Relative importance of armor specs

[JasonC]

This is really a continuation of the previous thread, "German tanks not good enough?" I've switched to a new thread because the previous is already 5 pages, many of them long posts, and has become slow to load. I pick up with a reply to Mark IVs last, useful comments.

First, I want to thank Mark IV for actually engaging on the real subject of the argument. It took five pages, but somebody finally did so, dropping the evasions and pretences and cliches.

"The argument seems to be that tactics win battles, logistics win wars, etc. We are mostly familiar with that."

Basically correct, that is the main argument. Although I would add other factors besides logistics at the "wins wars" level. Superior doctrine or training, and better operational maneuver also wins wars. They and logistics also win campaigns. And it is not tactics - which includes all how to use it, doctrinal stuff - that these are being compared to, but a narrower thing than all of tactics. That being technical differences in the equipment fielded by the two sides. Technical dominance is a different and narrower view than even tactical dominance would be. The argument is that technical armor dominance as a supposedly critical operational or strategic factor, is nowhere in evidence in WW II.

"opposing an enemy with groggier tanks than your own requires greater logistical superiority"

Not necessarily. The Allies often had groggier tanks in pure gun-armor terms in the early war, and still lost the campaigns. Superior doctrine and operational handling were quite sufficient, even in the absence of any clear superiority in logistics. Better logistics, better operational choice of moves, better doctrine - all these varied over wide ranges between the two sides, and those differences decided campaigns. Tech specs mostly varied over narrower ranges, and narrow or wide they did not decide campaigns.

Speculating they might have if the other factors were exactly equal is both debatable, and beside the point. It might well have been that the armor grog differences actually present would have been insufficient to prevent stalemated results if doctrine, operational maneuver, and logistics were all artificially equalized. Or that might have been avoided only if the armor-grog differences had been far wider than they actually were. But regardless, the reality is that the other factors always did vary by large amounts. The fights were never "fair". No sides seeks fair fights in war. And these other factors varied enough to swamp whatever leftover effects of tactical tech-spec differences still existed up at the damped level of month-long campaigns on whole fronts.

"The Allies had that when it mattered, and yes, they won the war"

This is true, but it is not the argument I am making. My position is not reducable to it. I account for early war German successes as well as late war Allied ones. The technical dominance view accounts for neither. My argument does imply things like, the German decision to delay full economic mobilization was far more decisive than the design qualities of the T-34, and nothing like counterbalanced by the engineer successes of the Tiger and Panther designs. It implies things like, getting the TOE and tasking and inter-branch cooperation of an armor division right, to support true combined arms, was more important than having uniform easy-eight 76mm Shermans.

It means the economic planners and the staff generals had more to do with the outcome of the war than the armor-grog engineers. It means the basic dynamic of the war was initially comparable logistics and superior German doctrine and operational command led to initial German successes, and later the Allies matched the doctrine category closely enough to neutralize that edge, while deploying their own economic edge decisively. Whereas the tech dominance idea has the most basic of all problems a theory can encounter. The signs are wrong on the real outcomes.

"would they have won as handily with worse tanks?"

Of course not. Part of the point is that the real differences in armor capabilities were relatively small, compared to the variance in all other factors. As I've argued at great length, part of the illusion otherwise is based on the "averaging up" mistake, when people pretend all one side's AFVs were the best of their fleet, and all of the others were the average of theirs. The mean of the distribution (which is normal - as many below as above the mean) of produced AFVs for the Germans, for instance, is smack between the Pz III/StuG and the Pz IV. Which are AFVs with quite similar grog stats to the average Allied T-34s and Shermans.

Beyond this mean, which accounts for 2/3rds of all German AFVs, the rest are split in both directions. For every Mark V chassis there was a Czech one, and for every Tiger and up chassis there was a Pz II one. In the east, the Russians had IS, ISU, and heavy SUs for every heavy tank the Germans fielded, and T-34/85s for every Pz IV or StuG. For every occasion in which Panthers faced only T-34s, there was another in which Pz IVs or StuGs faced IS or ISUs. In the west, the Allies had 5-10 upgunned AFVs for every uparmored German AFV sent against them. There is no question the Germans had the best late war tanks, but the overall fleet mix was only marginally superior, and mostly against the western Allies. Even that superiority peaked in Normandy, in July.

A more telling point from my perspective is the question, would the outcome of the war or of any of its campaigns have been significantly different if every tank on all sides for the entire war had been, say, a Pz IV long? I sincerely doubt it. The Germans would have won the early war fights just as convincingly, using superior combined arms doctrine and operational maneuver. The Allies would have learned to match those things, close enough, and their industrial capacity would still have outproduced the Germans just as decisively, and beaten them through attrition processes, quite as thoroughly as they did in the real deal. Did Panthers not yet matched by upgunned Shermans save the Germans from the second of these processes in Normandy? They did not. Did T-34s not yet matched by long 75s save the Russians from the first of them in 1941? They did not.

"Surely you're not arguing that armor quality doesn't matter"

I'm arguing that is doesn't matter much, and wasn't all that different to begin with. Even in the cases when the difference for portions of the fielded fleets was at its most extreme, it did not alter operational outcomes. The Allies attrited the German armor in Normandy within two months. The Germans went through 3000 uparmored Russian AFVs in 1941 with very low losses. The Russians won the decisive battles of the war in the precise period when they had only T-34/76s and the Germans had already fielded Tigers and Panthers.

If that is mattering a lot, what would not mattering look like? It is not like the direction of operational outcomes follows the pattern of armor quality swings. We can presume the sign of the effect of better armor quality is in favor of the guy that has the better armor. Since even at the outliers for armor quality differences we don't see operational outcomes moving along with armor quality swings, we can only conclude that armor quality effects are very small compared to differences in other factors, up at the operational level.

And this makes sense, because we know the impact of tactical factors is damped the higher you go up the organization chart. Because higher echelons have more and more ways of dealing effectively with any tactical problem faced, and the weapons load-outs of higher echelon units differ by smaller amounts from one side to another. For exampe, infantry or artillery parity can neutralize a moderate armor edge, by breaking up combined arms. Meanwhile the higher you go, the more the impact of maneuver increases, because the options and ability to weight one area more heavily than another goes up. That of odds remains, at the least, and because of attrition effects on ratios can sometimes increase. E.g. turn a 3:2 edge into a 3:1 edge by subtracing 1.5 losses from each side.

"If the guy with tactical superiority also had logistical superiority, his win would be far less costly"

"Far less" is highly debatable. The logistical (or operational, doctrinal, etc) seems to be necessary as well as sufficient. The tactical, tech spec superiority seems to be unnecessary and not alone sufficient. Adding a tech spec superiority may reduce losses, but by how much it not in the least obvious. It is entirely plausible that the tech difference would have to be extreme, to have any significant impact on the overall cost. In the Gulf it certainly was extreme, but it was so even with Bradleys. The Brads knocked out about as much Iraqi armor as the M-1s did, and took very low losses. They are armored to stop 50 cal rounds, not 120mm APDS. But 3km missle range plus night vision were quite enough.

"If the guy with better tanks is at a logistical break-even, he's going to win. '67 and '73 Arab-Israeli Wars seem to bear that out."

I don't think they provide evidence of any such thing. They show that superior doctrine, training, and operational handling are significant strategic factors, which we know from the early WW II cases already. The Israels won their earlier wars too, when they had Shermans and M3 halftracks. Their tanks were best in 73, and that was the nearest-run one of the bunch, because the Arabs had the initiative, coordinated their attack well, and had some reasonable missles (SAM-6 as well as Sagger).

"Many of your examples are of numerically imbalanced situations"

That is definitely part of the point. In CM QBs, the situations are artificially balanced. In real war, they are not. Armor grog specs do not matter very much when the reaction of a column of 40 US AFVs to encountering 8 StuGs is to wait two hours for 36 P-47s to work them over, simply because they can. When the reaction to an attack by a company of tanks supporting an infantry battalion on a 1 km frontage is a time-on-target shoot by the equivalent of 50 CM artillery forward observors from 105mm up to 8 inch, the angle of a glacis plate is not going to prove decisive. Those things happen.

To be sure, so do short range duels between M-10s and Panthers in hedgerow country. But those tend to have coin flip outcomes that wash out on a scale of regiments and days. Even battles are not usually decided lopsidedly in favor of a marginal technically superiority on one side. And the differences in the weapons mixes are marginal. One battle may be 4 Panthers vs. 5 Shermans, but another will be 10 Shermans against 4 Pz IVs or 5 Shermans vs. 3 StuG. The Panthers may trade with the M-10s, beat the Shermans, while the Pz IVs and StuGs trade with their Sherman opponents. The result added up over many of each type will be only moderately lower overall losses for the mix with some Panthers in it. Even battles usually result in significant attrition to both sides, which defers the decision and puts replacement rates in the driver's seat up at the operational scale.

"what if the breakout from Normany had been with Allied Panthers"

Since they guzzle at least as much gas, break down more, and were designed for an engine life of 500 miles, they still would have stalled after crossing France.

"and the Germans had been defending with short 75 Shermans?"

The Germans weren't defending with anything, armor wise, after the breakout. The armor was just plain gone. Total runners in the theater were down to 300 AFVs, for a frontage that had just exploded to 450 miles. Then southern France was added too, on top of that. The frontage finally narrowed again to about 375 miles at the west wall. All the runners could have been Tiger IIs, and it wouldn't have made the slightest difference. What stopped the Allies at the west wall was blown bridges, German infantry with PAK and fausts, fuel shortages, and exhaustion.

"Aren't better tanks, well, better?"

Sure. But (1) the tank match ups of WW II, by whole fleet mix rather than picked best type vs. merely average type, were not as uneven as the tech dominance crowd would have us believe, and (2) better tanks make relatively little difference compared to numbers, operational maneuver, combined arms doctrine, crew skill etc. Better tanks help at the tactical scale, and the closer you focus in unit scale terms, and the more artificially even you make all other factors, the more they will stand out. But this creates an illusion about their importance in the war. The war did not consist in numerically even matches with anchored flanks between handfuls of tanks differing only in tech specs, multiplied times n. And the tech dominance armor grogs talk as though it did. In fact, the critical factors at larger scales were generally factors specific to those scales - like operational maneuver, and strategic logistics.

This illusion is not limited to the contemporary armor grogs. Some of the participants suffered from it as well. The relative importance of operational maneuver or technical specs in the use of armor was a critical issue for the Germans in mid war. Some were looking for a technical "fix". They got the technical developments but they didn't fix anything to speak of. Meanwhile the principles of operational employment of armor on the defensive were poorly understood and indifferently applied. The proper employment of armor was long thought to be on the offensive only, and believed to depend on armor tech, sometimes to the exclusion of sufficient combined arms.

The relative importance of technology and production was also a critical issue in the same period. The Allies took the best existing chassis at the moment they entered the war and ran with it, focusing on numbers produced of those types (T-34, Sherman). The Germans spent 41 and 42 developing the Tiger and Panther but did not fully mobilize their war economy until the defeat at Stalingrad. The Russians did try to keep up with the Germans in armor spec terms, but for the most part just copied the moves they saw the Germans make, then beat them on production. The western Allies eventually understood the importance of upgunning AFVs, but didn't field uparmored types and didn't need them. Just upgunning a portion of the fleet kept armor specs close enough to counter the German investment in the technical dominance idea.

"If the argument is that the Germans were doomed to lose by the sheer industrial logistics of the thing, no argument"

That is certainly true once the western front is opened. It is not clear in the case of 41-43 in Russia, if the Germans had seen the importance of full economic mobilization and attrition logic early enough. German industrial potential in 1941 was as large as that of Russia. German AFV output at the 1944 peak was as rapid as peak Russian production. They might still have lost the war, even in Russia, though it is hard to see how the Russians could have dealt with ~10,000 additional 75mm Pz IVs or StuG by the end of 1942, which the Germans might easily have made had they mobilized the economy earlier. They might still have lost to the western Allies, though it might have taken atom bombs to do it.

But my argument, again, does not reduce just to the "sheer industry" point. It is a point about the relative importance of such armor tech differences as actually existed, over whole fleets. The relative importance of armor tech was decidedly limited. It was swamped by doctrine, maneuver, and odds effects, early war and late, when the Germans were winning and when they were losing, at times when fielded tanks were closest to one another in ability and at the times when they were farthest apart.

"in CM terms tank quality certainly makes a difference"

Quite. It is often the central factor in the outcome of a CM game. Some conclude from seeing this in CM, that this issue was critical in the real war. And the point is that this is an illusion created by a tactical level of analysis, and balanced situations artificially imposed to make for challenging and competitive games. It was not the central factor in the outcome of real WW II campaigns. In real operational level campaigns, the net effect of a lot of even battles on the CM scale was attrition - subtracting forces from both sides. Which then led to the operational victory of the side that could replace those losses faster. Other operational campaigns were decided by overall odds or maneuver, without involving primarily "fair fights" on the tactical, CM scale. As you say,

"WWII was not composed of day-in, day-out CM level engagements"

I am quite aware that armor technology and the US going home were parts of Hitler's pipe dreams. The point is that both were pipe dreams. A couple thousand uparmored AFVs in 1943 were not going to make up for boneheaded operational moves at Stalingrad and Kursk, nor for the numbers difference in fielded AFVs created by the decision to postpone economic mobilization until after the Stalingrad defeat. 800 Tigers and Panthers were not going to stop the combined industrial and military might of 2/3rds of the world focused on the cockpit of Normandy. Willpower wasn't going to do it either.

What were the critical items in the war? There were the other levels of analysis. Not individual will nor magical technology, but economic production and military thought. The things businessmen and staff generals were good at and applied their brains to, decided the actual outcomes of the campaigns, both when the Germans were winning, early, and when they lost, later on. These happen to have been two human groups whose professions and intellects the German dictator despised. He micromanaged both tasks, and confused one with raw materials symbols on maps and the other with pushing around little flags that represented units that had long since ceased to exist. Which he thought could be mastered by insisting the flags be pushed in only one direction.

His actual decisions in these fields were ruinous - to delay economic mobilization, to concentrate on seige attacks on prestige objectives at Stalingrad and Kursk, to throw away what remained of German armor in hopeless attacks at Mortain, and again in the Bulge. There were, after all, victories until Stalingrad so why upset the civilian economy with mobilization? There were tank production symbols at Stalingrad and oil symbols south of it. New heavy tanks would be magically effective. The only proper employment of armor was surely in mass offensive, and all ideas about its proper defensive uses were failures of will.

It is not a trivial matter to get right the relative importance of factors like economics, operational maneuver, and tank specs. Grand strategies were constructed around ideas on this subject. And some of those grand strategies were more in line with the real importance of the different factors than others. Pipe dreams are expensive. Having better tanks is better than having worse ones, of course. But having innaccurate, exaggerated ideas about how important better tanks are, can get you killed. E.g. the decision to attack at Kursk, which counted on new heavy armor being more important than operational stupidity. Or what the Germans spent 1941 and 1942 doing on the armor front, which counted on better technical designs being more important than just upgunning, then ramping production of what they had.

[Agua Perdido]

Excellent, thoughtful post (as always, Jason). I have nothing constructive or insightful to add. Just a bump for other interested members of the gallery.

Agua Perdido

[Jarmo]

Hard to add anything constructive to a post that long..

Tank (and other) tech difference. Being an engineer myself, with gearbox for a brain and all, I might tend to be too tech orientated. But anyway.

While the plate thicknesses and such might not matter much when the opposing sides are close enough to each others in overall quality, the difference becomes much more important when the gap increases. (maybe obviously)

It's probably true it wouldn't make such a big difference if all the german PzIV's would have been Panthers instead. But if we'd consider a PzIII vs Panther situation, the picture would be very different.

The tech gap becomes really important only when the other side has something you just can't kill in a fair fight.

Now, a King Tiger would seem to fit the bill, but the problem with it was that it wasn't so advanced after all. Just adding a ton of armour and a huge gun doesn't make a good tank. IF King Tiger had been reliable tank with similar fuel consumption to PzIV and had been manufactured in as great numbers as Panther, then it would have made a serious impact in strategic level.

Similarly, if germans had not "seen the light" and would have continued throughout the war with the 37mm armed PzIII as the main battle tank, that would have made a serious impact. Even going to full war production with them wouldn't have made things rosy.

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jarmo:

The tech gap becomes really important only when the other side has something you just can't kill in a fair fight.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is probably right; I don't think that the Germans could have obtained the results they got in France '40 being solely equipped with WWI style tanks, for example. But I don't think that Jason's point is that tech gaps never matter; I think his main point is that the tech gap that existed in WWII between tank fleets was not so great as to make a meaningful difference in longer term operations.

In fact what this means, assuming that the German tank fleet average is StuG/PzIV, and the allied tank fleet average tank is the Sherman/T-34, is that there is no tech gap.

Or there is no tech gap as it applied to fleets. Because these numbers are averages, though, there will be situations where there is a tech gap as it applies to individual battles. And the tech gap might prove the decisive factor in these individual battles, as it often does in CM. But, once again because these are averages, using the above average part of your tank fleet in a specific location means, through the rules of mathematics (or at least arithmetic) that other parts of the line will contain your below average tanks, which will be overmatched in turn by the average or better tanks of your opponent. So when you have many such matchups, the averages average out and there is no meaningful overall tech gap.

Now if the Germans fleet averaged out to a reliable, fuel efficient, easily mass produced King Tiger, and the average US fleet averaged out to a Sherman, there would be a substantial tech difference that would probably make itself felt operationally.

Note that I mostly assumed for the purposes of my argument that groggy things like guns and armor were the decisive factor in the tech gap. In real life there were a lot of non-groggy things (supply, logistics, air power, reliability) that were at least as important as the grog factors. The presence of these factors, combined with the fact that there was not much of a tech gap between tank fleets (and the allied fleet was much larger, btw), means that even where the germans were able to achieve numerical parity and local tech gap superiority (to coin a phrase), their successes were mostly limited and mostly local.

[PiggDogg]

Jason C,

Extremely well set forth and most informative. I thoroughly enjoy your posts. Please keep up the education. (Gee, I really don't want to sound like a slobbering groupie or such, but the supported insights are most educational & I would like to see more.)

Cheers, Richard

[Jarmo]

Guess I forgot to mention I agreed with Jason's post.

Well most of it anyway, my post was just.. hmm.. dunno..

..kind of fine tuning?

[Diceman]

I agree almost completely with Jason C's comments but would make some qualifying remarks regarding the impact of superior equipment. The equipping of units with superior weaponry does indeed have an operational impact. It's a term commonly referred to as force multiplier. All else being equal, a platoon armed with M14s and M60s might be expected to accomplish a task that would otherwise require a company of troops with bolt action rifles for example. The modern weaponry allows the M14 equipped platoon to operate with as much lethal effect as the WWI bolt action company.

This reality has a ripple effect all the way up the planning phase. It is very much taken into account when the question is asked "what resources are going to be required to accomplish objective "A", etc. It is also true however, that the technology factor is only one slice of the pie. It doesn't matter that a platoon is equipped with assault rifles, if when they run into the company with bolt action rifles, do not have the training, experience and discipline to bring that technology to bear on the enemy in an effective manner. In this example the quality factor is really a matter of quantity. The assault rifle can spit out more lead faster than a bolt action rifle, but quality also has its impact on the battlefield.

You can see this in CM. A few Panthers can be expected to deal with three or more times its number of Shermans. Therefore, if the primary function of Panthers was to deal with Shermans, you could accomplish the task with a fraction of the # of Shermans to be faced (all other things being equal). The logistical, and by implication, operational impact is significant. Having said that, if the Panthers are miss-handled, or the technology quality factor is otherwise breached, that is to say the Shermans get into range, out flank the Panthers, or the Panthers are crewed by people who don't know how to use them, the Panther becomes just another tank. The logistical theory of doing "more with less" burning right along with them.

This not to argue Jason's points on the quality of German armor. He is correct, overall the Germans didn't have much of an armor advantage technologically. German Uber tanks were a small fraction of the fleet, and there were as many tin cans produced or aquired as the uber tanks.

It is also true that solid logistical, and operational planning, along with well trained troops and support able to make those plans reality carry more weight on the outcome of wars than technology. But technology does have an operational impact.

[lcm1947]

Extremely interesting and informative post and replys. Thanks to all that contributed. I love it when you guys talk like that.

[PiggDogg]

My wife likes it when I talk like that. :eek: :eek: Ooooooops, excuse me. This is a subject not appropriate for a virginal audience such as this.

Cheers, Richard

[Mr. Johnson--]

Diceman said, <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>It is also true that solid logistical, and operational planning, along with well trained troops and support able to make those plans reality carry more weight on the outcome of wars than technology. But technology does have an operational impact.

Agreed, also, if you have a combined arms group it acts as greater than the sum of its parts. 1 inf company+1 tank Company+1 arty company does not equal 3 generic companies. It should equal more like 5 generic companies. Unless sent out into an open field, then they become dead generic companys.

And remember Hitler wasted many soldiers in Stalingrad and North Africa which could have been used at Kursk. That is one of the major reasons the germans lost there, their infantry were running low.

[Tero]

The argument is that technical armor dominance as a supposedly critical operational or strategic factor, is nowhere in evidence in WW II.

I think it is. Why, oh why the race to build better and better tanks if the dominance was not, if not critical, then decisive ? Every time there was a quantum leap in operational introduction of or encounter with a superior vehicle or AT asset each participant went through the ripple effect motions of updating or modifying their AFV and AT arsenals along with battlefield tactics and doctrine.

Granted, in reality much of the superiority of the new vehicles (and AT assets) laid in their suitability to the developing operational tactics and doctrine they were built to match, not in their technical features, which were or were not inherently superior as such.

The most significant criteria for AFV development remained allways the same: ability to defeat existing AT assets (and then some) and battlefield mobility. Which counted in the balance more was determined by the doctrinal and strategic thinkers, not the tactical nitpickers.

Those who had built up or were relying to an experienced and proficient force did not want to waste away their most important assets: experience and proficiency. Those who had just building up or rebuilding their force were after sufficient numbers, not necessarily technical superiority. Those who wanted to protect the crews but could not step up the production of adequate AFV's switched to totally new models in an effort to fill the gap with fewer high quality AFV's manned by high quality crews. Those who did not have the experienced crews stepped up the production of a basic model (which had to be determined first) which was then modified only if the production quantities (but not necessarily vehicle qualities) were not affected. But they were able to get the necessary numbers to overcome the fewer high quality vehicles.

We must not forget that doctrinal and other issues not only helped but also impeded the development. The US had their TD doctrine, the British had a division between infantry support and cavarly tanks, the Germans sacrificed sufficient numbers at the altar of technical superiority, überFinns were so broke in the 30's they had to opt to buy AFV's only without their guns etc.

Tech specs mostly varied over narrower ranges,

This is an illusion. Tech specs varied at a narrower range only because the role of the AFV was not in 1939 what it had developed into in 1945. Many of the vehicles in service in 1939 were built around an armoured doctrine that was proven flawed.

Basically there were two main categories of AFV's: infantry support tanks and fast moving cavarly tanks. There was no such AFV in 1939 that could be considered to be a MBT. The PzKw-III/PzKw-IV family came close but they had still been built around the 30's armoured/AT doctrines. The only real techical innovations they had incorporated in them were brought on by revolutionary tactical thinking: crew layout, intercom and cooperation with other branches. Otherwise they were quite unimpressive vehicles technically.

The first real instigator that lead into the MBT concept was the T-34 in 1941. It brought on the Tiger, Königstiger and the Panther along with the 75mm PAK40 AT gun with its mounts and AFV applications. Once the T-34 became too numerous the recoilles stand off man portable AT weapons appeared to fill in for the missing AFV's and AT guns. This in turn altered dramatically the doctrinal role of the regular infantry. They were no longer at the mercy of the AFV's in the way they had been when the armour/infantry doctrine altered on them in September 1939.

The full circle has been traveled and today it is the technical superiority of a AFV over other AFV's and AT assets that determines the outcome of any conventonal war. If you can beat the opponents AFV's the day is yours.

and narrow or wide they did not decide campaigns.

Again, they did decide them but not overtly.

Overconfidence or doubt in your own equipment brought on many a defeat. Also belief that the enemy assets were better or invincible erod force morale contributing to the events that follow.

No sides seeks fair fights in war. And these other factors varied enough to swamp whatever leftover effects of tactical tech-spec differences still existed up at the damped level of month-long campaigns on whole fronts.

Any given campaing in North Africa and the numerous operations around Kharkov are examples when tech-spec differences were NOT swamped by other factors. In both locations both forces were buiding up and launching offensive operations simultaneously and in both locations it was the tech-spec differences that determined the outcome.

Sure, superior German tactics could say to be the determining factor in the case of Kharkov. But they could not have succeeded without assets capable of overcoming the technical superiority of the Soviet AFV's. In the case of North Africa one could say it was the logistics that determined the ultimate outcome of the entire campaing. In essense it became a holding action ever since the initial Afrika Korps push failed to reach Alexandria. But it the outcome was considerably delayed because of German technical as well as tactical and doctrinal superiority. Superior tactics and doctrine carry you only so far in face of numerical superiority.

My argument does imply things like, the German decision to delay full economic mobilization was far more decisive than the design qualities of the T-34, and nothing like counterbalanced by the engineer successes of the Tiger and Panther designs.

However your argument does not take into account the strain the decision to switch production to new vehicles put on the German war economy in 1941-42 while they went to full war economy only in 1943. And that strain is clearly attributable to the T-34 and the T-34 alone. The supply of older vehicles was winding down causing severe problems as the attrition remained the same but there were no new replacement vehicles to be had.

Incidentaly, I have always wondered why the Germans did not tap into the captured French arsenal more. They made a number of 75mm PAK97-38's from older French 75mm gun mated with the 50mm PAK38 carriage. The French 75 was capable of taking out the T-34, and I suppose there was enough ammo to go around. Yet they did not use it more.

It implies things like, getting the TOE and tasking and inter-branch cooperation of an armor division right, to support true combined arms, was more important than having uniform easy-eight 76mm Shermans.

However it would have mattered if they would have had M3 Lees to work with. With all these implications you can not deny that even the US Army was working to get better and better AFV's up front. Just because they chose quantity over quality does not alter that basic fact.

It means the economic planners and the staff generals had more to do with the outcome of the war than the armor-grog engineers.

True. But the economists and staff generals do need the armour-grog engineers input when they do their calculations and projections to be able to foresee what raw materials and other stuff they need to build tanks that are technically within their reach.

For exampe, infantry or artillery parity can neutralize a moderate armor edge, by breaking up combined arms.

It can. However there were very few ME situations with comparably sized forces

It also depends on who is attacking and who is defending.

The logistical (or operational, doctrinal, etc) seems to be necessary as well as sufficient. The tactical, tech spec superiority seems to be unnecessary and not alone sufficient.

Another illusion. It totally depends of the timeframe. If you limit the timeframe then you must also limit the effects of the logistics to match the timeframe you choose. If force A has adequate logistical support from day 1 to day 30 to sustain its operations while force B is cronically low on supplies during that same period. Force A has marginally inferior tech spec, force B has tech spec superiority. Lo and behold force B trashes force A in an operation that last from day 1 to day 30. On day 33 force B has to retreat because of worsening overall situation. Do the events on day 33 reflect on the campaign of day 1-30 ? Does the overall logictical situation have an impact on it ? Does the eventual outcome of the entire string of operations have an impact on it ? Should they ?

A case in point: North Africa.

The Israels won their earlier wars too, when they had Shermans [7QB]

Shermans upgunned with tank-grog Panther 75mm and 105mm guns.

[QB]The Russians did try to keep up with the Germans in armor spec terms, but for the most part just copied the moves they saw the Germans make, then beat them on production.

Actually it was the Russians who had the lead. It was the Germans who copied and had to respond to new developments. And the Russians beat the Germans on production.

The western Allies eventually understood the importance of upgunning AFVs, but didn't field uparmored types and didn't need them.

Really ? The TD doctrine played a part in the upgunning delay.

What constitues uparmouring in your opinion ? Why the added armour plates on the M4/M4A1 ? Why did they make the Jumbo if it was not needed ? Why all the hard and soft add on armour field applications, if they were not needed ? Why the demand for the M-26 to be shipped over if it was not needed for its better armour protection ? Tank grog BS by the field units ?

Just upgunning a portion of the fleet kept armor specs close enough to counter the German investment in the technical dominance idea.

Was the upgunning done only to appeace the front line tankers in your opinion ?

They might still have lost to the western Allies, though it might have taken atom bombs to do it.

With the provisos you gave on the German armour production in 1939-42 what makes you think the Western Allies would have been at war with Germany by late 1943 ?

the combined industrial and military might of 2/3rds of the world focused on the cockpit of Normandy.

How is that 2/3rds calculated ? What was the industrial and military might portion you attribute to the Soviets and the Germans ? 1/3rd combined ?

But having innaccurate, exaggerated ideas about how important better tanks are, can get you killed.

Not only BETTER tanks. Much of the early war tank "superiority" was psychological. Interwar period publicity had overemphazised the abilities of armour. That meant that rickety blind boxes got results way out of proportion to their actual abilities. Had the western analysts been on the Tcheckoslovakia annexation they would have surely found out just how many German tanks broke down just by driving on the paved roads. That may have altered their view of the German "superiority".

Then again the stunning victory in Poland enhanced the image of the armour as a decisive force. That is why the Red Army failed initially during Winter War. They believed their own propaganda and they took the German experiences in Poland at face value.

Later the AFV's developed to actually resemble the psychological image but again they lost the edge again when stand off weapons for infantry became available.

Or what the Germans spent 1941 and 1942 doing on the armor front, which counted on better technical designs being more important than just upgunning, then ramping production of what they had.

There was also a matter of PzKw-III turret ring not being able to take the long barreled 75mm. And their doctrine dictated after all that the armour of the vehicle must be able to defeat a hit from a gun comparable to the gun the tank is carrying itself. They were planning ahead with the initial PzKw-III and PzKw-IV and they continued the trend with the Tiger and the Panther.

[Michael Dorosh]

Interesting to see France 1940 used as an example. The British and French had more tanks, and some of them were unkillable by German tanks - the Matilda comes to mind most readily. The French had the Char B1 bis (the one with the huge engine grating on the side - hope CM models that one when they get to the early war stuff).

[Michael Dorosh]

Just visited the old thread - I think Tero makes some valid arguments also - I see he just came in here and repeated some of them.

Allied tank crew morale was impacted by the knowledge that their leaders had been lying to them about their equipment (the failure of the 76mm gun on the battlefield was a sore point, also). If you look at the technical alone, you may not be able to discern any grand influence - but you can look at history through any number of lenses and pick out the information you want. Logistics, morale, etc., are all intermixed. The main point of Mark IV - that the Allies won, so what does it matter in the end - is one I can agree with (if that is what he meant).

But as I pointed out in the last thread, Montgomery's inspired style of leadership and man management certainly helped 8th Army out at El Alamein just as much as the brand new American tanks - which were a significant morale boost just as much as in increase in firepower/mobility for armoured units. And of course, the change in tactics that frustrated Rommel so. Had those shiny American tanks been used in front-on charges against massed German 88s, the results would have been the same as earlier battles.

And again, the question is raised - how many battalion-sized units of men at El Alamein - or anywhere - were actually equipped with tanks, as opposed to the majority of combat arms units that were infantry?

While the tanks themselves, technically, may not have played a direct role in changing the course of battles (x tanks destroyed y enemy tanks), their true role goes beyond the physical - as is the case with any weapon.

Perhaps, JasonC, you might start to see the disadvantages of trying to quantify the unquantifiable, and look more outside the scientific realm.

We might consider, to further Tero's example, the morale of Finn StuG crews vs. Soviet tank crew morale.

Tero, what say you on this? Did fighting on Finnish soil impart any advantages on Finn tank/SPG crews? What did Soviet tankers feel about fighting in winter in a country that seemed unimportant to them (or did it?)Please quantify for JasonC to the nearest percentile.

EDIT -

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Again, they did decide them but not overtly.

Overconfidence or doubt in your own equipment brought on many a defeat. Also belief that the enemy assets were better or invincible erod force morale contributing to the events that follow.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, this is what I just attempted to say; well stated Tero. I like your point on the Allies not "uparmoring" too - a quick look at Canadian tanks in Holland shows a mass of spare track and sandbags that had NOT been present in Normandy initially. Field unit BS indeed!

[ 10-01-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Perhaps, JasonC, you might start to see the disadvantages of trying to quantify the unquantifiable, and look more outside the scientific realm.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oi! Even if it ain't got numbers it still don't mean it ain't science!

It is called 'qualitative' research, as opposed to 'quantitative'. Still science.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Oi! Even if it ain't got numbers it still don't mean it ain't science!

It is called 'qualitative' research, as opposed to 'quantitative'. Still science.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Eep. 100 percent correct, of course. Hey, if I tell the girls at the hospital cafeteria that I am a scientist, think it will get me anywhere? It's a little more honest than wearing that stethoscope and hoping they think I'm a doctor...

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Eep. 100 percent correct, of course. Hey, if I tell the girls at the hospital cafeteria that I am a scientist, think it will get me anywhere? It's a little more honest than wearing that stethoscope and hoping they think I'm a doctor...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What do you mean? Simply being in uniform doesn't get you laid these days? Good thing I did not sign up for longer then...

Coming back to the topic though - I think tero is making some good arguments here. It is a bit unclear to me what you are trying to say Jason. What is the single thesis? It seems to be a mix of:

1. Armour specs don't matter. (Which I would disagree with) or

2. Armour specs in WW2 did not matter, and the battle was decided elsewhere. (Which as a thesis has a lot going for it)

[ 10-01-2001: Message edited by: Germanboy ]

[tss]

Michael Dorosh wrote:

We might consider, to further Tero's example, the morale of Finn StuG crews vs. Soviet tank crew morale.

Tero, what say you on this? Did fighting on Finnish soil impart any advantages on Finn tank/SPG crews?

That's very difficult to quantify. However, there were two cases where Finnish Sturms and Soviet T-34-85s met in quite identical, but reversed situations:

1) On 25 June 1944 at Portinhoikka crossroads Finnish Stugs had retreated to North towards Ihantala while the main body of Soviet armor proceeded to West towards Juustila. The Stugs regrouped and moved to take a firing position to the crossroads. They noticed six T-34-85s that were crossing a soft field, and at least few of them were bogged. Three of the tanks were quickly knocked out (two by Janhunen's Ps.531-2, gunner Anttila, one by Roukkula's Ps.531-5, gunner Leppänen) and rest Soviet crews bailed out, leaving their vehicles intact in the field. [i believe that these three tanks were the ones that Finnish recovery crews tried to get moving for several hours without any success until Lauri Heino, the only Finnish tank driver to get Mannerheim's Cross, came to the scene and got all three tanks moving with first tries].

2) On July 1944 (I don't remember exact date and my sources are at home) a Finnish Sturm column that advanced to counter attack at Vuosalmi was ambushed by a T-34-85 platoon at a flanking position. One Stug was knocked out, but the rest quickly returned fire and knocked the T-34s out.

What conclusions can be drawn here? Not much, the sample size is way too small.

There were also few cases where the presence of Stugs was enough to keep Soviet tankers away. This happened at least at Pertjärvi and Roukkulanjoki. At Pertjärvi the first T-34-85 was blown up by a simultaneous hits by two Stugs and at Roukkulanjoki one near miss was enough to discourage Soviet tankers. In both places Soviet infantry then attacked Finnish delaying positions without armored support and got thrown back with heavy casualties.

What did Soviet tankers feel about fighting in winter in a country that seemed unimportant to them (or did it?)

Actually, all battles involving Stugs happened in Summer 1944.

- Tommi

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:

Actually, all battles involving Stugs happened in Summer 1944.

- Tommi<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I obviously wan't thinking there. I am starting to wish there were some good references in English on the Finnish Army, this is quite interesting. Makes me wonder what the Mannerheim Cross was - is this on a par to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross?

And how would a tank driver win one?

[tss]

This evening I continued going systematically through combats of Finnish Stugs and I found a second occasion where a Soviet tank column panicked. This happened on night between 25-26 June. Finnish counter attack had taken back Leitimojärvi fields and Stugs were positioned in a forested hill. The Soviets sent a 12-tank company to reinforce the defenders. Apparently Soviet tankers had no clear picture of the situation, since they advanced on single column. Finns let the column close until the nearest tank was ~200 meters away. Then, a Panzerschreck destroyed the sixth tank, cutting the column in two. At the same moment, the Stugs hit two lead tanks. The crews of the three T-34-85s that were captured between KO vehicles bailed out and their tanks were captured intact. The six last tanks turned and sped away, showing their weak rear armor. At least two of them were destroyed. In the whole battle, no Soviet tank fired back.

Now, so that I will not be accused of überFennoism, I will add a short summary of the Stug attack to Talinmylly, on 27 June: Soviets stopped the attack, 2 Stugs were unrecoverably lost, 2 seriously damaged, and only one escaped unharmed. Soviet losses were one knocked out but probably repairable T-34-85 and one AT gun. That particular battle is nicely on-topic to this thread since Finns would most probably have lost it even if the Stugs had been replaced by King Tigers. The Soviets had 25 dug-in T-34-85 and JS-II tanks in the area in a hedgehog defence as well as a lot of accurate artillery. The attackers would have had to expose vulnerable flanks to at least some of them.

Michael Dorosh wrote:

I am starting to wish there were some good references in English on the Finnish Army, this is quite interesting.

Pretty much the all that I've seen are about Winter War. So, unfortunately, English references about Finnish armor are in very short supply.

Makes me wonder what the Mannerheim Cross was - is this on a par to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross?

The highest military award in Finland. It could be awarded both to officers and enlisted men. A total of 191 were awarded.

And how would a tank driver win one?

Heinos citation (no. 123, 21.11.1943) gives the following reasons:

- Skilled and brave tank driver

- Repaired an immobilized T-34 in no-man's land and drove it back to own forces.

- As the driver of the said T-34 contributed significantly to capture of Karhumäki town. In particular, he drove over a gun battery [actually two: one 45mm AT and one 76mm field gun] that was firing at T-34 all the time.

- On many occasions he joined recovery crews to evacuate damaged tanks from no-man's land.

Heino participated in recoveries of almost all heavy tanks that were captured in 1941-44 (2 x T-34-76 (out of a total of 4), 3 x T-34-85 (out of 7), 2 x KV-IE, 1 x ISU-152 (out of 2)). The capture of that first T-34 was particularly impressive, since it was also the first T-34 he ever saw and he still managed to fix its damaged gearbox and drive it away.

- Tommi

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I see he just came in here and repeated some of them.

While talking shop with tss in the original thread is fun I felt I had some point to make here also. Without dragging in the Finnish army to boot.

Logistics, morale, etc., are all intermixed.

There are very few factors that stand alone without any effect on other factors. I do agree with Jason that armour specs alone did not win or lose battles. But I disagree with his notion that they had no bearing what so ever in the proceedings.

In my opinion he is going from the general to the specific at random and he is choosing the specific aspects which to focus on so that they suit his point. His big picture is too big and his selected details are isolated and too small in relation to the other aspects he chooses to take into account.

The main point of Mark IV - that the Allies won, so what does it matter in the end - is one I can agree with (if that is what he meant).

Yet again storm in a glass of water that is larger than life.

Had those shiny American tanks been used in front-on charges against massed German 88s, the results would have been the same as earlier battles.

Did the M4 earn its nick name Ronson in the British service or did it get it only after the US landed in Africa ?

EDIT:

Just remembered they went by the name Tommy cooker also.

their true role goes beyond the physical - as is the case with any weapon.

Indeed. During the Polish campaign the (supposed) cavarly charges against tanks were cut down with MG's, not tanks rolling over the horses. Yet it is said they were charging tanks, not MG's.

Perhaps, JasonC, you might start to see the disadvantages of trying to quantify the unquantifiable, and look more outside the scientific realm.

Lets bow our heads down for a prayer:

Yea, though I walk through the the valley of the shadow of National Bias I shall fear no evil because we were the biggest, baddest and meanest mothers in the valley....

Seriously, I just got from the library a study on the Finnish army force morale during the summer of 1944 battles. Talk about psycobable.... It is hard enough to follow in Finnish. I'll post tidbits from it ASAP.

Tero, what say you on this?

Over to tss......

I'll continue from there if there is anything to add.

[ 10-02-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Tero]

Did fighting on Finnish soil impart any advantages on Finn tank/SPG crews?

That's very difficult to quantify.

I agree. It is hard to tell which instances have to do with fighting in Finnish soil and which have to be considered normal battlefield occurances.

What conclusions can be drawn here? Not much, the sample size is way too small.

Agreed.

However it could be extrapolated that the Soviet crews were more prone than the Finnish crews to bail out of operable vehicles when facing the possibility of encirclement or imminent actual close assaults by infantry. And there are accounts about how Soviet crews had to be smoked out of damaged vehicles which our troops meant to recover. There are accounts of Finnish crews fighting buttoned up against enemy infantry close enough for throwing hand grenades on the vehicles.

Finnish crews did not linger too long inside seriously damaged vehicles to fight to the last. One of the lost Stugs was a command vehicle which was abandoned intact when a shell exploded in front of the vehicle and the crew thought they had hit a mine.

[Tero]

Originally posted by tss:

Now, so that I will not be accused of überFennoism,

Come on, admit it. You are a closet überFinn.

I will add a short summary of the Stug

attack to Talinmylly, on 27 June: Soviets stopped the attack, 2 Stugs were unrecoverably lost, 2 seriously damaged, and only one escaped unharmed.

One of the lost Stugs drove into a "friendly" mine. The other was taken out by the enemy.

In Kuuterselkä we lost 5 Stugs and while the counterattack was a partial success the troops were ordered to widraw soon after the operation was over.

That particular battle is nicely on-topic to this thread since Finns would most probably have lost it even if the Stugs had been replaced by King Tigers.

Agreed.

...as well as a lot of accurate artillery.

Their use of balloons for the FO's has been understated and rather disregarded in Western histories. Does anybody know if the Germans ever encountered them ? For the Finns the balloons were very irritating because they could direct in artillery accurately on positions and from what I have read quite fast too.

The attackers would have had to expose vulnerable flanks to at least some of them.

They never got even that far.

So, unfortunately, English references about Finnish armor are in very short supply.

Finnish army in general is in English is in short supply.

The highest military award in Finland. It could be awarded both to officers and enlisted men. A total of 191 were awarded.

In prestige it was akin to the CMOH, the VC or the Iron Cross 1st class with swords, diamonds and laurels. It has not been awarded after the war.

[Tero]

I hope this comes out OK.

The last time I tried this the board crapped out:

http://uk.geocities.com/lepte2000/tanks2.jpg

http://uk.geocities.com/lepte2000/tanks1.jpg

Two pictures (one panoramic picture really) from Tali-Ihantala battles. A IS-2 and a T-34/76 have their turrets facing 6 o'clock.

http://uk.geocities.com/lepte2000/tanks3.jpg

Some Soviet armour after a Finnish artillery barrage / aerial bombardment.

[JasonC]

To Germanboy - I certainly mean #2, that the scale of differences actually present between WW II armor fleets did not have any significant strategic impact, and the few cases where it influenced operations that influence was minor and never decisive. Which certainly does not mean 1918 "Mothers" are as good a M-1 Abrams, or any other such straw man. It is a point about what mattered at the operational scale and up in WW II, and about why armor tech specs (in grog gun and armor terms) was not decisive in any operation.

To tss and Michael on the Finns - really guys, this is the second time I've asked. Get a Finns thread, please. The stuff is interesting and well worth talking about, but pushing it into every thread is just distracting.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

To Germanboy - I certainly mean #2, that the scale of differences actually present between WW II armor fleets did not have any significant strategic impact, and the few cases where it influenced operations that influence was minor and never decisive. Which certainly does not mean 1918 "Mothers" are as good a M-1 Abrams, or any other such straw man. It is a point about what mattered at the operational scale and up in WW II, and about why armor tech specs (in grog gun and armor terms) was not decisive in any operation.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Okay, I think this has a lot going for as a thesis.

The point about confidence in your weaponry as raised by Michael though is quite important. I am just reading another account in which it is claimed that the 2-pdr AT gun of the BEF was useless (source is a vet of the BEF). This is in fact not true. AFAIK the 2-pdr was perfectly capable of defeating anything the Germans could field in 1940. But the British soldiers did not trust the weapon to do that, and never did so in the desert as well, AFAIK.

The same goes for the 7th AD being sent out in Cromwells. There could well be an unquantifiable element there.

But on the whole I think I would agree with your thesis.