Rokossovsky talks about Kursk

[Grisha]

Am reading Rokossovsky's memoir, A Soldier's Duty, and on the Chapter entitled The End of the "Citadel" he describes the fortifications, which were begun in April '43, and largely completed by June. The amount of stuff in those defensive lines is immpressive. Average artillery density in his sector(Orel region) was 35 tubes per kilometer with more than 10 of those being antitank guns. That's more than one AT gun and two other artillery guns per 100m. Imagine the hell that must've been.

[Grisha]

Another interesting pasage in the chapter is when Rokossovsky compares the two pincer movements, Orel in the north, and Belgorod in the south. Rokossovsky commanded the Central Front which was tasked with defending the Orel pincer, while the Voronezh Front, commanded by Vatutin, was to defend against the Belgorod pincer. Here is what Rokossovsky had to say about the discrepancy between the two assaults, in which the northern group only advanced as far as 6-12km, whereas the southern group advanced up to 35km:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

We had got along without the GHQ Reserve, managing with our own forces. Some memoir writers and historians attribute this to the fact that the enemy's northern group, facing us, had been much weaker than the southern group, which had attacked Vatutin's troops. However, the difference between the two groups had not been all that great: the southern group had been superior to the northern by two panzer divisions, but inferior by three infantry divisions. Obviously, the reason lies elsewhere; namely, the Central Front had deployed its forces better, concentrating them on the most threatened sector, and the enemy had been unable to overcome such a concentration of forces and material. The Voronezh Front had taken a different approach to the defence problem, spreading its forces almost uniformly over the whole frontage. That, as I see it, was why the enemy, striking as he did against us, on a narrow sector, succeeded in penetrating comparatively deeply, so that substantial forces from GHQ Reserve were needed to bring him to a halt.

<hr></blockquote>

[Andreas]

Good thing he is not bitter about it

[Redwolf]

This is most interesting when considering that one of the biggest German mistakes was to assault without any element of surprise or uncertaincy about their intentions. The northern Soviet forces gain more of an advantage out of it than the sothern ones.

I wonder what the battle had been like if it started 10 or 8 weeks earlier, with weaker forces, but deployed so that one of the assault routes was mainly for detraction (and hopefully attraction of reserves) and the other almost as strong as it was in July. Or/and if the northern movement didn't take the obvious route.

I know this what-if stuff is always kind of pointless, but in such cases of single outstanding blunders that are at least fun

[PJungnitsch]

Am I right in thinking that Rokossovsky was one of the best of the Soviet commanders? That is an impression I've gotten somewhere.

About the bitterness thing, I crossed the (then) Soviet Union on the Trans-Siberian once, and when mangled English/Russian didn't work I was surprised that the Soviets I met were quite happy to speak to me in German.

[JasonC]

The guns per kilometer measure is quite misleading, and the force to space was much lower than that in practice. Because that reflects all layers of the defense, which was in great depth.

The forward infantry positions had rifle battalions on a kilometer to a mile of front, with only 4 out of the 9 in a front line division deployed "up". The portion of 45mm ATGs to rifle formations in the forward zone was 4 ATGs per battalion.

Behind the 4 front battalions came 2 reserve ones, the immediate 2nd tier, and still considered part of the first line of the defense. Then the reserve regiment behind them, at about half the density. Then, behind the whole front line division position, again at half its (overall" density, came the reserve divisions of each corps. Each army had a reserve corps as well, and some fronts had reserve armies. The southern prong fought through the first front's positions and was stopped by the second front

(Front equals Army Group for those in Palm Beach. Yes Virginia, they had a whole army group in reserve in and just behind the whole Kursk salient. It is what stopped the southern pincer).

The attackers put a full panzer corps on the front of 1 infantry division, or at most 3 infantry regiments, at the points of attack. Which means the immediate front line forces facing 3 Panzer divisions was only 4-6 rifle battalions with 16-24 45mm ATGs.

In other words, there was great dispersion of forces back to front. The thing was, the attackers then had to get through layer after layer. And as all those "1 back" reserves shifted to the more threatened sectors, often the next line on was the same density as the first, not just half as thick.

A front line division's zone (around 5 miles, 3 in the densest parts) - which would face 2-3 panzer divisions worth of attackers at the spearpoint locations - was 3 layers deep itself (forward battalions, reserve battalions, reserve regiment). In that space they had 36 45mm ATGs and 24 76mm duel purpose field guns, in 5-15 gun positions. These were not quite all close enough to see each other's targets, but their fire zones all overlapped in a defensive network of strongpoints, with the gaps between each covered by fire from the adjacent positions.

They could expect hundreds of tanks, outnumbering the defending forward guns by between 3 to 1 and 10 to 1, which would knock out individual gun positions in sequence, trying to negotiate a path through the grid. Which they everywhere did, penetrating the front line divisions in all cases. The best stop that was achieved was the reserve divisions of a given corps preventing further intrusion.

By the time a whole front line corps was committed, the infantry could expect modest amounts of tank support - typically ~30 odd T-34s and western company sized units of SUs or KVs, total 50-75 AFVs, on the frontage of an attacking Panzer Corps.

It was not a case of ATGs every 100 yards side to side, in one linear position. If it had been, a single coordinated artillery barrage would have smashed through. The great dispersion in depth was meant to dissipate attacking artillery firepower, and the 2 up 1 back deployments were meant to act as "self sealing tanks" around areas of penetration.

[Redwolf]

Another interesting aspect of Kursk is that the AT guns were not deployed in Pak "front", but Pak "nests", with dozens of guns in small patches of cover, with wide (but covered) space between them.

Such a Paknest structure would be very useful when facing overwhelming number of tanks, when the goal is to knock out or immobilize as many as possible, but no hope of really stopping them. They would open fire only at extremly short ranges.

At least the heavy (Tiger) tank formations went through them knocking them out themself. I wonder why they couldn't rely on artillery more. Surely the initial Kursk penetrations would not be deep enough to run out of range and surely such a Paknest would be a priority target.

[JasonC]

Here is another way of looking at the 35/km figure, for those used to western front densities.

From mid June through July in Normandy, the US 1st infantry division had a frontage of about 6000 yards, with 2 of its regimental teams side by side with half that each, and the 3rd behind in reserve.

That layer alone has 28 guns per kilometer of front. Corps level arty behind will bring it to the same figure as the Russian Kursk one. The 1st ID frontage is 5.5 km. Here are the guns the 1st ID had -

ATG

3x57mm per battalion = 27

9x57mm additional with each regiment = 27

36x76mm with the divisional AT battalion

= 90 ATGs

ATGs per km - 16.4

Howitzer

6x105mm pack per regiment = 18

36x105mm div arty

12x155mm div arty

= 66 howitzers

156 total guns with division

Total division guns per km = 28

Not counting mortars, of which there were 81x60mm and 54x81mm, and perhaps 12 4.2" chemicals attached too.

Then corps might have an artillery group of 36 155s behind them (the US had as much corps and army level arty as div arty, about). Which would bring the gun total to 34.5 per km, ignoring the mortars.

The Russians were actually in greater depth. But they had fewer ATGs and howitzers per formation - 36 ATGs per division (all of them 45mm), not 90, and 36 howitzers per division (most of them 76mm), not 66. So the front gun line was considerably thinner than in Normandy, but they made up for it with double the depth (1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 ... = 1).

[JasonC]

Redwolf - from the diagrams I've seen of the Russian AT deployments, the typical ATG position was just 4 guns (an AT platoon or 76mm battery), and some went up to 12 guns (one level up). Never more. I think the story of dozens in one spot probably includes the ATRs, which were as numerous as the guns in the artillery formations (deployed along with them), on top of the ATRs in the infantry.

But yes, it was a strong point defense. I'm sure the 45mms (let alone the ATRs) held fire to close range out of sheer self-preservation - if they opened at long range, they'd draw a hail of tank fire before they could do much in reply. Waiting until close had two benefits - (1) a better chance they'd go around you and you wouldn't get to close range at all, and (2) a much better chance of hurting anything when you did have to fire.

Also, most of the German tanks were Pz IVs (half) or older Pz IIIs, uparmored to at least 50mm (or 30+30) fronts, and most of the Russian ATGs were 45mm, which could penetrate that much only out to around ~500 yards (with modest angles included, etc). Their 45mm HVAP (T rounds, when they had any) could barely get through the 80mm Pz IV and StuG front hulls, under the same range. The same goes for the 30mm flanks of the main types, in the case of the accompanying ATRs - they needed to be very close. So everything about the armor grog war made 300-500 yards the right range for the AT positions.

[Grisha]

Thanks, Jason. Wasn't thinking straight. And I do have Glantz' The Pursuit of Deep Battle, which addresses this all rather nicely, including many maps of division/army/front deployment for both attack/defense throughout the war. You gave me the kick in the head to access those memory banks again

machineman,

Yes, Rokossovsky was arguably the Soviet Union's best Front commander in WWII. What really strikes me about his memoir is his continuous concern for his staff. It appears that his relationship with his staff was of great importance, to the point of almost being familiar. He speaks with great admiration for Chernyakhovsky, another great commander:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

He was a fine commander, young, educated, cheerful - altogether a remarkable man and very popular with the troops. Such things are readily apparent. When an officer comes up to his Army Commander and delivers his report with cheerful confidence, this is the commander's achievement.<hr></blockquote>

[Paul Lakowski]

I have a vague recollection of Rokossovsky, implmenting a tactic at Kursk , where by the bulk of the russian tanks were deployed inbetween the ridges that crossed the german advance.

This way as the spearhead Tigers and Pz crested the ridges they were set apon by mass of T-34 [etc] that broke from cover and dashed at short range to clash.

I even seem to remember that this was based on Wellingtons similar tactic at Waterloo...where he deployed his less capable troops between the folds in the ground to avoid exposing them to the fierce French artillery.

Has any one else read this?

[The Commissar]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:

I even seem to remember that this was based on Wellingtons similar tactic at Waterloo...where he deployed his less capable troops between the folds in the ground to avoid exposing them to the fierce French artillery.

Has any one else read this?<hr></blockquote>

Well, it might be a similar tactic which was deemed effective under the circumstances, but I doubt it was "based on Waterloo". The Soviets at Kursk and the British at Waterloo simply used a similar way of keeping their troops safe from getting blasted to hell and losing their effectiveness.

[CombinedArms]

It's intriguing to compare the Russian defense in depth at Kursk to the American's defense against the Ardennes offensive.

Here, the Americans were, of course, spread very thin and were not expecting an attack at all. There was no depth to the position and no reserves, except a couple of airborne divisions taking R & R in SHAEF reserve well behind the lines.

Ultimately, the Allied forces had to rely on their mobility to stop the offensive. The thin front line held longer than might have been expected, and, except for the surrender of two regiments of 106th division, the attacked forces executed a fighting retreat.

They pinched in the shoulders of the assault and denied the attackers key road junctions like St. Vith and Bastogne. Peiper's deep penetration was bottled up and choked off. Meanwhile, divisions we're pulled out of the line from many miles away--often breaking off their own attacks-- and were rushed forward to thwart the assault.

In short, the battles were fought completely differently--yet the end results were the same, with the Germans stopped cold both times.

It suggests to me the problem, at this stage in the war, of attempting a deep penetration across a narrow front against an experienced enemy and expecting that alone to lead to victory. Monty might have thought of this as he planned Market-Garden. The heady days of the German encirclements in France in 1940 were long gone by 1943 and '44. Only after a front had totally collapsed due to attrition, as in Normandy in August '44 or on both fronts in April '45, was anything like blitz krieg possible again.