Delay in called Soviet artillery fire.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

One of many strengths in the approach of BTS, in modelling their games, is the energy they put into research. They get the details correct. Because of this there is a 90% chance they already know what follows. However, on the off chance that they have not come across the following source, here it is.

“ As a result of these checks and subsequent work on correcting problems, the opening of fire,….was brought down to 40-90 seconds in a number of units. As a rule, prepared fire was opened in 1.5-3 minutes after it was called for and the opening of unplanned fire took 4-7 minutes.”

The Battle of Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study, 1944.

Just to set things in context, by “prepared fire” they mean what CMBO calls called fire on Target Reference Points, TRP. By “ unplanned fire” they mean the usual fire called by a spotter in CMBO against targets other than a TRPs.

At this point it is worth mentioning that Soviet After Action Reports and studies where very honest and reliable. They do start with a brief sentence to the effect of “our great leader, Comrade Stalin” but after that the propaganda factor is nil. This is also the view of historians such as David Glantz. When you read them it is quite a shock just how honest they are. They really were written to be learnt from. I have always considered the reason for this to be the fact that the Soviets so very nearly lost. They realised fully, including Stalin, that the military should be free to use all their skills so as to insure victory. Anyway, whatever the reason, Soviet WW2 After Action Reports and “War Experiences”, written during the war, do give the impression of being “spin free”.

Given the above, it can be taken that the delay for the Soviets in called fire, against TRPs, should be around two minutes. When called by a spotter against targets other than TRPs it should be around five minutes. This is for July 1943.

Hugely looking forward to CMBB,

All the best,

Kip.

[Andrew H.]

The Amazing BTS sees all, knows all. In this thread, Steve mentioned that Sov. forces would place reliance on pregame bombardments because the delay for Sov. FOs would be so bad.

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by kipanderson:

The Battle of Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study, 1944.

[snip]

At this point it is worth mentioning that Soviet After Action Reports and studies where very honest and reliable. They do start with a brief sentence to the effect of “our great leader, Comrade Stalin” but after that the propaganda factor is nil. This is also the view of historians such as David Glantz. When you read them it is quite a shock just how honest they are. They really were written to be learnt from. I have always considered the reason for this to be the fact that the Soviets so very nearly lost. They realised fully, including Stalin, that the military should be free to use all their skills so as to insure victory. Anyway, whatever the reason, Soviet WW2 After Action Reports and “War Experiences”, written during the war, do give the impression of being “spin free”.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I began this book several months ago. Due to the dryness of its tone and the somewhat staggering wealth of detail, I had to take a break from it for a while, but I was struck by the same impression as you. While this account may omit or unintentionally misrepresent some details from the German side (not surprisingly), it seems to me that they gave a good faith effort to get it as accurate as they could at the time.

Anyone seriously interested in the Eastern Front or how the Soviets conducted the war, and especially how they conducted this battle should at least give this book a look.

Michael

[Scott B]

Good info. Some questions, of course.

You mention this as being from the Kursk study; would this then be the response time for a unit in a prepared position with wire communications to the firing units? The problems with Soviet artillery were primarily due to a lack of fire support assets that was largely negated at Kursk due to the extensive preparations they had made prior to the start of defensive operations.

The reason I think it might be relevant is in the offensive where wire communications may have been left behind (and where radio communications may not be common), Soviet observed fires may not arrive so quickly. 4-7 minutes is pretty damn good for WWII; the Combat Mission population is probably a little spoiled by optimistic response times.

What factors would make late war experienced Soviet artillery spotters with effective communications (ie: ruling out commo and experience) less responsive than the Germans, anyway?

Scott

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B:

What factors would make late war experienced Soviet artillery spotters with effective communications (ie: ruling out commo and experience) less responsive than the Germans, anyway?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Different organisation of artillery support could be a factor. I maybe totally off here, but AFAIK the Red Army concentrated artillery at a much higher level, making the weight of fire more devastating, but at the same time removing lower-level control over it. While the Heer, at least on TO&E had access to fairly heavy stuff on Division and Corps level, this may not have been the case for the Red Army to the same degree.

As I said, I fully expect a correction, the GPW is not really my strong point...

[Andreas]

BTW, Kip - great info. You just showed me how to spend my book token

[JasonC]

It is always useful to cross check from the other side of the hill. Toward the end of Keegan's "Face of Battle" he quotes a German commander discussing a Russian infantry attack (supported by some tanks etc, but basically infantry branch) around mid-war. The picture it gives of Russian artillery responsiveness is not consistent with the commonly heard claim (these days I mean) that they "only did prelims".

After describing the effects of the preliminary bombardment ("defensive positions looked like a freshly plowed field" etc), the German commander remarks that in dealing with the subsequent infantry attack, "fire discipline is of the utmost importance". And Keegan elaborates. The point of holding fire until the range is close enough for it to be deadly, is to prevent the attacking Russians from going to ground safely - and then renewing the artillery barrage, on newly identified, remaining German positions.

While many tubes would be dedicated to planned fire - including TRPs on defense, preliminary bombardments on offense, interdiction and counterbattery, etc - obviously the Germans were well aware of the danger of disclosing their firing locations without breaking the attacking infantry. From continued, responsive, fire support.

Doctrinally, the Russians emphasized use of mortars for this sort of thing, by pushing them down closer to the attacking infantry formations. Each regiment's 120mms and each battalion's 82mms were expected to support their sub-units when they met resistence, not just blast a grid-square beforehand. Rockets and div-arty (on up) could do that.

For what it is worth.

[Michael Emrys]

Also the Sovs usually supplied their attacking infantry with a generous number of assault guns to provide immediate heavy support where they expected serious resistance. The SU-76 were especially numerous.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

It is always useful to cross check from the other side of the hill. Toward the end of Keegan's "Face of Battle" he quotes a German commander discussing a Russian infantry attack.

The picture it gives of Russian artillery responsiveness is not consistent with the commonly heard claim (these days I mean) that they "only did prelims".

After describing the effects of the preliminary bombardment ("defensive positions looked like a freshly plowed field" etc), the German commander remarks that in dealing with the subsequent infantry attack, "fire discipline is of the utmost importance". And Keegan elaborates.

The point of holding fire until the range is close enough for it to be deadly, is to prevent the attacking Russians from going to ground safely - and then renewing the artillery barrage, on newly identified, remaining German positions.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Keegan's exact words are "To fire too late....would have been to drive the Russians too quickly to cover, sparing many and leaving them with their will to advance shaken, while calling down on the German positions a further helping of the terrible prepatory bombardment which they had undergone..."

Now hold on. This is Keegan talking out of his ass. There is no evidence here that Keegan is an expert on Russian artillery practices, nor does Mellenthin even mention Russian artillery. This passage is in no way a clear view of "the other side of the hill" nor is it evidence that Russians were able to call down further fire. From what Mellenthin says in the quote, that never happened, and Keegan provides no reason why he assumes it was possible.

This is a very poor example, if you are trying to "prove" that Russian artillery was indeed responsive and capable of being called down quickly.

Even if we concede that the Russians were capable of calling down the supporting fires Keegan talks about, no timeframe is given - it could mean a half hour later, or a half a day later.

I am not saying you are right, or wrong, but if this is your only evidence, it doesn't say a single thing. Keegan's FACE OF BATTLE is a masterpiece regarding British infantry, but he hasn't demonstrated any knowledge of Russian WW II artillery, and it is quite possible he is using the practices of other armies to guide his comments on Mellenthin's quote.

Would be interested in better sources on this subject, it is an interesting one.

[ 09-07-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Jeff Duquette]

Interesting information Kip. This is sort of what I have been looking for with regards to my recent email inquires to you on references on WWII Red Artillery. With all the information Glantz, Gebhardt et al have been providing us with regarding the Red Army I have been wondering if the standard assessments of Red Artillery (ala TM 30-340 or Liddell Hart) are becoming dated. Were Soviet FO’s actually more capable of dealing with surprise targets in a reasonable amount of time (reasonable relative to US Army…Commonwealth Army or even the German Army for that matter). Any thoughts in this regard?

[ 09-07-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Andrew H.]

One effect that I think the pregame/1st turn bombardment might have is that it will emphasize historical weaknesses that certain weapons systems -- like infantry guns -- had.

In one of the (countless) earlier threads dealing with whether certain items of German equipment were too cheap, the IG guns came up as an underpriced item. Someone responded that these weapons were appropriately priced because they were particularly vulnerable to artillery. A historically true point, although one that has less relevance for CM given the cost of artillery, the limited number of fire missions, the delay, and the opportunity costs of firing at an IG. Especially if it is not around other vulnerable units.

If there are pre-game bombardments, however, the weakness of these guns vs. artillery will be increased. Which might bring their costs more in line with their historical effectiveness.

Of course they can be dug in or placed in bunkers trenches or whatever new fortifications CMBB permits (the fortress of Brest-Litovsk? )...but that will also increase their price.

[JasonC]

"Keegan talking out of his ass" generally makes more sense than the contents of certain other people's heads. But his mere authority is hardly needed on the subject; it is the tactical reasoning behind it that is obvious once it is mentioned. (That is "reason", you know, that other thing besides "authority", that some people seem to pretend doesn't exist in historical or military matters?) And this is hardly the only instance of the importance of fire discipline being harped on by German defenders. And it is confirmed by Russian doctrine, as I pointed out. Both sides are using doctrines that make sense only with Russian real time artillery (or mortar, my point was) coordination (tubes pushed to low infantry echelons for Russians; holding fire until attackers are close instead of firing throughout their entire approach for Germans). They were definitely doing so for their health, not on a lark. Also, it was the German officer who remarked "in dealing with these attacks, fire discipline is of the utmost importance", not Keegan. Keegan merely explained what fire discipline means and why it matters, to civies who can't be expected to know what the term means.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by kipanderson:

...

“ As a result of these checks and subsequent work on correcting problems, the opening of fire,….was brought down to 40-90 seconds in a number of units. As a rule, prepared fire was opened in 1.5-3 minutes after it was called for and the opening of unplanned fire took 4-7 minutes.”

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Kip, of relevance here is what they mean by 'opening'. Is that the first roound FFE, or the first round of adjustment? If it is the later, then the overall delay before FFE becomes quite long - especially if their adjustment procedures weren't too flash.

Now, from the Soviet POV this 'reduced' delay might have seemed just wonderful, especially if they had been used to waiting an hour or more in the past, but it doesn't necessarily make them the equals of the Germans, Americans, or the Commonwealth. Or even the Mighty Finns.

Then again, maybe it was to the opening of FFE. Who knows. :confused:

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

[QB]"Keegan talking out of his ass" generally makes more sense than the contents of certain other people's heads. But his mere authority is hardly needed on the subject; it is the tactical reasoning behind it that is obvious once it is mentioned. (That is "reason", you know, that other thing besides "authority", that some people seem to pretend doesn't exist in historical or military matters?) <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

FACE OF BATTLE was written in 1974, and published in 1976, well before Soviet archives were opened up, and Keegan is a British historian who has concerned himself with studies of British infantry, and IIRC, the fighting in Normandy. Please educate me as to his research regarding Soviet artillery practices in WW II.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

And this is hardly the only instance of the importance of fire discipline being harped on by German defenders. And it is confirmed by Russian doctrine, as I pointed out. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, you haven't. The others have indicated that their reading tells them it took longer for Russian FO's to call down artillery fire compared to western Allied artillery capabilities. You haven't cited anything that runs counter to this. You use an aside from a book about British infantry at Waterloo, Agincourt and the Somme.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Also, it was the German officer who remarked "in dealing with these attacks, fire discipline is of the utmost importance", not Keegan. Keegan merely explained what fire discipline means and why it matters, to civies who can't be expected to know what the term means.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That could mean all kinds of things; in fact, Keegan first describes at length why the fire discipline was essential - they had to hold their fire until the Russians were "terrifyingly close" - not because of potential Russian counter battery fire, either.

Then he turns to a discussion of why firing too soon would be a bad thing. He never mentions any time frame for Russian artillery fire, merely mentions that firing too soon would drive the Russians to ground and allow them to call down additional artillery fire.

He doesn't say how long it would take to call it down, and if you read Mellenthin's quote, the German officer never mentions the Russians doing anything of the sort.

So what does any of this have to do with the response time of Russian artillery to an FO's request?

The importance of fire discipline is also relevant to such issues as small arms ammunition conservation; how do we know that Mellenthin wasn't actually referring to that issue by his comments?

I think Keegan has jumped to a hasty conclusion here - if his conclusion (that the Russians were capable of instantly calling down additional supporting fires) is borne out by other sources, please present them. I'd love to read it.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Keegan's exact words are "To fire too late....would have been to drive the Russians too quickly to cover, sparing many and leaving them with their will to advance shaken, while calling down on the German positions a further helping of the terrible prepatory bombardment which they had undergone..."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Mellenthin actually mentions Red Army arty in a footnote at least (Soviet Artillery in WW2) He said it did not have the capability to do e.g. silent registration.

It is probably looking at your quote that the German officer is indeed talking about continued fire on previously registered targets that still resist. Or a case of the practice of allowing the Germans to come out of their dug-outs, and get caught in stage two, or the practice of leaving gaps leaving small gaps in the barrage, to allow infantry to move on undetected. There were cases during Bagration (1944) in which the barrage needed to be cancelled, because the initial recon-in-strength had already taken the German line the day before.

Red Army arty appears to have been very well led during this initial bombardment, but the general verdict from readings on the GPW that I have done so far is that the Red Army relied on the direct support from assault guns, once they had broken through, and that the German practice of attacking at the hinges of breakthroughs, and holding on to strongpoints their, was very counterproductive, because both of these would be in the range of the initial barrage guns.

Michael is of course correct that the quote by Keegan gives no time-frames, and does not appear to say whether this was a position that had already undergone bombardment.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Michael is of course correct that the quote by Keegan gives no time-frames, and does not appear to say whether this was a position that had already undergone bombardment.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, sort of - he also never discusses the possibility of the Russians calling down further fire, which is what is at issue here. Thanks for the other info though, it is quite interesting - I have very little in the way of source info on the Red Army.

I'm not trying to call anyone's knowledge into question - simply pointing out that Jason has insisted this quote is evidence that Russian supporting fires were easily called down, whereas in fact it says nothing of the kind. Again, as a student of the historical process, it is interesting to me to note how a few words can be misinterpreted and then misrepresented. Keegan may in fact be right on the money, but from the other comments in this thread, that idea doesn't seem to have much merit in this case.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

It is interesting to read everyone else’s responses.

Just to clarify a point that was raised by Jons. The impression I get, and the assumption I was working on, is that the authors of the study were referring to timings for FFE. I do not claim to “know” this to be the case, but if you read the entire chapter I believe nine out of ten readers would reach the same conclusion. If it had been the case that it took another ten minutes for the FFE to arrive, the authors are likely to have mentioned the fact. It’s a shame that I cannot scan in the chapter, or somewhat more of it, but I do not have a scanner.

ScottB asked “would this be the response time for units with wire communications?” Yes, mostly. Other chapters of the study make it clear that at this stage of the war most communications, but not all, were wire. Radios were clearly something of a bottleneck for the Soviets. If you take a close look at the aid sent to the Soviets, mainly by the US, it includes vast quantities of radios. However, 90% of western aid arrived post Kursk, mostly during 1944. Clearly, the Soviets, as was the case with all armies, will have had systems in place using “line-men” to make sure lines were put down very quickly. However, I agree that in the attack, particularly pursuit, there must have been times when they could not match the pace of advance. One point that needs to be made is that the Soviets were as aware of the need to “manoeuvre” their artillery as any other army. That is to make sure the artillery moved forward with the advance. This too, is made clear in the study. If there was a problem, it will have been with getting the communications/surveying set-up. BTS’s idea of having fixed, telephone spotters in CMBB is a very realistic one, in my view.

Jeff wrote,

“With all the information Glantz, Gebhardt et al have been providing us with regarding the Red Army I have been wondering if the standard assessments of Red Artillery (ala TM 30-340 or Liddell Hart) are becoming dated. Were Soviet FO’s actually more capable of dealing with surprise targets in a reasonable amount of time (reasonable relative to US Army…Commonwealth Army or even the German Army for that matter). Any thoughts in this regard?”

My view is yes, they were. But this is the case in all areas of the post-Kursk performance of the Red Army. It was always known that the Red Army in the second half of the war was very different from that in the first half. But now all the data is being released it is a bit of a shock to discover just how good they were. This has been discussed many times before on the forum, so I will not waste too much time on it. We will never all agree. Just one quick example says it all. In the mid-eighties, David Glantz, wrote something along these lines (referring to the “overall force ratio”)

“ The force ratio, Soviet to German, during the second half of the war was not 7-8:1 as the Germans claimed, nor 2-3:1 as the Soviets claimed, but around 5:1.”

David Glantz now admits, in his own books, that it was indeed, 2.7:1. The detail of the damage done to the Germans on the Eastern Front has been known since the end of the war. We now know that the Red Army that inflicted this damage was a lot smaller and more effective than the Germans liked to believe, for very understandable reasons.

To address the point made by Andreas, Germanboy, that called fire artillery assets were often a higher echelon asset in the Red Army, I agree. However, in my view, this means called fire was not “always” available, or not available as uniformly as in other armies. But when it was I see no reason why the Soviets should have been especially incompetent in its use, during the second half of the war. Faced with the same problems, they will have developed similar solutions.

Anyway. I believe, others will differ, that the quote I gave regarding the delay in called fire should be taken to mean what it appears to mean. They are not the figures for one small, unrepresentative battle but the overall average for a truly vast, strategic engagement. Until something better comes along, they are the figures I would use in CMBB. However, as always, it is what Steve and Charles think that matters.

All the best,

Kip.

[Jeff Duquette]

Kip:

Your points regarding lack of radio and typical dependence upon field telephones seems fairly consistent with some of the older references on Soviet Artillery and its limitations. Several sources I have also indicate a real shortage of trained FO’s and folks trained in fire direction in the Red Army from 1941 to 1943. It is implied that this was part of the reasoning behind Soviet massing of artillery assets.

I also agree with your points regarding the relative speed between CFF and FFE. They seem reasonable enough, assuming wire communications could be maintained between FO and FDC. Although I suspect at Kursk every blade of grass had been pre-registered or was present on some Soviet FO’s range card.

It would also seem reasonable to assume that response times for fire missions would be much quicker in established defensive positions in which wire has been laid and perhaps registration fires have already been conducted. Speedy response time is also a reasonable assumption at the start of Soviet Offensives in which wire communication is already in place and registration fires have been conducted. Presumably difficulties arise during enemy barrages or counter battery fires where wire communication lines become vulnerable to being severed.

The lack of radios as well as trained FO’s\FDC’s is perhaps the clincher regarding movement to contact and meeting engagements in which bringing down speedy fire missions on surprise target becomes a real test. Again this is relatively consistent with many older references dealing with this subject.

I did locate a used copy of “The Battle of Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study, 1944” for a very reasonable price. Thanks for the tip Kip.

[Scott B]

Did some looking around of my own. Nothing in Zaloga's Red Army Handbook, nor anything in my translation of "Combat Regulations for the Infantry of the Red Army" from November '42. My copy of Chapter V (Tactics) of the US Army's March 1945 TM-30-340, Handbook on U.S.S.R. Military Forces, aside from already being a questionable source given its nature, goes into some detail about the fire planning process but gives little or no help in how the fire support system reacted to opportunity targets.

Incidentally, I did find a couple quotes on radio sets-- Krivosheev quotes the total number of radio sets in Red Army inventory from June '41 to August '45 as about 189,000, where 35,000-40,000 (according to two separate secondary sources on Lend Lease: Richard Overy and Walter Dunn; I don't have anything primary source wise on hand) of these were lend leased to them from the Western allies. More notable would seem to be the 380,000 field telephones and 1,250,000 miles of telephone wire that they received via lend-lease-- clearly wire communications was the more common option for the Soviets throughout the war, although I'll be damned if I can find any numbers on the amount of total Soviet produced field telephones received by Red Army units during the war.

The centralization of Red Army artillery assets, as far as I've been able to determine, came more from a doctrine emphasizing centralized control, massed fires, and economy of force rather than the weakness in their fire support structure; their later movement to larger artillery formations (brigades and ultimately divisions and corps) was, however, directly linked to their inability to control large amounts of artillery fire effectively. Each artillery division had its own observation battalion, which seems to have worked well for them.

Unfortunately I can't really comment on how the Kursk piece fits into the puzzle because my knowledge of that specific engagement is fairly weak; as far as I'm concerned the Soviet counteroffensive is the really interesting part of the Kursk operation, rather than the no-brainer "strength-on-strength" misapplication of precious German combat resources in the meatgrinder.

I haven't had a chance to read Red God of War for about three years, but I did go through it then looking closely for a description of Soviet WWII fire support techniques and anything I could find on their system of fire direction, and I found it lacking in that regard. Otherwise, I remember it as a fine work; I was looking to compare the various warring nations' artillery systems at the time, and I still don't know exactly how the Soviets called for fire, but it does appear that they used a direct line from an (often static) observation post to coordinate fires from division level artillery and above.

At any rate, I did manage a look through Vol 6 of Charles Sharp's Soviet Order of Battle in World War II series (the volume that deals with artillery units) and he seems to indicate that most Soviet rifle formations were expected to deal with unplanned threats with their own organic assets, which would primarily consist of mortars. Depending on the period, that'd be something like 2 50mm mortars per company, 8 82mm mortars per battalion, and 6 120mm mortars per regiment.

Also according to Sharp, at the opening of the war only the howitzer regiment (not the light artillery regiment of 76mm guns) had the communications and survey sections to allow indirect fire. Also, there was some sort of artillery command platoon within division headquarters, but that appears to be it. What's more, soon after the invasion began, Stavka yanked the howitzer regiments and placed them into the reserve 'pool' anyway. The 76mm field guns at the division level (24 of them arranged in 3 battalions of 2 batteries, each with 4 tubes) were expected only to provide direct fire support. The heavy emphasis on direct fire support (the Soviets often mention how much it saved ammo) lasted well beyond the end of the war. I suspect at the Combat Mission level, it would likely be more common to see a 152mm gun firing direct over open sights at an enemy than having a spotter available with a radio able to call it in.

Anyway, I'll keep an eye out, but this is about all I have laying around; I'm very curious as to what Red Army artillery will look like in CM2, given the shortage of good tactical level information that I've seen on its employment. Hope this is of some use, at least.

Scott

[JasonC]

"most Soviet rifle formations were expected to deal with unplanned threats with their own organic assets, which would primarily consist of mortars."

Bingo. My estimate of the situation too. Div arty and up were centrally controlled and firing planned fire, in prep barrages or defensive concentrations plotted long in advance. Field guns were firing direct as you mention, especially early on. Later and on the attack, SP assault guns did more of that direct fire work, and the lighter field guns shifted more toward the div-arty methods. The most responsive fires were from the organic weapons of the smaller attacking formations - the mortars.

My understanding of the problem involved, which this division of effort tried to solve, was not merely about communication, it was also about command. As in who "owns" these guns and directs their fire, with what priorities, for what purposes. The typical Russian answer to the issues of initiative, massing, responsibility, setting of priorities etc, that this issue raises, was the echelon system.

Each scale had organic artillery assets and control went with the scale, not "flex-timed" across the levels of the organization chart. This is not the same as the use commonly made of artillery by the other powers.

Understand that e.g. the western Allies system of sometimes allowing one FO to call for every gun in a corps, was not a level of responsibility the Russians were likely to give to a green artillery lieutenant. The western system relied on high levels of initiative at very junior positions. It could also sometimes lead to the problem of the best or just most aggressive FO getting all the fire, while other nearby units "starved". It also exploited relatively abundant ammo supply - forward and low-level responsibility undoubtedly led to higher demand for fire missions.

The German system was dedicated support by firing battalions to particular maneuver battalions or KG, supplimented by a staff-run corps or higher "tasking" group. This placed the bulk of the command responsibility on staff officers. It prevented "starving" on individual units of reactive fires (as long as there was ammo), and allowed some massing of fire through the corps or higher HQ. But not as much as the western Allies often achieved.

The Russian echelon system was in the same direction but far more so. The only "dedicated" support a tactical commander could be sure of were the assets under his own direct command. Massing of fires was planned out at higher echelons, but also delivered planned, not reactively. This meant a Russian artillery staff only had to solve a map planning problem with plenty of time to do it, and with intel reduced to maps provided to the staff doing this.

Whereas a German corps artillery direction group had to plan massed fires reactively in real time, which requires an accurate mental picture of the developing battle and the effects of previous moves. It is much more demanding, and leaves much greater room for error if attempted by inexperienced officers.

To solve the command problem, the different powers turned to quite different methods, relying on different organizational abilities. The US and UK relied on a front line officer's eyes and initiative, and on generally abundant ammo. The Germans relied on a staff officer's brain at division or corps. The Russians relied on a bureaucracy, with each level pushing to use its own assets to solve its own problems.

One man's opinion...

[ 09-09-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]