game favors armor way too much

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by tero:

>The point was that German infantry were specifically trained to kill tanks, whereas Allied infantry - as best as I can tell from what I have read - were not.

Actually I think the Allies were trained to wait for suitable tools to be brought up to break the nut instead of using whatever is at hand to combat the menace (including a bottle of champaign posing as a Molotov's coctail in the Eastern Front used by a German officer to spook a pesky KV or T-34 that would not die or run away). That is why the US Shermans did not officially get the hot ammo which was reserved for the TD command. Procedure before practicality.

I agree completely.

[Polar]

The trouble is, you can't take anecdotal evidence and use it to model all, or even just "elite" troops in CM.

The trouble I see, is that people are always willing to crack open some book and say "well right here, this (fill in nationality) soldier killed 40 enemy soldiers, and took out 15 enemy AFVs using only a pen knife!"... but, be it true or not, does that mean that a squad of infantry with pen knives should be neigh unstoppable in CM? No.

Audy Murphy reportedly turned back 3 German tanks and several german rifle squads all on his own using nly the .30 cal machingun on a destroyed tanks turret... does that mean that my U.S. Rifle squads should all be fearless in the face of the enemy? No.

I don't think, therefore, you can take anecdotal evidence of heroics for any nationality and say it was due to their training. In many cases, these heroics are in SPITE of the individuals training.

Joe

[Monte99]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

irl men against tanks definnety a crap shoot, men scared heap big tank canoon go boom-boom

AI can be intepeted as reailistic portrayal of this - tank big and scary infantryman where only a khaki shirt for armor AI pretty good as far as me concern

haha me like funny post sound like bizarro superman

[Purple4Ever]

haha me like funny post sound like bizarro superman

or the Tonto-Tarzan-Frankenstein skit from Saturday Night Live - LOL!

------------------

"The mass of the [Red] army stationed in Western Russia is to be destroyed in bold operations involving deep penetrations by armored spearheads, and the withdrawal of elements capable of combat into the extensive Russian land spaces is to be prevented.

By means of rapid pursuit a line is then to be reached from beyond which the Russian air force will no longer be capable of attacking the German home territories."

- - - Directive 21 "Fall Barbarossa"

[This message has been edited by Purple4Ever (edited 02-08-2001).]

[Major Tom]

Actually, I tend to lose most of my tanks to enemy tanks, but, I tend to kill most of my enemies tanks with Infantry. When I have a tank force I tend to be most afraid of dense packs of forest and buildings, not knowing what Zook, Faust or PIAT might be hiding in there. Enemy tanks are fairly easy to kill, especially when you have no tanks of your own and they know that. They always get too close, thinking that the war is won once the last Sherman goes up in flames, then they get nailed by concieled PIAT's and their infantry gets routed.

Handling Infantry is easly, handling tanks is difficult. There are only a few avenues of approach for an armoured force, while Infantry can go anywhere. Infantry AT, from medium-close range is deadly.

When I have a tank force, my greatest fear is Infantry, not enemy armour. Infantry used well is much harder to kill than a tank used as well. Always have Infantry with your Armour, you don't always need armour for your Infantry.

[Skipper]

Oops. I did include a caveat not to try it yourself, didnt I?

Gasoil = diesel oil.

Gasoline is american english.

[Guest tero]

>The trouble is, you can't take anecdotal evidence and use it to model all, or even just "elite" troops in CM.

Agreed. But how can we define "elite" in this context if the qualifications can not be measured with a yard stick ? The only qualifiable meters are level of training and combat experience in the form of time under fire and kills scored.

>...but, be it true or not, does that mean that a squad of infantry with pen knives should be neigh unstoppable in CM? No.

Lets look at it this way: would a "normal" squad even think about using the pen knife or would it abstain from the event in the absence of proper equipment ? That is definitively something that distinguish elite from recruits and indeed nationalities.

>Audy Murphy ..... does that mean that my U.S. Rifle squads should all be fearless in the face of the enemy? No.

Not even when people believe they should, having seen the movie ? Not to mention ALL The Duke movies...

>I don't think, therefore, you can take anecdotal evidence of heroics for any nationality and say it was due to their training. In many cases, these heroics are in SPITE of the individuals training.

I disagree. It was often the training accompanied with combat experince that enabled these "elite" forces to accomplish the feats that make the anecdotes.

[Skipper]

Looks like what all this comes down to is that American and Brit troops did not see too many german tanks at all throughout the war. Even more rare were german tanks rolling across their trenches.

When they saw german tanks, however, they would normally have their own heavy weapons around. Besides, there were not many enough veterans with reallife antitank experience to drive it into every recruit head that when you see a tank attack rolling, it is usually too late to run away.

Which was not the case for germans throughout the war and for RKKA in 1941-43.

That's why you see many astonishing german accounts of infantry stopping tanks, many astonishing soviet accounts of the same (the latter mainly related to 1941-42), but not quite as many in the way of brits or americans doing that.

Speaking of german infantry having no fear for tanks. Give me a break, please. They were as scared by tanks as everybody else (ie, horribly scared). You don't read about this in many memoirs, let alone official unit histories (pffff, now that's one good source of "killing 30 tanks with a penknife" sort of stories). That was not something anybody would want to remember. However, believe me, there are multiple soviet accounts of german units leaving their trenches and running from a tank attack.

By the way, scarcity of german armor and abundance of heavy AT weapons in allied forces, I would imagine, were also the reason why neither west allies nor in fact USSR put a great research or production emphasis on RPGs to be issued to each and every squad. After all, panzerfaust was not a terribly complicated piece of kit to simply re-engineer - as long as noone was concerned about patents and copyrights.

But they did not bother. Why? Because probability of an armored attack was small to start with, and because they were able to assign proper AT weapons wherever such an attack could be anticipated.

[cmoh]

interesting to see if they put finnish troops in CM 2 to fight along germans and possibly other east-european countries against russians. if the game starts as early as -39 poland, i would want to see if "winter war" is include, where finnish troops destroyed many soviet tanks with molotov coctails.

[Skipper]

>Don't take my word for it. Check out

Ahh, so you were also counting mobility kills, breakdowns and such. In that case the total doesn't strike me as odd.

Good URL, by the way, thanks. So it was, (1)-(7) artillery, (8) mines etc. Well, my impression was based on the account by a heavy tanker (tester of prototype KV, actually) - for them the poicture might be different. So, okay, never mind, grenades and molotovs are still the reason Number 10.

> (1) mines

> number of mines you need to produce a kill

> as being 2000 mines statistically speaking.

Yup. And finns had enough time to put scores of mines in preparation. Besides producing, according to the table, about 15% of the combat kills, their abundance was also responsible for severely penalising mobility and morale of red troops. In other words, they were a major factor.

>(9) boulders under snow

> Not that effective since they were UNDER

> the snow

Look, that's exactly what makes them dangerous for a machine. Cause you don't see them, or cant tell a snowpile from a boulder.

Out of those 2000 "breakdowns", I am 100% sure, tremendous lot were caused by the "antitank terrain".

>and swamps under ice

> frozen and thus no problem to the tanks as

> the ice could carry them.

At times could, at other times could not. Since lake surface was the only place that was not mined, they used it a lot to move around. Result: 100 tanks sunk, 5% of "combat" losses.

> actually close quarters fighting in the

> dense forest was preferred.

Speaking of dense forrest, you will surely agree that it made soviet advantage in heavy weapons and artillery less of a factor simply by limiting an average LOS distance.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Skipper:

By the way, scarcity of german armor and abundance of heavy AT weapons in allied forces, I would imagine, were also the reason why neither west allies nor in fact USSR put a great research or production emphasis on RPGs to be issued to each and every squad. After all, panzerfaust was not a terribly complicated piece of kit to simply re-engineer - as long as noone was concerned about patents and copyrights.

But they did not bother. Why? Because probability of an armored attack was small to start with, and because they were able to assign proper AT weapons wherever such an attack could be anticipated.

Must be why Soviet forces used the Panzerfaust 150 (modifdied) under the title RPG-2 post war and continued production of the Panzerfaust 100 post war aka RPG-1. Never mind the wholehearted use of captured Panzerschreck and Panzerfausts by Soviet forces during the war, in preference to the lead-lease USA Bazooka.

Take a gander at Hofbauer page. http://www.geocities.com/Augusta/8172/panzerfaust4.htm#foreign

------------------

Absolutely Shatter, you have been completely misunderstood. When Andreas, Chuppy and Peter posted pictures of themselves at the IWM I took the earliest opportunity to complement Chuppy on how hot he looked in that T-shirt. Of course the next time an appropriate thread about the front bogey wheel on the Matilda II came up I skillfully insinuated a subtle remark about what a spunk PeterNZ was and a redhead too!

But alas, shatter, everyone thought I was a dickhead as well.

------------------

Muddying the waters as usual.

by Simon Fox

Mr T says "I pity the foo!"

[Sig]

Talking about AT weapons, I think we should consider the psychological benefit of having such a weapon in your squad!

Even if your chance to knock out a tank is quite low (accuracy problems, short distance to target, infantry screen, armour) at least you have one. Without an organic AT weapon, a squad would simply be dead when facing one of these steel behemoths.

I have no data concerning the effect of this psychological impact, but I *think* it must be significant. Has somebody more precise information?

Sig

[Guest tero]

>Ahh, so you were also counting mobility kills, breakdowns and such.

"To all causes". The source is Russian and our own statistics only counted those that had been reported and which had been calculated statistically.

>In that case the total doesn't strike me as odd.

3 000 tanks out of action for lenghty periods of time is quite a lot no matter how you count them. Besides, the number of "irrevocable losses" does not include the 200 odd tanks (+ other vehicles) our forces captured and the ones that were actually lost in the other fronts. The figures stated are for the Karelian Isthmus alone. Further north there were 3-4 divisions annilated and who knows how many depleted.

>Good URL, by the way, thanks. So it was, (1)-(7) artillery, (8) mines etc.

The mines are in my oppinion too high up still.

Bottom line is the most effective and reliable AT assets (from the infantry mans point of view) in the Finnish arsenal were the AT guns and the tank hunter with his satchel charge/Molotov's Coctail/log/ grenade bundle/mine.

>Well, my impression was based on the account by a heavy tanker (tester of prototype KV, actually) - for them the poicture might be different.

The KV was tested quite late into the campaign. The circumstances were a bit different for the heavies too. The AT guns could not hurt them so other means had to be used to try and stop them...

NOTE: a Finnish 37mm AT gun did take out a KV in 1941 when it shot through the drivers vision slit.

>So, okay, never mind, grenades and molotovs are still the reason Number 10.

I disagree. For the average front line troops they were the most effective ways to combat tanks. And the only weapons they could rely on. Artillery fire was erratic in arriving at best. Minefields were of no good once the tanks were rolling past them. AT guns were few.

>Besides producing, according to the table, about 15% of the combat kills, their abundance was also responsible for severely penalising mobility and morale of red troops. In other words, they were a major factor.

Indeed. Booby traps were a major weapon. It must be noted that many minefields were "left behind" to slow the enemy down and cause chaos. But the thing with them was you had no control over them, you could only hope they kill something.

>> Not that effective since they were UNDER

>> the snow

>

>Look, that's exactly what makes them dangerous for a machine. Cause you don't see them, or cant tell a snowpile from a boulder.

How many times have you actually walked/waded through a snowdrift ? The problem with the bolders and other such AT devices was that they were often too short and when there was enough snow the tanks could simply drive over them.

The added disadvantage was they provided cover for the attacking infantry while they failed to stop the tanks.

>Out of those 2000 "breakdowns", I am 100% sure, tremendous lot were caused by the "antitank terrain".

The figures are from the Isthmus front which had decent enough roads. Not many but they were decent (allthough mined ). Further more the Finnish defences were located along such terrain features as edges of fields and rivers. The Red Army complied and used human wave tactics. That meant that they deployed at their leasure along the defensive line and launched their attacks at their leasure. Only in 1944 did the Red Army surprise our army by actually attemting to drive their tanks through forests and woods when attacking. During the Winter War they were mainly deployed along the roads. Given the rather anal attitude towards keeping records I'd say a mechanical breakdown was just that. Weather or terrain was not counted as a legitimate cause (as the machines had been made to withstand such conditions but not such wear and tear )

>At times could, at other times could not.

Most of the time they could.

>Since lake surface was the only place that was not mined, they used it a lot to move around. Result: 100 tanks sunk, 5% of "combat" losses.

Lake/river surface is not the same as marsh. They could be and there was a procedure to mine them. Actually I think most of the sunken tanks were sunk in the Gulf of Finland and the bay of Viipuri when the Red Army started using the frozen sea to out flank the defences and the attacking force became the target for the Finnish coastal artillery.

>Speaking of dense forrest, you will surely agree that it made soviet advantage in heavy weapons and artillery less of a factor simply by limiting an average LOS distance.

Actually no. Our troops could hide but the trees did not stop the heavy artillery barrages from falling. Granted, much of the fire was directed wild. Single men spotted moving in the woods were targeted.

The LOS issue was a factor when resuplying the front line troops and when hunting the tanks after they had breached the defensive line while the accompanying infantry was stopped at the defensive line.

[Guest tero]

>Talking about AT weapons, I think we should consider the psychological benefit of having such a weapon in your squad!

I agree.

>Without an organic AT weapon, a squad would simply be dead when facing one of these steel behemoths.

Not unless they stand in front of it to be shot at. The tank is essentially blind !!! Even when unbuttoned. IRL squads had smoke grenades so they could blind the tank even further potentialy making its crew panic and reverse out or even abandon the vehicle.

>I have no data concerning the effect of this psychological impact, but I *think* it must be significant. Has somebody more precise information?

I think that the knowledge that the tank is blind and has restrictions as to where it can go (brought of by either combat experience or by training) is far more important. You can use a number of weapons or artefacts (including a log in extreme cases) to combat the tank.

The tank made the troops panic but once they learned it was NOT all powerfull and that it had blind spots and weaknesses you can utilize to beat it. What mattered was the fact that you had to strip the tank of its escorting infantry and it was the tank that was dead.

[Skipper]

> Must be why Soviet forces used the

> Panzerfaust 150 (modifdied) under the

> title RPG-2 post war and continued

> production of the Panzerfaust 100 post war

> aka RPG-1.

Keyword AFTER THE WAR. Who were they preparing to fight after the war? Hint: not germans.

I am well aware that in 1950s Soviet infantry was literally flooded with handheld RPGs and other light AT weapons.

> Never mind the wholehearted use of

> captured Panzerschreck and Panzerfausts by

> Soviet forces during the war, in

> preference to the lead-lease USA Bazooka.

First time I hear about "wholehearted use". Surely enough, if you come across such a neat toy, you'll pick it up and use it. But it was neither produced, nor issued to the troops officially, as far as I can say. Morale: they didn't need it all that much.

Bazookas - there were not nearly as many around, as there were panzerfausts, and they were not issued as a standard squad weapon, anyway.

[Skipper]

> I disagree. For the average front line

> troops they were the most effective ways

> to combat tanks.

Last ditch measure - that's all.

> Not many but they [roads] were decent

> (allthough mined)

Hmm... I daresay you don't know what "decent" or "enough" means in that particular case and context. Road network density in central Russia was considerably higher, and quality better, yet it was still considered by germans "too few, too bad". In 1941-44, as soon as they were stopped, germans did not even bother to mount operations in that part of the front.

> Actually no. Our troops could hide but the

> trees did not stop the heavy artillery

> barrages from falling.

But they could certainly stop forward observer from overwatching big areas and testing TRP solutions quickly. I've spent enough time travelling around Karelia to know the terrain there. If given a choice, any sound-minded officer would want to advance around it, not through it.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Skipper:

> Must be why Soviet forces used the

> Panzerfaust 150 (modifdied) under the

> title RPG-2 post war and continued

> production of the Panzerfaust 100 post war

> aka RPG-1.

Keyword AFTER THE WAR. Who were they preparing to fight after the war? Hint: not germans.

I am well aware that in 1950s Soviet infantry was literally flooded with handheld RPGs and other light AT weapons.

> Never mind the wholehearted use of

> captured Panzerschreck and Panzerfausts by

> Soviet forces during the war, in

> preference to the lead-lease USA Bazooka.

First time I hear about "wholehearted use". Surely enough, if you come across such a neat toy, you'll pick it up and use it. But it was neither produced, nor issued to the troops officially, as far as I can say. Morale: they didn't need it all that much.

Bazookas - there were not nearly as many around, as there were panzerfausts, and they were not issued as a standard squad weapon, anyway.

After the war the Soviets had an overwhelming advantage in numbers of tanks vs. the western allies and later NATO. With you earlier reasoning the manufacture of such weapons (fausts/RPGs) was redundant. The practice of using Faust’s was of course so insignificant that during the war they were given the Soviet army designation of RPG-1. Creating designations for captured weapons tends to mean that some one concerned with logistics is interested in tracking them and that they are considered valuables enough to track. Also you note that when found they were used vs. the 'small' threat of German AFV, which of course was so negligible that the revision of the IS-2 with better turret armour the IS-3 was produced in light of the ability of German AFV's to punch through the turret armour with surprising ease. This of course mounting a gun that was extensively tested vs. armoured targets why not mount a low velocity 12,2cm with better HE performance and would be cheaper to manufacture to boot? German records also shows that their biggest Soviet tank killers were still the German AFVs at even the later dates. Perhaps the Soviet designs were merely engaged in theoretical exercises?

I also think that you'll find that the Soviets were quite keen on fighting the western half of Germany after the war, which had been cunningly rebuilt to face off vs the Soviets.

Also 'NATO' began a mad scramble to come into being and begin a quest for Armour parity after they noted that the Soviets were continuing to manufacture the latest T 34-85s and IS 3s. The Anglo-American side had for some reason been scraping its tank fleets after the war, which means that the Soviet manufacture of Panzerfausts began at a time when 'NATO' was at its weakest in tank numbers.

[This message has been edited by Bastables (edited 02-09-2001).]

[Guest tero]

>Last ditch measure - that's all.

You forget the state our army was in back then. They were the ONLY measure available.

A dead tank is a dead tank is a dead tank.

>Hmm... I daresay you don't know what "decent" or "enough" means in that particular case and context.

Have you taken a look at a period topological map of the area ? The Isthmus was the best tank country in the region back then. The roads were in better shape in our side of the border they were in the Soviet side. The fields made for ideal attack ground with relatively open spaces to use manouver tactics in. The defence relied on fixed defences to deny the enemy the space to manouver. The defences simply had to hold. A breach through the lines meant mortar peril to the army and indeed the entire country.

>Road network density in central Russia was considerably higher, and quality better, yet it was still considered by germans "too few, too bad".

That is immaterial.

>In 1941-44, as soon as they were stopped, germans did not even bother to mount operations in that part of the front.

Which part ? The only German troops in the Isthmus EVER were the few formations send to assist in the defence when the Red army started the summer offensive in 1944.

>But they could certainly stop forward observer from overwatching big areas and testing TRP solutions quickly.

CM rendition of TRP's and artillery accuracy is not even close to reality. Besides, the Red Army used OP balloons and fixed fire plans. Doctrinally speaking they had no need or use for quick acquirement of target solutions. They were thorough in their preparations and THEY set the pace.

>I've spent enough time travelling around Karelia to know the terrain there. If given a choice, any sound-minded officer would want to advance around it, not through it.

Depends on what kind of tactics you use. Tactics deviced in the open steppes just do not work in terrain like that against an enemy who knows it. Look at what happened in Afganistan and Tshechenia.

Ever wondered why the Soviets never tried to stage a landing across the Gulf of Finland to Helsinki ?

[tss]

Skipper wrote:

Hmm... I daresay you don't know what "decent" or "enough" means in that particular case and context. Road network density in central Russia was considerably higher, and quality better, yet it was still considered by germans "too few, too bad".

Uhm... Are you really certain about that? Sure, the road network was really poor in the Northern Finland, but there are a lot of roads in the Karelian Isthmus. I don't know about roads in central Russia (or Ukraine), but the roads in Soviet Karelia were much worse than in Karelian Isthmus.

Several months ago I scanned a portion of 1938 Isthmus road map. Unfortunately, I managed to destroy the original files but I just extracted it from a postscript document and converted it to PDF. You may see it at (warning! the file is pretty big, since it is of print-quality) http://www.tcs.hut.fi/~tssyrjan/pics/map.pdf . I seriously doubt that road network in Russia was denser than that.

And finns had enough time to put scores of mines in preparation

Yes and no. There were times when AT mines were in severe shortage and three or four loosely spaced AT-mines would be "the minefield". However, Soviet tank doctrine was so predictable that the mines could be placed in right spots.

Look, that's exactly what makes them dangerous for a machine. Cause you don't see them, or cant tell a snowpile from a boulder.

Again, yes and no. If the snow is too deep, the tank will roll over the boulder without any trouble. Winter 1939-40 was the coldest of the 20th century and the snowfall was heavier than average.

One illustrating example of usefulness of anti-tank obstacles during winter happened at the Kollaa front: one Soviet tank-driver amused himself by driving on the top of a tank obstacle row, in full view of the defenders, for ~1/2 hours.

- Tommi

[Skipper]

Bastable:

1. According to soviet doctrine of the time, tanks were not anti-tank tools. Tanks make great value for money when they are wreaking havoc in enemy's backyard. When you have to use tanks in AT role, it means you made a mistake. Germans were forced to use tanks in that role extensively, and it was not good for them. So, when you compare strictly tanks to tanks, you are misleading yourself. You should compare combination of tanks, SP guns, AT guns, strike a/c and artillery.

2. I honestly have no idea when, where and to whom those PFs were first issued en masse in Soviet Army. So, cannot discuss it. I know for sure that they were not in the rifle squad TOE anytime during WWII. Although they could be there, at a price. Somehow, people thought that making several million air bombs (or whatever else) was better than making several million PFs. Somehow, germans decided otherwise. Both sides have reasons for these choices.

3. Heavy weapons ratio of USSR/Western allies in Europe in 1945-48 was not nearly so drastic as Germany/USSR in late 1944-45.

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

In "On to Berlin," Gavin talks about how, after his paratroopers captured a truckload (literally) of Panzerfausts, he had the instructions translated and the troops carried the fausts as personal anti-tank weapons.

Of course, these are paratroopers, who need to be more self-sufficient. There's also no report of whether they actually knocked out any tanks with the fausts.

[Skipper]

> but there are a lot of roads in the

> Karelian Isthmus. I don't know about roads

> in central Russia (or Ukraine)

I know firsthand what the road network was like around Vuoksa/Ladoga in 1980s - after they built quite a few more roads FROM THE EAST. I also know what it is like in Ukraine. Rest assured, the difference is principal.

> There were times when AT mines were in

> severe shortage

There were minefields laid around Mannerheim line well before the war started. Local shortages of mines during the war is a different story. Again: Mannerheim line was a well-prepared defensive position, 80 km wide by 30 km deep, in antitank terrain, impossible to outflank, and presenting severe logistical difficulties to the troops advancing from USSR territory. Also defended by people with attitude. It would not be a walkover for any army of the era, including Wehrmacht.

> If the snow is too deep, the tank will

> roll over the boulder without any trouble

Penknife story, typical. When and where the snow is that deep, large scale offensive operations are nearly impossible, anyway. Even if your tanks can go through thanks to wide tracks, your everything else will be stuck dead. In reallife tanks were colliding with those boulders all the time, which did not do any good to the tracks and suspension.

Now, what are we arguing about? Are you trying to convince me that for any decent army Mannerheim line was easy pickings, and RKKA could not punch through because it was worse than average? Tell you what, an average army of the time (1939) would not even think about punching through the Mannerheim Line, let alone try it and eventually succeed.

> Which part ? The only German troops in the

> Isthmus EVER were the few formations send

> to assist in the defence when the Red army

> started the summer offensive in 1944.

That is not an exactly true statement, but you are correct - germans had no considerable ground forces there until 1944. And this is exactly my point - they did not bother to mount any operations in that area, and basically relied on finns to hold the line. Now, somebody will say that upon reacquiring what they thought was their own, finns simply had no desire to go any further. Yeah, I almost believe that...

[illo]

Skipper is there ANYTHING you dont know?

Why pretend to be expert in something youre not? Sometimes it is good to listen what others say and you may learn something.

[This message has been edited by illo (edited 02-09-2001).]

[tss]

Skipper wrote:

I know firsthand what the road network was like around Vuoksa/Ladoga in 1980s - after they built quite a few more roads FROM THE EAST. I also know what it is like in Ukraine. Rest assured, the difference is principal.

Looking at the 1938 road map of the area I count six major roads, two minor roads, and one railroad leading to Soviet Union from Finnish side in the Isthmus. The Isthmus is about 60 km wide, so that there was one major road going every 10 km. In addition, there were many small wagon-roads that are not marked in the road map. (For example, the road from Kirvesmäki to Volossula is not shown in the map that I posted, but it is shown in the 1:20000 topographical map that I have in front of me right now).

Like I said, I don't have road maps of Ukraine, but I do have one of Karelian Isthmus in 1938, and the road network was, if not good, at least adequate.

There were minefields laid around Mannerheim line well before the war started.

Well before and well before. My grandfather served in a sapper company at Taipale during the Winter War. According to their war diary, the first time when they laid minefields was on 2.12., third day of the war, full two days before Soviets arrived at Taipaleenjoki and four days before their first attack over the river. Note that those minefields were placed in front of Finnish lines at Koukunniemi, the second most important place of Finnish lines in that sector. Yes, there were preparations done before the war but the time and material run out.

Local shortages of mines during the war is a different story.

The shortages were pretty universal. There was no abundant supply of mines in any part of the front. Additionally, the fuzes didn't work well in the low temperatures and many mines simply refused to explode.

Again: Mannerheim line was a well-prepared defensive position, 80 km wide by 30 km deep,

According to Soviet propaganda. In reality, Mannerheim line was two trench lines (main defence line and support line) that were ~1km apart. There were some concrete fortifications, but most of them were already obsolete forward-firing casemates that were very vulnerable to direct fire. For example, at Lähde sector of Summa area, where the Red Army finally managed to break through the lines, there were a grand total of _three_ concrete fortifications on the three kilometer front line. Only one, "The Million Bunker", was modern and it had three flanking fire MGs. "Poppius" had one MG firing forwards and the third one was basically a covered MG nest.

The Mannerheim line had, on average, one concrete fortification per kilometer. This can be compared with the Maginot line that had 10 fortifications/km. So, Mannerheim line couldn't even be compared with the Maginot line in that respect.

To get that 30 km depth figure, Soviets counted the delaying area into it. In that area, small Finnish "protection forces" conducted a fighting withdrawal buying time.

During the war, Finns started to fortify a second defence line several dozens of kilometers behind the main line. However, the only thing that could be done was short pieces of trenclines, no bunkers at all.

Also defended by people with attitude.

That is true. The strenght of the defence was not in the fortifications but in the defenders.

Now, what are we arguing about? Are you trying to convince me that for any decent army Mannerheim line was easy pickings, and RKKA could not punch through because it was worse than average?

RKKA was certainly worse than average. Without any questions. Now, let me make a comparison. During summer 1944, RKKA got through Finnish lines in two days. During Winter War, it took two months. Certainly, attacking during summer is much easier, but Soviets had so great numerical and material superiority that an average army would have crushed Finnish defence in few weeks, at most.

That is not an exactly true statement, but you are correct - germans had no considerable ground forces there until 1944.

Please, name one single German unit that fought in the Isthmus before 1944, if you can. You can't do that, because there weren't any. The nearest German unit was the 163rd (I think, my sources are lost right now) infantry division that fought on the North wing of the attack to Ladoga Karelia.

- Tommi

[Chupacabra]

There were minefields laid around Mannerheim line well before the war started.

Well before and well before.

Well before that even, AFAIK. I believe that the Finns began laying down mines in the area that would be fortified as the Mannerheim Line during 1919-1920, during the Russo-Polish war. I am not positive about this (have only seen reference to it in one source), but it would have made sense to do so.

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