Panzergrenadiers

[edward cameron]

In his book "Panzertactic" by Wolfgang Schneider, he claims that one of the real advantages of having panzergrenadiers located in halftracks is that they could fight from these vehicles and did not necessarilly have to dismount. However, I note that in Combat Mission the panzergrenadiers are not aloud to fire from the halftracks. Does this impact on the offensive capabilities of the panzergrenadier units.

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[TheDesertFox]

he claims that one of the real advantages of having panzergrenadiers located in halftracks is that they could fight from these vehicles and did not necessarilly have to dismount

To be fair, he doesn´t claim it, he states a fact.

Anyone who is interested and want´s to read primary material should start and read "Heeresdienstvorschrift 298/3a "Fuehrung und Kampf der Panzergrenadiere" and the various other manuals of the "Schnelle Truppen". In fact it was SOP to fight from the halftrack and to dismount if the mission made this necessary.

Helge

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- The DesertFox -

Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net

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[Olle Petersson]

Not more than the Allied equivalent.

Allied infantry can't shoot from their APCs either.

I wonder how common anything of this was in combat? The armour of the halftracks seem barely bullet proof (8mm FMJ).

Cheers

Olle

[Abteilung]

It would seem sensible to allow an "unbuttoned" APC to puts its occupants to good use (besides the poor driver), but it would seem a bit difficult to make the AI want to play nice with such abilities. Kinda like a multi turreted vehicle of sorts.

[This message has been edited by Abteilung (edited 02-08-2001).]

[Forever Babra]

When this tactic of fighting from the halftrack was developed, was the enemy using copious quantities of M2 HBs in the vicinity? I thought not...

[Mr. Clark]

Was the Halftrack containing the troops in motion while they were fighting from it?

If not, it seems like a suicidal way to fight... with the low HT armor. Grenades (and especially bazooka rounds) would seem capable of massive casualties... certainly more than if the troops were not contained in the little box on the road...

I'm CERTAINLY not arguing the truth of this tactic, as I have no way to research it at the moment. I'm just puzzled by why it would be used at all... perhaps I'm just picturing it all wrong.

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"Fear is for the enemy... Fear and Bullets."

"They didn't want to come... but I told em, by jeepers, it was an order."

[This message has been edited by Mr. Clark (edited 02-08-2001).]

[Michael Dorosh]

This flies in the face of everything I've ever read, that stated empatically that Panzergrenadiers invariably dismounted to fight. A SPW is pretty small - you could only have half a squad shooting from one - plus there would be nothing to set up the squad's LMG on. I realize the SPW had two MGs already mounted, but what would the rest of the squad be doing - and how could it close with enemy troops in an entrenchment or building?

What kind of "mission" made it "necessary" to dismount?

I wonder if Schneider's book is as poorly researched as "Frontsoldaten"?

Bear in mind also that halftracks were not common in the German Army. Usually only one battalion in three of panzergrenadiers got them - the others got trucks. And only panzergrendier and panzer units got them - maybe 1/10th (someone else will have the actual figure) of the army's divisions were motorized or armoured.

Even Grossdeutschland's panzergrenadiers were mostly transported by truck.

[This message has been edited by Michael Dorosh (edited 02-08-2001).]

[TheDesertFox]

I wonder if Schneider's book is as poorly researched as "Frontsoldaten"?

Well actually Schneiders book is a translation of german field manuals beefed up with a bunch of photos. He (Schneider) is a retired Battalioncommander (OTL.d.Res) and you pretty much can assume he knows what he is talking about. But if you call a translation of a primary document "poor research" feel free to do so.

I can only repeat: The ability to fight from halftracks is strongly emphasised in the field manuals as an integral important part of Panzergrenadier doctrine.

Helge

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- The DesertFox -

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[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by TheDesertFox:

But if you call a translation of a primary document "poor research" feel free to do so.

I can only repeat: The ability to fight from halftracks is strongly emphasised in the field manuals as an integral important part of Panzergrenadier doctrine.

I would call a book based solely on field manuals as not worth reading - does he not interview any veterans to see what was actually done? I'd place more faith in that.

I once went to the home of gentleman who started as a machinegunner in the French campaign and went on to be an NCO, then later an officer, in Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 901. He showed me his medals, Soldbuch and photos. He never mentioned anything about fighting from halftracks, though he did talk at length about having to march 30 km a day with the machinegun. Of course, I didn't ask him about it specifically because I thought I knew the answer already.

I've read plenty of field manuals that bear little resemblance to what is actually done in the field. Whether this is one of them or not is open to question - anyone else think this sound wrong?

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[Kingfish]

Question:

A what period during the war was this tactic considered SOP? Somehow I can't see the practice of cramming 8+ men into a thinly armored, highly flammable, mortar magnet and blitzing them into the crosshairs of zooks and Ma deuces as a sound tactic.

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"What do you know about surfing, major, you're from God damn New Jersey"

[TheDesertFox]

I would call a book based solely on field manuals as not worth reading

Michael, doesn´t matter what you call it, you can´t change what was done, and how it was done. Go ahead and talk with some veterans who served in armoured Panzerregiments and survived the war. You will easily be able to see that the drill was that as much fire as possible is sent in the direction of the bad guys in the shortest possible time if they encountered resistance. And then they had to decide if it was necessary to dismount or if it was possible to continue the firefight mounted. As I said it depends on the mission they had to complete, but to say they weren´t able to fight from the halftracks is ignoring the facts.

Helge

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- The DesertFox -

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[Robert Mayer]

While I have no real evidence to add to this debate , I do have a couple of observations, for what they're worth.

As to why soliders would want to fight from a halftrack, well, that steel plate is better cover than grass. We get fixated on its vulnerability to certain weapon systems in the game, but in combat I suspect the choice between hunkering down behind thin armor and having nothing but a dust cloud between you and enemy rifle and machine-gun fire wasn't a hard decision to make. Yes, the presence of enemy AT assets and heavy MGs might make a difference, but in most cases being behind any sort of armor would probably be seen as better than being behind no armor. Even in the game I've seen squads in halftracks take fewer casualties from having their ride shot out from under them then they do duking it out from outside the vehicle.

In the matter of fighting dismounted as a tactical occurrence, it reminds me of Soviet doctrine from the Cold War era, where infantry in BMPs were supposed to fight mounted, the idea being that the IFVs would roll along with the tanks in a rapid assault. Of course, those vehicles were fully armored, not open topped, but were just as vulnerable to the Ma Deuce as most WWII light armor. So if the Russians in the 1980s were talking about fighting while mounted, I can't see why it's that absurd that the Germans of 1944 were doing the same.

[Olle Petersson]

When I got my military training about ten years ago, it was stated as current armoured infantry doctrine to fight mounted if the APCs could close with the defenders at high speed. If there were barbed wire, tank ditches, minefields or other obstacles then fighting would be dismounted. This was described as universal SOP (NATO and WP alike), and we were supposed to be the defenders.

So the tactic is to supress the defenders with an arty barrage, and as soon as the barrage lifts it's full speed until you're on top of the defenders. The APC's parked across the trenchline...

As for the "only a half squad" statement:

That should read "only a dozen [mounted] halfsquads in APCs", with another half dozen in reserve, vs a platoon of defenders.

(You're assumed to attack with a 3:1 strength ratio or better.)

Cheers

Olle

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[TheDesertFox]

Just in case some of you are seriously interested to dig deeper into this. Here are some quotes and a list of relevant primary documents which deal with the subject.

Heeresdienstvorschrift 298/3a (Berlin 1944) concerning command and control and combat operations for Panzergrenadiere "Fuehrung und Kampf der Panzergrenadiere" - translated by Wolfgang Schneider:

"Mechanized Panzergrenadiere are the armored assault troops (Sturmtruppen) of the Panzerdivision. Their unique, rapidly maneuvering operations form the prerequisite for operational commitment. Together with tanks they form a close combat team. They carry out independent assignments in bold, rapid action.

A high level of maneuverability, all-terrain capability, armored protection, highfirepower and an abundant outfitting of the means of command and control enable them to master difficult situations rapidly and succesfully.

Mechanized Panzergrenadier formations fight from Schuetzenpanzerwagen. Enemy action and terrain can temporarily force them to a rapid change from mounted combat to fighting on foot. Even during dismounted operations, the heavy weapons mounted on the Schuetzenpanzerwagen (antitankguns and mortars) in mobile commitment give them a unique capability.

Combat elan and boldness, united with lightning-fast power of decision and great maneuverability, characterize the Panzergrenadier."

H.Dv.299/4a, Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Schnellen Truppen, Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Schützenkompanie (gp.) vom 25. Mai 1942:

"Zusammenwirken mit Panzerkräften ist eine der wesentlichsten Aufgaben [...] Blitzschnelles Erfassen günstiger durch den Panzerangriff gegebener Einsatzmöglichkeiten [...], kühnes Ausnutzen der Lähmung des Feindes und ständige engste Verbindung mit dem Panzerverband sind von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung für den Erfolgg. [...] Feindliche Widerstandsnester im Hauptkampffeld, Feldstellungen und Schützenlöcher, die von den Panzerkampfwagen nicht erfaßt bzw. nicht niedergekämpft werden konnten, werden infolge des besseren Blickfeldes vom Schützenpanzerwagen leichter erkannt und mit Bordwaffen, Maschinenpistolen, Gewehren und Handgranaten vom Fahrzeug aus vernichtet."

HDv. 299/4a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die schnellen Truppen, Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Schützenkompanie (gp.) vom 25. Mai 1942:

"Rasches und rücksichtsloses Zupacken ist die Vorbedingung für den Erfolg ... Zwingen Feindlage und Gelände zum Absitzen, so ist rascher Wechsel zwischen Kampf zu Fuß und Kampf vom Fahrzeug... anzustreben."

HDv. 299/4a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die schnellen Truppen, Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Schützenkompanie (gp.) vom 25. Mai 1942:

"Panzerschutz und Geländegängigkeit machen die Schützenkompanie (gp.) zur Zusammenarbeit mit Panzerverbänden besonders geeignet ... Die Schützenkompanie ist zur Durchführung jeder infanteristischen Kampfaufgabe befähigt. Schnelligkeit und Geländgängigkeit, hohe Feuerkraft und Panzerschutz verleihen der Kompanie eine besonders starke Angriffskraft. Die Ausstattung mit gepanzerten Kraftfahrzeugen befähigt die Kompanie auch zum Kampf vom Fahrzeug. Entsprechend der Feindeinwirkung und dem Gelände wechseln Kampf vom Fahrzeug und Kampf zu Fuß einander rasch ab. [...] Der Schützenpanzerwagen ist ein Hauptkampfmittel der Schützenkompanie (gp.)."

H.Dv, 130/2b Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie. Heft 2b Die Schützenkompanie (mot.) der Infanteriedivision (mot.). Berlin 1941;

H.Dv. 130/4b Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie. Heft 4b Die Infanteriegeschützkompanie (mot.Z.) und die Kraftfahrgeschützkompanie, Berlin 1938;

H.Dv. 130/9b Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie, Heft 9b Vorläufige Richtlinien für Einsatz und Führung des Infanteriebataillons (mot.). Berlin 1941

H.Dv. 298/2a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe, Führung und Kampf der Panzergrenadiere, Ausbildung und Einsatz der Panzergrenadierkompanie (2p.). Berlin 1944;

H.Dv. 298/2b Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe. Ausbildung und Einsatz der Panzergrenadierkompanie, Berlin 1945;

H.Dv. 298/3a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe, Führung und Kampf der Panzergrenadiere, Heft 1 Das Panzergrenadierbataillon (gp.), Berlin 1944;

H.Dv 299/4a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Schnellen Truppen. Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Schützenkompanie (gp.), Berlin 1942;

H.Dv. 299/4a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Schnellen Truppen. Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Panzergrenadierkompanie a, Berlin 1943

H.Dv. 300/1 Truppenführung I.Teil, Berlin 1936

H.Dv. 300/2 Truppenführung II.Teil. Berlin 1934 und 1944

H.Dv 400/10 Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppen. Heft 10 Richtlinen für den Kampf des Panzerregimentes und der Panzerabteilung. Berlin 1945;

D644/2 Vorläufige Anweisung für die Ausbildung von Schützeneinheiten (mot.), Teil 2 Die MG Kompanie (mot.), Berlin 1936;

D660/4 Mittlerer gepanzerter Kraftwagen (Sd.Kfz.251) auf Fahrgestell des Zugkraftwagen 3 t Typ Hkl 6p, Berlin 1943;

Merkblatt 18b/38 Panzer helfen Dir ! Was der Grenadier vom gepanzerten Kampffahrzeug wissen muß, Berlin 1944;

MerkbIatt 75/10 Taktisch richtiges Fahren mit SPW, Berlin 1944;

Guderian, Heinz "Die Panzertruppen und ihr Zusammenwirken mit anderen Waffen", Berlin 1940

Wehren, Helmut von "Gefechtsausbildung der Panzergrenadiere", Berlin 1944

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- The DesertFox -

Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net

WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891

[Michael Dorosh]

None of this makes much sense to me.

How are we defining "fighting"?

For shock action, a halftrack with guns blazing is great. For seizing ground, pretty worthless. Desert Fox, I think the crux of what you are saying is indeed that the question of mounted/dismounted is dependent on the mission. For the infantry fighting we see in CM, I would have to say that is a mission best conducted unmounted.

As for being safer in a halftrack than on the ground - not on your life. The armour on a halftrack is easily penetrated at combat ranges by .50 and even .30 calibre machine gun bullets. I think you presume open ground is billiard table flat - not so; a good infantryman can always find a way to hide and protect himself in seemingly "open" terrain.

As for eight men firing from a halftrack - good point, but have you ever been in one with all your kit on? The picture of eight men squeezed into one side of a halftrack, trying blazing away is ludicrous.

Perhaps we could all stop the conjecture and Desert Fox could quote to us from this history he is citing. I'd love to see more detailed info.

I'd also like a detailed explanation of what "missions" required the troops to "fight" while mounted. I'd suggest that for shock action, and fast speed, they would definitely stay mounted - but that the "fighting" they did while mounted would not amount to much. To get to grips with the enemy they had to disembark.

Further definition is required.

Ollie, I appreciate the real life example you provide, but bear in mind an Infantry Fighting Vehicle is a new concept that didn't exist in the 1940s, and the differences Robert describes (armoured roof, but don't forget that IFVs have firing ports so the troops can fire from inside in safety) are very large ones, not to mention the doctrinal changes that have occurred since 1945.

[Steve McClaire]

My two cents: Keep in mind that there are many different types of fighting.

From what I've read, armored panzergrenadiers (those actually equipped with halftracks, and not just motorized in trucks) made up only a small part of a panzer division (1 battalion out of 4, or 2 out of 6 for SS divisions). The purpose of these troops was to provide infantry support for the panzers, traveling along with them during a breakthrough and exploitation.

Under these circumstances, I can understand why they'd want to maintain their mobility and stay mounted, as long as the opposition was not a serious threat (they are in the enemy rear area, theoretically). You probably wouldn't dismount just to force your way past a roadblock, especially considering you will certainly have armor support. I would also expect that they would certainly dismount to fight their way through any reasonably well-established defenses.

Given that the period covered by CMBO doesn't have a lot of mobile German breakthroughs, and that the game play is based on fighting full-scale battles, I don't think CMBO suffers for not allowing passengers to fire their weapons while mounted. It would be a cool feature, but a very minor one, IMO.

[Michael Dorosh]

Steve - I agree completely. Perhaps if we had some quotes from the manual, this is what Desert Fox has been trying to say. My apologies if I've dismissed anyone unnecessarily, I presumed we were talking about staight infantry fighting as shown in CMBO, not high-speed breakthrough operations.

[JoePrivate]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Steve - I agree completely. Perhaps if we had some quotes from the manual, this is what Desert Fox has been trying to say. My apologies if I've dismissed anyone unnecessarily, I presumed we were talking about staight infantry fighting as shown in CMBO, not high-speed breakthrough operations.

No, just using Babelfish to translate, the quotes from DesertFox talk about PzGrs in SPWs, in conjunction with armour, fighting from their vehicles in the main battle area against improved positions, foxholes, nests of resistance etc. Doesn't sound like 'only in the rear area' but I will stand to be corrected.

[Kingfish]

In the matter of fighting dismounted as a tactical occurrence, it reminds me of Soviet doctrine from the Cold War era, where infantry in BMPs were supposed to fight mounted, the idea being that the IFVs would roll along with the tanks in a rapid assault. Of course, those vehicles were fully armored, not open topped, but were just as vulnerable to the Ma Deuce as most WWII light armor. So if the Russians in the 1980s were talking about fighting while mounted, I can't see why it's that absurd that the Germans of 1944 were doing the same.

I could be wrong on this, but I understood the purpose of the BMP was to allow Warsaw Pact infantry to support armor within an NBC enviroment, not to conduct assaults on prepared positions while fully loaded.

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"What do you know about surfing, major, you're from God damn New Jersey"

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

CMBO mostly models, for lack of a better word, set piece battles. I suspect that a lot of fighting from HTs would simply involve small, cut off units during exploitation; not an assault against an equally well-equipped enemy.

The quotes are also sort of interesting for their lack of specificity and, well, bombast. I mean, they read more like a sales broshure you would get from someone trying to sell you a HT, than like a field manual. E.g.,

"Panzerschutz und Geländegängigkeit machen die Schützenkompanie (gp.) zur Zusammenarbeit mit Panzerverbänden besonders geeignet ... Die Schützenkompanie ist zur Durchführung jeder infanteristischen Kampfaufgabe befähigt. Schnelligkeit und Geländgängigkeit, hohe Feuerkraft und Panzerschutz verleihen der Kompanie eine besonders starke Angriffskraft. Die Ausstattung mit gepanzerten Kraftfahrzeugen befähigt die Kompanie auch zum Kampf vom Fahrzeug. Entsprechend der Feindeinwirkung und dem Gelände wechseln Kampf vom Fahrzeug und Kampf zu Fuß einander rasch ab. [...] Der Schützenpanzerwagen ist ein Hauptkampfmittel der Schützenkompanie (gp.)." Buy the new SPW 250/1; it's been completely updated for 1943!.

This sentence: "Entsprechend der Feindeinwirkung und dem Gelände wechseln Kampf vom Fahrzeug und Kampf zu Fuß einander rasch ab" [~"Panzergrenadiers quickly switch between fighting from the vehicle and fighting on foot, depending on the terrain and the strength of the enemy."] is notably vague, as it doesn't precisely (or even generally) describe under what conditions the PGs should switch between fighting on foot or in their vehicles.

[Stephen Smith]

Folks-

While I wasn't in WWII, and I wasn't in combat, I have some relatively recent real world training experience that may bear on the topic. Last year, I spent three weeks training at Hohenfels, Germany as an infantryman in M113's (i.e. 1960's version of a halftrack-though it was fully tracked). I was a company commander, and was able to be one of the guys standing up in the track during the battle whenever I felt like it. My own experiences:

1) 'shooting' while moving: utterly impossible. You are being bounced around so much it would be impossible to actually hit anything. Those that are standing up literally hold on with one hand, perhaps hold a map with the other. You consider yourself lucky if you don't a) fall out, lose your weapon, or c) ruin your kidneys being thrown against the sides of the 'hatch' or open top.

2) 'shooting' while stationary: theoretically possible, for two soldiers. The open top is probably big enough for six to stand up in, crammed together, wearing no gear. With gear on, perhaps four could stand up. To realistically aim and shoot at something, perhaps two could stand up. Soldiers take turns standing to avoid getting sick and to get fresh air. The idea of 8-10 soldiers standing up and fighting is preposterous.

3) 'shooting' out of firing ports. Utterly ludicrous idea (note: the M113 does not have firing ports, but the M2 Bradleys do). Impossible to see anything. Inside the vehicle, there is just enough room for an understrength squad to sit next to each other, bent over. Weapons are aimed straight up at the roof, machine guns are laying on the floor, ammunition is in boxes under someone's butt, two guys are probably laying on the floor at everyone else's feet because there isn't enough bench room for everybody. The idea of fighting from 'inside' a M2, or BMP is some contractor's drawing room idea-utterly absurd in the field.

My own guess is that when field manuals describe 'fighting' from the back of a halftrack, they mean one of two things 1) some civilian contractor wrote a paragraph or two about something he has never experienced and which is completely unrealistic, or 2) 'fighting' is meant to be 'spraying a bit of suppressive fire as you drive by quickly, leaving the enemy that you see for the dismounts that are following behind you. In other words, use the machine gun to suppress, keep driving to your objective, and dismount and fight there-dismount as late as possible (dismount=delay and thus a loss of speed on the battlefield), stick with the tanks, leave the dug in enemy and bypassed enemy for the truck mounted or marching soldiers to your rear, and roll on as long as possible.

Steve

[Michael Dorosh]

That's another one of the big difference between a 1980 IFV and a 1944 APC; it provided an enclosed NBC-safe environment. That's an excellent point as well.

The postwar Czech Tatra (you see them in some movies, including Staliingrad) was an upgrade of the Sd Kfz 251 SPW that German panzergrenadiers used, but they had armoured roof structures added, as well as weapons ports on the side. That suggests to me that whoever designed thes changes was catering to a doctrine that proposed "fighting" from the vehicle. But it still doesn't prove one way or another what was done in 1944.

To be truly silly, I'll point out that most APCS and IFVs have really big doors on the back (as did some 251 halftracks)...

Edit - didn't see Stephen and Andrew's posts. Thanks for the translation and the real life experience. Consider that 8 of the 10 men in a panzergrenadier squad circa 1942 had bolt action rifles, and the idea of "spraying" fire from a moving halftrack becomes even sillier.

My militia unit used to have Grizzly IFVs; seems to me it was standard to use them as fire support while the infantry fought forward. I suspect most 251s did the same. There are plenty of photos that show this concept in action - I have yet to see a photo of infantry shooting from the vehicle (bearing in mind most "combat" photos were staged, anyway).

[This message has been edited by Michael Dorosh (edited 02-08-2001).]

[Steve McClaire]

Michael Dorosh: Looks like you were posting while I was composing. Nothing like repeating more or less the same thing as someone who posts right before you.

I don't understand more than a few words in German, so it's hard for me to tell from the quotes given, but I believe the Germans decided later in the war (after Kursk, I think) that making the initial breakthrough was better left to infantry divisions, saving the panzer divisions for exploitation. Punching through with panzer divisions was costing too many tanks and vehicles -- thus the initial attack during the Bulge was mostly made by volksgrenadier divisions.

Some of the dates given in the source quotes are 1943 or earlier, and so may be quoting tactics that were no longer widely employed in the CMBO time period.

[TheDesertFox]

I presumed we were talking about staight infantry fighting as shown in CMBO, not high-speed breakthrough operations.

Michael,

Please bear in mind that that Panzergrenadiere execute completely different missions than infantry forces. To be clear, I speak of the Panzergrenadierbattalion (gep.) and not the truck mounted mechanized Infanterie.

The halftrack mounted Panzergrenadiere are to closely follow the Tanks and to support them against enemy infantry. This is mobile warfare as it is practiced today. Their employment is strictly tied to the actual objective of the commitment of the tanks.

In this context it is very important to understand that dismounted combat is very time consuming and incurs the danger of leaving the tanks stationary and thus increasing their vulnerability.

It is not the task of Panzergrenadiere (gep.) to control terrain assigned to them and clear out enemy resistance that is there. That´s the job of Infanterie. The task of Panzergrenadiere is to lead wide ranging maneuvers and to deliver massive blows in close coordination with tanks. Thus it is eminently important to stay mobile. To not put a brake on the fluidity of the movement and the dynamics of tank operations. Basically the three primary missions of Panzergrenadiere are to:

1st) Overcome defiles, obstacles (in cooperation with Panzer Pioniere (gep.)) and barriers with speed and surprise.

2nd) Rapidly advance through enemy held areas in which opportunities for observation and fields of fire are limited and, if necessary, claim the battlefield in dismounted combat.

3rd) Take and hold terrain sectors that do not have clear fields of observation and/or are difficult to negotiate in advance of other forces.

Keeping the momentum of the tank movements is of great importance here. I hope this makes clear that tactically speaking Panzergrenadiere were different from Infanterie and thus used different doctrine.

Thus they fought mounted as long as possible, threw handgrenades, fired their rifles, their MGs while mounted, because they needed to stay mobile. Of course you can´t clear enemy resistance in a town or wood while fighting from a halfrack, but that simply wasn´t the task of Panzergrenadiere. They had to fight with the tanks and screen them against enemy infantry and keep mobility while doing this and push for the objective which usually is the enemy artillery and supply depots.

I hope this helps to understand the difference in doctrine between Panzergrenadiere (gep.) and mechanized (mot.) Panzergrenadiere which essentially were tasked Infanterie missions and not Panzergrenadier missions.

Just in case someone doesn´t understand why I frequently use the word mission and what this means. We, german army then and now, have something called Auftragstaktik (mission oriented orders). That means that you only tell your subordinates WHAT you want them to acchieve and WHY you want them to acchieve this. You don´t tell them HOW. It is up to the subordinate leader to figure out the details to complete the mission. This gives him full flexibility and a maximum of freedom within his borders.

Helge

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- The DesertFox -

Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net

WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891

[Michael Dorosh]

Desert Fox - yes, I think we are now talking about the same thing. I will agree with your last post.

Not to beat this to death, but the question now becomes whether or not Combat Mission portrays the kind of "fighting" or missions that you are discussing.

Thanks for providing the quotes - I just now saw them. (I'm at work and posting on the fly).

Thanks also for keeping your cool; I enjoyed this discussion very much. It's a pleasure to talk with people who can remain scholarly - that goes for all of you. I've learned a lot.

I will also apologize if I've caused any offence.