German Armour development during WWII

[Skipper]

Back to Luftwaffe, one critically important result of the german air superiority that is often overlooked was air recon. Which was then the best, if not the only way to follow enemy tactical redeployments quickly enough to counter them.

The lack of air recon data was in fact one of the biggest command and control problems that soviet commanders experienced in 1941.

[Enoch]

I can't speak for what the Germans did, but the Americans did often attach the independent tank or tank destroyer battalions to infantrty formations. These tank/tank destroyer battalions would often end up as almost semi-permanent units within an infantry divison as they would spend long periods of time fighting along side the infantry. Several authors argued that the American amry would have been better served by simply attaching these aromored units to the infantry formations to allow for better training and coordination in battle. I suppose you could extrapolate the same argument to the Germans as well.

The earlier point made that the Germans never abondoned a production line is an important one. Despite increased attention of developing heavier tanks late war production of StuG's and Hetzers was still substantial.

One other question, the JagdPanzer IV had sloped armor. Any particular reason this was never incorporated with the StuG III or IV? Too much time to redesign?

Great posts so far.

[ 04-30-2001: Message edited by: Enoch ]

[jgdpzr]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Enoch:

One other question, the JagdPanzer IV had sloped armor. Any particular reason this was never incorporated with the StuG III or IV? Too much time to redesign?

Great posts so far.

[ 04-30-2001: Message edited by: Enoch ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, the jpzr basically was a Stug IV with sloped armor.

[ 04-30-2001: Message edited by: jgdpzr ]

[Redwolf]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Enoch:

I can't speak for what the Germans did, but the Americans did often attach the independent tank or tank destroyer battalions to infantrty formations. These tank/tank destroyer battalions would often end up as almost semi-permanent units within an infantry divison as they would spend long periods of time fighting along side the infantry. Several authors argued that the American amry would have been better served by simply attaching these aromored units to the infantry formations to allow for better training and coordination in battle. I suppose you could extrapolate the same argument to the Germans as well.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The problem the Americans had was that the AT capabilities of the U.S. infantry units was too badly underdeveloped. Remember that at D-day, the Americans still though they could get away with 75mm tank guns (dual-purpose with HE) and 57mm AT guns (defense only). As they quickly pushed the 76mm in tanks, something had to be done with the infantry AT capability as well and since the tanks were reasonably used in frontline tank units, the tank destroyers that were supposed to be concentrated in reserve were strickly demanded by the infantry in lack of any decent AT gun.

The Germany infantry had many sub-standard AT weapons as well, but the relationship to the enemy tanks was not as bad as for the Americans and the Americans probably had a harder time ignoring their infantry commanders.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

One other question, the JagdPanzer IV had sloped armor. Any particular reason this was never incorporated with the StuG III or IV? Too much time to redesign?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Jagdpanzer IV was supposed to be exactly that (with 75mm L/70). However, the StuG III could not be upgraded that way because the chassis was too small. StuG IV was the old StuG III superstructure, because the new superstructure wasn't ready (probably because of the gun chaos) when the chassis was ready.

[JasonC]

redwolf said U.S. infantry only had 57mm AT. Sort of, but not quite. The infantry regiments, yes. All ATGs serving with infantry divisions, no.

The initial ATG plan was based on 37mm AT guns, back in North Africa days. Each battalion had 4 (in the HQ company, the AT platoon of it), then there were another 12 at the regimental level, the regimental AT company. These were changed to 3 and 9 57mm guns respectively, before D-Day. So each regiment had 18 57mm, an infantry division had 54 of them.

But there was also a TD battalion for every infantry division. Actually, 60 of them all told served in the ETO or Italy. And in mid '44, half of these were towed battalions, each with 36 76mm AT guns.

The actual history is that in North Africa they had all been self-propelled, but ad hoc vehicles. There were 76mm on half-track chassis, and 37mm "portees" on 3/4 ton pickup trucks. The M-10 then came out, as the first purpose-built TD, putting the same 76mm gun (based on an older 3" AA gun) onto a Sherman chassis. Troop experience in the desert, meanwhile, had shown that the ability to dig in and hide, and thus lay ambushes more easily, could be more valuable than the mobility of being self-propelled (at least, for the 37mm on a pickup truck!). So the troops asked for towed "TDs" (i.e. anti-tank guns; the U.S. said "TD" just like the Germans said "PAK"). By early 1944, half of the available TD battalions had 76mm towed pieces.

In France, with rather more terrain cover than in the desert, it was quickly found that the self-propelled (and armored) versions were much better than the towed guns, and the units switched again. The Hellcat also became available, and later the Jackson. By January '45, 20% of the TD battalions were still towed 76mm, 20% still had M-10s, 23% had Hellcats, and 37% had Jacksons. But on D-Day there were few Hellcats, and the units were split about 50-50 towed 76mm or M-10.

With its TD battalion attached, a typical U.S. infantry division had 90 AT weapons, 54 of them 57mm, 36 of them 76mm. The latter could be towed or tracked. For comparison, typical German infantry divisions had between 24 and 45 PAK, most of them 75mm but some 88mm heavy FLAK, some older 50mm, depending on the composition of their divisional AT battalion and the 13th, 14th etc companies of their infantry regiments. (24 - 12x2 in 2 AT battalion companies, 3rd with light AA. 45 - 12x3 in AT battalion + 3x3 in regimental AT companies).

Incidentally, while I am at it I might as well add the AA component info. The U.S. attached 1 automatic weapons AA battalion to each division. Those had 32 40mm (earlier 37mm) AA, plus 32 quad 50s. Each Corps had two more of those battalions. At the army level there were more auto weapons plus the heavy AA battalions, each with 16 90mm and 12 50 cal. All told there were several hundred of these AA battalions, enough for 1 per division at division level, again at corps, and again at army level.

Obviously this degree of effort would have been better spent putting more 90mm AA, 76mm AT, or 40mm AA at the division level, since the German air threat hardly merited the level of effort (1/4 of a million men served in the AAA). But at the time the force had been planned, the German airforce had been looked rather more dangerous than it turned out to be.

Why do I include this here? Because some of the German divisions wound up including AA in their AT battalions, not having divisional AA battalions. (Some did, most didn't). So an apples to apples comparison requires including the FLAK/AA too.

So, 36 76mm, 54 57mm, 32 40mm was the standard "PAK and FLAK" load-out of a U.S. infantry division with its attachments - with the 76mm either towed or SP TDs, about 50-50 chance of either around D-Day, moving to 20-80 favor the SP TDs by January '45.

[JasonC]

"StuG detachments were not parcelled out"

Uh huh, right. That is why if I ask "where was the 902nd StuG brigade in Normandy?", I get 4 different answers in 3 days, and then find out that 21 of the brigade's 31 AFVs are with the 91st infantry 2 days later.

Name a single occasion in which 3 StuG brigades were used together, en masse, as a "shock reserve". You won't find one.

Name 5 occasions in which StuG brigades were used as complete units, no parcelling, and without being subordinated to a local infantry division or KG. Or, when a KG was formed around them, instead of them being included in a KG.

Or, name 3 times when a frontage was assigned to a StuG brigade and not to another other unit at the same time.

Of course they were parcelled out, that is what they were for. The higher command organization simply let the area commander decide where they were most needed and thus who to give them to, and when to take them back. It was a *property right* over their aid and use, not an operational reality.

Do you think that because Tigers were also assigned to Panzer Corps that therefore they were never attached to divisions and KGs, but instead were always used en masse at the corps level? Give me a break.

All of which, incidentally, is exactly the function that seperate TD battalions and independent armor battalions performed in the U.S. army in the same period, or why they were not permanently asssigned to a single infantry division. Being independent as a battalion meant that higher ups could remove them from a division's sector, into reserve, before assigning them to another division. It also facilitated divided attachments, as when one company is given to each division in one corps, or to 2 divisions across their boundary, etc.

[Enoch]

I don't think that the independent tank battalions in US formations filled quite the same role they did in the German army. IE they were not parcelled out piecemeal to other formations.

A quick an unscientific sample turned up three independent tank battalions. The 737th served with the 35th Ifnatry division in France and then with the 5th Infantry division in Luxembourg, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The 746th served with the 4th Infantry divison from mid June to early Jully 1944 and then from mid July to the end of the war. The 750th served 6 weeks with the 104th infantry divison in November and December of '44 and then from February to the end of the war. From my own memory of other readings, this type of long term attachment seemed like the norm in regards to the independent battalions.

I look at this as something of a semi-permanent attachment. Of course, as the situation would change, higher ups might reassign a unit.

redwolf: that seems like a very reasonable explanation for why no angled armor ever showed up on StuG's.

I don't know that I've run across a definitive statement on this: why the open tops on US TD's? Is it related to the problems US industry had with casting large enough turrets early in the war to hold larger guns?

[Stalin's Organ]

Jason - real armies have many more troops behind hte lines than in the front one, which is why corps and armies have significant AA assets - they're not there to be parcelled out to divisions that might feel they are under an air threat!!

A plane moving at 300 mph covers 5 miles a minute (500kmph and 8km/min roughly) - it doesn't see unit boundaries, and it's much more likely to see 5 acres of vehicle park or stored dump than 5 acres of an infantry regiment dug in!!

[JasonC]

OK, here is a bit more detail on the number and organization of Jadgpanzers, StuGs, and Marders used in Normandy. I'm not doing any original research, just analysing other people's numbers here. All told I find 124 JdgPz, 500-550 StuG (or StuH), and 130 Marder. Where were they?

JgdPaz - 3 Heer Pz divisions had 31, 25, and 16 JdgPz. 12SS had 10, plus 11 more in July. And a sub-unit of the 17SS (PG) got 31 after the breakout, which fought alone without reaching the rest of the division (with heavy loss).

Marder - 17SS had 12, 6 different Heer infantry divisions had 14 each, 116th Pz had 6, and 3 static infantry divison had 9-10 each.

StuG - 4 independent StuG brigades had 138, one of them a FJ formation the rest Heer. These also 30-100 replacements over the course of the battle (which is the source of the uncertainty in overall numbers). 6 Heer infantry divisions had 10 each. Two Heer Pz divisions had 6 and 10, a 3rd had 40. And 5 SS divisions had 38-45 each, 210 for the 5, one of with was PG (17SS) the rest Pz. 3 of the SS divisions used them in place of tanks (9SS and 10SS, 2 companies each of 1 Pz battalion, 17SS (PG), the whole Panzer battalion).

58% of Jgd Pz. were in Heer Pz. div.

42% of Jgd Pz. were in SS div.

12% of the StuGs were in Heer Pz. div.

45% of StuGs were in SS div.

30% of StuGs were in ind. brigades

13% permanently attached to infantry.

86% of the Marders were in infantry divisions.

Here are some ratios of TD to all towed PAK and heavy FLAK, in mobile divisions. TDs are first, PAK+FLAK second.

Heer - 2.3:1, 1:2.1, 5:4, 3:1

SS - 3:2, 5:4, 4:3, 5:4, 1:1.7, 2.8:1

In infantry divisions, the same ratio ranges from 2.7:1, favor the TD type, to none, all towed.

Incidentally, the Jadgpanzer and Marder are as rare (or common) as Tiger Is. The StuGs are about as common as Panthers, not as common as Pz IVs. Overall, if you lump together Tiger+Panther as "heavy", then the breakdown of types in the Normandy fighting runs -

31% heavy

36% Pz IV

33% TD types

Pretty close to 1/3rd each, I'd say. If you want to move the JdgPz category they are ~5% of the total. Note, that means 5/8ths of the German armor force was not armored enough to stop a short 75mm AP round from the front.

Or if you like bell curves -

5% Tiger

26% Panther

36% Pz IV

28% JdgPz + StuG

5% Marder

[JasonC]

"corps and armies have significant AA assets"

Oh, I am well aware of that. It remains the case that several thousand reasonably large direct fire artillery pieces spent the war staring at empty blue because the fighter sweeps had already done their jobs. Meanwhile, up at the pointy end, a lot of German critters were running around that could have used the attentions of 90mm AA.

The U.S. should have used its AA as flexibly as the Germans did. The Germans had much, much greater demand for AA heavy and light in their rear areas. Yet their 88mm FLAK did more useful front line work than the U.S. 90mm AA guns. Not for any lack of the AA guns on the U.S. side. It was purely a weakness of doctrine, an overcautious use of a potentially very potent asset.

[JasonC]

"the independent tank battalions in US formations...were not parcelled out piecemeal"

I agree, they tended to stay attached to one unit. That unit did change from time to time, though. E.g. in the early Normandy fighting, the 1st Infantry division had 3 independent tank battalions attached to it, turning into something close to a large armor division. After it won enough ground southward, most of these were withdrawn, able to refit and re-attach to other divisions. Also, I've seen some TD battalions that went through 6 or 12 switches of attachments over the course of the war. Detaching individual companies, though, tended to be a short term and tactical affair. Usually, the battalion was assigned to a division and all its companies worked with units of that division.

[Mattias]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by redwolf:

The Jagdpanzer IV was supposed to be exactly that (with 75mm L/70). However, the StuG III could not be upgraded that way because the chassis was too small. StuG IV was the old StuG III superstructure, because the new superstructure wasn't ready (probably because of the gun chaos) when the chassis was ready.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Just some more meat on that bone:

The design of (what was to become) the StuG III began in 1936 and this is the reason for it's archaic armour layout. Once it was in production and the armour really became an issue that could not be tackled with increasing thickness, say in 1943, the war was in a stage where the production lines could not be interrupted.

Though better dedicated tank killers where later fielded the StuG remained at the very least respectable in this department and still very strong in it's intended role as infantry support. Simple, cheap and relatively plentiful it remained in service.

The StuG IV was born (early 1943) partly as an attempt to field a StuG with a more efficient armour layout, it would have had a sloped front with slightly thinner and less refined armour than the JgPz IV.

However, before this project could be brought to fruition the Alkett factory, which produced the StuG III chassis, was bombed and a "simple" mating of the Pz IV chassis with the StuG III superstructure had to be pressed into production.

The StuG is thus no more than an ad hoc emergency solution. Something that is plain to see by, for example, the clumsy integration of the drivers station.

The JgPz IV on the other hand was designed (beginning late 1942) to improve and refine the aspects proven strong in the StuG concept. In particular the AT capability was developed. The idea was to create a tank destroyer though, not primarily a StuG Mk. 2.

The JgPz IV/70 was a logical extension of this concept.

M.

[JasonC]

Here is another way of looking at supporting arms, for the U.S. infantry around mid 44. Take a typical infantry division, and assume its TDs are towed, and it has vanilla 75mm Sherman in support, the usual AA, engineers. What weapons would really be firing in defense of a battalion position?

14-18 artillery pieces (105mm)

17 direct fire guns

15 mortars

24 bazookas + 2 FTs

20 50 cal MGs

27 30 cal MGs

33 BARs

33 SMGs

400+ M-1s

The artillery would be 2 105mm from the regimental cannon company direct fire, or the whole 6 firing indirect, plus 1 battalion from the divisional artillery.

The direct fire guns would be 4x76mm towed AT, 5x75mm Shermans, 6x57mm towed AT, 2x40mm automatic AA.

The mortars would be 6x81mm, probably firing indirect, and 9x60mm, probably direct.

The bazookas are from the line companies, weapons company, and battalion HQ company. The FTs are from one attached engineer platoon.

The MGs would include 2 quad 50 cal AA, 12 single 50 cal (including 5 on the Shermans), 27 .30 cal (including 10 on the Shermans).

The BARs and SMGs are from the line platoons, the battalion recon platoon, and one attached engineer platoon.

All told, 50 ranged heavy weapons plus 80 ranged automatic weapons, rising to 76 and 113 at close enough range (zooks, FTs, SMGs), plus 2-3 rifles for each heavier weapon. Sorta gives some idea of why such an unit could hold ground sometimes.

Take away the AA and the tanks, and the heavy direct fire vs. infantry type targets drops 1/5, vs. armor it drops 1/3, and the MG type firepower also drops 1/3. Div. arty being busy would have a similar -1/3 effect on the HE tubes firing, and more like -1/2 in weight of metal.

Incidentally, with some trucks and jeeps as prime movers for guns and all the attachments, such a battalion force runs ~5000 points in CM.

Just an illustration, I don't claim it means much of anything.

[LimShady]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

All of which, incidentally, is exactly the function that seperate TD battalions and independent armor battalions performed in the U.S. army in the same period, or why they were not permanently asssigned to a single infantry division. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well although there were never any formal attachments, by the middle of Fall 1944, the US Army kept assigning the same armor batallions to infantry divisions so that tank/infantry teams could stay intact.

On a different note, in Camp Colt to Desert Storm, the author notes that the only real time the TD doctrine was carried out was at El Guettar in North Africa.

Chris

[Stalin's Organ]

Jason I stil think you're oversimplifying.

For example most 88mm guns in the front lines of hte German army in 1944 were not FLAK - they were PAK, and those that were FLAK were infinitely better suited for direct fire than the US 90mm or the Brit 3.7, having better mounts and proper optics and fire control systems for he jobs.

And while the benefit of 20/20 hindsight tells us thathte Luftwafee was not a significant tactical threat, the Allies had no way of knowing that at the time - Bodenplatte beign an obvious example of the possibilities that had to be considere.

Also sneak raids were still mounted, andthere was celarly a significant fighter presence devoted to defending hte reich, plus the jet-threat had to be considered....

[JasonC]

"most 88mm guns in the front lines of the German army in 1944 were not FLAK - they were PAK"

Worth examining. Initially I was skeptical, simply because the 88 FLAK was a much more common item. But "at the front", the case may be close - see below.

"the Allies had no way of knowing (the Luftwaffe wasn't a threat) at the time"

Um, sure they did. They flew regular fighter sweeps and did not encounter enemy AC west of Germany. And the guys on the ground were not constantly being buzzed. And the radar showed little on the threat board. And they strafed German airfields.

Of course there was a ton of light and heavy AA in southeast England to intercept buzz bombs. But the U.S. AA force was additional, and the buzz bombs stopped flying after August-September to boot (when the launch sites were overrun).

The primary defense of installations from air attack was the fighter force anyway. Of course they would leave something. But 250,000 men manning 350 battalions of AA, with only ~50 of those ever seeing a German (direct - another ~50 probably saw a few planes or were in the area of 2-3 raids), is a scandal any way you cut it. I mean, 350 battalions is a lot of war material.

As for the idea that the 90mm was unsuited, they plopped it into the Jackson TD because they needed more hitting power, and it worked tolerably well there. Enough so, that 2/5 TD battalions used Jacksons by the end of the war. There are numerous stories of Panthers KOed by 90mm from the front. There wasn't T ammo for it, that was about the only significant drawback.

It was bad doctrine, period. The automatic weapon AA did do some damage up at the pointy end (still could have done more IMO). The 90s basically did not, though they were far more capable.

Next to the factual question of German usage. First the reason for my skepticism.

The 88 PAK was a relatively rare item - 3500 built all told, 43-45. The 88 FLAK was abundant - 14300 built, 4 times as many.

But it is an empirical proposition, so I decided to look and see. Here are the 88s, PAK and FLAK, that I found in the Normandy OOB -

HQ level AT units -

6x88PAK, 36x88PAK, 27x88PAK, 15x88PAK (attached 2SS), 21Pz 24x88PAK, 77Inf & 85th Inf each 12x88PAK in 1 *arty* battalion, 91st Inf 8x88 PAK + 2x88 FLAK. Total 88PAK in Normany - 140.

The mobile divisions had 90 88mm FLAK (18,8,8,0,12,0,12,12,12,8). 5FJ had 12.

The III Flak corps had 108 88mm FLAK at the start, and got 53 more in the battle. It lost at least 35 in ground combat. It was mainly used for AA, and claimed 450 aircraft shot down. The unit also claimed 80 tanks by the 88s, plus a dozen by other means (Faust) and 14 armored cars (which may have been by light AA).

A Scottish verdict - not proven. The number of 88s of each variety seem to have been about the same, for front-line combat, at least in Normandy. The ratio in the theater (for 88mm of course) was 2 PAK to 3 FLAK, and the ground combat losses of the III FLAK corps, plus the 102 attached to the divisions, basically equals the number of PAK versions present. How many more of the 126 additional 88 FLAK - that were in, or went through, the air defense 88 pool - saw ground combat, is not certain. It is unlikely it was more than ~45 more. So the overall number used in ground combat was similar.

[JasonC]

Or, otherwise put, and at the risk of continuing to oversimplify -

The Germans had 100 odd 88s PAK at the front shooting tanks, and 100 odd 88s FLAK in the rear shooting planes, and 100 odd 88s FLAK in between, switch hitting. While under intense air attack. Meanwhile, all the U.S. 90mm were in the rear not shooting non-existent German planes.

Now, if the U.S. had attached just 15 heavy FLAK battalions to the division with assigned frontage in Normandy, would this have denuded England, or the landing sites? No, not even close. But it would have given every U.S. division 16 more heavy guns, duel purpose AA or AT. A battery might have been guarding the HQ or a dump. The others would be available as a battalion, or attachable to the regiments as batteries.

And then the U.S. would have had as many 90mm poking their noses along the front, as the Germans had 88s poking their noses back the other way. I think that mighta helped morale just a tad. Not to mention the physical help from 12-32 extra high power guns in a TD "front" to deal with German armored counterattacks.

Yeah, they would have had to train the men. Somehow I think they could have managed, seeing that all the AT guys were civies too a few years earlier. It doesn't strike me as rocket science. Obviously, duel use of a powerful weapon gets more out of it than non-use of it does.

[Enoch]

I want to ask again the question of what, if anything, led to the push for larger and heaveier tanks?

So far I've seen several poosible reasons. The first and most obvious is that better armor protection was needed against improved anti-tank weapons. Early German tanks simply did not have this. Second, some tnaks (the panther) weren't necessarily pushes for larger tanks. Simply replacements for outdated tanks like the III and IV. Third, Hitler liked bigger things (I don't think we should discount this explanation at all). I'm not sure that you can seperate any of these and claim one is the answer.

One last question. What exactly was the role the Germans sought to fill with the super heavy tanks? Were they going to be anything more than a semi-mobile pillbox? I saw somewhere that the Maus was seen as something that could fill gaps in the Atlantic wall. Why bother building a tank to fill that role? What about the other super heavies that were on the drawing board?

[Skipper]

What other reason beyond bigger AT guns entering service do you need? A medium tank should be able to face an enemy's normal AT gun and have a good chance to survive the encounter. Otherwise, it loses a lot of tactical options. Because AT gun nearly always has a first shot, if not first two or three in such a duel, enough frontal plate thickness to defeat an AP round of a given caliber gets on the top of design specifications.

[Enoch]

I certainly agree that more capable AT weapons led to the need for better armor. But, I don't think it is sufficient to explain the unrealized development of the super heavies. Also, the tiger was a pretty slow tank. I would think that it was not developed with the same role in mind as earlier tanks. Seems to me it was seen as a more dedicated tank killer.

[Redwolf]

Jason,

on a related note, I would like to consult you for some force rules regarding the new combained arms league on tournamenthouse, especially for historical equipment of Volksgrenadier and Gebirgsjaeger.

If you are interested, please send mail to redwolf@cons.org.

Other please excuse the off-topic post.

[Herr Oberst]

This may be coming in way late, but IIRC (and that's a big IIRC), I read somewhere in one of my books about the "typical" German doctrine:

Consider an inverted V as your attack force...

The heavy tanks, forming the point of the vee, were to help "crack" the enemy line. Their high armor and firepower, but generally slower speed were to assault known positions.

The medium tanks, forming the wings of the vee, were for initial breakthrough and flank protection with their higher mobility, but somewhat lighter armor and often dual role guns.

Light tanks were meant to be third echelon initially positioned in the center behind the heavies. Their higher mobility and longer range made them the exploitation tanks whose job it was to wreak havoc behind the enemy lines after breakthrough was achieved.

Or somefink like that...

[ 05-01-2001: Message edited by: Herr Oberst ]

[Redwolf]

Mattias, I think some of the details are debatable:

- the original StuG had the short 75mm, so I think it is inprecise to

say that it turned out to be a good tank destroyer. Rather, it was

found that it was easy to make it one.

- most sources I remember say that the 75mm L/70 was the original plan

for the Jagdpanzer IV and the L/48 was only built in when the L/70

did not become available in time. Also see http://www.panser.dk/artikler/id002/stugnadev.htm for StuG and JPz

IV.

[Keith]

The tank formation mentioned in the above post was refered to as the panzer wedge. Unfortunately for the Germans it was a complete failure at the battle of Kursk - as described by Guedarian and Melenthen. Basically the lighter tanks fell victim to AT assets once the heavy tanks rolled through. In addition, having the heavy tanks up front negated the advantage of superior long range guns and made them more vulnerable to AT fire. The exact opposite of the panzer wedge should have been used. Also there was poor infantry-tank coordination in Kursk.

With regard to the push to the super heavy German AFVs - this came from Hitler's obsession with technology and the belief that if Germany could produce certain quantity of technically superior vehicles/planes/rockets then the Germans could win the war. In reality these super heavy tanks consumed a tremendous amount of fuel - which the Germans were desperately short of - and cost a rediculous amount of scarce resources (labor, material, enginnering) to make in comparsion to the earlier tank models. Not to mention the additional complexity of spare parts required.

Interesting point - in the battle of the Bulge offensive the German panzer divisions were so short on fuel that they started siphoning fuel from the fuel inefficient Panther tanks and transfering the fuel to the MKIV battalions and the recon battalions just to remain at least partially mobile.

Germany should have concentrated on churning out the MKIV, StugIIG, Marder/Hetzer, and the MKV tanks.

[Redwolf]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Keith:

Germany should have concentrated on churning out the MKIV, StugIIG, Marder/Hetzer, and the MKV tanks.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There are so many counterpoints that I don't know where to start.

Overall, if you didn't include the Panther, that would sound like the Americans approaching a Sherman 75 only force. At what time can you decide "now that is enough, now we concentrate on *this* tank"?

The Marder wasn't a planned vehicle anyway, there was no production, just conversion.

A Panther cost about the same as the Pz IV. The reson for continuous IV production would be that the chassis was needed for other tasks as well (spare parts and other vehicles).

Further producing the StuG IIIG would require keeping the Pz III chassis in production. It would be more rationale to use the Pz IV chassis which would be in production for other reasons. Once you have the IV chassis in the StuG, there is no reason to keep the old StuG superstructure, so you arrive at the Jagdpanzer IV quickly, as outlined in this discussion.

As for heavy tanks, we still don't have sufficient detail about the combat effectivness of heavy tank formations and/or what would happen if the opponents has heavy tanks and you don't. On one hand, ignoring enemy heavies sounds like extremly risky business, but on the other hand, how many times did german heavies meet soviet heavies? I lack even minimal input to form an impression about this question.

[ 05-01-2001: Message edited by: redwolf ]