Attrition and Maneuver- Apples and Oranges

[coralsaw]

IIRC from my studies:

1) Japan was "forced" to declare war against the US mostly for economic reasons. She was mostly dependent on imports for survival, and had undergone numerous embargo crises imposed by the US. Therefore, a plausible strategy would be to conquer parts of china to further its produce, and parts of south east asia, in order to create a "safe Japan-based basin". In order to achieve expansion, US reaction had to be overcome. The best way to go about it was a preemptive concentrated strike, i.e. "the decisive blow that will lead to favourable peace terms".

2) It is not widely known why Hitler declared war on US. The most plausible explanation is that the US supplies to UK made a UK-Germany ceasefire agreement (that's what Hitler wanted, at least temporarily) improssible, since he could not "starve UK to capitulation". Hitler could not openly attack the supply routes with his U-boats without declaring war to the US. Hitler indeed tried to request Japan to attack the USSR, since they were long-time enemies with each other, but the Japanese government stonewalled him, since they did not want to open war with both US and USSR.

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My squads are regular, must be the fibre in the musli...

[This message has been edited by coralsaw (edited 02-22-2001).]

[Spook]

Originally posted by Henri:

This is rather fuzzy in my memory, but I am almost sure that the stated objective of the Japanese in winning the Battle of Midway was that the destruction of the US fleet would bring the US to negotiate a peace settlement that gave Japan what it wanted in the Pacific region (whether or not this would have happened is another question). The Japanese never intended to force the US to surrender, and I am not even sure that they had any plans to take over Hawaii.

Henri

Hoping that a Midway victory would force the USA to consider peace could be defined as a goal, Henri, but if the USA didn't choose to opt out, then what?

If there was really no point to a Midway invasion beyond "forcing the US fleet into the open", then why bother to assemble an invasion force?

The reason is that Midway had greater strategic value beyond defeating the US fleet. It was viable as a base to threaten US operations at Hawaii, either as a Hawaii invasion jump-off point or as an airbase for land-based Japanese bombers.

I never stated that Japan expected to force the USA to surrender, nor did I state that Japan intended to invade the USA mainland. But a later Japanese invasion of Hawaii would be viable if the Japanese Navy was in local control of that region of the Pacific.

Regardless of what was historically recorded in Japan's military planning, it stands to reason that invading Hawaii would be considered if the USA chose to fight on. Why allow your primary opponent to maintain an advance base in the Pacific? Take out Hawaii, where would US Navy operations kick off? The US west coast, or perhaps from Samoa.

I doubt that the Japanese could hold Hawaii for very long (over a year) against a US counter-invasion if it did succeed in capturing it. But logistically speaking, the USA would've been much more "removed" from interfering with Japan's PRIMARY strategic interests in China, the East Indies, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia.

[Henri]

Originally posted by Spook:

Regardless of what was historically recorded in Japan's military planning, it stands to reason that invading Hawaii would be considered if the USA chose to fight on.

It appears that you are right as to Japanese planning. I found the following at the Midway web site:

In the middle of January 1942, Rear Admiral Matone Ugaki, Yamamoto's chief of staff,

proposed that after "June of this year we should occupy Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, send our air force forward to these

islands and dispatch the Combined Fleet with an occupying force to occupy Hawaii and at the same time bring the enemy fleet

into a decisive battle."

Many Japanese officers disagreed, and considered that Midway and Hawaii would be too difficult to defend since their supply lines would be so extended.

From the beginning, the stated Japanese objective was to bring the US to the negotiating table by causing the destruction of their fleet (which is debatable if it had occured), but the Japanese DID consider the invasion of Hawaii as an altrnative after the expected victory at Midway.

Henri

[Spook]

Originally posted by Henri:

Many Japanese officers disagreed, and considered that Midway and Hawaii would be too difficult to defend since their supply lines would be so extended.

(snip)

Henri

I can understand the concerns of the dissenting Japanese officers. The geographic position of Hawaii is such that it would have been tenuous to maintain a Japanese garrison there for very long.

But knocking out Pearl/Hawaii would've been a tremendous strategic boon to Japan, even with eventual recapture by the USA. Hawaii had extensive airbases for US aircraft basing/shuttling, and large fuel farms. Pearl in turn provided excellent forward ship repair & resupply facilities and the primary Pacific sub pens. As the US Submarine Service ultimately proved highly effective in "interdicting" the primary Japanese shipping routes, pushing back the US subs alone would've been a great strategic relief for the Japanese.

Of course, in the circumstance of losing Hawaii, the US could well had expanded operations in Samoa, Australia, and New Zealand (before eventually recapturing Hawaii). But building up advanced bases to the degree that Hawaii provided would've taken some time.

[Marlow]

Originally posted by SirOscar:

I can't disagree more, had Lee pulled off a victory at Gettysburg or even by passed the battle and headed into D.C. which was like 30 miles down the road, the war might of ended right then and there. You are totally over looking the political situation of the time, before Gettysburg the North was getting it's butt kicked on a regular basis and there were MANY in the North who were already calling for an end to the war, had Lee been able to take or siege D.C. I think it HIGHLY likely that the war would of been over.

Well, I disagree with your disagreement. Typical Civil War battles resulted in the loser retreating with the victor too exhausted to pursue. Then, the loser would set up shop a little bit down the road, and if the winner pursued, another battle took place. It is unlikely that Lee could have just waltzed into Washington even if he won at Gettysburg. Further, not to discount the political importance of a win, don't forget that the Union won the most important battle (militarily in any event) of the war the same day: Vicksburg. That victory, cutting the South in half, would likely offset much of the political ramifications of a loss at Gettysburg.

I also disagree with the statement " before Gettysburg the North was getting it's butt kicked on a regular basis." This was true in the east, where most modern historians tend to focus (I have my opinions on why this is the case, but its too long to go into now). However, in the west, the Union regularly defeated the Confederates:

Fort Henry

Fort Donaldson

Shiloh (not pretty, but the Union kept the field, and took initiative from the South)

Perryville

Stone River (maybe not a win, but not a loss, and certainly not a 'butt kickin.')

Last, but not least, the whole Vicksberg campaign.

There are probably some others that I am forgeting

[fubar628]

The pivotal battle in the Pacific, in my opinion, was at Pearl Harbour. The only chance the Japanese had was to invade and capture the Hawaiian Islands and hope the Americans would sue for peace. But even if they had successfully invaded the Hawaiian Islands, it would have only delayed their inevitable defeat because the US would not have let them keep Hawaii.

In fact, on that Sunday morning, what those Zero's, Val's and Kates did was truely wake up the American industrial might.

After this, it was only a matter of time until the resources could be marshalled in the Pacific. Even if the Japanese had won a total victory at Midway, the end result would have been the same. If the Japanese could not even defeat an unsupplied Marine Division at Guadalcanal, what chance did they have against a well supplied, technologically superior foe? By 1945 the US had produced well over 100 carriers of various sizes. What that meant was that they had absolute air superiority over any battlefield. They could, if they so chose, put 1500 - 2000 front line fighters up over any battlefield. Remember the Mariana's Turkyshoot. The Japanese Zero, a marvel in 1940, was obsolete by 1942 and it was still considered a front line fighter in 1945. It was badly outclassed by the Hellcats, Corsairs and P-38's. Plus, Japan could not replace the pilots they were loosing.

Additionally, the 100+ carriers meant that any target could be pounded by 2000 or so bombers from the carriers (equivalent to a raid of about 200 or so B-17's) on a more or less continuous basis. Realistically, the Americans did not even have to invade the smaller islands, they could have pounded them into dust, and starved the Japanese to death by cutting off all supplies.

The frontline Naval superiority combined with the logistics ability ensured Japan's destruction. Once the needs of the European front were met, it was only a matter of time until the defeat of Japan.

[CavScout]

Nothing is that set in stone. If the Japanese had been able to force the US fleet into a fight at Midway and had had destroyed the Pacific fleet, there is every possibility a settlement or stalemate could have been reached. No one really knows. It is a "what if".

[Henri]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Nothing is that set in stone. If the Japanese had been able to force the US fleet into a fight at Midway and had had destroyed the Pacific fleet, there is every possibility a settlement or stalemate could have been reached. No one really knows. It is a "what if".

Whaddaya know, we agree! This was indeed a "what-if", and one that Yamamoto did not agree with, since he had lived in the US and knew it fairly well.

Contrary to the other Japanese leaders, he did not believe that the US would buckle under and negotiate after a serious defeat, which everyone agreed was the only way that the Japanese could win the war.

Henri

[curih]

Japan's only real hope was a cease fire. The Japanese had the same problem with the US that Germany had with Russia. They picked a fight with an enemy that was just too big.

curih

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Henri:

Whaddaya know, we agree! This was indeed a "what-if", and one that Yamamoto did not agree with, since he had lived in the US and knew it fairly well.

Contrary to the other Japanese leaders, he did not believe that the US would buckle under and negotiate after a serious defeat, which everyone agreed was the only way that the Japanese could win the war.

I find it hard to believe that Yamamoto didn't think it had some chance as he planned the battle. Why would he plan something he thought had no chance? Midway was his baby.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by CavScout:

I find it hard to believe that Yamamoto didn't think it had some chance as he planned the battle. Why would he plan something he thought had no chance? Midway was his baby.

Because that was his job. He was an admiral, so he planned naval battles and fought them. Remember the Japanese soldiers who formally 'surrendered' in the 1970s. No point going on, but also no way to change track halfway. A different mindset.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Because that was his job. He was an admiral, so he planned naval battles and fought them. Remember the Japanese soldiers who formally 'surrendered' in the 1970s. No point going on, but also no way to change track halfway. A different mindset.

Sorry, but sounds more like a "cover" for the mistake he made at Midway.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Sorry, but sounds more like a "cover" for the mistake he made at Midway.

Maybe - OTOH I lived in Japan and worked as the only foreigner in a Japanese office full of civil servants for two years. It would not surprise me if that was the reason from my experience.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[The_Capt]

Quick question on the Janapese/US debate.

It is commonly held that Churchill knew about the raid before it happened and let it go on anyway without telling the US because he desperately needed the US to be drawn into the war.

Now my question is; does anybody have any evidence that FDR had that info but also let it happened anyway as a method to bring the US into the war. I find it unusual that although significant damage was done at Pearl Harbour, that all of the carriers were out training. If one were to make it look real, but not cripple the US fleet doing so, it would seems that this was the way to do it. Just a thought.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Maybe - OTOH I lived in Japan and worked as the only foreigner in a Japanese office full of civil servants for two years. It would not surprise me if that was the reason from my experience.

Unless you had some "experience" with Yamamoto what are you trying to say? I suppose you wouldn't attribute any of what they said to be slightly skewed. I am sure they wouldn't want their "Hero" to have made a mistake. Blame it on someone else.

[Henri]

Originally posted by CavScout:

I find it hard to believe that Yamamoto didn't think it had some chance as he planned the battle. Why would he plan something he thought had no chance? Midway was his baby.

Sorry, I wasn't clear, I guess; Yamamoto was against launching a war against the US because he didn't agree that the US would negotiate after a decisive defeat at Pearl Harbor (it was expected to catch the Carriers at Pearl Harbor, but they were at sea).

But once the decision to go on was made, like a good soldier he went along and did his best.

As you say, he was not against Midway. The plan at Midway was to draw off the US fleet with a feint on the Aleutians, and to strike a decisive blow against the divided US fleet, but this did not work, mostly because the US had broken the Japanese code and knew where the main attack was headed for and for other well-known reasons (the US was lucky to win the carrier battle).Again, it is probably safe to say today that even had the Japanese succeeded in destroying the remainder of the carrier fleet, it seems unlikely that the US would have given up, although they might have lost both Midway and Hawaii temporarily.

The Japanese under-estimated both the US industrial might and the US will to fight once they were involved in a war where the US population saw themselves as the victims of aggression.The attack on Pearly Harbor had exactly the opposite morale effect that the japanese leaders were expecting.

Henri

[CavScout]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

Quick question on the Janapese/US debate.

It is commonly held that Churchill knew about the raid before it happened and let it go on anyway without telling the US because he desperately needed the US to be drawn into the war.

Now my question is; does anybody have any evidence that FDR had that info but also let it happened anyway as a method to bring the US into the war. I find it unusual that although significant damage was done at Pearl Harbour, that all of the carriers were out training. If one were to make it look real, but not cripple the US fleet doing so, it would seems that this was the way to do it. Just a thought.

The whole problem with this conspiracy theory is that while the carriers where out at sea they were not viewed at the time as the main naval weapons. The battleships were STILL viewed as the weapons to have. It would later in the war that carriers would come into their own. Hell, even at Midway the Japanese were trying to lure the US into the big naval battle. Why do you think they had all the ships for?

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Henri:

Sorry, I wasn't clear, I guess; Yamamoto was against launching a war against the US because he didn't agree that the US would negotiate after a decisive defeat at Pearl Harbor (it was expected to catch the Carriers at Pearl Harbor, but they were at sea).

But once the decision to go on was made, like a good soldier he went along and did his best.

As you say, he was not against Midway. The plan at Midway was to draw off the US fleet with a feint on the Aleutians, and to strike a decisive blow against the divided US fleet, but this did not work, mostly because the US had broken the Japanese code and knew where the main attack was headed for and for other well-known reasons (the US was lucky to win the carrier battle).Again, it is probably safe to say today that even had the Japanese succeeded in destroying the remainder of the carrier fleet, it seems unlikely that the US would have given up, although they might have lost both Midway and Hawaii temporarily.

The Japanese under-estimated both the US industrial might and the US will to fight once they were involved in a war where the US population saw themselves as the victims of aggression.The attack on Pearly Harbor had exactly the opposite morale effect that the japanese leaders were expecting.

Gotcha there. I tend to agree.

[russellmz]

a funny thing about midway is that the japanese lost because they were gamey.

the japanese played extensive wargames to determine their chances before a battle.

in one wargame of the midway invasion, a die was thrown and two japanese carriers took hits. the admirals forced the umpire to ignore this result. (we got uber carriers! no way that could happen)

btw, even if we lost all our carriers, we would probably have held outlong enough to bring some carriers from the atlantic and in another year or two we would have built enough carriers to still out number the japanese 2:1. offensive would have just been delayed...

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russellmz,

Self-Proclaimed Keeper for Life of the Sacred Unofficial FAQ.

"They had their chance- they have not lead!" - GW Bush

"They had mechanical pencils- they have not...lead?" - Jon Stewart on The Daily Show

[This message has been edited by russellmz (edited 02-23-2001).]

[Spook]

I pretty much concur with Henri's latest comments too.

Now to the Capt's query: I'm not one who's personally convinced YET that FDR was "wired up" in a way to know exactly the Japanese raid plans and intended the Pearl raid to happen as it did, but a recent book by an author named Stennit holds that FDR did indeed plan this all along. The book is called "Day of Deceit." A review at TheHistoryNet site is provided below.

http://www.historynet.com/reviews/bk_wwiijan01lead.htm

[Philistine]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

Quick question on the Janapese/US debate.

It is commonly held that Churchill knew about the raid before it happened and let it go on anyway without telling the US because he desperately needed the US to be drawn into the war.

{snip}

Is this really commonly held?

While I've seen some conspiracy-theory arguments, I don't think I've seen anywhere close to this belief being "commonly held" by anyone, much less a majority (or even substantial minority) of reputable historians. Although I've most often seen it in reference to FDR or high-up American officers.

Why do you feel this belief is "commonly held?"

--Philistine

[The_Capt]

I have read about the fact in several books and on history documentaries. Don't ask me to quote them all because there have been quite a few and hence "my common belief statement". I watch one show one the history Channel "Codebreakers" or some such and the British had code breakers in the Pacific who had access to "hints" of this information and when the invasion was reported to Churchill an eyewitness who was interviewed stated that he showed no surprise or emotion at all. Indicating he knew before-hand.

I am not saying I am an expert but the British network was very well established by then, thanks to colonial influence just about everywhere.

I agree that the belief in the time was battleships but a forward looking Naval officer could have easily seen the results of Airpower in the German Campaigns and draw a few conclusions.

I don't know, I was just asking the question to see if anybody had any insight.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

I agree that the belief in the time was battleships but a forward looking Naval officer could have easily seen the results of Airpower in the German Campaigns and draw a few conclusions.

What exactly was happening in Europe that would've bolstered aircraft carrier usage?

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Unless you had some "experience" with Yamamoto what are you trying to say? I suppose you wouldn't attribute any of what they said to be slightly skewed. I am sure they wouldn't want their "Hero" to have made a mistake. Blame it on someone else.

Well, since I fail to make myself clear. I never talked to my Japanese colleagues about Yamamoto. I observed their behaviour in a difficult situation. Often they would just 'soldier on' regardless of whether there was any point to it.

The Japanese language has a word for it: Ganbaru, usually translated into English as 'do your best', but really meaning 'do your best even if you know you are screwed, because you have to save your face'. The closest I would know is the English 'stiff upper lip'.

Now I am not saying that it was the case with Yamamoto, I am saying it could have been . Please notice the subtle difference.

If you could please scroll up, you may remember you asked a question. I attempted to answer it. Whether you believe that answer or not, is not my problem. I am as much in the dark as you are to the real reason, since we both were not there to ask Yamamoto what he wanted.

All I am pointing out is that there is another explanation, apart from the one you apparently have chosen to believe regardless.

Have a nice day.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Well, since I fail to make myself clear. I never talked to my Japanese colleagues about Yamamoto. I observed their behaviour in a difficult situation. Often they would just 'soldier on' regardless of whether there was any point to it.

The Japanese language has a word for it: Ganbaru, usually translated into English as 'do your best', but really meaning 'do your best even if you know you are screwed, because you have to save your face'. The closest I would know is the English 'stiff upper lip'.

Now I am not saying that it was the case with Yamamoto, I am saying it could have been. Please notice the subtle difference.

If you could please scroll up, you may remember you asked a question. I attempted to answer it. Whether you believe that answer or not, is not my problem. I am as much in the dark as you are to the real reason, since we both were not there to ask Yamamoto what he wanted.

All I am pointing out is that there is another explanation, apart from the one you apparently have chosen to believe regardless.

Have a nice day.

The Japanese are not the only ones to have soldiers disagree with what was happening or had been ordered but continued to do their job. I fail to see how you can attribute this as some Japanese 'trait' other than some foolish racist idea.

Secondly, he planned the mission and it failed. The failure is his responsibility. It is much to easy to say, "I didn't want to do it... I was just following orders.."

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 02-23-2001).]