Russian Tank Platoons

[RCHRD]

I have read many, many accounts of Russian tank tactics. It seems the Platoon Cmndr w/3 tanks would control his platoon with flags or hand signals early in the war. What if you could only give orders to the pltn cmndr and have the other two tanks controlled by the AI with a bias for following the cmndr.

[109 Gustav]

Might be good, at least for green and conscript crews.

A long, long time ago I rembember BTS saying they planned to model the limited communication between Russian units. I hope this is still true, and if so, I wonder how they're planning to do this

[Username]

Sounds like a good abstraction. If the plt commander is KOd something has to be resolved. Will one of the other two take over, will they just be TACAI controlled or will a Company HQ tank take over, etc?

But I like this kind of abstracted C-cubed limitations. Lets hope BTS folds it into the mix.

Lewis

[Jeff Duquette]

Sounds like an good idea. Just thinking out loud now; What happens if the pltn Leader's tank is KO'd? Would another tank in the platoon assume the roll of leader of the herd? Or would the remaining tanks in the platoon be restricted to movement by the AI?

Just one additional comment; why shouldn’t this apply to German Tank Platoons as well? Tanks don't typically operate as independent entities; they operate in teams...(sections, platoons, companies, etc) and tend to play "follow the leader" so to speak. If you’re an “Indian” and not a “Chief” than you guide on the platoon leader or platoon sergeants tank. They're the guys that know what the mission is, and they're the guys with the maps. Unit cohesion, unit integrity, and unit teamwork is everything. Without unit cohesion and teamwork we are no longer talking about a combat unit, we’re now talking about an armed mob.

[Alexander]

Something to keep in mind: German tanks during the war operated within a platoon structure, too. More flexible with their radios, without a doubt, but subject to contraints not present in CM1. Something else to consider; Russian Shermans, supplied thru lend-lease- were equipped with radios (and leather padded seats).

What if you could only give orders to the pltn cmndr and have the other two tanks controlled by the AI with a bias for following the cmndr.

I'm guessing that the CM2 will promote the #2 tank when the command tank 'goes down', probably sacrificing any command benefits (targetting, spotting, bogging avoidance, morale?) broadcast by the platoon leader. I also anticipate that it will be cheaper, per vehicle, to purchase a platoon than a single tank for a QB.

Another guess: since it seems logical to suppose that radio systems were relatively fragile, CM2 will depict radio breakdowns, simulating non-critcal 'system hits'.

BTS, make me a beta tester, now!

[Schugger]

Do you really think they will add a command structure for AFVs?

A command structure will only be useful in very large scenarios or QBs where you have a decent number of AFVs which make up a platoon or even a company.

While I'm making some wild speculations, what about adding more delay time for tanks which have no radios...which results in a lower effectiveness of the vehicle...reflected in a lower point cost.

What a can of worms!

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Just one additional comment; why shouldn’t this apply to German Tank Platoons as well? Tanks don't typically operate as independent entities; they operate in teams...(sections, platoons, companies, etc) and tend to play "follow the leader" so to speak. If you’re an “Indian” and not a “Chief” than you guide on the platoon leader or platoon sergeants tank. They're the guys that know what the mission is, and they're the guys with the maps. Unit cohesion, unit integrity, and unit teamwork is everything. Without unit cohesion and teamwork we are no longer talking about a combat unit, we’re now talking about an armed mob.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Radio communications. Three man turrets.

Until the tank platoons had these two features, the team wasnt playing as a team. The advantage of a dedicated commander unencumbered with loading, shooting, radio tasks, etc made tha taem possible. So while they should still be within a reasonable proximity of each other, they didnt need to be in LOS of each other. They could share info real time, so that a heads up call about what is over the hill is broadcast to the rest.

Having a dedicated radio operator WITH a radio is also important. This is often overlooked. Radio technology back then was tube based and required an operator that was trained.

Intercoms are important for the internal operations of the tank team.

So you have a tank platoon with a platoon leader that has a recieve-only radio. And someone above is squaking orders into the platoon commanders ear and he is yelling into a intercom-tube and kicking his gunner in the left and right shoulder while waiving some flags while hanging out a hatch without vision ports...sound like fun?

Most likely he would just tell the tank on the left to stay on his left and the tank on the right to stay on the right and follow. They should concentrate on targets on the left and right respectively.

When the T34s went to the 3man turret/radios and 85mm gun, the germans were in trouble. Targets could be effectively engaged and things like target overlap avoided.

Take the following drill into account:

Panther platoon firing on T34 company that is attacking. Panther platoon commander designates target "T34 company on the left, advancing at speed" he orders ""Platoon half-left". The platoon (5 tanks lets say) moves its left section and right section around the commanders vehicle so to face its armor towards the target. The platoon commander then orders "Left section/Right section fire at will". The section commander then orders his two vehicle command to fire in alternating turns. This has the distinct advantage of not overlapping targets and allowing the two tank commanders in the section to observe the fall of the shot from the other vehicles gun. The left panther section works from the targets left side in. The right section does the same. They destroy targets on the outer sides so that they are not getting flanked. The platoon commander (having the best gunner in the platoon) observes the T34s movements and trys to target either long barreled weapons or determine the T34s commander vehicle from its tell tale actions/antenna,etc. He also coordinated with his upper echelons, etc.

Other examples are when moving forward in bounds. The overwatching vehicles can immediately broadcast where danger is lurking once it reveals itself. This can allow the manuver element to take better evasive action/pop smoke/etc.

This is called force multipliers. The sum of the parts are GREATER than the whole. So yeah a T34 is great on paper but it may have been the most destroyed weapons system during the war (due to many reasons of course but also due to some of the reasons outlined here).

In the case of the T34 platoon earlier, if he had a target on his left (lets say a StuG) , he could order the left hand tank to target him and advise the right hand tank as to where he was, Then he orders the right hand tank to wheel around/follow himself and they both take the StuG in the flank.

A few years earlier it might be the following:

Platoon Commander sees StuG but cant relay the info anywhere. He gets his flag out just in time to see the StuG get a shot into the left hand T34. He drops the flag and kicks the gunner in the left shoulder. He screams into the intercom-tube and the driver halts and points his tank to the left. The Stug is now targetting the halted commander. The right hand t34 is overshooting the situation and just notices the commander halting. He looks for the commanders signal (instead of looking for targets or firing). The commanders vehicle then goes up in flames. The right hand tank (being second in command) decides to pull back because he cant see the other tank and does have any way to communicate with him.

[ 04-15-2001: Message edited by: Username ]

[Jeff Duquette]

I understand that the intent of RCHRD’s original post is to somehow tackle the advantages of German small unit command structure and the availability of radio sets in German MBT’s. This is not something new relative to discussions on WWII Russian tactical wargames. This goes way back to the “stone-axe” days of James Dunnigan and Panzerblitz.

The question is really how to properly implement something like what is being suggested without totally castrating Soviet tanks ability to maneuver in some sort of coherent manner. I suspect if one takes this to far to one extreme, one might end up with a de facto solitaire game in spite of two players being involved.

There are after action reports detailing a fair level of sophistication to Soviet Armored tactics (circa 1942 plus). On the other hand one also comes across reports, which would lead one to believe that we are at times talking about armed mobs and not combat units. (If you can find it grab it; “Small Unit Actions During The German Campaign in Russia” Dept. of the Army, July 1953. Great book detailing German Field officer interviews conducted after the war by the US ARMY…kind of a lessons learned on the Eastern Front as detailed by German Officers who fought there). But this is equally true at times of German Panzer Truppen…take a gander at the Lorraine Campaign.

I’m not really averse to RCHRD’s idea. Quite the contrary, I am simply interested in folk’s thoughts on the implementation of such a thing in any computer based Eastern Front TAC wargame. There is a huge level of untapped potential in computer wargames that simply was not available in the old’n days of Panzerblitz, Africa Korps and even Squad Leader. It will be interesting to see where imaginative\innovative game designers -- designers who are not content to rest on the laurals of past successful game engines -- will take us.

[Michael Emrys]

I find myself more or less in agreement with everything posted here so far. Which is pretty bloody amazing!

Michael

[Redwolf]

German tank platoons in WW2 were certainly communicating with optical signs. There is the famour picture of early S.S. Panthers at Kursk that show handsigns very directly.

While they tried to get a radio into each tank, early in the war only the platoon commander tank had one that could send, all other could just receive. Also, radio silence would have been useful occassionally. I don't think that the tank radios would offer any kind of obfuscation, much less encryption and also radios can be located and you probably don't want to give your flanking manoeuvre away.

[Skipper]

Aint know about NATO, russian tankers are still using flag signals today, whenever radio silence is desirable.

[Jeff Duquette]

As of 1985 the US ARMY was still doing rudimentary training with flag signals between tanks. Dunno what they are up to now. We learned hand and flag signals long before they ever let us touch a radio. Radios are great tools but they don't substitute for a platoon leader\platoon sergeant seeing the conduct\deployment of his unit with his own eyes.

[Username]

I agree that hand signals are used by any unit that has to keep radio silence (read that as during a NON-CM modeled period of time).

Intercoms are not so restricted. Be they primitive tubes (like used in ships) or throat mikes or whatever. They are not broadcasting in radio freq's but rather on wire. Intercoms make the tank a small unit. The better the intercom, the better the coordination.

Intra platoon radios make the platoon a small team. Its really the smallest amount of armor anyone would want to field at one time. During battle, you would not practice radio silence. Most pictures during action show limited arm waving unless for a camera. If your radio is out, then theres always the hand signal. Ive read accounts of tank commanders having to give up their tank because a higher up has lost commo and he needs to be in touch.

The 3 man turret and the two way radio made the modern tank. Is that basic principle also going to get the BTS remix?

Lewis

[ 04-15-2001: Message edited by: Username ]

[Jeff Duquette]

Speaking of crewmen communication within a tank, intercoms and the like, I was recently watching a newsreel circa 1939. Some training maneuvers at Ft. Knox Kentucky involving the M3 Stuart. In color and everything! Quite dramatic...M3's catching some air...M3's runing over trees...M3's fording streams at high speed.

TC communication with the driver consisted of the TC “gently” kicking the driver in the shoulder. Gently kick him in the right shoulder for a right turn. Gently kick him in the left shoulder for -- yup you guessed it – a left turn. In the heat of battle how gentle do you reckon these shoulder kicks became?

[Commissar]

Concerning inter-crew communication in Russian tanks [from an interview with a T-34 tank driver, Semion Aria]---

Q: Did you have radios in your tank?

A: Yes, a radio located at the right side of the hull was used to communicate with the unit commander. Internal communications were over the telephone, but it worked horribly, like pretty much everything built during the time of war. That's why we communicated with our feet, that is the tank commander's boots were placed on my shoulders, he pushed either my left or my right shoulder, and I turned the tank accordingly either left or right. When I worked as a lawyer, the manager of our office was Krapivin, a Hero of the Soviet Union, former commander of a tank regiment. When I told him how we had fought the enemy with our boots, he said: "Oh! Now I believe that you're really a tanker." Besides that, there were absolutely horrible triplexes on the driver's hatch. They were made of disgusting yellow or green plastic that gave a completely distorted, wavy picture. It was impossible to make out anything through such triplex, especially in the rocking tank. That's why we conducted war with hatches opened to palm width.

The Russian Battlefield, Soldiers at War

[ 04-15-2001: Message edited by: Commissar ]

[Conall]

Good points all, in addition you could add that the Germans benefitted from the advantage of operating under auftragestaktik at every level. Auftragestaktik translates very roughly as "mission oriented tactics". One key compnent is that anyone with a leadership role (plt cmdr, plt Sgt etc), should know the intent of the commander two echelons higher - therefore a section commander knew at least the full company brief, the plt commander knew at least the full battalion brief etc. In the context of a tank platoon this meant that the loss of the platoon leader was not automatically a cause for complete disfunction. Efficient radios also helped the transition of command if necessary. By contrast the Soviets, to the best of my knowledge, didn't initially operate a system with anything like that degree of tactical flexibility. Until perhaps mid-1943 Soviet units below the battalion level at least operated a major disadvantage in terms of command flexibility. I look forward to being proved wrong

regards,

Conall

[Jeff Duquette]

Great post Conall…nice to see you still dropping in here on occasion. I especially like the last line:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I look forward to being proved wrong<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

All to appropriate I think for this forum at times…some of the more zealous folks here are not particularly found of reasonable discussions. This should get me flamed

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Martin Cracauer:

also radios can be located and you probably don't want to give your flanking manoeuvre away.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You mean the engine noises and clouds of dusts wouldn't already do this?

[Redwolf]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

You mean the engine noises and clouds of dusts wouldn't already do this?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not at the same distance as a radio does when the other side has even a primitiv construction to locate a sending radio. At least the Germans had quite some equipment to do so.

Do you really doubt this was a problem for radio usage? Just curious.

[Grisha]

I would like early-to-mid Soviet tanks units to be implemented just the same way infantry squads are now. In other words, there would be a command tank, and any orders to the subordinate tanks would be delayed in direct relation to their distances from the command tank, as well as visibility to him.

[RCHRD]

If a Russian tank platoon commander is knocked out, why not just double or even triple the delay times for orders issued to them. You know, they say; "Oh my god, Ivan is dead. what do we do now?

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Martin Cracauer:

Do you really doubt this was a problem for radio usage? Just curious.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yeah, kind of. Never thought of it really. Would be interested in a source that discusses this. Off hand, I kind of doubt that radio-direction finding equipment was of any use at a tactical level, but really have no idea.

I do know that the Germans jammed radios (I've read the memoirs of a Canadian infantry signaller that mentions this - whether they did so to tank radios is another question - but it seems to me that they concentrated more on jamming enemy communications than on using those communications to locate enemy forces.)

[ 04-17-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[RCHRD]

In an earlier post it was mentioned that a russian guy said his tank had a radio. I read that interview and I'm pretty sure it was late in the war he's talking about. 43 or 44. In 41 and much of 42 only the platoon commander had a radio in his tank and flags and hand symbols were how he was supposed to communicate orders to his platoon. Richard.

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

**punt**

[Abteilung]

Locating a sending radio unit is a simple matter of triangulation. Any three recievers working in conjunction can source the signal. This is a well know concept of rf communications. No special equipment needed, just some rudimentary knowledge of electronics.