Infantry Divisions against armored divisions?

[CombatGeneral]

In World War II how did an infantry division advance against armor or against heavy armored divisions. I understand they had tank destroyers attached but how many? What gave the infantry division its punch? Were the armor divisions used with the infantry divisions in an advance or used seperatly. Let me know your thoughts.

[Michael Dorosh]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by CombatGeneral:

In World War II how did an infantry division advance against armor or against heavy armored divisions. I understand they had tank destroyers attached but how many? What gave the infantry division its punch? Were the armor divisions used with the infantry divisions in an advance or used seperatly. Let me know your thoughts.<hr></blockquote>

Third Canadian Division did just that during Charnwood - attacking the 12th SS Division (whether or not they were panzer, or panzergrenadier, they still had a goodly number of tanks). The Third Division did have armoured support from the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade for that one, as well as self propelled guns of at least one British artillery regiment.

You go with what you've got.

What gave the commonwealth infantry divisions their "punch" was the fact that they commited to set-piece battles with complex artillery fire plans that were designed to shoot them onto their objectives. There were also many independent tank and armoured brigades on which they relied increasingly for support, in essence creating divisional battle groups that would have been organized not unlike an armoured division.

IIRC US "infantry" divisions also had organic armour.

CW and US "armoured" divisions also had organic infantry, so it was never a case of one or the other - but in how the two arms were mixed.

A Canadian or British Armoured Division had one brigade of armour (three tank regiments (battalions)) and an armoured recce regiment (battalion) which in action usually was equipped like a standard armoured regiment. They also had one brigade of regular infantry (three battalions of 810 men each) plus a Motor battalion mounted in trucks, halftracks and universal carriers.

A standard Canadian or British infantry division had an armoured recce regiment equipped with scout cars (not tanks as in an armoured division), and three infantry brigades (dismounted) supported by a machinegun battalion (which also had mortars). As stated, these divisions were often supported by independent armoured formations, of which there were several in the British and Canadian forces.

So basically, that is that - and the fact that German tanks were not present in great numbers all along the front.

[Eric Young]

Most US Infantry divisions had a battalion of attached, (not organic) tanks. TOE strength of 53 tanks in the battalion. Most had an additional battalion of either towed, (early) or self propelled tank destroyers as well. This could range upward of two tank battalions attached as well as the tank destroyers.

This in essence made all American infantry divisions the equal in tanks to Panzer Grenadier divisions and some panzer divisions.

E

[Keith]

Interesting points Michael. U.S. infantry division typically had a tank battalion as well as a tank destroyer battalion attached for support. In addition independent artillery battalions could be attached. As such the typical American infantry division was as strong as a full strength German panzergrenadier division.

With regard to armored divisions, the Americans split their units into three independent combat commands "A", "B", and "R" (reserve). Typically an infantry battalion would be paired with a tank battalion and engineer and artillery assets. In addition a combat command could be further split up into task forces for a specific purpose. Operationally you would typically see infantry divisions tasked to open a breach in the enemy's defenses for a combat command or task force to follow through for pursuit.

[Redwolf]

It is also worth noting that a tank division is not supposed to be in defense. If it is, as it was in Normandy for the Germans, there is something seriously wrong with the front as a whole. In that case you should be able to find a better place to strike (although that wasn't true for the British sector in Normandy either).

If you still want to attack an armour-heavy defender, it works best from airplances, obviously, or if you have lots of tanks to spare, as the British in Normandy had.

[JasonC]

US infantry divisions were typically supported by single independent armor battalions, or TD battalions, or both - and occasionally by up to three armor and one TD battalion at the same time. This let each attacking regiment receive limited armor support, typically two steps below the infantry unit size, or one step below at the point of attack (tank company with infantry battalion e.g.). The unit ratios in armor formations were more like even, or at most two infantry to one armor - and the infantry was half-track mounted to keep up with the tanks.

As for how they attacked if an armor formation was opposite them, pretty much as they always did. They laid down heavy artillery barrages and walked forward. Wherever strong resistence was encountered they called for additional fire, or support from other arms - tanks, TDs, armored cavalry, AA firing direct, assault engineers.

In addition, every infantry formation had various heavy weapons organic, from machineguns and mortars to bazookas, anti-tank guns, to howitzers. These could be brought opposite the tougher parts of a defense to plaster it by fire. The infantry companies also maneuvered through rougher terrain areas - towns and villages, wooded high ground, etc, where tanks could not easily get at them.

A US ID on the attack with typical attachments could have the following heavier weapons - 12x155mm howitzer, 54x105mm howitzer, 12x4.2" mortar, 54x81mm mortar, 81x60mm mortar, 36x76mm ATG or TD, 54x57mm ATG, 32x40mm AA, 44x37mm guns on light armor (Stuarts and M-8s), several hundred bazookas, and around a thousand MGs and BARs, vehicle or foot. In addition, they might receive fire support from 36 corps and army level artillery pieces up to 8" caliber. A division's artillery typically fired thousands of rounds in a day's heavy fighting, just from the 105mm and up stuff. They might also receive air support by up to 36 fighter bombers at a time.

The net result was that any area the units of the division could deploy within sight of, could be plastered by all kinds of fire. Sometimes that fire would be more effective against one enemy arm - force his infantry out, say, or into cellars or deep dug-outs. Or knock out his guns. The position would then be under fire from all this crap, plus not have combined arms able to defend it, and then on top of it have infantry creeping in on the place with close-in weapons from bazookas to grenades.

If the defender's didn't bug out, eventually they would run out of guys under all the fire, get close assaulted, or the infantry would creep past them and cut them off, and they'd run out of ammo and surrender. Naturally the defender's played too, and threw back all of their own crap at the attackers. Then other sub-sections of the attacking division took their place, cycling in and out of the line, wearing the defender's out.

There were occasions where infantry formations attacked armor without all of the attached support. And example is soon after the Salerno landings in Italy, when the Germans threw a battalion of Pz IVs at the landing zone quite early on, since it was right nearby before the invasion. They shot up two companies of US infantry pretty bad, but were everywhere thrown back, losing about half the tanks involved.

The kills were made with a whole grab-bag of weapons, a few of this and a few of that. The number one item was 105mm towed howitzers firing direct, with others KOed by a few of the light AFVs already ashore (M-8s as it happens), by towed ATGs, indirect fire by field arty (typically immobilizations), and a few each by naval gunfire and airstrikes. Mostly it was the bigger supporting guns reaching out, not infantry getting close. The latter mostly made the Germans retreat here or there, instead of actually bagging tanks.

What did defenders do about the all-purpose flying metal storm all the heavy weapons above could create? They tried to stay out of the sighting picture of most of it, by KOing anybody who tried to set up too close. They dug holes or went into cellars to get away from the arty. They used camo and tried to stay out of sight so the attackers wouldn't know where to dump the shells.

As for the tanks, typically they pulled back from the front and tried to stay out of sight, so ATGs or towed guns couldn't pick them off. Then they came back out to shoot up attackers here or there when the opportunity presented itself. A platoon or so would sometimes catch a battalion of infantry advancing and shoot the heck out of them for half an hour, while the battalion couldn't reply effectively or get artillery support for whatever reason.

The tanks couldn't get too close if they wanted to be invunerable (and usually, they did), and the defenders would try to get into cover they couldn't get at without coming close (middle of woods, back side of houses, etc). Then eventually the tanks' ammo bins would run dry and they'd clank off to get more, and the shaken infantry would try to make what progress they could again in the meantime - and set up some ATGs or register some artillery in case the tanks came back. Or get tank support of their own.

I hope that puts some flesh on the answer to your question.

[CombinedArms]

(Edit: Oops. While I was writing Jason C filed his report. Sorry for any overlap.)

What they said about attached tank and TD battalions. To amplify just a bit....

A US infantry division had a substantial amount of organic artillery and typically had significant--sometimes massive-- attachments of arty, as well, from the corps or even army level.

The infantry div's attached battalion of tanks is basically 1/3 the total of tanks in an armored division. If you add the same number of TDs, or another attached tank battalion, and you're at nearly 2/3 of an armored division's strength in armor, plus you've got a whole LOT more infantry. If one regiment was leading the attack, you could attach the whole tank battalion to that one regiment, and you'd have a company of tanks (17) for each battalion of infantry.

If you visualize a CM battlefield with a battalion of infantry and 17 tanks (way more than you usually get), then add in about five times as much arty support and air support as you're accustomed to, and you'll have an idea of the potential power of this kind of assault.

For an assault against a prepared position an infantry division was in many ways preferable--mostly because it had more infantry. The drawback of the armored division was that it was a short on infantry--each of the three Combat Commands had just a battalion of infantry per battalion of tanks. That meant that each tank company (17) had just a company of infantry as organic support. If that company took losses in the initial assault, it might be hard for the attack to continue. This explains why infantry divisions were used for attacks and armored divisions for exploitation.

Anyway, that was the doctrine--it didn't always work that way in practice. (Sometimes an armored Combat Command would actually be attached to an infantry division. This happened at Bastogne, for example, with the 101 Airborne and a CC of the 7th Armored (IIRC).) Still the US doctrine of attaching tank battalions, arty battalions, etc. to infantry divisions was for the most part highly flexible and effective, allowing for a concentration of strength at the critical point of attack or defense. There were drawbacks, but mostly it worked very well.

My guess is that about half of the US Army's tank strength was in the attached tank battalions.

[ 12-18-2001: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]</p>

[Mr. Johnson--]

Did the Russians have anything equivilent to a CCB or a Kampfgroup? Or were they just not that flexible?

[CombatGeneral]

Great information guys, thanks for the help, I had no idea you guys knew so much. Wow, you put my knowledge to shame.

[Simon Fox]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Third Canadian Division did just that during Charnwood - attacking the 12th SS Division (whether or not they were panzer, or panzergrenadier, they still had a goodly number of tanks). The Third Division did have armoured support from the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade for that one, as well as self propelled guns of at least one British artillery regiment.

You go with what you've got.

What gave the commonwealth infantry divisions their "punch" was the fact that they commited to set-piece battles with complex artillery fire plans that were designed to shoot them onto their objectives. There were also many independent tank and armoured brigades on which they relied increasingly for support, in essence creating divisional battle groups that would have been organized not unlike an armoured division.

IIRC US "infantry" divisions also had organic armour.

CW and US "armoured" divisions also had organic infantry, so it was never a case of one or the other - but in how the two arms were mixed.

A Canadian or British Armoured Division had one brigade of armour (three tank regiments (battalions)) and an armoured recce regiment (battalion) which in action usually was equipped like a standard armoured regiment. They also had one brigade of regular infantry (three battalions of 810 men each) plus a Motor battalion mounted in trucks, halftracks and universal carriers.

A standard Canadian or British infantry division had an armoured recce regiment equipped with scout cars (not tanks as in an armoured division), and three infantry brigades (dismounted) supported by a machinegun battalion (which also had mortars). As stated, these divisions were often supported by independent armoured formations, of which there were several in the British and Canadian forces.

So basically, that is that - and the fact that German tanks were not present in great numbers all along the front.<hr></blockquote>

Don't forget that British/Commonwealth divisions also had an AT regiment in their organisations. In the case of the infantry regiment this comprised 4 batteries each of 12 guns organised into troops of 4. At least two of these batteries would be self-propelled guns ie M10, Achilles or Archer.

As Mike has pointed out the Commonwealth had a considerable number of independant armoured brigades which were attached to infantry formations for specfic operations.

[JasonC]

The Russians had numerous different unit types and designations that effectively let them vary the armor to infantry mix, by committing a formation of the desired type at the point it was was wanted. They use some cross attachments and support assignments to help further this, but generally on a fairly permanent basis (for one battle or campaign), not shifting the attachments on the fly.

The basic counterpart to the western armor divisions was the tank corps, which called its major subunits "brigades", and had 3 armor to 1 infantry. However, only the infantry formation was the size of a western regiment. The tank "brigades" were the size of western tank battalions - 63 medium tanks, in 3 "battalions" of 21 each, as two "companies" of 10. The battalion was more like the western or German tank company, and the "brigade" was more like a western or US tank battalion.

In addition, each tank brigade had one battalion of infantry organic, often in the form of SMG armed tank rider units. As a result, a tank corps had the equivalent of 3 western armor battalions and 6 infantry-type battalions - a very useful mix, similar to the ratio of German panzer divisions. In the field, the tank brigades and the motor rifle brigade of the corps could act as KG or combat commands, e.g. by assigning one motor rifle battalion to each tank brigade, you get 3 task forces of 1 armor to 2 infantry battalion equivalents. Or two of them could be left armor heavy, while the third was attached to the whole motor rifle brigade, giving two TFs of 1-1 composition and one "ground holding" TF of 1-4 composition.

The mechanized corps was a similar formation in overall combat power, but had a different internal structure. Instead of 3 tank and 1 motor rifle brigades, it used 3 mechanized brigades (a third type) and 1 tank. The mechanized brigades each had an organic tank "regiment", which was essentially a half-battalion in western terms, with 32 medium tanks and no organic infantry. So overall, a tank corps have the equivalent of 2.5 armor battalions, working with 10 infantry type battalions - giving one half the tank-infantry ratio of the tank corp unit type.

Here again the organic brigades could function as KG or combat commands. If the tank brigade were split to support all three mechanized brigades, you got three teams each with 53 medium tanks and 3 1/3 battalions of infantry. If on the other hand it were left to support just one, you got two infantry heavy teams with 32 tanks and 3 battalions of infantry (similar in practice to US ID regimental combat teams with independent armor and TD support), and a third tank-heavy team with 97 medium tanks and 4 battalions of infantry - a very strong formation.

For lower levels of tank support, the Russians used independent armor brigades (read, "battalions") and regiments (read, half-battalions or the size of western TD and Pz Jgr formations) assigned at the army level. They could then be paired up with a rifle division, or spearhead its leading regiment. These options could create tank-infantry ratios as high as in the mechanized corps (independent brigade supporting one regiment), or as low as one tank platoon per infantry battalion (independent regiment supporting a whole division), the latter roughly the level of AFV support common among German Heer infantry formations with a few StuG.

They thus had the range of levels of armor support covered, from tank-heavy down to a little thin line-stiffening - depending on the kind of formation they assigned, where. By hard-wiring most of this into the unit designations, they effectively centralized this decision. Instead of a local staff officer at division deciding who to task with whom, an army level officer would send a tank corps or a mech corps or release an independent brigade or regiment - and the local commander would find the tank-infantry ratio decision made for him.

But the tank and mechanized corps commanders, who were the true counterparts to US and German armor division commanders, did retain some flexibility below the army level. By deciding how to task their four organic "brigades", they could effectively make KGs to suit the needs of the situation. Split this one to support those three, or pile these two here and leave those two alone - that was the practical decision still under his control. He also assigned corps level units like his SP arty, recon, attached SUs, etc, much like Panzer division commanders did with their division level "leftover" assets.

It worked fine as a system, if the tank or mechanized corps commander knew how to manipulate it properly. And it left such critical decisions essentially only in the hands of either army level, or armored formation "corps" level officers. Who were more likely to know what they were doing than green new replacement majors and colonels. Its greatest merit was that it was hard to completely screw up, because some infantry was organic to everything and all of the possible armor-infantry ratios were mostly sensible. This system was really only perfected in the course of 1943, incidentally.

I hope this is interesting.

[PiggDogg]

You know the neat thing about CM?

It is that one can see the forces & forces mixes of each side. Then one can see how each force & mix acted & interacted on the battlefield.

It has taken a long time (for me since 1958-60) for this sort of game/simulation to come about. However, in CM, one can actually see the book information applied in a visual, entertaining, and enjoyable manner.

Cheers, Richard

[Mr. Johnson--]

Thanks Jason, very insightful as always.