Abandoned tanks

[Scipio]

Their was a discussion about bailing crews, the general result was that the crew tents to jump out of the tank at the first serious hits to save their lifes and get a new tank.

After thinking about it for a while, this seems to be unlogic. A tank crew was an easy and valuable target when they have left the tank. The don't know about the situation outside of the tank. Wouldn't it be more sensefull to stay in the tank as long as possible?

I currently read 'Stalingrad' by Anthony Beevor. He writes about German tanks attacking Russian KV tanks from behind. They were unable to penetrate the KVs, but after a while, the tanks were already unmovable and the turrets badly damaged - the crews bail out - absolutly deaf and dismayed.

That doesn't sounds to me like 'we better get out before we are hit again'.

[Ellros]

Ah, but the Russians weren't riding in bonfires waiting to happen...

[Kingfish]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scipio:

After thinking about it for a while, this seems to be unlogic. A tank crew was an easy and valuable target when they have left the tank. The don't know about the situation outside of the tank. Wouldn't it be more sensefull to stay in the tank as long as possible?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And risk being turned into a charcoal briquette, I don't think so. Talk to any tanker, from WW2 to desert storm, and ask them what they fear the most. Guaranteed it's having their vehicle fireball while they're in it.

[Andreas]

KV-1 56 tons, heavy tank

Sherman 35 tons, medium tank

KV-1 diesel, hard to set alight

Sherman - petrol, aka Tommykocher, aka Ronson

KV-1 decent gun, capable of fighting back against threats

Sherman - 75mm Peashooter

You may insert Cromwell, Churchill, or Stuart for Sherman.

[Mark IV]

The KV was the exception, rather than the rule, on the WWII battlefield. Most tanks could not take anywhere near that kind of punishment, and would burn and/or explode. The Germans (and I suspect others) adopted a "shoot til it burns" policy with apparently abandoned tanks, anyway, to prevent recovery by the enemy.

Immobilized, un-burning tanks are bullet magnets, and very large bullets at that. Some turrets and virtually all hulls had escape hatches, and the crews were eager to use them once the tank was no longer viable.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scipio:

After thinking about it for a while, this seems to be unlogic. A tank crew was an easy and valuable target when they have left the tank. The don't know about the situation outside of the tank. Wouldn't it be more sensefull to stay in the tank as long as possible?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

May I recommend that instead of thinking about it, you would learn a lot by reading about it? Whether it appears logical to you today or not is reasonably irrelevant in light of the words of the tankers who got shot at then. I gave you a number of good recommendations that showed this point in the other thread.

Here's another one, and that is excellent:

'The South Albertas' by Donald E. Graves. Does not come cheap, but worth every Pfennig. The best regimental history I have ever read.

Staying in a tank that was hit but not immediately killed was a great way to get yourself a medal, a mention in despatches, and a black-rimmed telegraph to mom.

[Stalin's Organ]

A man is actually a very small, inconspicuous target when he's tryingto bry himself in the ground.

OTOH any tak is very large and obvious.

Russian heavy tank crews stayed in their tanks in 1941 mostly due to inexperience and poor training. As a result they died.

Evolution in action meant that this trait died with them and was not passed on to succeeding generations of tankers.

[Andrew H.]

Also, keep in mind that the KV wasn't -- as far as I can tell from this thread -- penetrated. Allied tankers didn't abandon their tank at the first non-penetrating hit, nor necessarily when the tank was immobilized. What they did was abandon the tank at the first penetrating hit, knowing that they would only have a couple of seconds to get out (or oot, if they were Canadian) before the tank blew up.

The KV tankers eventually abandoning their immobilized but otherwise intact tank was more a failure of morale than anything.

[sturmtiger101]

Looking through some of my modest literature on afv combat and a few web sites as well, IMHO, a case can be made for both abandoning or remaining in a disabled afv in the midst of action with the enemy. I believe that many factors: type of damage, current dangers outside the vehicle, risk of fire inside, chance of recovery, repair or immediate assistance from comrades, crew training and morale, etc., are taken to account in whole or in part before the commander orders a crew to bale out. I've read of actions in which the crew elects to stay in their vehicle and await recovery / rescue, even continuing to engage enemy targets, rather than bale out and expose themselves to fire. Likewise, crews choosing to leave (abandon) their afvs often suffer significant casualties from enemy fire, indeed resulting in the death or capture of the entire crew. The image that comes to my mind is a picture of a MkIII ausf H or J knocked out during the German drive to Stalingrad, the bodies of all 5 crew members liter the area surrounding the tank, with one crewman hanging half way out of the escape hatch located in the lower hull, just above the roadwheels. It is apparent that they were machine gunned in the act of abandonment. As another example,who has read of the account of the 27 July '44 action at "Barkman's Corner" at a crossroads junction on the St. Lo - Coutances road? Ernst Barkman and crew in their Panther engaged and fought off a large American armoured colum, knocking out nine Shermans and several other vehicles. His Panther took many ap hits as well as enduring an attack by " jabos " ( fighter - bombers ) and suffered a broken track, damage to the running gear, damage to the ventilation system, cracks and sprung weld seams to the armour, and the driver suffered a head wound. Still he and his crew stayed in the tank, slowly managed to withdraw by manuvering with only one track side intact, and saved their tank to fight another day, albiet after some time in the shop. This is growing rather more long winded than I had planned... however, the point I'm trying to make is that it just depends on the circumstances and panic or lack there-of, of the crew in question. I've seen this born out just recently in a CMBO game in the " Stoumont " operation. A veteran Panther G crew remained in their tank after becoming immobilized by an unseen 76 mm atg at a range of less than 200meters. The tank also took internal spalling of the armour from a second and third hit to turret as it rotated towards the gun. the Panther then knocked out the atg, it's half track carrier lurking nearby and then proceeded to shoot up several infantry squads that crossed within it's line of fire. At the time the tank was about 500 meters in front of the rest of my troops, no close support. The vehicle and crew survived the scenario intact and manned, hopefully this tough crew and tank will return in a few more scenarios to help me complete the operation ( Game #3 of 11 total ). Christ on a crutch! Sorry so rambling guys, just two cents worth from a lurker here at battlefront...

Cheers,

Eric Tuggle

[ 08-12-2001: Message edited by: sturmtiger101 ]

[Andreas]

Eric, hi. Just my point. Barkmann got the Ritterkreuz for his action. I have some accounts of tankers from 9th RTR (Churchills) sticking it out after penetrating hits. They are written up in the citations for the Military Crosses and Medals that these guys received. The safest option seems to have been (talking about Allied tanks here) to get out, drop into a close-by ditch, and just pray that more important targets than you are around. Running away from the tank was a very bad idea. Someone running on a battlefield must have a purpose in mind and is therefore subject to considerable attention of the wrong kind, I imagine.

[sturmtiger101]

Andreas,

Agreed, sir. I myself would most definatley want to get the heck out of a Sherman that had been penetrated, regardless of it's remaining functional capability! And crawling to a ditch or other cover seems most prudent indeed. Thank you for your reply, sir.

Regards,

Eric

[Scipio]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

May I recommend that instead of thinking about it, you would learn a lot by reading about it? Whether it appears logical to you today or not is reasonably irrelevant in light of the words of the tankers who got shot at then. I gave you a number of good recommendations that showed this point in the other thread.

Here's another one, and that is excellent:

'The South Albertas' by Donald E. Graves. Does not come cheap, but worth every Pfennig. The best regimental history I have ever read.

Staying in a tank that was hit but not immediately killed was a great way to get yourself a medal, a mention in despatches, and a black-rimmed telegraph to mom.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Gimme some GERMAN titles please. I'm no English professor. I guess you can already read my accent

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scipio:

Gimme some GERMAN titles please. I'm no English professor. I guess you can already read my accent <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would assume that the book by Guderian (the son) about 116th Panzer should be available in German. I tried to find it the other day. Alternatively, check in on www.feldgrau.com and ask for German language sources. Not really my area, I focus more on the Pommies

[Scipio]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

I would assume that the book by Guderian (the son) about 116th Panzer should be available in German. I tried to find it the other day. Alternatively, check in on www.feldgrau.com and ask for German language sources. Not really my area, I focus more on the Pommies <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Do you have the exact title?

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scipio:

Do you have the exact title?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This thread is about the English translation. They have another book that looks interesting.

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=9&t=000949

In general, the sort of memoirs and detailed unit histories that are available for the Allies are either non-existent, or very hard to come by for German units. The same goes for web presence of units.

[ 08-14-2001: Message edited by: Germanboy ]

[tss]

Germanboy wrote:

I have some accounts of tankers from 9th RTR (Churchills) sticking it out after penetrating hits.

There was also a RKKA tanker who remained in his BT-7 (or maybe it was a T-26) firing away the gun even after the turret was penetrated three times by a German Somua. IIRC, the fourth penetration finally killed him. This happened in Autumn 1941 near Salla in Northern Finland. The Soviet tanker should certainly have been made "A Hero of Soviet Union" posthumously, but most probably his superiors never found out about the combat.

But generally, from what I've read, the most likely tanker response to a penetrating hit is to bail out as quickly as possible and to worry about the dangers of the outside later.

However, tanks immobilized by mines are a different question.

- Tommi

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

KV-1 56 tons, heavy tank

Sherman 35 tons, medium tank

KV-1 diesel, hard to set alight

Sherman - petrol, aka Tommykocher, aka Ronson

KV-1 decent gun, capable of fighting back against threats

Sherman - 75mm Peashooter

You may insert Cromwell, Churchill, or Stuart for Sherman.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Churchills were actually not very prone to fire, once hit or penetrated. Indeed, they had the lowest loss rate amongst their crews of any Allied tank in NW Europe, according to David Fletcher's excellent book on the vehicle.

A combination of extremely thick armour, very reliable and well sealed engine and fuel tanks and a large number of different means of egress meant it was a very survivable vehicle. Combined with its ability to climb mountains like a goat and its an excellent tank for supporting infantry with, which is of course exactly what it was.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian:

A combination of extremely thick armour, very reliable and well sealed engine and fuel tanks and a large number of different means of egress meant it was a very survivable vehicle. Combined with its ability to climb mountains like a goat and its an excellent tank for supporting infantry with, which is of course exactly what it was.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

True, I was a bit harsh sticking them in the same category as the Ronsons.

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

True, I was a bit harsh sticking them in the same category as the Ronsons.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Apology accepted.

What I find particularly interesting is that while the tendancy of the Sherman to brew-up at the drop of a hat is well known, that of the Panther to do the same is generally ignored.

The Heeres Waffen branch noted that if any hit was achieved on the Panther's engine deck, it tended to result almost certainly in an engine fire. This is in the excellent Shiffer book on the Panther, which includes a great many of the vehicle's development reports.

Which makes me wonder about all the German tanks as they were almost universally petrol engined machines. Was their petrol any less flammable than Allied petrol?

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian:

Which makes me wonder about all the German tanks as they were almost universally petrol engined machines. Was their petrol any less flammable than Allied petrol?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No. The problem with the Sherman, in particular, was that the ammunition tended to catch fire. This was fixed by wet storage of the ammunition.

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

No. The problem with the Sherman, in particular, was that the ammunition tended to catch fire. This was fixed by wet storage of the ammunition.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Errr, German tanks didn't have wet stowage either...

So, the question remains, why was Allied petrol and now ammunition so much more prone to burning than German petrol and ammunition?

BTW, according the tests the 8th Army carried out on AFV's in 1941, it wasn't the ammunition or even necessarily the petrol which usually caught alight initially - it was the personal gear of the crew, which was usually stowed higledy-pigledy within the vehicle. Which is why from about 1942 onwards, British AFV's appeared with stowage bins, on the outside of the vehicle for the storage of personal equipment. This is mentioned in Fletcher's excellent book, "The Great Tank Scandal - British tank design 1939-1942".

[Guest Babra]

Although I have encountered several references to crews remaining inside disabled tanks to continue fighting, they almost universally fall into the category of "heroic acts"; last-stand defences and that sort of thing.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scipio:

Gimme some GERMAN titles please. I'm no English professor. I guess you can already read my accent <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Your accent cannot be worse than mine...

Try this, email me if the link does not work.

German language book about 13th PD

[ 08-19-2001: Message edited by: Germanboy ]

[dalem]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian:

Errr, German tanks didn't have wet stowage either...

So, the question remains, why was Allied petrol and now ammunition so much more prone to burning than German petrol and ammunition?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

All U.S. Army vehicles except the M10 TD were gasoline-fuelled, not diesel (the one M4 model that was twin-dieselled went to the Marines). I believe the Germans were all diesel. I also believe that gasoline is more volatile than diesel, which makes it real good for going 'vroom-vroom' across the landscape, but also makes it real good for going 'whoosh-boom' near fires.

Combine a more-volatile fuel with dangerous ammunition storage and you get the early model Sherman fireballs. Even after wet stowage was introduced I would expect that fires were just as common in the U.S. vehicles, and that the spectacular quick brew-ups were what decreased.

So, maybe a possible piece of data to add to your general discussion is that a U.S.-built (i.e. gasoline powered) vehicle is always going to be more prone to catching fire than a German diesel powered one.

Of course, my reasoning could be full of crap, as well.

-dale

[ 08-19-2001: Message edited by: dalem ]

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by dalem:

I believe the Germans were all diesel. I also believe that gasoline is more volatile than diesel, which makes it real good for going 'vroom-vroom' across the landscape, but also makes it real good for going 'whoosh-boom' near fires.

Combine a more-volatile fuel with dangerous ammunition storage and you get the early model Sherman fireballs. Even after wet stowage was introduced I would expect that fires were just as common in the U.S. vehicles, and that the spectacular quick brew-ups were what decreased.

So, maybe a possible piece of data to add to your general discussion is that a U.S.-built (i.e. gasoline powered) vehicle is always going to be more prone to catching fire than a German diesel powered one.

Of course, my reasoning could be full of crap, as well.

-dale

[ 08-19-2001: Message edited by: dalem ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The reasoning is fine. But the facts are wrong: German tanks weren't diesel. Russian tanks were diesel, though. Here's what Zaloga's Sherman Tank in US and Allied Service says about Shermans and fire:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> The Sherman, besides being thinly armored, also had the reputation of being a fire-trap. This was popularly attributed by many in the US Army by the decision to use petrol engines rather than diesels. This view was sparked by the Tank Destroyer command's pitch to its troops about the supposed advantages of the diesel engines (used in some of the M10s) over the petrol engines used in most US Army Shermans [snip story about scaring rube soldiers by throwing lit match into tank of diesel fuel].

In fact, battlefield experience and Ordinance tests established that the main cause of Sherman fires was ignition of the ammunition propellant. A lesser culprit was the occasional ignition of turret hydraulic oil, personal stowage or sometimes fuel. It was estimated that 60-80 percent of Shermans pentrated by AT rounds or Panzerfausts burned. This is easy to believe in view of the fact that a penetration form nearly anywhere in the frontal arc would bring a projectile in contact with ammunition, and once the casing ruptured, the HE filling used in many German AP rounds would ignite it. The common practice of storing 30 or 40 additional rounds of ammunition outside the bins and racks only served to exacerbate the problem. Once a propellant fire broke out the crew had little choice but to abandon the vehicle as quickly as possible.

Ordinance developed two solutions to this problem. As a short-term solution, plates of applique armor 25-35mm thick were added to the hull sides over the two right-hand ammo bins and one left-hand bin to lessen the chance of penetrations at these vulnerable spots. The was reasonably effectivce against the smaller calibre anti-tank weapons still encountered in Italy in 1943 and early 1944, but it was ineffective against hits by Panthers, Tigers, or Panzerfausts.

In February 1944 some late production M4A3s had "wet" stowage bins added: these consisted of racks surrounded by water. When the bins were hit by an AP round they poured water over the spilled propellant, either preventing a fire or inhibiting it long enough to allow the crew to escape. The propensity of American crews to pile in added ammunition meant that even this improvement could not be totally effective, but a study done by the Army in 1945 found that only 10-15 percent of the wet stowage Shermans burned, as compared to 60-80 percent of the dry stowage Shermans. The wet stowage was used on M4A1s and M4A3s fitted with the 76mm gun, and on a small number of late M4A3s with the 75mm gun.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>