Soviet Artillery in CM2

[Scott B]

The massed use of artillery in large offensives did not really become a feature of Soviet offensives until 1943, and quite frankly the kind of offensive that the Soviets preferred in a breakthrough would be wholly unenjoyable for most of us in a CM scenario (ie: too imbalanced).

A late war full breakthrough attempt, generally speaking, is a no-win scenario for the defenders in the first defensive belt. They're speedbumps, and thus not that interesting at the CM level. At the 3rd or 4th defensive belt or in the mobile reserve, sure, I can see it. Early in the war as well, but you're not looking at the same kind of fire support there; the artillery that the Red Army was famous for really started pouring in during the '44-45 offensives.

There does exist something of a problem in abstracting the effect of pre-game artillery, though. It definitely has a tactical effect on the defenders, in both morale and damage. Artillery used in a suppression role will keep the defender's head down and allow the assaulting troops to close with them. Even the already mentioned tactic of uncovering and then recovering to the original defensive position had its problems, as an experienced Soviet fire planner might work over a position more than once as the troops approached in anticipation of such a ploy.

To be done right Soviet artillery should mostly be planned before the scenario begins, during the set-up phase. A Soviet mobile unit (particularly a Forward Detachment, which is totally different from a Kampfgruppe) would try to compensate for their lack of fire support with direct fires, but a more common rifle unit would more typically have only their assigned mortars and AT guns.

Let's see... other minor point: Sovs also had the 120mm mortar (that the Germans copied) and late in the war the 160mm in limited quantities.

Scott B.

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

Agreed…see my previous post regarding mortars and the Red Army. My only hair on a gnats ass nit-pick would be dates for massed artillery concentrations. Uranus was heralded by massed concentration of artillery fire (late 42). However, modeling massed artillery barrage…drum fire barrages...on helpless Rumanian and Italian positions prior to Uranus would most likely be a bit of a bore for the Italian player.

The critical point here is the lack of significant radio\wireless sets severally cuts into an Armies ability to adjust and fire in real time. Thus the Soviet affinity for large caliber assault guns…SU-122 and 152. Direct fire artillery support.

Requiring players to pre-plan barrages I think would have a certain appeal. Such a thing would forces players to plan prior to hitting the start button for their respective scenarios.

[JasonC]

"From what I understand, the normal use of soviet artillery would be 82mm and 120mm directly "on call" to batallion or company, 76mm regimental guns more often than not in direct fire mode, and all other calibres in counterbattery, preplanned strikes and on call to higher HQs."

The Russians loved mortars, precisely because they could coordinate their fire more easily, firing from closer to contact. And they had great gobs of them, an order of magnitude more 120mm mortars in particular, than the Germans had.

German commanders do not speak of no artillery fire after the preliminary bombardment, either. Instead, they talk about the need for strict fire discipline to break Russian attacks, because when they opened up too soon, the Russians would go to ground more or less intact and hit them with more indirect fire. That was probably mortars, most often.

The prelim - vs. on call distinction is real, and the weight of metal was heavily in favor of the prelim, as easier to coordinate. But the shelling the Germans would face on call included 120mm mortars, nothing for infantry and guns to sneeze at.

I'd expect relatively high delay times for Russian arty, with the mortars substantially better.

Another way to make the heavier arty types more useful for "prep" and less for on-call, is to have them fire wide-sheaf. If you overlap several of those, you will still get heavy destruction, and over a wide area too.

Another thing to make this workable, might be to have the heavier modules come with fewer rounds but with each cheaper. That would let the Russians fire all-at-once barrages more readily. So, instead of 1x105mm with 100 rounds US for 210 points, you'd expect perhaps 3x122mm with 35 rounds each, for ~75 points each or 225 total. Firing wide sheaf.

But they wouldn't work as well for point targets, on the fly as it were. The mortars and 76mm could do that job.

Just some ideas on how to get it to work.

[JasonC]

Originally posted by Schutzstaffel:

[QB]the soviets had 2 main morters...

No, they also made more than *40,000* of the 120mm mortars. That is about half as common as the German 81mm, and ~6 times as common as the German 120mm, which the Germans copied from them. A great weapon, as the Germans were the first to admit. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

[grunto2]

i would like to use 76mm, 122mm, and 152mm batteries in a direct fire role.

my understanding is that the soviets had a fondness for direct artillery piece fire.

certainly the 76mm was very common.

andy

[KiwiJoe]

I think you are all wrong. CM mostly models SMALL battles. I see them as being random "frindge" clashes. There would be no prep bombardments in these cases. Either you'd wait for reinforcements (if so these battles arnt modelled by CM) or go in fighting and try and take the small enemy force out quickly... which is what Cm battles are all about. The only artillery thus avaiable would be mortars and perhaps SOME artillery that happened to be on call in the area. This is basically what CM models now and what CM2 should model in the future. As such the russians should have a reasonable amount of 82mm and 120mm mortars as artillery and a small amount of howitzers and gun artillery. (ie the later stuff should be expensive). This means that the delay for artillery falling SHOULDNT be much more than any other country.

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

“This means that the delay for artillery falling SHOULDNT be much more than any other country.”

I think you are WRONG in this assessment. This isn’t a matter of TIME of flight. It is a question of communication between FO and FDC. WITHOUT wireless this communication would be restricted to runners FIELD TELEPHONES or wig-wagging (if that was employed by the Red Army).

[MrSpkr]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Matthew_Ridgeway:

“This means that the delay for artillery falling SHOULDNT be much more than any other country.”

I think you are WRONG in this assessment. This isn’t a matter of TIME of flight. It is a question of communication between FO and FDC. WITHOUT wireless this communication would be restricted to runners FIELD TELEPHONES or wig-wagging (if that was employed by the Red Army).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree absolutely. Radios were uncommon in Russia - there might be a single radio for a tank platoon (especially in the early years). On defense, its not much of a problem because the defender could lay land lines. On the attack, however, it became a problem.

MrSpkr

[tss]

MrSpkr wrote:

I agree absolutely. Radios were uncommon in Russia - there might be a single radio for a tank platoon (especially in the early years).

Sure, Soviets didn't have that much radios available for forward observers. However, the radios that they had were allocated on the observers of breakthrough units. Also, in 1944 Soviets tried to get forward observers as close to the enemy as possibly, even before the battle.

For example, at Ihantala (on 28 or 29 June 1944) one Finnish night patrol stumbled on a Soviet FO team that had actually infiltrated _through_ Finnish lines. They had radios.

Earlier that summer Finns had in several places suspected that enemy spotters were in rear areas but as far as I know this was the first (and only) time when a FO team was actually found there.

- Tommi

[Skipper]

> Radios were uncommon in Russia - there

> might be a single radio for a tank platoon

> (especially in the early years).

Simply "in the early years", not "especially". In a sense that availability of radios drastically improved by 1943, to the degree that you couldnt call them "uncommon" anymore.

Even in 1941, lack of radios did not mean the total absence of radios.

What BTS should do, it seems, is to model FOs with field telephones and FOs with radios. There should be some sort of penalty for a wire connection, but I dont know what exactly.

By the way, having to direct artillery by a field telephone doesnt mean immobility. A forward observer following the advancing infantry would trail a wire behind him. Ie, he would be able to move for upto several hundred meters.

Finally, I fully agree with the opinion that CM engine cannot model strategic breakthroughs of prepared defences. This would be a task for at least a regiment. CM, for obvious manageability reasons, does not handle regiment-sized engagements. However, firewall tactics and other forms of preparatory artillery fires more complex than simple "shooting at map coordinates" were commonly used in battalion sized assaults.

[ 04-20-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by KiwiJoe:

I think you are all wrong. CM mostly models SMALL battles. I see them as being random "frindge" clashes.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

CM certainly can model fringe clashes. But it is not limited exclusively to doing so. It can also model parts of larger battles, though admittedly it is less than perfect at doing so (in that there is presently no way that I know of to account for what may be happening on the flanks of what is portrayed on the screen). If it were not able to do so, however imperfectly, it would be less useful than it is.

Anyway, my thoughts on the subject.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

There should be some sort of penalty for a wire connection, but I dont know what exactly.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think someone (but not Lewis! ) has already suggested that there could be random pauses in the availability of artillery connected via wire, somewhat in the way a gun can be temporarily unavailable due to a jam. This models a broken wire and the time it takes to track down the break and fix it.

Michael

[MikeyD]

I'm having a hard time matching up the concept of 'prep fire' to the game's timescale. Sure the German lines may have endured 8 hours of bombardment before the scenario starts, but the game battle's usually just 20-30 minutes long!

Prep fire should probably be regarded in the same way as strategic bombing on the Western front - a good excuse to add rubble and burning buildings to your scenario but inappropriate to model in a game of this scale. Perhaps BTS will give us crater graphics to scatter around when constructing a scenario, with protection numbers approximating light buildings perhaps?

[tss]

It will be interesting to see whether CM2 can handle the Ihantala battle or not. The infantry units aren't a problem at all: Finns had less than 500 men on the battle area and near reserves (a regiment, but so heavily attrited that it was down to a batallion strength) and on the final day before the 12th regiment was relieved its combat strength had fallen to 200 men or so.

The Soviets had more infantry, but they too had had so many losses that the units that were sent to attack were not much stronger than a couple of batallions, at most. However, they had several dozens of tanks and assault guns in the area left after they lost almost 50 tanks in the first two days.

The problems come from artillery.

Picture a CM map about 3000x2000 meter large. Put there at least 50 Finnish target registeration points and perhaps 20-30 Soviet ones. (I have seen the Finnish artillery target chart but not a Soviet one. The disparity in the figures is due the fact that Finns had many "barrage targets" that would need at least 2 or 3 CM TRPs to cover). Add enough Finnish spotters to get the fire of 21 artillery batallions, that is, 63 batteries (well, 247 guns to be exact, some batteries were not in full strength) ranging from 75mm up to 8". Add enough Soviet spotters to get ~500 guns.

Watch how many units are alive after five rounds of combat.

(At Ihantala Finns usually fired artillery missions 5-7 batallions at a time (15-21 batteries) against 200x300 meter target areas).

- Tommi

[ 04-20-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

[Jeff Duquette]

You reckon Finns and other German Allied truppen\equipment will be modeled in CM2…Italians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, French, Spanish, (etc).

TSS great post...well informed as usual. I'm curious if perhaps indirect Artillery is overly powerful in CM when considering entrenched troops? Various post war studies from both WWI and WWII would seem to imply that well entrenched soldiers were not dying in droves even during fairly heavy, extended, barrages.

Presumably large scale Soviet preparatory barrages would typically be occurring against front line areas that have remained relatively static for a period of time...read German or German Allied troops would be entrenched. The implied static condition would probably be the case in order for larger Soviet Artillery concentrations to be occurring. It takes time to assemble large numbers of guns and stockpile large quantities of ammunition for the type of Drum Fire barrages we seem to be talking about here. In addition the Soviets would typically creep along during the registration process in order to avoid "tipping there hand" - so to speak --- ie maintain some hope of acheiving operational surprise at the intended schwerpunckt.

Personally I don't think it would be a bad thing to allow the Soviets to have heavy prepratory, pre-planned barrages in CM2. I reckon it wouldn't be utilized in two player games very often for some of the reasons already stated by others.

As far as prepratory barrages being outside the typical time frame of a CM scenario, I disagree on this point. The Soviets were apparently fond of employing rolling or walking barrages during an attack similar to the old fashioned British Army WWI practice. Artillery saturates a location for X number of minutes than increases range by 100 meters (or whatever) and bombards the next location. All laid out in a neat timetable. The timetable would typically be something which is non-adjustable in real time. An infantry assault would follow closely behind the rolling barrage…100 to 200 meters behind.

Side note: The Soviets were one of the last\only countries to continue the production and employment of shrapnel shells during WWII. Some sort of hold over from successes achieved with this type of round during WWI. Most other WWII belligerents had switched over to high explosive rounds during the intra-war years.

[ 04-20-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[tss]

Jeff Duquette wrote:

I'm curious if perhaps indirect Artillery is overly powerful in CM when considering entrenched troops? Various post war studies from both WWI and WWII would seem to imply that well entrenched soldiers were not dying in droves even during fairly heavy, extended, barrages.

I was personally surprised to find out that the Finnish JR 1 had "only" 20% physical losses on 9-10 June 1944. After all, the Valkeasaari sector was pounded by almost 1000 guns, including several batteries of 12" naval guns, for hours.

However, if you consider also the psychological losses, the men who get shocked so badly that they can't think about anything else than getting out of the way of the coming major assault, the losses of JR 1 skyrocket to something like 80% or more.

Also, apparently not a single defender of the two strongpoints that faced the first attackk (and thus had the heaviest bombardment) survived. (Some may have been captured, I'm not sure, but in any case those two platoons were completely written out).

All laid out in a neat timetable. The timetable would typically be something which is non-adjustable in real time.

It was a common Soviet practice to indicate the position of the front line by firing signal flares constantly. When the flares advanced close to the edge of the barrage, the artillerists knew to move the fire forward.

- Tommi

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>“However, if you consider also the psychological losses, the men who get shocked so badly that they can't think about anything else than getting out of the way of the coming major assault, the losses of JR 1 skyrocket to something like 80% or more.”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Excellent point. Shell shock.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It was a common Soviet practice to indicate the position of the front line by firing signal flares constantly. When the flares advanced close to the edge of the barrage, the artillerists knew to move the fire forward.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Also an interesting insight. This would seem to imply that Soviet Artillery was operating fairly close to the front lines…assuming they were adjusting fire based upon visual queues – in this case signal flares.

I just read something in TM-30-340 "Handbook on Soviet Military Forces" implying that barrage balloons were still being employed on occasion by Soviet Artillery spotters ala the old WWI approach to fire and adjust (this certainly must have been an extremely risky job). Another implication regarding lack of radio communication. Fire adjustment would have been via a field telephone from the Balloon observer directly to the FDC…or whatever the Soviet equivalent of FDC was.

The more one reads on Soviet WWII artillery practices the more one gets the impression that their capabilities were more in line with some of the more sophisticated artillery practices of World War I.

[Michael Emrys]

Quote from Tommi:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It was a common Soviet practice to indicate the position of the front line by firing signal flares constantly. When the flares advanced close to the edge of the barrage, the artillerists knew to move the fire forward.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Also an interesting insight. This would seem to imply that Soviet Artillery was operating fairly close to the front lines…assuming they were adjusting fire based upon visual queues – in this case signal flares.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not necessary for the firing batteries to be too awfully close to the front; only someone with a pair of binocs, a good viewing location, and a telephone to the FDC.

Michael

[Scott B]

If the regimental observation post could see the flares, they could get word back to the guns. That's all you really need-- just set it up in advance.

There were a number of limiting factors for the availability of Soviet Artillery in WWII. Primarily you saw a lack of the necessary equipment-- even with a massive amount of guns available, without the proper communications gear and trained gunners, your ability to put steel downrange is greatly limited. This is one of the main reasons for the ruthless centralization of much of the artillery in the Red Army, including everything considered "heavy."

When the Soviets did have arty available, they had a LOT of it, however. The Soviets understood well the principles of mass and momentum. By the later part of the war Soviet artillery was employed in division and even corps organizations when tasked out to support main effort (usually breakthrough) operations. Few of which I expect to ever attempt to model in Combat Mission.

The point is this-- you will occasionally see at the Combat Mission scale an attacking battalion reinforced with higher-level artillery, but for the most part the extreme artillery concentrations will be limited to battles beyond CM's scale. In the end I think the amount available shouldn't be much more than is available to the Allies in a typical CM battle now. Early in the war there should certainly be shortages except in specific circumstances. The most effective use of Soviet field guns in the defense should likely be in a direct fire or self-spotted role, as they were used historically. The only penalty for wire communications over radio communications should be in the mobility of the observer, however-- responsiveness should be roughly the same.

Scott B.

[von_M]

I have absolutely nothing to add to this discussion. Just the future name for CM2, and a request that BTS doesn't totally remove Russian arty as a threat in CM2.

[Jeff Duquette]

I knew I had seen this tendency on the part of the Red Army to push their indirect firing artillery relatively close to the front lines.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: B.H. Liddell Hart’s “The Red Army”

ARTILLERY

Traditionally, the Soviet High Command has placed more emphasis on artillery equipment than on any other type of military 'hardware'. Stalin referred to this branch as the 'God of War'. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet Army today possesses a formidable inventory of large artillery systems. In direct-fire weapons especially, the Soviet Union is probably unequalled by any other nation in the world. The principal weakness of Soviet artillery is lack of supporting equipment required for indirect fire and fire control. During the Second World War the Russians compensated for this weakness by depending on massive concentration of firepower in relatively minor sectors. The Soviet tactical concept of 'breakthrough artillery’ and the organization of artillery into 'divisions' clearly indicate the trend of their thinking with respect to the role of this arm.

The Soviet Army has always stressed the need for mobile artillery. Soviet tactical doctrine calls for artillery to follow the foot soldiers and armour as closely as possible. The evolution of this tactical concept has been at least in part due to the weakness of their indirect fire control. To accomplish this mobility the Soviet Army has always been strong in self- propelled artillery. At present the Soviet Army has a number of weapons in this category. In particular, they have a 76-mm SU gun which, although still found in many units, is thought to be obsolete and is being replaced by 85mm. and 100mm.SU guns. In addition they have a 122mm SU gun and a 152-mm SU howitzer. The larger-calibre weapons are mounted on the JS-III tank chassis, while the 85-mm. and 100mm. SU guns are mounted on the T-34 tank chassis. The 76-mm. SU gun is mounted on the chassis of the obsolete T-70 light tank.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[tss]

I wrote:

I was personally surprised to find out that the Finnish JR 1 had "only" 20% physical losses on 9-10 June 1944. After all, the Valkeasaari sector was pounded by almost 1000 guns, including several batteries of 12" naval guns, for hours.

As I have mentioned earlier, my grandfather was a platoon assistant-leader in JR 58, the unit that was positioned next to the ill-fated JR 1 that took the heaviest blow in the Soviet breakthrough. JR 58 also received heavy bombardment but since the Soviets found it a tougher nut to crack, they decided to concentrate on JR 1 (yes, they could have come through also from JR 58's sector, but JR 1 offered slightly less resistance).

One other thing that I've mentioned about grandpa' is that his military records have a month-long gap. I previously thought that he had been wounded in the bombardment and for some reason it hadn't been recorded (they were quite confused days).

However, yesterday I found out that he and 5-6 of his mates were left behind the advancing Red Army lines. It took them three weeks to get back to own side. Neither he nor any other man in his group ever told their families what happened during those weeks. Never. Two of them are still alive (grandpa' died almost 10 years ago), and hopefully they tell about it someday.

- Tommi

[Jeff Duquette]

Interesting story. You best wrestle this information from one of the survivors before the chance is gone.

JR = Jagaer Regiment?

[tss]

Jeff Duquette:

JR = Jagaer Regiment?

"Jalkaväkirykmentti" (infantry regiment). However, jääkäri troops were also abbreviated with 'J', but they were organized in batallions (JP, "jääkäripataljoona") and brigades (JPr, "jääkäriprikaati").

-Tommi

[MrSpkr]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:

I wrote:I found out that he and 5-6 of his mates were left behind the advancing Red Army lines. It took them three weeks to get back to own side. Neither he nor any other man in his group ever told their families what happened during those weeks. Never. Two of them are still alive (grandpa' died almost 10 years ago), and hopefully they tell about it someday.

- Tommi<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

My great-uncle had a similar experience fighting the Japanese on Okinawa. He was either captured or just stuck behind enemy lines for several days. He never discussed the incident and took his story to the grave.

I hope you can find out what happened with your grandfather. But - be ready for what may be an unpleasant and unsavory story.

MrSpkr