British/Commonwealth Infantry weapons...poor?

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

I thought you said you had no idea the ROF for the M1? Now you're sticking to your 8-16 number after I've posted numbers showing the ROF to be twice that?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

OK. Lets put it this way, I've fired semi-automatic rifles in a military situation and they were equipped with removable box magazines, which are easier and quicker to change than loading with a clip. I suspect

the number you quoted was in fact the maximum rate of fire, not its effective rate of fire, based on that experience.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

quote:

My question to you, Vanir, have you ever served in the military and been taught to

shoot in a military situation?

Nope. I've spent a lot of time shooting guns, but I never served. It's also irrelevant. Being trained to "shoot in a military situation" and actually doing it when bullets are coming back at you are two different worlds. The Americans discovered this in Normandy when they realized the way they had

been trained to shoot "in a military situation" was totally wrong. They had to unlearn.

And the way they were trained sounds a lot like the way you were trained.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yet, the method which I was taught has stood my army in good stead for fifty+ years and has stood the test of battle in major and minor conflicts ranging from WWII

through to East Timor, Vanir. I'd also suggest that being non-military trained makes you rather unqualified to pass judgement on whether or not military training methods are wrong or not.

Civilian shooters in my experience and going from many of the comments here, don't know how to use a bolt-action rifle correctly, nor that simply blazing away at the highest rate possible is not the be-all and end-all of shooting in a battle.

Again, going from the comments here, there seems to be a presumption that the weapon is removed from the shoulder to chamber a fresh round - rubbish. There also appears to be a presumption that the palm of the hand and a violent movement is required to chamber a fresh round - again rubbish. The weapon is kept into the should a small, sharp movement is executed to chamber a fresh round and the thumb and forefinger grip the handle on the bolt, not the whole hand.

As I've mentioned, and others alluded to, firepower rests not just on the amount of lead which flies about but the controlled application of that fire. GRIT - Group, Range, Indication, Target - the method by which an infantry section or platoon command _directs_ the fire of the men under his command, against the targets they seek to kill/destroy.

Soldiers are taught to hit what they aim at, not just blaze away in the general direction of the enemy. If their section command indicates a target, they are expected to hit it, not metres to either side.

The US Army was often observed, has been observed even by myself, when firing to have extremely poor fire discipline. Target detection and direction is poor and control of weapons and men poor. I don't want people to think this is merely a case of "yank bashing" it isn't, that observation is backed up in numerous sets of memoires, comes from my own interviewing of WWII and later conflict veterans. It is merely an observation, not an insult.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

quote:

Perhaps our tactical doctrine, which is dedicated more to "pure" infantry tactics, in

close terrain such as Jungle or scrub (which is what predominates in our region) is closer to what they used in WWII compared to what NATO or US Armies use, which rather makes me think what I'm saying is far more applicable to a game devoted to WWII than trying to suggest that a tactical doctrine from 2001 is relevent to 1944-45.

No. Sorry. Wrong.

The Germans did use the "NATO/US" style tactics you dismiss. This is about the sixth time this has been said here and you seem to be ignoring this rather telling bit of information.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And as someone else has pointed out, rather tellingly, they lost. They were unable to prevent themselves from being outmanauvred or plain outfought and they lost. The proof is in the pudding and that one's recipe was

shown to be somewhat wanting in substance.

You may as well say that because the Americans dropped the Atomic bombs on Japan that the reason why the Japanese infantry's tactics failed was because they didn't have an atomic bomb.

What area of the world did the action covered in Combat Mission take place?

Western Europe.

Until very recently, what area of the world did US and NATO forces expect to be fighting and trained as

such?

Western Europe.

The US largely adopted the German philosophy of infantry tactics because they had it used against them in WW2 and so they knew it worked.

Refute that.

[ 08-21-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

You seem to be mistaking the point I'm making. I'm not suggesting the tactics in use today, are necessarily wrong (misguided perhaps but not wrong). I am pointing

out that attempting to apply the tactics of today, without the weapons of today, will usually result in, not neceessarily failure but rather inaccuracy, Vanir and no understanding that you're acting in a manner

which is not appropriate to the period.

I was under the impression that people wanted to utilise the correct tactical doctrine for the period, rather than trying to act like the Mobile Infantry of Starship Trooper fame in 1944-45.

[Vanir Ausf B]

I can see this is becoming pointless. I'm just repeating myself over and over and you're ignoring the evidence I post to back my statements.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian:

I'd also suggest that being non-military trained makes you rather unqualified to pass judgement on whether or not military training methods are wrong or not.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I knew you were going to say that eventually. Never mind the fact that a long time military man has echoed almost everything I have said. Never mind that I have backed up my points with evidence other than my own personal opinion. Never mind the fact that being in the military apparently did not prevent you from being completely ignorant of basic US and German infantry tactics in WW2.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Soldiers are taught to hit what they aim at, not just blaze away in the general direction of the enemy. If their section command indicates a target, they are expected to hit it, not metres to either side.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Read Dupey and related quotes I provided on this subject. Oh, wait, they weren't British so that's a strawman. Nevermind.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>And as someone else has pointed out, rather tellingly, they lost. They were unable to prevent themselves from being outmanauvred or plain outfought and they lost. The proof is in the pudding and that one's recipe was

shown to be somewhat wanting in substance.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's a fatuous arguement. Under this logic, everthing about the losing side in a conflict is necessarily inferior to the winning side, else they would not have lost.

There have been whole books written on why Germany lost WW2, and you will not find one that lists poor small unit infantry tactics as one of them.

I suppose you think the Allies had better tanks than the Germans. They had to have. They won. The proof is in the pudding.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I was under the impression that people wanted to utilise the correct tactical doctrine for the period, rather than trying to act like the Mobile Infantry of Starship Trooper fame in 1944-45.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have posted quite a lot of first hand information about what tactical doctorine was used for the period. Starship Troopers? Eh... right.

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Triumvir]

Nothing else withstanding in this argument, the Allies did have better tanks than the Germans. The T-34 certainly outperformed its equivalents.

Or does Allies only mean Anglo-American?

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

You are aware that the US achieved a better than 10 to 1 kill/loss ratio in each of those conficts (except the Pacific which was more like 6 or 7 to 1 IIRC).

Yeah, I doesn't work.

[ 08-21-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Vanir, keep erecting that strawman. Tell me, how many Americans _died_ because the tactic didn't work and didn't eliminate the Japanese or other enemies?

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Triumvir:

Or does Allies only mean Anglo-American?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Being as everything else in this discussion has been Anglo-American, yes.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian:

Vanir, keep erecting that strawman. Tell me, how many Americans _died_ because the tactic didn't work and didn't eliminate the Japanese or other enemies?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

LOL!

If the tactic didn't work, how did they achieve the high kill ratios in the first place?

[Slapdragon]

My worthy colleagues Vanir, the Capt, and Aitkens, along with the rest, are pointing out some important facts that are getting ingored.

First -- the Germans lost, but they did not loose because aimed fire was more or less used by them. Like WW1, WW2 had 40% of the casualties caused by artillery and 30% my machinegun fire. Rifles account for a relatively small amount of losses, and they are completely out of the picture when it comes to breaking defensive lines, as WW1 showed.

Most shots are fired to suppress. Suppression, as studies from the German 1930s work that led to the MP44 to the US SALVO and SPIW studies, , is caused from a volume of fire directed over an area. The goal is to get the other guy to duck their heads, or become suppressed. Once suppressed, they can't hurt yoy anymore and they still can get shot. Also, you can move around to dig them out, or call artillery in which is the real killer anyway.

In WW2, aimed fire was extremely rare not because everyone did not want to do it, but because there were to many tanks and machineguns roilling around the battlefield to make it safe. Both sides spent a lot of time hiding behind trees or hugging the ground, something obviously not taught the "diggers."

The ideal German system, which would someday be the standard for the entire world (except Australia and I think upper Lapland) and never put completely into place, was to give every soldier a 200+300 meter rifle, and base each squad around a base of fire weapon (MG42). Platoons and companies would get the same weapon on a tripod for defensive sustained fire. If the war had gone on longer, every German soldier would have an automatic weapon.

The US in the Bocage got their ass kicked in short range fights. It was so bad that by Bulge, many squads had adopted a new "semi-official" arrangement with two BARs trying in vain to keep up with the firepower gap. The airborne had a cludgy M1919A6 made and set up special 3 man fire teams to use them (you can see one of these in the great movie "Battleground").

(The US and Commonwealth effectiveness on the ground was because of copious use of very high quality artillery from the 60mm US mortar to the 240mm canon, wide availability of the M4 and M10 in infantry support roles, extreme mobility, and a very high quality logistics and communication system. )

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]

[Vanir Ausf B]

And by the way, you brought up the subject of US tactics in those conflicts, not me. So it is your strawman, not mine.

EDIT: Er... I meant that to Brian, not Slappy

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by The_Capt:

Quote

Brian, you are living in the past and so is the Australia judging by your comments. You may be able to produce a fantastic infantryman but that isn't going to matter?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You are entitled to your opinion. However, as I point out in another post, this has stood the test of time and conflicts large and small ranging from WWII through to now, East Timor. Are you still going to tell us we've got it so wrong?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

As to the threat the rifleman will guard against? Well there are many on the modern battlefield and some will continue to be infantry, of course most of them are guarding their weapons systems too.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thank you, so the threat they guard against is other infantrymen. I think I've proved my point.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

I have been a professional Army officer for 13 yrs and what I am saying is nothing more than an extension of current NATO doctrine. "Firepower" has come of age in High Intensity conflict. You and yours may continue to pine away for the days when the bayonette, rifle and blood were the principal weapon on the battlefield but I am sorry those days are gone. Hell if airpower continues to excel at the rate it is we could all be out of a "warfighting" job and be restricted to peacemaking and security roles.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

If you believe that, then I am worried, very worried. Pray tell, when has airpower "excelled"? It failed in Kosovo, badly. It failed to expell the Iraqis from Kuwait. It failed dismally in Vietnam. It failed in Korea. It failed in WWII. Perhaps you'd care to name a conflict where either the threat or actual use of ground forces was not required to eject the enemy from the ground he controlled?

I do not pine for the days of the bayonet, in the slightest. I used to believe like you that its end had occurred and then I took up the serious study of military history and realised my mistake.

Indeed, I'd point out that the days of the bayonet are not over, despite what the proponets of "weapon systems" or airpower might proclaim.

When it comes down to, its always the PBI who do have to fix that bayonet and use it, when all else fails. Be it on Tumbledown Mountain or at Xa Long Tan or Kapyong or Buna and Sananda.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

I think we should settle this with a CM game... <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sure. Anytime. I'll take British, you can be German.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

And by the way, you brought up the subject of US tactics in those conflicts, not me. So it is your strawman, not mine.

EDIT: Er... I meant that to Brian, not Slappy

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Dang, and I was going to call you a yellow unmilitary bastard.

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]

[Slapdragon]

Airpower failed in Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, and the Gulf? Boy, do they make all Commonwealth soldier smoke crack, or is it just your regiment?

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Triumvir:

Nothing else withstanding in this argument, the Allies did have better tanks than the Germans. The T-34 certainly outperformed its equivalents.

Or does Allies only mean Anglo-American?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course it does.

Actually, the T-34 mechanically was not very good. Its armour was excellent and its gun for the most part adequate.

What was good about it was that it represented, despite being an evolutionary development for the Russians, a revolutionary leap for the west in combining well-sloped armour, a reasonable gun with a reasonable, if mechanically unreliable chassis.

The KV was also quite a surprise for the Germans. Now, imagine if the KV variant with the 100mm gun had gone into production before the outbreak of war (its turret was used for the KV-II BTW). It would have been the equivalent in effect of the introduction of the Tiger I in North Africa - heavy tank, big, long-rang gun, well protected, mechanically reliable (to a certain extent).

Speaking of mechanical reliability, its a pity its not factored into CMBO, IMO.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Dang, and I was going to call you a yellow unmilitary bastard.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I've been called worse... and likely will be again

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Airpower failed in Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, and the Gulf? Boy, do they make all Commonwealth soldier smoke crack, or is it just your regiment?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

OK, here's a question for you about airpower - its objective in each of those conflicts was to either destroy the enemy or interdict his supply lines or force him from the field.

Did it succeed?

No.

In Korea - the Chinese and North Koreans were defeated? Nope. In Vietnam? Mmmm, whose helicopters evacuated whose embassy again? In Kosovo, was the Jugoslavian army destroyed and forced to withdraw? Nope.

I think instead of dismissing my viewpoint as being drug induced - one which I do not appreciate and which is pointless ad hominem, you'd better make sure you can back your's up with some facts.

Airpower is useful. It no more than any other single arm or service wins wars singlehanded. Remember the concept "combined arms" - something the airpower zealots forget. I'd recommend less Douhet, Trenchard or Mitchell and little more real history.

[Simon Fox]

Gee Slappy all that sparring you've been doing with Lewis is really paying dividends, you're really getting a bit of power in behind that viscious rejoinder.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Airpower has only failed in those conficts insomuch as it did not win the war all by itself (well, actually, it did in Kosovo...). That's a very narrow diffinition for success. It could also be said that armor failed in WW2 because infantry, artillery and airpower was also required for victory, and it would be just as silly.

Boy, now we're way off topic. Anyone think the Ravens will repeat this year?

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

LOL!

If the tactic didn't work, how did they achieve the high kill ratios in the first place?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not good enough, Vanir - perhaps you should answer my question first - how many _didn't_ it kill?

They are the ones which matter - from the viewpoint of the infantry on the ground, the ones who will be betting their lives on whether or not they will be killed by the enemy survivors - and yes, there always will be some.

They are the ones which will be making those infantrymen quake in their boots, fill their pants and wet themselves and scream for their mothers as their guts spill on the ground.

How many Americans died in WWII, Korea, Vietnam and so on, because the massive mis/over-application of firepower didn't work, Vanir?

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian:

OK, here's a question for you about airpower - its objective in each of those conflicts was to either destroy the enemy or interdict his supply lines or force him from the field.

Did it succeed?

No.

In Korea - the Chinese and North Koreans were defeated? Nope. In Vietnam? Mmmm, whose helicopters evacuated whose embassy again? In Kosovo, was the Jugoslavian army destroyed and forced to withdraw? Nope.

I think instead of dismissing my viewpoint as being drug induced - one which I do not appreciate and which is pointless ad hominem, you'd better make sure you can back your's up with some facts.

Airpower is useful. It no more than any other single arm or service wins wars singlehanded. Remember the concept "combined arms" - something the airpower zealots forget. I'd recommend less Douhet, Trenchard or Mitchell and little more real history.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

OK, so your failure to recognize airpower succeeded in each conflict didnot come out of a crack pipe. You comment though is pure bunk. You assume airpower was suppose to "win the war". IOK, so you admit that "its objective in each of those conflicts was to either destroy the enemy or interdict his supply lines or force him from the field".

On Korea, Korean and Chinese regiments would arrive into battle at 30-40% strength because of air support, and would suffer a steady attrition each day when not bunkered from air attack. The Chinese were never able to sustain an offensive in Korea because they could never move supplies down the Korean land mass. Break throughs petered out as Chinese soldiers starved and ran out of ammo during 1952 and 1953. By your definition, this is a failure because the air corp did not kill each and every soldier on the field.

In the second Vietnam war, air power was extremely effective at 1) closeing down all major commerce to the North, 2) Saving 40,000 allied lives through medical evacuation, 3) killing nearlky a half million vietnamese soldiers by their own admission during the length of the war. The Vietnamese could not move soldiers down country openly, could not operate openly during the day, and never once during US involvement was able to sustain an offensive. Vietnam was won politically. Airpower in fact performed brilliantly.

In the Isreali conflicts, 1/2 of all tank kills were made by airplane.

In the Falklands, the ability to project airpower was a major factor in the invasion and its success. The British came within three or four ship losses of loosing the battle that the Infantry would have (and did) win handily.

In the Gulf War air power destroyed over a hundred thousand men, several hundred armored vehicles, and effectively pinned the Iraqi's in place. It was so good, the Allies lost only a few hundred soldiers, over half to fratricide.

In Kosovo the Serbs capitulated because of airpower. No ground forces invaded.

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]

[PJungnitsch]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>(The US and Commonwealth effectiveness on the ground was because of copious use of very high quality artillery from the 60mm US mortar to the 240mm canon, wide availability of the M4 and M10 in infantry support roles, extreme mobility, and a very high quality logistics and communication system.)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Fully agreed. And I don't agree with Slapdragon very often. And on the air superiority thing: Infantry tactics get a lot easier when anything that moves on the other side gets strafed and rocketed as a matter of course, and when attacks are preceded by carpet bombing on a massive scale by the heavies and followed by spot attacks by the mediums on anything that is left. Advanced German small unit tactics that increased the firepower and effectiveness of each unit kept the Germans in the game, but could not by itself overcome everything else stacked against them. The stories of how the Allies suffered when they were caught in 'friendly fire' airpower incidents show what a difference command of the air makes.

The ability to pound your opponents to mush with artillery and aircraft before the PBI occupy the ground can make inferior small unit infantry tactics look pretty good.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Brian:

Not good enough, Vanir - perhaps you should answer my question first - how many _didn't_ it kill?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You see, you misunderstand the purpose of the "application of firepower". The goal is not to completely wipe out every last enemy soldier, but to disrupt and atrit. The PBI will alway have to go in at some point, and always with the expection of meeting resistance and taking some loses. So how is it that the lack of mass firepower actually makes the battlefield more safe for the grunts? At the very worst, the enemy is uneffected, in which case losses would be the same as if there was none.

In short, there is nothing to lose by mass FP except ammo, and potentially a lot to gain (fewer enemys shooting back).

EDIT: Misread part of the question, sorry about that

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Simon Fox]

I would just like to point out that Brian's comments regarding airpower were in response to this statement from the_Capt: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Hell if airpower continues to excel at the rate it is we could all be out of a "warfighting" job and be restricted to peacemaking and security roles.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Which seems to imply that other arms will become redundant. Thankyou for your attention. I now return you to normal programming....

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

You see, you misunderstand the purpose of the "application of firepower". The goal is not to completely wipe out every last enemy soldier, but to disrupt and atrit. The PBI will alway have to go in at some point, and always with the expection of meeting resistance and taking some loses. So how is it that the lack of mass firepower actually makes the battlefield more safe for the grunts? At the very worst, the enemy is uneffected, in which case losses would be the same as if there was none.

In short, there is nothing to lose by mass FP except ammo, and potentially a lot to gain (fewer enemys shooting back).

EDIT: Misread part of the question, sorry about that

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually Vanir you draft dodging hippy scum, I think it is easier to sum up.

For airpower to be considered an effective tool it must kill everyone, hold the ground, rape the sheep, trample the corn (or kine, I always forget what gets trampled) and rejoice at the lamentations of the women. In other words, it must do allthings in the battle and do them perfectly, or else it is a failure.

[Desdichado]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

In the second Vietnam war, air power was extremely effective at 1) closeing down all major commerce to the North, 2) Saving 40,000 allied lives through medical evacuation, 3) killing nearlky a half million vietnamese soldiers by their own admission during the length of the war. The Vietnamese could not move soldiers down country openly, could not operate openly during the day, and never once during US involvement was able to sustain an offensive. Vietnam was won politically. Airpower in fact performed brilliantly.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Linebacker I raids were instrumental in bringing the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table, which would make it one of the most successful strategic bombing campaigns ever mounted.

[Hon John Howard MP LLB]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Cybeq:

To me, this topic is rather laughable. Around the turn of the century the Germans invented their Mauser action and developed the K98. This rifle was vastly superior to anything anybody else had.

A combination of cartidge (propellant) and action made a good weapon - for pinpoint, long-range work (as in the Second Boer War).

The contemporary Long-Lee Enfield was only just inproduction following the successful Lee-Metford (which was a balck powder cartridge weapon).

The Brits and Americans came up short in the bolt-action rifle department and desired a "K98" of their own.

See above - British contemprary weapons were comparable. Tactics ("Field Craft" and command and control) let them down in the Boer War.

The Americans developed the 1903 Springfield and the Brits developed the Lee-Enfield, both borrowing heavily from the Mauser design.

Could I be enlightened where the Lee-Enfield (and by this I assume you mean the Rifle .303 in Short Magazine Lee Enfield) borrowed "heavily from the Mauser".

Among these three rifles the K98 is generally considered to be superior with the 1903 Springfield a close second and then the Enfield.

For what purpose ?

All in all a fairly equal bunch. These rifles all participated in WWI. When WWII rolled around the Brits and Germans carried their WWI weapons into battle while the Americans developed a next-generation battle-rifle. This rifle, the Garand (designed by a Canadian no less) is considered by many to be the greatest battle rifle ever developed (including Patton). It's accuracy, range, power, and rate of fire surpass the Enfield.

Funny - I note that it was never adopted as the US sniper rifle (the Springfield reigned supreme in US circles) while both the Rifle No 3 and No 4 had sniper developments.

If ist was so good why was it never adapted to a sniper weapon ?

It is still used today in rifle matches.Garand Match

So are the match versions of the Kar98 rifle an carbine, Lee-Enfield series, Springfields ('03 and '97 models) as well as just about any other rifle that has been made in the last 100 years where there are stocks available of weapons, ammunition, parts and dedicated people who want to use them.

It's value today on the open market surpasses the Enfield by a huge margin.

Perhaps because it is harder to convert to match standard - semi-automatic is not necessarily an advantage.

In short it is superior to the Enfield in every conceivable way.

Still has not produced any evidence to support superiority of the Garand.

Well, except magazine capacity. If your American friends give you a hard time about the superiority of the Garand again gently remind them it was invented by a Canadian, John Garand. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>null

[Tero]

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Like WW1, WW2 had 40% of the casualties caused by artillery and 30% my machinegun fire. Rifles account for a relatively small amount of losses,

30 % of the casualties are unaccounted for. Can you provide the breakdown of that part ?

and they are completely out of the picture when it comes to breaking defensive lines, as WW1 showed.

At army, divisional and regimental level perhaps. But in the company level (in the CM scope) the rifle did play a part and it did matter. Otherwise the men attacking the enemy positions would not have needed to carry one. They would only have needed a piece of paper and a pencil to rack up the enemy casualties.

Most shots are fired to suppress.

Today they are. But not according to the British and the American WWII doctrines.

Once suppressed, they can't hurt yoy anymore and they still can get shot. Also, you can move around to dig them out, or call artillery in which is the real killer anyway.

To suppress them and to pin them down for arty to chew them over you need to locate them first and get a fix on their positions. That is the part where you need some fancy footwork and some infantrymen with small arms.

In WW2, aimed fire was extremely rare not because everyone did not want to do it, but because there were to many tanks and machineguns roilling around the battlefield to make it safe.

Not really. Aimed fire was not extremely rare. Otherwise officers like Gen. Depuy would not have complained about the US infantry having a tendency of not discharching their weapons in combat because of the lack of clear targets.

Furthermore everyone wanted to do it, even the Germans, but apart from the Red Army and the Japanese very few armies employed consistent tactics and doctrine that presented suitable targets for it at comfortable ranges.

The armour rolling around posed more of a psychological threat to the infantry than a physical one. It was the accompnying infantry that was the real threat to them. You could strip the armour of its protective infantry cover but to be able to stop the armour you needed more than a bullet from your rifle. Once effective handheld, stand off AT weapons were developed the infantry regained its superiority over armour in the battlefield.

A MG rolling around was not the real threat to the infantry, it was a MG lurking in them woods yonder that was the one to watch out for.

The ideal German system, which would someday be the standard for the entire world (except Australia and I think upper Lapland)

The ideal German system was built around the premise that they would be in the role of the attacker. Once they started getting their legs waxes by the Soviets they needed to come up with defensive tactics to counter the style of attack they had invented and spread around so effectively. Did they manage that ?

The US in the Bocage got their ass kicked in short range fights. It was so bad that by Bulge, many squads had adopted a new "semi-official" arrangement with two BARs trying in vain to keep up with the firepower gap.

Most of the American infantrymen were carrying the super effective M1 Garand semiauto rifle which was supposedly way better in ROF when compared to the bolt action rifles. Where does the firepower gap come from, IF it has nothing to do with differences in the Allied (the British and the Americans) tactics and doctrines when compared to the German tactics and doctrines ?

(The US and Commonwealth effectiveness on the ground was because of copious use of very high quality artillery from the 60mm US mortar to the 240mm canon, wide availability of the M4 and M10 in infantry support roles, extreme mobility, and a very high quality logistics and communication system.)

Bloody hell, for once I agree with you on something.

Well, you could omit the "very high quality" remarks. Otherwise one could think you advocate the cause of the über-Americans.