How did DIVISIONS deploy to fight?

[Andreas]

Michael,

German divisions often (but not all of them) had a Feldersatzbatallion (FEB), which was the place where raw recruits coming from the depot units back in the Reich would be trained up to be suitable for frontline use. From the start of Barbarossa on, beginning with the two-regiment divisions, these FEB were used as stop-gap KGs, to make up for weakening main infantry forces. But not all divisions had them to start with, and their (ab)use as line infantry did not help matters. Obviously this would get worse when losses increased over time in Russia.

Following the campaign in Poland, and again following the campaign in France, there are complaints about the quality of replacements received (e.g. divisional histories of 21st ID and 13th ID (mot)). The long breaks between the following campaigns did however allow the divisions to digest the lessons learned in them, work on weaknesses exposed, and train the replacements up. I have references to life-fire training by 21.ID in the Eifel in winter 39/40 (including a section killed in an artillery short), and to extensive training of 12.ID (mot) when it converted to become 12.PD in 1941, in particular in the type of operations that were expected in Russia.

Training was pretty much a constant feature of the Wehrmacht, and when a unit was taken out of the line, many junior leaders and specialists would go on courses. I also have references to NCO schools that were set up by divisional GOCs in at least two divisions, 12.PD and 1st Para division (their NCO course was stupidly annihilated defending against the landing of 78th 'Battleaxe' division at termoli in 1943).

This is why I am of the opinion that the Wehrmacht in June 1941 was at the height of its capabilities. After three victorious campaigns, and a lot of downtime for training, even soldiers that would probably have been considered hardly suitable in e.g. the US, due to their age, had been shaped into very well-trained and capable specialists. From then on, it went downhill.

But yes, these 3-month Reserve II chaps would have seen a lot of training, and a lot of it based on real lessons learned in campaigns, before they went to war.

BTW, I own a training handbook for Wehrmacht officers on how to fight a reinforced infantry battalion, written by two Wehrmacht Colonels. I think it saw a number of revisions between 1939 and 1941 (I own the autumn 1941 edition). Very interesting book.

[reinald@berlin.com]

Originally posted by Andreas:

But yes, these 3-month Reserve II chaps would have seen a lot of training, and a lot of it based on real lessons learned in campaigns, before they went to war.

That I doubt as a general statement. May well be this or the other division enjoyed a break long enough to train their men, but others certainly had little time to do so.

Why?

1. The procedure of "organic-halfing". New divisions were set up on old ones split in half. Anyone who's ever been in the military can gauge how long it must have taken to get things running smoothly again. Training Res II guys sure was a sideshow for these units.

2. In September 1940 300.000 men were released to work in the arms industry. Those were mostly Res II types for reasons stated in my post above. The soldiers were only called back May/June '41 with some 58.000 still remaining on leave on June 22.

3. The units transported from the channel back to barracks met 450.000 fresh recruits there who had been born in 1922 and also needed training. Barracks and training facilities were heavily overstacked and thorough training was hardly possible.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Michael,

German divisions often (but not all of them) had a Feldersatzbatallion (FEB), which was the place where raw recruits coming from the depot units back in the Reich would be trained up to be suitable for frontline use. .

Weren't these split during the war into Ersatz und Ausbildungs Bataillonen? (Replacement and Training battalions)?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Weren't these split during the war into Ersatz und Ausbildungs Bataillonen? (Replacement and Training battalions)?

Possible, but the first I hear of that. I think that may have depended on the unit in question.

Reinald, thanks for the correction. Everyday's a schoolday Is that all from Vol.5 of the MGFA book?

[reinald@berlin.com]

Is that all from Vol.5 of the MGFA book?

5/1 to be specific. Vol. 5 was published in 2 parts. 5/1 gives superb overview over occupation policies and administration in western Europe, German war economics until winter 1941/42 and personnel ressources for Wehrmacht and economy until summer '42.

I'm at the moment reading 5/2 which continues where 5/1 stops.

[Andreas]

Ah, thanks a lot. I need to get them little by little.

For those not in the know - this is what he is talking about: Germany and the 2nd World War

The books are a lot cheaper in German - I believe OUP has priced them for university libraries. This is the official history published over the last 15 or so years by the Office of Military History of the Bundeswehr. It does not get much more official than that, I guess.

[reinald@berlin.com]

Andreas, to help you save a little (my incomplete collection of vol. 1-7 is a costly hobby):

Vol. 4, "Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion", has also been published as a cheaper paperback. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Nr. 11008, ISBN 3-596-11008-4

[Tero]

Originally posted by Keke:

I think you exaggerating a bit, although it has said that the best supplier for the Finnish Army was the Red Army.

The percentage is off the cuff, yes. But some (most ?) of the pre-war arty was war booty taken from the Russians during the civil war.

Edit: After rereading your post, I see you meant the actual AG North. I haven't ever heard such a comparison, and it doesn't sound valid to me.

I think such a comparison has not been made. However, if you read for example Ehrfurt or other English language histories and compare remarks of the Finnish defensive efforts and compare that to accounts about the AG North/KG Kourland defensive efforts I think it is fair to say AG North has been rated better than the Finnish army.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I was talking of the chaps that did the work, not of the equipment here.

Without the proper equipment they would have been out of a job anyway.

Captured kit, maybe a bit in these areas.

A bit ? The entire inventory of the French and the Polish armies available to them. And more. Can't really envision only the trucks and Chenilettes and arms being utilized.

Cannibalised kit, very little, since most of the disbanded units tended to be disbanded behind Soviet lines, making access to their equipment a tad difficult.

That is true.

BTW -I would not rate AG North's performance as a success.

Tactically I think it was at least noteworthy.

They just got lucky, and then that luck was wasted because Dönitz wanted to have a training area for his submarines... Gotta love the inter-arms rivalry of the Reich

That has not ceased to amaze me.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Tero:

I think such a comparison has not been made. However, if you read for example Ehrfurt or other English language histories and compare remarks of the Finnish defensive efforts and compare that to accounts about the AG North/KG Kourland defensive efforts I think it is fair to say AG North has been rated better than the Finnish army.

That just shows how little is known about the summer 1944 battles between Finns and Soviets outside Finnish borders and Russian archives...

[JasonC]

I've missed most of the discussion up to now because I was away for a week. I am glad to see the answers went beyond "2" lol. But I think a lot of side subjects have entered without answering the original question. They are interesting themselves, though. First I will address those. Then the original.

On the Germans being short of manpower from early on, compared to a limitless demand I do not doubt it. But it is not really a plausible explanation for the fighting strength of infantry divisions. Despite being the "business end", they weren't the top manpower priority really until the late summer of 1944. It was only after the collapse of AG center and France that the Germans pulled out all the manpower "stops" and seriously combed out the rear areas.

Germany had almost 18 million men between the ages of 15 and 44 in 1939. About that number served in the military sometime during the war. Germany fielded a total of around 250 infantry divisions, half of that number at any given time. At 10k each that is only 1/7 to 1/8 of the available manpower. And only about 1/2 of those are actual infantry. The "tail" is extensive.

Then there is the issue of the 6 battalion ID, which was sometimes a 9 battalion force anyway. Because of things like a recon battalion, a field replacement battalion, an engineer battalion. All have other important uses, but in practice all were cannabilized for trench strength when occasion demanded it.

Arguably it was stupid to starve the formal infantry arm so much and then in practice shove specialists from other areas into the gap thus created. The obvious reason for it anyway is the burn rate in the infantry, and the fact that it went up over time.

But the German replacement army was huge. It continued to churn out fresh divisions at a rapid clip clear to early 1945. Enough to reconstitute entire army groups. The rear area as a whole was not what was being starved.

The issue of what formal organization to use for IDs is seperably from the total strength of the infantry. Because, as some have already noticed, once you fix the number of men you have at the front, you can still have them in fewer large divisions or more numerous smaller ones, which in turn can be organized in many different ways.

The two most common German solutions were the 3 regiment and the 2 regiment division, each with 6 battalions. Although a number of the 3 by 3s stayed around into 1944, despite the smaller official TOEs.

To start with, imagine you have a 3 by 3 division at full strength assigned a certain frontage. It might be deployed 2 up 1 back, or perhaps all 3 regiments on line. Each regiment is in turn deployed 2 up and 1 back. Thus the overall frontage is manned by 4-6 infantry battalions, with 1 or 2 tiers of reserves, battalion to regimental strength. Consider this the doctrinal ideal.

Now choose a way to react to losing 1/3rd of the manpower per unit of frontage. I put it that way because the frontage was not allowed to shrink, and the manpower provided to the army (while in principle it might have been changed) was set outside the Heer. You'd also face such situations simply from the speed combat losses hit the unit, compared to replacement or recovery times.

I can keep the same 3 by 3 organization, all sub units fully manned, but extend the division's frontage to 50% more than previously. But this has considerable drawbacks. The size of the sectors given to subunit types is set not just by the overall manpower strength (which can vary linearly), but also absolutely by the ranges of the component weapons at that echelon.

Concretely, a very long division sector means some units will be out of range of portions of the divisional artillery. The ability to mass div arty and shift it to the decisive point is one of the key fighting characteristics of an infantry division. Deploy the men too widely, and they are outside the range envelope where this support is possible.

Battalions are the center of heavy weapons groups, particularly 81mm mortars. These have a maximum range of only about 2.5 km. They need to be set up somewhat to the rear of the front line to protect them from small arms. Farther lets them use defilade and protects them from easy sound ranging when they open up. They need to reach some distance into the enemy.

You can't get the same effect from battalions stretched over twice the frontage as you can from regular deployments where all the organic mortars can hit any portion of the unit's front. You can split them into small 2 mortar sections. But you neuter the firepower that way.

Similarly, company level HMGs are meant to interlock their fields of fire, creating complete fire grids that threaten any intruder from two different directions, once close enough. Single directions of fire are much easier to seek cover against. And when only the weapons directly ahead are a threat, local success snowballs. The interlock principle is meant to make success at one point in the line dependent on advances elsewhere (to take out the MGs covering neighoring sectors). Seperate the MGs too widely, and you just lose this, drastically weakening the defense.

Notice that all of these absolute range considerations are tied not to the infantry proper, but to their various levels of supporting weapons. So ideally, you'd like to leave the heavy weapons arrangement undisturbed. Everything has been planned out for a certain range of absolute scales. So and so many HMGs every n meters, so and so many mortars every 5n meters, 105s every 50n meters, etc.

It is not hard in manpower terms to keep the heavy weapons manned. They use perhaps a quarter of the fighting strength manpower, perhaps an eighth to a tenth counting "tail".

What is the role of the infantry manpower in the defense? It has three major functions. Surge defense strength against close, heavy assault (since the heavy weapons provide the basic, long range fire structure). Depth of manpower to absorb continual losses and "wastage". And local counterattacks to restore the integrity of the heavy weapons "grid" when it is penetrated to this or that depth.

Naturally, the last also covers practically all the true offensive uses of IDs (though for the second half of the war, and for IDs rather than mobile formations, that was a secondary matter).

Well, somebody has to go, to accomodate 1/3rd losses. You can keep the existing structure an give every subunit a "haircut". You can drop a regiment. You can drop 1 battalion per regiment. The Germans sometimes did each of these. But the TOE doctrine said the last was preferable. Why?

Suppose the original was deployed 2 up 1 back and you just give everyone a haircut. You've now got 4 front line battalions each 2/3rds strength. The front is relatively brittle. You've got 2 tiers of reserves, including a regimental team with a strength of 2 battalions. That means a single powerful counterattack is feasible. But everything else is poor. It would be nice to retain the possibility of a single powerful counterattack. But otherwise the arrangement has little to recommend it.

If instead I drop the rear regiment, then I have 4 full strength battalions on line. The front is no longer brittle. I have only 1 tier of reserves, full battalion strength. If I want to send one big counterattack, I must task two seperate battalions from two regiments together for that attack only. Not impossible, but organizationally clumsy. I am set up from shallow counterattacks only. As long as I face only limited pressure that will work - and the front is thicker than the original "all trimmed" case. But the organization is not set up to handle "hits" up to its own scale minus one.

Instead, drop 1 battalion from each regiment. Now, deploy the up regiments all up, without reserves. Keep the back regiment. I again have 4 full strength battalions on line - the front is as strong as in the previous case. I still have a total of 2 battalions as a single tier of reserve, just like the previous case. But now they are in one regiment. With its own HQ and organic weapons.

Suppose I want to support the front line with weaker, single battalions. Then I simply deploy the rear regiment in side by side battalions, behind the up regiments. I "pass" them to the front line regiment HQs if they are needed in that sector. The rear regiment HQ has relatively little to do if that is used. But it can process replacements, rest cases, etc. The up regiments have the command span to handle 3 battalions. Those just consist of 2 organic and 1 "assigned" to their "KG".

Suppose instead I want one big counterattack. Then I keep the back battalions together, keep them under their regimental HQ, and use them where needed. It is much more straightforward than in the 2 regiment each 3 battalion set up.

All I've given up compared to the original is some of the tiering. I can support as strongly as the front line regiments did in the full strength case. *Or* I can support front line battalions with a reduced regiment, 2 battalion counterattack. Everyone has their heavy weapons, at the right ranges.

What I can't do is both in succession. The big 9 battalion could, but I've lost the manpower for that. What happens if I need to perform the same mission? Well, I fight the forward 4 battalions the same as usual. I use the back regiment as my first tier of support. Then I must call for help.

Perhaps I can scrap together an engineer battalion and field replacement battalion and use them as the first tier, and then use the reserve regiment as a true reserve regiment - perhaps stiffened by some StuGs sent to save my sorry tail, or perhaps fleshed out by a recon battalion.

If I can't manage any of these, facing a crisis that would tax a full 9 battalion division, I must appeal to corps. Anything smaller scale, or that such ad hoc remedies can address, I can handle as before despite my weakened overall manpower.

Now, suppose instead the original deployment was 3 regiments up, each 2 up and 1 back. Perhaps on a longer frontage. That means it had 6 battalions on line, 3 reserve battalions, but as individual "singles" checkerboarded behind the line. Now I must give this formation a 1/3rd reduction and try to continue the mission.

If I give everybody a haircut I get a weakened frontage and weak, 2/3rds strength reserves. I still have 3 of them, and I have all my heavy weapons, but that is all the solution has to recommend it. I get a relatively brittle front with weak reserves.

Instead, suppose I have 2 regiments each of 3 battalions. Then I have a choice. I can keep the whole front strong by deploying all up. Or I can deploy each side by side regiment 2 up and 1 back. This leaves 4 battalions on line, with as much manpower as the first. I have 2 reserves instead of 3. Each is full battalion strength instead of 2/3rds. At best a marginal improvement in concentration of my reserves.

With 3 regiments each of 2 battalions, I deploy them side by side of course. Regiments therefore have the same frontage as before. They have 2/3rds the manpower, as in the "haircut" case. If I *want* a strong front, I put both battalions up. This means no reserve *in that regiment's sector*. If instead I want a 2/3rds battalion strength reserve, I can create one (by e.g. attaching one company to an "up" battalion in that regiment).

Or I can create a stronger, full battalion reserve - but only have 1 battalion up in that sector. Perhaps the center, with one battalion acting as reserve for the whole line. With 3 HQs to play with and full strength underlying units, I have more options than in the previous case and each thing I try is more likely to work than in the "all haircut" case.

The purpose of a divisional organization is to give the division commander the ability to plan and fight his division flexibly, responding to different typical situations or threat levels with stock solutions that will generally work as designed. Obviously, any extreme case can stress the division beyond its breaking point. And that necessarily comes sooner with fewer men on a given section of front. But some organizations preserve better options, or make more natural the right choices, while others do not.

The reason a 6 battalion organization can work at all is the 9 battalion one was original meant to fight 2 up 1 back in a tiered fashion. The 6 battalion types (either of them) are simply meant to fight "flatter", with only one tier of reserves instead of 2. In effect, it is like a choice of a two rank line rather than a 3 rank line. Using the second rank more flexibly, one sees, can be a reasonably effective substitute for having both a second and a third.

The Germans probably noticed this in part because their mobile divisions were organized on a 4 battalion structure. That was a legacy of the armor heavy period, when for a while several "regiments" were non infantry. But since divisions fought 4 up in their typical deployments anyway, this proved livable. Mobile formations just had to fight flatter, getting more out of each battalion by supporting it with tanks etc.

In practice, they got a second tier from divisional assets (recon, pioneers, Pz Jgrs). SS divisions, with their Pz Gdr legacy, had 3rd battalions in each regiment without this stop gap - arguably a better organization. When attacking and on narrow enough frontages, a Heer panzer division could get a second tier by putting its Pz Gdr regiments in column. But for most of the war that was a luxury; each division had too much frontage for it.

Early on, the panzer corps organization, with 2 PDs and 1 motorized infantry division (typically with 2 regiments each of 3 battalions) was able to provide a second tier, in column, by using elements of the follow on motorized infantry division in support of each PD. Typically to hold ground already taken, and thus free up the PD spearhead for another advance.

This meant the second tier was in a different division, which could have caused organizational nightmares. In practice it didn't when the Germans had the initiative and were successfully making large advances. The PDs were recognizably "senior" and in the driver's seat. Regiments were attached to them as needed, typically as additional KGs answering to the PD commander.

When they cleared an area, the follow on guys held it and reverted to motorized ID control. The long distances sometimes involved actually favored seperate divisional "ownership". If all of the men had been stuffed into the PDs (getting rid of the motorized ID portion of the corps), they would have constantly found themselves spanning hundreds of miles trying to hold too much.

What was the "fight flatter" idea bad at? Attrition style attacking. It is one thing to defend with a 6 battalion ID - it is admirably suited to that, as an adaptation to lower strength per km. But battering away against a strong enemy for months at a time, it would not work well at all. Attrition style attacking depends on *rotation* of the organic regiments.

One regiment must be resting and rebuilding at all times. The two up regiments may be fighting much as in a 6 battalion division. But in addition, the 9er has "wind" or endurance. It keeps hammering. Every week a fresh regiment replaces one of the tired ones in the line, while another transitions back into reserve and rests up.

The Germans didn't use IDs for this. They attacked with PDs. Those depended on the power of their tanks for an initial break in. The equivalent of resting and rebuilding was getting a PD out of the line, or at least pulling back its tanks and refitting them. Or a fresh from the factory battalion (of StuGs for an ID, or Tigers for a panzer corps) reinforced.

The Germans *did* face difficulties whenever the initial break in did not prove decisive, however. None of their "flattened" organizations had the depth to outlast, to simply wear out, their opponents. They could try for that effect with column deployments, with many divisions stacked behind the leading spearheads.

And in the early war, they had that luxury sometimes (look at e.g. the deployment of German IDs in deep column right behind the PDs in the France 1940 campaign - and how it successfully widdened holes). Later on they did not, and many counteroffensives failed due to inadequate staying power. If the initial crack didn't rupture the entire line but only made a local break in, they could (and did) run out of infantry depth, leave the tanks inadequately supported, and lose combined arms.

Fundamentally the Germans did not rely on infantry depth because they were doctrinally opposed to attrition methods, as unlikely to win the war for them strategically. There may have been some shortsightedness in this, because the war was eventually a heavily attritionist one. Arguably the Germans were slow to accept this and adapt to it, and suffered in possible performance as a result.

E.g. by late total mobilization of the economy - between Moscow and Stalingrad instead of as soon as invasion of Russia was planned. The tank production of 1944 by 1942 would have made a huge difference. And e.g. by delay of rear area comb outs to boost trench strength until after the disasters of the summer of 1944. The increase in infantry strength that made possible the stand at the borders of Germany after it was too late to change the overall outcome might have made a bigger difference at the Dnepr bend a year earlier.

For the way they fought (non attrition methods, IDs mostly defending and PDs attacking) and what the army got to fight it with (i.e no change in mobilization, production, or comb out dates), the flatter organizations were admirably suited. That just doesn't mean those larger strategic decisions were the right ones.

All of that is just on the issues raised by the thread. It still doesn't really address the original question in any detail. More on that later, but this post is already too long as it is.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Tero:

I think such a comparison has not been made. However, if you read for example Ehrfurt or other English language histories and compare remarks of the Finnish defensive efforts and compare that to accounts about the AG North/KG Kourland defensive efforts I think it is fair to say AG North has been rated better than the Finnish army.

That just shows how little is known about the summer 1944 battles between Finns and Soviets outside Finnish borders and Russian archives... </font>

[Sardaukar]

Originally posted by Grisha:

For what it's worth, I think the Finns handled themselves better in 1944 than AGN(Courland). In fact, I would like to see a Finnish account of the actions surrounding the Viipuri(Vyborg) area in 1944. Keke or Tero, do either of you know where this can be had - in english?

That was on of the instances when Finns didn't do well first, due to poor performance of new and raw 20th Brigade, also lacking ammunition and weapons, tasked to defend Viipuri.

I'll try to dig something up...

Cheers,

M.S.

[JasonC]

Has uber Finn chit chat killed this thread? Or was it me? Does anyone still care about German division organizations and their whys and wherefores? Should I move my giant post to a new thread to get comments? Does anybody read this stuff? lol.

[Andreas]

Actually yes, and I was going to comment on it. Whether anybody else reads it, who knows.

[Screeny]

Waiting anxcious for JasonC's answer on th einitial question!!!

[YankeeDog]

Well, I, for one, found your post very interesting, Jason, and will certainly check here later for more.

Cheers,

YD

[Michael Emrys]

Oh well, okay, yeah, I vote for it to continue too...I guess.

Michael

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Has uber Finn chit chat killed this thread? Or was it me? Does anyone still care about German division organizations and their whys and wherefores? Should I move my giant post to a new thread to get comments? Does anybody read this stuff? lol.

Well, I THINK the original topic does not mean only German divisions and their deployment are relevant in this context.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC (snipped and numbered by me):

1. Then there is the issue of the 6 battalion ID, which was sometimes a 9 battalion force anyway.

2. The Germans probably noticed this in part because their mobile divisions were organized on a 4 battalion structure. That was a legacy of the armor heavy period, when for a while several "regiments" were non infantry. But since divisions fought 4 up in their typical deployments anyway, this proved livable. Mobile formations just had to fight flatter, getting more out of each battalion by supporting it with tanks etc.

3. What was the "fight flatter" idea bad at? Attrition style attacking.

4.The increase in infantry strength that made possible the stand at the borders of Germany after it was too late to change the overall outcome might have made a bigger difference at the Dnepr bend a year earlier.

5. For the way they fought (non attrition methods, IDs mostly defending and PDs attacking) and what the army got to fight it with (i.e no change in mobilization, production, or comb out dates), the flatter organizations were admirably suited. That just doesn't mean those larger strategic decisions were the right ones.

1. By that counting the original 9 battalion division, is in effect a 12 battalion division (3x3 plus Recce, Pioneer, replacement battalion).

2. In practice though, what seems to have happened late in the war is that the mobile forces were split up to 'stiffen' the frontline, because it was clear that the infantry divisions by themselves could no longer handle it. This led to a frittering away of reserves, and placing them too far forward in harms way.

3. I would not quite agree with that. I think they were also very bad at defending against a capable attacker. I have a few quotes by Soviet officers/historians on how, during the 1944 offensives, surprised that they found a third defensive line after fighting through the first two, but it was not manned. Presumably because the infantry was not there to man it. Had it been manned, it would have slowed down matters, in some cases probably considerably, giving the German commanders more time to react, and it may even have stopped total routs. Basically with this structure you have to put everything into the shopwindow, and risk losing it all there, in one fell swoop.

4. Yep, that stand at the borders in Poland was particularly impressive . The stand at the borders really only happened in the west, because there the border happened to conincide with a big river. Where there was no natural obstacle, as in Poland, no stand happened. The Oder river did not become a border until after the war.

5. I would disagree again, see 1. The flat structure invited desaster in 1944. It was okay when the Soviets were fairly inept (1942, and early 1943), or when the defense was backed up by nature (Italy/Normandy) or massive amounts of armour, in relation to frontage (Normandy), but in the more open country of e.g. Byelorussia, with all the mobile reserves on a 1,000km front being a single Panzergrenadier and a Panzer division, it was just begging for a vicious kicking. Which is what they got. But of course, by that time even the firepower force multiplier was no longer working, because the frontages did not allow the divisional heavy assets to support all battalions.

Originally posted by JasonC

Battalions are the center of heavy weapons groups, particularly 81mm mortars. These have a maximum range of only about 2.5 km. They need to be set up somewhat to the rear of the front line to protect them from small arms. Farther lets them use defilade and protects them from easy sound ranging when they open up. They need to reach some distance into the enemy.

You can't get the same effect from battalions stretched over twice the frontage as you can from regular deployments where all the organic mortars can hit any portion of the unit's front. You can split them into small 2 mortar sections. But you neuter the firepower that way.

Similarly, company level HMGs are meant to interlock their fields of fire, creating complete fire grids that threaten any intruder from two different directions, once close enough. Single directions of fire are much easier to seek cover against. And when only the weapons directly ahead are a threat, local success snowballs. The interlock principle is meant to make success at one point in the line dependent on advances elsewhere (to take out the MGs covering neighoring sectors). Seperate the MGs too widely, and you just lose this, drastically weakening the defense.

Notice that all of these absolute range considerations are tied not to the infantry proper, but to their various levels of supporting weapons. So ideally, you'd like to leave the heavy weapons arrangement undisturbed. Everything has been planned out for a certain range of absolute scales. So and so many HMGs every n meters, so and so many mortars every 5n meters, 105s every 50n meters, etc.

While correct, I am at a loss what this has to do with anything. The battalion as a weapons group with its organic weapons is not the issue. The question are the regimental and divisional support weapons. If, as you say, the only difference between a 9 and a 6 battalion division is that one is 'all up', while the other is '2 up, 1 back', then it follows that the frontage covered by the six frontline battalions, all other things being equal, is the same. So there would be no difference in the ability of one or the other to bring the organic support weapons to bear. The only difference is that in an 'all-up' formation you have another set of regimental support weapons up as well.

In closing, the real problem by early 1944 was two-fold. The Wehrmacht was overtaxed, particularly in the east. The available forces stood in no relation to the frontage to be held. That was bad strategy. This by itself would not have caused the pretty much total collapse of summer 1944. This was finally caused by a clear development in Soviet command capabilities on all levels. But the Soviets again benefitted hugely from the shallowness of the German lines, and that is a tactical problem that turned into an operational nightmare, when the 'flat' structures collapsed with a speed that made any attempt to react impossible. This is where I think your analysis that the 6 battalion division was as capable as its predecessor, is just wrong.

Having a different structure, with consequently fewer infantry divisions, may well have forced hard but sensible choices at a time when these choices could still have made a difference, i.e. sometime in 1943. That at this time the Germans principally were able to still make those choices is shown in the order for the retreat from the Rhzev salient ('Büffelbewegung'), although this may well have been driven by the need to prepare for Kursk.

[JasonC]

"If, as you say, the only difference between a 9 and a 6 battalion division is that one is 'all up', while the other is '2 up, 1 back',"

Not what I said.

"then it follows that the frontage covered by the six frontline battalions,"

A 9 battalion division in 2-1 formation puts only 4 battalions on the front line. The 2-1 split is repeated at each echelon level. Two regiments up, one full regiment back. Plus one battalion of each forward regiment back. Thus, 4 up front, 2 in immediate reserve, 3 in a further layer of reserve.

A 6 battalion division also puts 4 battalions on the front line. It still has reserves, just one tier of them rather than 2 tiers. "Flatter" is not "completely flat", just more flat than continual tiers.

If you use the 9 battalion formation but only have 2/3rds of the manpower per unit of front, you have to decide how to handle the manpower shortfall. Saying, "it would be better to have 9 full battalions" is a "gee duh" point but completely beside the actual question.

Which is how to organize and use the strength you actually have, not the strength you'd like. If wishes were horses, beggars would ride. You only get to fiddle with the organization and its deployment, not with the quantity organized and deployed. So, where does the shortfall come from?

If you keep a 9 battalion organization, they are either weakened battalions or they cover more frontage. You don't have the option of just having more men - unless you want to leave holes hundreds of miles long for the enemy to waltz through.

If they are weakened battalions but you still use 9 of them in the standard 2-1 tiering, then your front is weaker. 4 battalions up, yes, but each only 2/3rds of TOE.

If you leave the battalions at full strength organizationally and keep 2-1 tiering, then each has to cover a longer frontage to keep to the manpower to frontage you actually have available. But if the frontage of a battalion extends too much, bits of its assigned sector are out of range of its organic mortars, or those have to be split up neutering their firepower, HMGs don't interlock, etc.

You can't begin to evaluate the various possible solutions to the problem until you first see the very existence of the problem they are alternate ways of addressing. The total manpower per unit of front is 2/3rds what you'd like it to be. Now don't moan about it, but adapt.

As for white Russia being "more open", um, it is a forest, dotted by countless small lakes, with marshes here and there, crossed by numerous rivers including several major systems. In 1944 it had quite a limited road and rail net. France is vastly more open, and easier to cross in every way.

Rivers did not stop the western Allies. Patton got over the Rhine, once he got to it, in less than a week, without any fanfare. Earlier, his spearheads crossed the Moselle and took Nancy even in the pursuit phase, despite hundreds of fresh Panthers thrown at them. Gas shortages stopped him for a week, but that cleared up by the second week in September.

What stopped him was new German infantry. 2 veteran Pz Gdr divisions (almost without tanks) from Italy, replacement SS Pz Gdrs, lots of green VG that fought far better than the Panzer brigades, ad hoc groups formed from NCO and officer cadet schools, etc. 3rd Army slaughtered the Panzer brigades, but was set back on its heels by infantry in woods.

As for there being no stop in the east, um, last I checked the war did not end in September of 1944. It took 7 more months. The Germans went from the Polish border to the outskirts of Moscow in 3 months in 1941. So with their gonzo odds and their flawless operational skill, why didn't the Russians follow up the destruction of AG center all the way to the outskirts of Berlin in 3 months?

"Logistics". Well yes, but not logistics in the sense of inability to walk or drive. Logistics in the sense of inadequate accumulated smashing power to get through the new line the Germans cobbled together, along the Vistula etc. The Germans lost entire army groups, but still had a line at the end of it. That is not at all easy to do. And it takes fresh men, lots of them.

Of course in 1944 the German infantry divisions were more like regiments, and some were more like battalions. The war was decided in 1943, in the Kursk Russian offensive period and at the Dnepr bend. But the Germans surged their infantry manpower to stave off disaster after the summer of 1944, buying 7 more months. That surge would have been one heck of a lot more useful in the late summer and fall of 1943 than it was in the late summer and fall of 1944.

As for the idea that they were so flat in formation that they always lost, though, it overlooks a number of annoying facts. The Russians were still losing as many men as the Germans, despite their overall odds and the operational drubbing they were inflicting. How do you suppose that happened? Then there are all the operations the Russians don't talk about because they didn't exactly work.

As for the idea that the Germans split up their panzer divisions, um, they were ground down certainly but they sometimes threw 9 of them at the same sector. The US sent combat commands into action all over the place regularly. For the Germans, occasionally a KG would be left in the line somewhere when the rest of its division moved on, but most of the time PDs were kept together. They weren't really large enough anymore, in 1944, for it to make any sense to split them up. They often had 30-70 tanks.

Then there is the idea that the problem was "wasting" the PDs on defensive uses, instead of supposedly massing them for decisive counterattacks. The problem is the Germans launched any number of grandious armored counterattacks, most of which were fiascos that lost half the assigned armor in a matter of days.

It was in fact much more sensible to employ the armor as defensive "linebackers", from reserve. The actual German practice was to assign frontage to most PDs as soon as they were committed somewhere (*not* working with IDs, but between them). They were indeed attrited in defensive fighting this way. Some of that was essential to use them at all on defense, but a lot of it was not having IDs to relieve them.

But also, local commanders (army level typically) avoided pulling them off the line into reserve, because the high command would instantly scarf them up and send them elsewhere, often on some grandious counterattack scheme. Give them frontage and they can't be pulled out without making a hole, which would mean a retreat, and therefore cannot be seriously entertained. To retain "ownership" of a PD, you had to give it frontage. And only ownership by the local (army) level would keep it earmarked for defensive use.

The echelons were fighting each other, because the doctrine on use of armor was overly offense minded.

A proper mobile defense would have the PDs behind the ID line as reaction reserves, in corps strength preferably. Occasional KG fire brigades for small stuff, often single PDs to counterattack a bridgehead or single deepest penetration by one infantry regiment (or weak RD), in important cases a whole panzer corps for a serious 3-5 day local counteract. Then disengage again, back into reserve after the front is restored, and refit.

But this sensible scheme was too defense minded to be accepted as a general policy on the use of armor. Some local commanders, army or AG level, did it anyway, and when it was used it typically did fine.

We are probably disagreeing more than is necessary. A useful discussion anyway, better than one sentence "yes I read it" comments...

[jrcar]

Re-entering a bit late

The firepower in a division comes from its arty. This being located in both the Inf Regts and the div arty park (plus any assigned corps or army assets).

The secondary firepower is the machine guns in the units. The rest of the infantry are really just there to protect the machine guns, and then the arty, from enemy close attack and to fix the enemy so the arty can target the area. Loosing a regiment is a small loss of firepower, for a large release of manpower.

I agree with Jasons points of the regiments.

Having a third element (whether its in a platoon, company, battalion, regiment or division) gives a commander tactical maneuver options. And as Jason notes the inf divisions weren’t assigned maneuver tasks, that’s the role of the mobile divisions.

At the operational level of command more maneuver elements is also important, so by taking out tactical flexibility the Germans were able to maintain operational flexibility, and in large conflicts that is far more important

Cheers

Rob

[Tero]

Originally posted by jrcar:

The secondary firepower is the machine guns in the units. The rest of the infantry are really just there to protect the machine guns,

That applies only to the Germans.

and then the arty, from enemy close attack and to fix the enemy so the arty can target the area.

The problem is the infantry has to have enough FP to pin the enemy down so the arty can blast them. IMO the Germans reliance on the MG was detrimental, given the Red Army docrine of seeking hand to hand combat.

Loosing a regiment is a small loss of firepower, for a large release of manpower.

I disagree. If, as you say, the arty is the main force and the infantry is the blocking force then losing that blocking force renders the mainforce that much more impotent.

I agree with Jasons points of the regiments.

He makes some valid points. However, the German tendency of forming strongpoints both make and break his arguments. The distribution of regimental/divisional support assets was important. But the logic of massing both the infantry and the support assets into strongpoints made them easy targets for preplanned attacks. Just as the text book reaction to breakthroughs made them liable to fail because there was a way to device a counter plan well before the breakthrough was made.

Having a third element (whether its in a platoon, company, battalion, regiment or division) gives a commander tactical maneuver options.

Which in turn, in the case of the Germans, are limited by the high command grand strategies.

And as Jason notes the inf divisions weren’t assigned maneuver tasks, that’s the role of the mobile divisions.

Lets not get fixated on the Germans too much.

Perhaps this kind of thinking was one of the failings of the Germans. The Red Army used their mobile and infantry divisions in a very different manner (and the überFinns had only one truly mobile formation ). Compared to the Germans the Soviets designed their operations (after 1942-43) as a series of smaller, controlled steps which they could manage better. The German early operations were charaterized by sweeping, spectacular grand scale moves which left huge gaps between the mobile and the infantry formations.

At the operational level of command more maneuver elements is also important, so by taking out tactical flexibility the Germans were able to maintain operational flexibility, and in large conflicts that is far more important´

That did not really actually work now, did it ?

I'm sure that was the plan but the Ruskie buggers figured out and used it against the Germans.

[jrcar]

G'day Tero, comments below

jrcar The secondary firepower is the machine guns in the units. The rest of the infantry are really just there to protect the machine guns,

Tero That applies only to the Germans.

I'm not talking about doctrine, but reality. The principle firepower potential of infantry is the machine gun. I recognise the Finns situation was different, but at normal combat ranges 100-500m the MG rules (as long as you have them).

Jrcar and then the arty, from enemy close attack and to fix the enemy so the arty can target the area.

tero The problem is the infantry has to have enough FP to pin the enemy down so the arty can blast them. IMO the Germans reliance on the MG was detrimental, given the Red Army doctrine of seeking hand to hand combat.

Well the MG is an excellent suppression tool, but yes if you can bear hug the enemy then it makes calling for indirect fires difficult. This is where having sensors does count, and good weather! I would certainly prefer more infantry in a Div, but its important to get the mix right, and given limited manpower, and enough weapons, arty provides the main killing power.

jrcar Loosing a regiment is a small loss of firepower, for a large release of manpower.

Tero I disagree. If, as you say, the arty is the main force and the infantry is the blocking force then losing that blocking force renders the mainforce that much more impotent.

Its the mix thats important, you need both. But the latter requires less manpower, but you still need enough of the former, and I think 6 Bn is just enough (if kept upto strength).

Jrcar I agree with Jasons points of the regiments.

Tero He makes some valid points. However, the German tendency of forming strongpoints both make and break his arguments. The distribution of regimental/divisional support assets was important. But the logic of massing both the infantry and the support assets into strongpoints made them easy targets for preplanned attacks. Just as the text book reaction to breakthroughs made them liable to fail because there was a way to device a counter plan well before the breakthrough was made.

"He who defends everything defends nothing". Yes strong points are easy to target, but they make the most efficient use of the manpower and heavy weapons. The alternative of spreading them out into smaller penny packets is even worse.

jrcar Having a third element (whether its in a platoon, company, battalion, regiment or division) gives a commander tactical maneuver options.

Tero Which in turn, in the case of the Germans, are limited by the high command grand strategies.

Yes fundamentally Hitler was stupid to attack, but how does that impact on this discussion?

jrcar And as Jason notes the inf divisions weren’t assigned maneuver tasks, that’s the role of the mobile divisions.

tero Lets not get fixated on the Germans too much.

Well this discussion has gone a bit off the original topic, but we are talking about the German change from 9-6 Bn divs and if that was a smart idea or not. And the underlying principles DO apply more broadly.

We in the Australian Defence Force face these issues all the time, how much infantry and how much heavy weapons do you have in your mix. In the past we were infantry heavy and lacked a lot of heavy weapons, our demographics (along with many other western nations) means that we have a smaller pool of manpower to draw from in the future, while needing to increase our combat power. Having increased heavy weapon allocations will help us to do this, along with improved command and control.

But there is a point where you do not have enough bayonets, my contention is that 6 Bn’s in a German div is just enough (provided they are kept upto strength).

*** cut - no comment***

Jrcar At the operational level of command more maneuver elements is also important, so by taking out tactical flexibility the Germans were able to maintain operational flexibility, and in large conflicts that is far more important

Tero That did not really actually work now, did it ?

Yes it did! They were able to keep the mobile divs (and some inf divs) off the front line to provide counter-attack forces or launch new offensives. I agree with Jason on the fact that these were frequently wasted by the overly offensive minded General Staff, but the concept worked very well.

A few general points.

The Germans did not have enough combat power to hold everywhere in enough strength to guarantee stopping a breakthrough.... hardly anyone ever does (although the Finnish circumstances with a defence on a narrow front may be an exception...).

Even against the odds the Germans were able to continue to create forces capable of offensive action by holding the line with less, while forming a strong reserve.

I think (with the benefit of hindsight) these forces were then frequently wasted but not always.

The above points also applied to the Soviets, and a lessor extent the western allies from 1943 onwards.

cheers

Rob

[ August 07, 2003, 08:01 PM: Message edited by: jrcar ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by jrcar:

G'day Tero, comments below

Down under ?

I'm not talking about doctrine, but reality. The principle firepower potential of infantry is the machine gun.

No other army had a belt fed MG as a platoon SAW except the Germans.

I recognise the Finns situation was different, but at normal combat ranges 100-500m the MG rules (as long as you have them).

The situation was the same for the Soviets, the Italians, the Rumanians and the Hungarians. Just to name the Eastern Front.

Well the MG is an excellent suppression tool,

And I'm not trying to downplay it. But the fact is the Germans were pretty much the last ones in the Eastern Front to start officially equipping their platoons with more automatics to supplement the platoon FP.

but yes if you can bear hug the enemy then it makes calling for indirect fires difficult.

Indeed.

This is where having sensors does count, and good weather!

Fighting in good weather only went out of style a century or so ago.

I would certainly prefer more infantry in a Div, but its important to get the mix right, and given limited manpower, and enough weapons, arty provides the main killing power.

The late war Red Army infantry division complement was 5000 - 9000 men.

Its the mix thats important, you need both. But the latter requires less manpower, but you still need enough of the former, and I think 6 Bn is just enough (if kept upto strength).

It depends on the tactical situation.

"He who defends everything defends nothing".

He who puts all eggs in one basket will lose all of them at the same time.

Yes strong points are easy to target, but they make the most efficient use of the manpower and heavy weapons. The alternative of spreading them out into smaller penny packets is even worse.

True. The strongpoint approach called for mobile response to local crisis. And the Red Army took that into account in its planning. By wearing the mobile forces down and tying them up in several places at the same time rendered the entire concept impotent. Had there been a flexible frontline the concept would have been, well more flexible.

Yes fundamentally Hitler was stupid to attack, but how does that impact on this discussion?

The same way you people claim the narrowness of the of the frontline the Finns had has an impact on this discussion.

Well this discussion has gone a bit off the original topic, but we are talking about the German change from 9-6 Bn divs and if that was a smart idea or not. And the underlying principles DO apply more broadly.

Yes. Anybody know how the Hungarians for example developed their infantry formations ?

We in the Australian Defence Force face these issues all the time, how much infantry and how much heavy weapons do you have in your mix. In the past we were infantry heavy and lacked a lot of heavy weapons, our demographics (along with many other western nations) means that we have a smaller pool of manpower to draw from in the future, while needing to increase our combat power. Having increased heavy weapon allocations will help us to do this, along with improved command and control.

The thing is the modern wars just are not the same they used to be. The Finnish defence are built now on the brigade formation and the main aim is to disrupt the attacker by being mobile enough to disperse and mass up where the enemy is the most vulnerable, guerilla style. That also entails the enemy forces are engaged and blocked at the points of our choosing.

But there is a point where you do not have enough bayonets, my contention is that 6 Bn’s in a German div is just enough (provided they are kept upto strength).

The Finnish army faced the same problems as the Germans did, including battlefield attrition. The diffences in the German and the Finnish way of dealing with the crisis culminate in the way in which the CHQ dealt with them, including the man power losses. The Finnish army as a whole could not have sustained the kind of losses the Germans did. In case you are not aware of it the Finnish army did not lose any formations from platoon size up in enemy encirclements. AFAIK no full companies were lost in that manner, I know for a fact no Bn's or regiments were lost).

Also, the Finnish platoon small arms mix was different, giving them inherently more FP over the German one in standard text book configuration. Thus I think it is fair to say that a depleated German platoon was further up the creek than a similarly depleated Finnish platoon, in terms of organic fire power.

Yes it did! They were able to keep the mobile divs (and some inf divs) off the front line to provide counter-attack forces or launch new offensives.

In the Eastern Front the last great German offensive was the Kursk offensive. And for all their counter attacks AG Center and AG South could not hold their ground. Some even say both were routed.

I agree with Jason on the fact that these were frequently wasted by the overly offensive minded General Staff, but the concept worked very well.

The concept was sound, but only in paper. The fact of the matter is the Red Army studied the German tactics very closely and deviced means to pulverise the main points of defence and neutralize the mobile counter attacks. This was possible because of the German CHQ would not acknowledge defeat until all was lost and there was nothing left to do but to but assemble the fleeing survivors and establish a new MLD some times hundreds of kilometers from the original one.

The Germans did not have enough combat power to hold everywhere in enough strength to guarantee stopping a breakthrough.... hardly anyone ever does

The had enough combat power. The thing is their defensive zone should have been at least 100 km deep. They were denied the tactical flexibility which their chosen tactics called for.

(although the Finnish circumstances with a defence on a narrow front may be an exception...).

Please check the average width of the Red Army offensive operation zone. Compared to that the "Finnish special circumstances" claim and argument does not really hold water.

Even against the odds the Germans were able to continue to create forces capable of offensive action by holding the line with less, while forming a strong reserve.

So why did AG Center collapse so spectacularly ?

[ August 10, 2003, 01:50 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]