British/Commonwealth Infantry weapons...poor?

[Hon John Howard MP LLB]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Hanns:

The Enfield (and Springfield) being copies of the Mauser are similiar in their ease of use.

The Lee action uses rear locking lugs versus the forward locking lugs of a Mauser action. Fundamentally different. The Lee action is as much a copy of a Mauser action as an elephant is a copy of a mouse - both mammals ain't they ?

The only problem is after each shot you must reacquire your target. There is a lot of moving around, especially when prone to chamber a new round.

Obviously poorly trained on the Lee action - bet you used the palm of the hand to chamber the next round ?

On the other hand with a semi-auto you squeeze the trigger, make minor adjustments to your target and fire again. It's a Hell of a lot simpler than using a bolt-action and the more simple things are in combat the more attention you can pay to what's going on around you.

While reacquiring the target - the problem of all large cabre (full power) rounds in a compartively light frame. That is one of the reasons why an LMG/MMG/GPMG weighs so much - to absorb the recoil while maintaining some semblance of contact with a target.

snip a bit of irrelevance

The main point is that if the Enfield was as good as the Garand, then why did both the Germans and the British attempt to copy it during the war?

Citation please !

I have found no evidence of them "copying the Garand". if anything the UK was ahead of the US - attempting to produce a semi-auto rifle in a new calibre OFFICIALLY before WWII but the war intervened (what was needed was weapons not the promise of them some time in the future).

German developments were influenced by encountering Russian semi-automatic weapons rather than US.

Another interesting note is that the Americans had racks of Garands sitting in armories during WWI

!!!!!!

but considered it too much of a risk to let fall into enemy hands so they kept them in the US.

Citation please !<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[Vanir Ausf B]

Willpower...fading...can't...resist...urge...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

30 % of the casualties are unaccounted for. Can you provide the breakdown of that part ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

If they could be broken down, they wouldn't be unaccounted for.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Today they are. But not according to the British and the American WWII doctrines.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

As someone who has read Depuy should know, doctrine and practice are not always the same.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Not really. Aimed fire was not extremely rare. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Furthermore everyone wanted to do it, even the Germans, but apart from the Red Army and the Japanese very few armies employed consistent tactics and doctrine that presented suitable targets for it at comfortable ranges.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I see a contadiction in these 2 statements.

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman:

The ability to pound your opponents to mush with artillery and aircraft before the PBI occupy the ground can make inferior small unit infantry tactics look pretty good.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not really. The big stuff going off just masks the inferior small unit tactics. And that is counterproductive as the brass back at the capital do not understand your needs to make changes in the armour production so you get heavier (and more expensive) tanks to the front. And they sure as hell will not understand how the hell were you able to squander ALL the artillery rounds sent your way to pound that little patch shrubbery on that small farm.

(Read: the production of Pershing and the shortage of artillery rounds experienced by the US Army after the initial landing took place because of the extraordinarily high consumption in the boggace )

Once the ability to "pound your opponents to mush" is lifted or impaired the men on the spot become SOL instatly. Convercely, once your opponent stops or reduces the pounding, for what ever reason, the side with superior (relative to forces engaged of course) small unit tactics regains the upper hand and can throw a series of monkey wrenches into the opponents extemely mobile wheels.

[Simon Fox]

Hey John,

GST please fix or do somefink

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Not really...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think he was talking short term. You're talking long term.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

[qb]Like WW1, WW2 had 40% of the casualties caused by artillery and 30% my machinegun fire. Rifles account for a relatively small amount of losses,

30 % of the casualties are unaccounted for. Can you provide the breakdown of that part ?

and they are completely out of the picture when it comes to breaking defensive lines, as WW1 showed.

At army, divisional and regimental level perhaps. But in the company level (in the CM scope) the rifle did play a part and it did matter. Otherwise the men attacking the enemy positions would not have needed to carry one. They would only have needed a piece of paper and a pencil to rack up the enemy casualties.

Most shots are fired to suppress.

Today they are. But not according to the British and the American WWII doctrines.

Once suppressed, they can't hurt yoy anymore and they still can get shot. Also, you can move around to dig them out, or call artillery in which is the real killer anyway.

To suppress them and to pin them down for arty to chew them over you need to locate them first and get a fix on their positions. That is the part where you need some fancy footwork and some infantrymen with small arms.

In WW2, aimed fire was extremely rare not because everyone did not want to do it, but because there were to many tanks and machineguns roilling around the battlefield to make it safe.

Not really. Aimed fire was not extremely rare. Otherwise officers like Gen. Depuy would not have complained about the US infantry having a tendency of not discharching their weapons in combat because of the lack of clear targets.

Furthermore everyone wanted to do it, even the Germans, but apart from the Red Army and the Japanese very few armies employed consistent tactics and doctrine that presented suitable targets for it at comfortable ranges.

The armour rolling around posed more of a psychological threat to the infantry than a physical one. It was the accompnying infantry that was the real threat to them. You could strip the armour of its protective infantry cover but to be able to stop the armour you needed more than a bullet from your rifle. Once effective handheld, stand off AT weapons were developed the infantry regained its superiority over armour in the battlefield.

A MG rolling around was not the real threat to the infantry, it was a MG lurking in them woods yonder that was the one to watch out for.

The ideal German system, which would someday be the standard for the entire world (except Australia and I think upper Lapland)

The ideal German system was built around the premise that they would be in the role of the attacker. Once they started getting their legs waxes by the Soviets they needed to come up with defensive tactics to counter the style of attack they had invented and spread around so effectively. Did they manage that ?

The US in the Bocage got their ass kicked in short range fights. It was so bad that by Bulge, many squads had adopted a new "semi-official" arrangement with two BARs trying in vain to keep up with the firepower gap.

Most of the American infantrymen were carrying the super effective M1 Garand semiauto rifle which was supposedly way better in ROF when compared to the bolt action rifles. Where does the firepower gap come from, IF it has nothing to do with differences in the Allied (the British and the Americans) tactics and doctrines when compared to the German tactics and doctrines ?

(The US and Commonwealth effectiveness on the ground was because of copious use of very high quality artillery from the 60mm US mortar to the 240mm canon, wide availability of the M4 and M10 in infantry support roles, extreme mobility, and a very high quality logistics and communication system.)

Bloody hell, for once I agree with you on something.

Well, you could omit the "very high quality" remarks. Otherwise one could think you advocate the cause of the über-Americans. [/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The best thing I can say is read previous commentaries on this. For example, the M1 is better than a bolt action, but neither was as effective as an MP44 (a German weapon so this you should agree with) and in any case the power of a squad was not its rifles but its automatic weapons. Soldiers fired to suppress when they were not aiming at fixed targets, machineguns can and did move around the battlefield, and I think I will let Vanir cut down the rest of your comments.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Hon John Howard MP LLB:

null<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Indeed.

When you are typing your post, look down below the 2 rows of buttons and you will see a little link saying "What is UBB Code?". That should get you going

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Tero]

Willpower...fading...can't...resist...urge...

When was that CMPA (CM Posters Anonymous) meeting again ? We can go together.

If they could be broken down, they wouldn't be unaccounted for.

Then how can it be said that the rifle was an insignificant cause of casualties if 30% of the total number can not be verified accurately enough ? The MG's may have fired most of the rounds but how many of them hit separate targets and how many induced fatal wounds ?

As someone who has read Depuy should know, doctrine and practice are not always the same.

Concur. But since there was reportedly a "firepower gap" still at the time of the Bulge (and beyond ?) and the men were still carrying the same M1 Garand semiauto rifle they had carried since the landing something is amiss in this equation. They had to take up an extra BAR to replace one of the excellent, high ROF M1 Garands ? Some people are of the opinion that the M1 Garand was better than the BAR. Yet the GI's in the field deemed it better. Does not compute.

Unless the GI's frame of mind was so inherently opposed to "spraying and praying" with his precious, precision but high ROF capable M1 Garand he had to take up a dedicated weapon sactioned to be used in such a manner.

Not really. Aimed fire was not extremely rare. Furthermore everyone wanted to do it, even the Germans, but apart from the Red Army and the Japanese very few armies employed consistent tactics and doctrine that presented suitable targets for it at comfortable ranges.

I see a contadiction in these 2 statements.

Aimed fire was not RARE at all. The ROF of the regular riflemen (bolt action or semiauto) was dependant on the situation. It could range from desultory pot shots to maximum ROF in decisive junctions in attack or defence. But I would not say it was rare. What made aimed shots less frequent or less intense was the fact that most armies used tactics deviced to deny the enemy clear point targets.

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

I think he was talking short term. You're talking long term.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes. But in any case, the inferior tactics may look good but the fact that they ARE inferior is not changed.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Then how can it be said that the rifle was an insignificant cause of casualties if 30% of the total number can not be verified accurately enough ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

A disproportionate number of unaccounted for were likely killed by artillery, as opposed to bullets. Think about it and I'm sure you'll see why.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Aimed fire was not RARE at all.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Depuy: "He was trained to shoot at and hit a target, but in combat, in the attack, he rarely ever saw a target."

Care to rephrase?

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

[QB]

OK, so your failure to recognize airpower succeeded in each conflict didnot come out of a crack pipe.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm supposed to take that as an apology? Sorry, try again.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

You comment though is pure bunk. You assume airpower was suppose to "win the war".

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, in fact I have proved the reverse. It was the airpower zealots who assumed that it

would "win the war" - in fact they promoted and still attempt to promote that it

will "win the war". In reality, it never has and more than likely never will.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

IOK, so you admit that "its objective in each of those conflicts was to either destroy the enemy or interdict his supply lines or force him from the field".

On Korea, Korean and Chinese regiments would arrive into battle at 30-40% strength because of air support, and would suffer a steady attrition each day when not bunkered from air attack. The Chinese were never able to sustain an offensive in Korea because they could never move supplies down the Korean land mass. Break throughs petered out as Chinese soldiers starved and ran out of ammo during 1952 and 1953. By your definition, this is a failure because the air corp did not kill each and every soldier on the field.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, its a failure because the metre used to measure its success - "win the war" was demonstrably not achieved. As you note, Chinese forces continued to arrive, even if depleted at the front. Sufficient supplies arrived to sustain them and allow them to prevent the UN forces to break through, in their turn.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

In the second Vietnam war, air power was extremely effective at 1) closeing down all major commerce to the North, 2) Saving 40,000 allied lives through medical evacuation, 3) killing nearlky a half million vietnamese soldiers by their own admission during the length of the war. The Vietnamese could not move soldiers down country openly, could not operate openly during the day, and never once during US involvement was able to sustain an offensive. Vietnam was won politically. Airpower in fact performed brilliantly.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yet it still failed, despite what was claimed for it, to "win the war".

I'd also suggest that in reality, not all commerce with the north was stopped - the rail lines to the PRC were never closed (for political reasons) and that whilst it evacuated many soldiers - that is not normally what is classified as "airpower", per se. As to the casualties inflicted, so what, the PAVN still won, in the end. It was able to sustain itself and fight effectively in South Vietnam.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

In the Isreali conflicts, 1/2 of all tank kills were made by airplane.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Interesting claim - which war? The only post-conflict assesements I've read have made the point that aeroplanes were signalling ineffective in destroying AFV's.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

In the Falklands, the ability to project airpower was a major factor in the invasion and its success. The British came within three or four ship losses of loosing the battle that the Infantry would have (and did) win handily.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I note that this is the one conflict you cite where there was no claim by the airpower enthusiasts that airpower would "win the war" and even you admit that it was only a "major factor" - not the factor.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

In the Gulf War air power destroyed over a hundred thousand men, several hundred armored vehicles, and effectively pinned the Iraqi's in place. It was so good, the Allies lost only a few hundred soldiers, over half to fratricide.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, the casualty figures are now generally agreed, even by the US military to have been grossly inflated by the media during the Gulf War. 100,000? Please, lets be a little realistic!

As to its being "so good", who was it that made the Iraqis retreat, out of Kuwait? The aeroplanes, flitting around overhead or was it the approach of the ground forces?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

In Kosovo the Serbs capitulated because of airpower. No ground forces invaded.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yet, the aim was not to make the Jugoslavs (please remember, there are more than one ethnicity which makes up Jugoslavia) "capitulate" but withdraw from Kosovo. It singularly failed to do that. Indeed, as the war progressed, the aim of the war shifted, from destruction of the Jugoslavian army and police forces in Kosovo and their means of attacking the Kosovars to one of economic and political destruction of Jugoslavia - the classic aims of the application of airpower.

Even so, it was not until NATO and the US started talking seriously about the use of ground forces and started to mass them on the Jugoslavian borders that the Jugoslavian government surrendered.

Even NATO and the US Airforce have admitted to just how inaccurate their air strikes were, whilst the amount of equipment and material which the Jugoslav army withdrew showed just how hollow the NATO/USAF claims were.

As I keep stating, airpower is but one arm, it is not the sole arm. So, lets be a little realistic here.

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

Depuy: "He was trained to shoot at and hit a target, but in combat, in the attack, he rarely ever saw a target."

Care to rephrase? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

He rarely even SAW a target but how RARELY did he SHOOT at it if he saw a it (or a bush that acted like a target) ? Let alone hit it. :cool:

I just absolutely love semantics.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Not really. The big stuff going off just masks the inferior small unit tactics. And that is counterproductive as the brass back at the capital do not understand your needs to make changes in the armour production so you get heavier (and more expensive) tanks to the front. And they sure as hell will not understand how the hell were you able to squander ALL the artillery rounds sent your way to pound that little patch shrubbery on that small farm. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There is some truth to this, but tactics could and did evolve seperate from official doctorine. The grunts on the ground who saw their buddies being mowed down while doing "Walking Fire" did not wait for the brass to figure it out. They learned overwatch and suppression, even though it wasn't "official". Just like carrying 2 BARs was not official TO&E. This is why forcing all US squads in CM to follow official US tactical doctorine (as you want) would not be any more historically correct than it is now (leaving it up to the player). But that's a different thread (I hope).

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

He rarely even SAW a target but how RARELY did he SHOOT at it if he saw a it (or a bush that acted like a target) ? Let alone hit it. :cool:

I just absolutely love semantics. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Uh... if you're shooting at a target you can't see, and likely only have a general idea of his location, that's not an aimed shot, that's area fire.

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

There is some truth to this, but tactics could and did evolve seperate from official doctorine.

Concur. But the tactics and changes in it could not alter or supercede the technical limitations imposed by the hardware available to the soldiers. On the other hand, unimagintive use of assets may leave some of the potential unused.

The M1 Garand of May -44 was the same M1 Garand in May -45. With exact the same specifications. The way in which it was used was not changed that for it to be dissimilar from the bolt-action rifle, even in terms of ROF, judging by the need to take up extra BAR's to increase the ROF of a platoon regardless of the fact that the M1 Garand was more than capable technically to handle the job. Instead "proper" high ROF weapons, (but not the SMG ) were taken up to work the suppression angle.

This is why forcing all US squads in CM to follow official US tactical doctorine (as you want) would not be any more historically correct than it is now (leaving it up to the player).

The "problem" is the fact that the TacAI is the same for ALL units regarless of the differences in the official tactics and doctrine. Most of the actions in CM are determined by the TacAI, not the player.

But that's a different thread (I hope).

I think threads named like this are destined to take this route, eventually.

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

Uh... if you're shooting at a target you can't see, and likely only have a general idea of his location, that's not an aimed shot, that's area fire.

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

First off, it is suppressive fire, not area fire. Area fire weapons include artillery, aerial bombs and the like.

Secondly, seeing a target to shoot at rarely does not mean you shoot at the target you see rarely.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

judging by the need to take up extra BAR's to increase the ROF of a platoon regardless of the fact that the M1 Garand was more than capable technically to handle the job. Instead "proper" high ROF weapons, (but not the SMG ) were taken up to work the suppression angle.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Your logic is off here. The M1 is semi-auto. The BAR is full-auto. That's why they took an extra for more FP. To suggest that this somehow indicates the M1 had no higher a ROF than a bolt action is nonsensical.

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Secondly, seeing a target to shoot at rarely does not mean you shoot at the target you see rarely.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

:eek:

Ok, you've finally managed to lose me competely. I'm gunna go see if Star Trek is on.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

Your logic is off here. The M1 is semi-auto. The BAR is full-auto.

IIRC there were two models, one selective fire, one full auto only.

That's why they took an extra for more FP. To suggest that this somehow indicates the M1 had no higher a ROF than a bolt action is nonsensical.

Technically it did have a higher ROF. But was this technical advantage used IRL the way it gets represented in CM now ?

Judging by the fact that more full-auto capable weapons were taken up it must be concluded this technical advantage was not utilized IRL, even with the changes in tactics and doctrine.

Hence the M1 Garand should be toned down in CM in relation to the bolt action rifles to represent the fact that the full potential of its higher ROF was not utilized by the GI's during WWII.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

The "problem" is the fact that the TacAI is the same for ALL units regarless of the differences in the official tactics and doctrine. Most of the actions in CM are determined by the TacAI, not the player.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One last blurb.

The problem of programming it into the TacAI is that it is then set in stone for all Scenarios/QBs, regardless of date or troop experience. So playing a QB in April '45 with crack troops, you would see your Ami units use the same dumb tactics they did in the bocage when they were fresh off the boat. Not good. Not realistic.

If you want to have no-shooting Amis vs. blazing Germans, just play Green Amis vs. Reg or Vet Germans and you'll get the desired end result. But this way, you're not forced into it all the time like your ideas would.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

IIRC there were two models, one selective fire, one full auto only.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I believe all or nearly all BARs in use 44-45 were full auto. I know all BARs made from 1940 were.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Judging by the fact that more full-auto capable weapons were taken up it must be concluded this technical advantage was not utilized IRL

Hence the M1 Garand should be toned down in CM in relation to the bolt action rifles... <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Cripes.

Last time: The 2 BARs had nothing to do with M1 ROF vs. bolt action. I have no idea where you get this. They took the 2nd BAR so as to have a 2nd full-auto weapon with serious power. Simple as that.

Now I'm going for real. I can't keep Terry Farrel waiting any longer

[Tero]

Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

Last time: The 2 BARs had nothing to do with M1 ROF vs. bolt action. I have no idea where you get this. They took the 2nd BAR so as to have a 2nd full-auto weapon with serious power. Simple as that.

And you see nothing wrong with the picture: a squad has semiauto weapons capable of considerable highter ROF than than bolt action rifles in the corresponding team.

The whole team is equipped with semi or full auto weapons to boot while the corresponding teams carry a mixture of bolt action rifles, SMG's and LMG's. And the corresponding teams have fewer men as well so the technical odds are heavily stacked in favour of team 1.

Yet, for reasons unknown, their semiautomatic rifle does not have adequate ROF and they need weapons capable of slightly greater ROF than the one they already carry.

Sustained ROF is not apparently what they are after since they go for a magazine fed weapon when there are belt fed MG's around that can take a bipod.

Smells like a serious case of force specific tactics and doctrine.

(OK, granted they had plenty of heavy stuff on tab but that does NOT reflect in any way to the tactics they used and how they used (or in this case clearly misused) the weapons they had at hand.)

Now I'm going for real. I can't keep Terry Farrel waiting any longer

You'll be back. :cool:

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

:eek:

Ok, you've finally managed to lose me competely. I'm gunna go see if Star Trek is on.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have been told before my sentences tend to be too long.

Lets retry:

You see a target to shoot at rarely.

You shoot at the target you see. Do you shoot at it rarely ?

Got that ?

[Brian Rock]

I'm a bit bemused by the other Brian's insistence that a bolt action rifle is at least the equivalent of a semi-automatic. It begs the question why armies have abandoned them - including the Australian Army.

As for WWII Aussie attitudes to high ROF weapons, here's an interesting link about Diggers' reactions to Owens and Sten guns in the Pacific war: http://www.smallarmsresearch.org/abstracts/v5n3&4Parker.pdf

It supports both the benefits of aiming (last para pg 1) and of a high ROF weapon for suppression (para 9, pg 2) depending on circumstances.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

The problem of programming it into the TacAI is that it is then set in stone for all Scenarios/QBs, regardless of date or troop experience. So playing a QB in April '45 with crack troops, you would see your Ami units use the same dumb tactics they did in the bocage when they were fresh off the boat. Not good. Not realistic.

There is some truth in what you say. But I just plain do not subscribe to the underlying "universal soldier" axiom.

The TacAI is set in stone so the question now stands: is there too much written on the stone ? The options available to the player now are very restricted. Should the player be given more control over the actions or some variables that are acted out in the 60 secs (like squad formation, spread etc) ?

you'll get the desired end result.

You assume too much.

What are the "desired" results I want ? Contrary to popular belief I do not want to rewrite WWII history.

But this way, you're not forced into it all the time like your ideas would.

This is where we disagree. As things stand the player is forced into it all the time too. The it the player is forced to is just a different one. As the forces all act the same you can use patent tactics no matter which side you play. If the different nationalities had different characteristics in their responces to battlefield stimuli (based on historical facts, not some arbitrary biases mind you) there would be less predictability in the game.