byelorussia is wide open compared to France - news to the Landser lost in the endless forest east of Minsk.

There was only a second half of 1944 stand in the west, because there are no natural obstacles in Poland (the Bug, Vistula, and Oder don't count, the Moselle and Rhine do).

Actually the west was static from at most September 1944 to January 1945. The AG center line along the Vistula was basically static from August 1944 until January 1945, though of course the Russians attacked in the south and in the Balkans.

But you weren't trying to say it was monotonic losing, no nothing like it. You demanded examples of any successful German ID defense, challenging their existence as though none had occurred, but did not mean to imply they always lost.

And you ask for any example ("come on - just one") source, and I give you one of the most obvious, common ones, in the most obvious place, in the worst year and place for my claim, and you sniff that it isn't more obscure or learned.

But I've saved the best for last. The whole dispute was over whether cases like Leontina were typical or rare. I say they were rare, and so do you. You even say "of course". I quote "of course these were not typical examples of combat. But they could have been the typical examples of combat when it really mattered."