Manoeuvre, CM and Deep Thoughts

[The_Capt]

OK, I will first direct everyone to my tirad on Attrition and Manoeuvre in the ATTRITION thread.

First let me say that I will refer to the two above concepts in terms of modern military doctrine (as taught at the Canadian Staff College, we have american instructors and students too so both nations have roughly the same ideas). The two concepts are in fact philosophies and doctrine on "how to do business". The goals of Manoeuvre; dislocation, disruption and whatever the hell the last one was, are all aims of Manouvre doctrine but not the doctrine itself. One can be executing Manoeuvre doctrine by doing nothing or digging in to take the brunt of the enemies force "face on face" so long as it fully supports your commanders (and his commanders) intent, regardless of the mission.

Now let's discuss something really wild. Manoeuvre was developed to empower subordinates with the capability to exploit opportunity, within the guidance of just what in the hell the entire team is trying to do. This was done because warfare evolved around ones ability to "think faster/plan faster and move faster" and therefore be able to strike weakness and bring about decisive victory quickly. And troops on the ground have a much better view, and therefore, are in a better position to see opportunity when it comes.

Now CM is attritionist by nature, we direct almost every movement that happens, our troops do not carry out any major initiatives. If they did I have no doubt the "bug" posts would be endless.

The point is, should they?

Our Point of View (POV) is godlike in comparison to the real world we know much more than out troops do about the "big picture" we get instant feedback from out troops and even with FOW we get an instant picture of the battlefield. The entire reason why Manoeuvre doctrine is being adopted was because troops in the front have a better view of the battlefield than a commander hearing reports on the radio, we then empower them to act. Not so in CM we, the commanders, see and know everything faster and more completly than our troops, should not the power for decision rest with us.

All interesting stuff but answer me this; isn't modern combat beginning to look more and more like CM. The E-Battlefield is a reality right around the corner and it may render the philosophy of Manoeuvre as obsolete. The idea of striking weakness and flanking are not new gentlemen, it how one goes about doing it in which lies the future...your thoughts please.

[Henri]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

The idea of striking weakness and flanking are not new gentlemen, it how one goes about doing it in which lies the future...your thoughts please.

Well, I think I exposed my POV pretty much in the old thread on maneuver warfare I started some months ago and which has just been revived with some interesting discussions and the same flame wars.

I am happy to see someone here who has received recent training at the staff level giving his point of view, and I am happy to see that the Canadian army has apparently adopted maneuver warfare as an important concept.

I partially agree with your evaluation of CM as not fully allowing maneuver warfare due mostly to its flag-oriented scenarios, and this was the main reason for my being roasted on this forum some four months ago. I would qualify that by saying that CM does not ENCOURAGE maneuver warfare, but it does allow it occasionally.

Although I am an unconditional proponent of maneuver warfare, I usually find myself fighting attrition battles, although one could argue that is more a reflection on my warfighting ability than on the character of the game...

Henri

[Guest Big Time Software]

Hmmm... honestly I don't think it is wise to have two threads discussing the same topic. However, I did want to say that Henri's thoughts as follows...

I would qualify that by saying that CM does not ENCOURAGE maneuver warfare, but it does allow it occasionally.

... have been debated quite well, I think, in the other thread:

http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/015753.html

I'm not trying to steal anybody's thunder, but I think the discussion in the other thread is far enough along that moving to a parallel thread is only going to detract from the quality of the discussion by splitting it up. However, I am going to leave this one open unless The_Capt doesn't mind me closing it up.

Thanks,

Steve

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

Now let's discuss something really wild. Manoeuvre was developed to empower subordinates with the capability to exploit opportunity, within the guidance of just what in the hell the entire team is trying to do. This was done because warfare evolved around ones ability to "think faster/plan faster and move faster" and therefore be able to strike weakness and bring about decisive victory quickly. And troops on the ground have a much better view, and therefore, are in a better position to see opportunity when it comes.

A few years ago I read a book about Israel's Six Day War in 1967, and the author made essentially the same point. As he describes it, Israeli junior commanders basically had three directives:

1. Get behind the enemy.

2. Stir up whatever trouble you can.

3. Keep headquarters informed about what you're up to.

This tactic brought them brilliant success in that war. But I have since wondered how well it would have worked against a more experienced, disciplined, and determined enemy. I can see how it could lead them into traps where they could be annihilated in detail.

Michael

[Guest Big Time Software]

Michael:

This tactic brought them brilliant success in that war. But I have since wondered how well it would have worked against a more experienced, disciplined, and determined enemy. I can see how it could lead them into traps where they could be annihilated in detail.

Exactly. The Soviets were masters of infiltration, but they lacked skill and coordination for years. So even during the first weeks of the war in the East, Germans were finding tanks and infantry in their rear. While this happened previously, there was a difference -> the Soviet units generally put up a fantastic fight, no matter what the odds were. Although a lot of German effort had to be diverted to take care of these enemy forces, they were not very successfull in the big picture. Well, not for the first year or two.

Point is... if the enemy knows what it is doing, running around in the rear is a LOT more difficult than it otherwise could be. And if the side doing the running around isn't skilled enough, they are dead meat if the enemy is skilled.

This again underscores that Maneuver Warfare is NOT as easy to practice as it is appears to be.

Steve

[Grisha]

Steve,

I'm pretty much in agreement with you wrt maneuver & CM, and since it's all been said in the other thread I'll not take it any further. But I do have one question: is there presently a way for units to gain points by exiting off the map at specific locations? If not, will there be in CM2?

I feel the type of maneuver Henri is talking about is outside the scope of CM's game level, but feel that having such victory exit zones would be an eloquent way of defining where tactical maneuver does meet with CM.

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[Grisha]

Hmm. okay, my bad. Skimmed too quickly over the maneuver thread initially. This time I went over it again, but more slowly. Maneuver warfare...

Henri, I think what you are trying to explain is what Soviet forward detachments got very good at from 1944, on. Namely, decisive and innovative action through wide freedom of action, and a well balanced force composition. What you are talking about is not so much tactics, operations, or strategy as a command/control concept, or lack thereof. Kind of like the Dutch national footbal team of the Johan Cruyff days - the 'Orange Swirl'. Can CM simulate this? I really don't see why not, as long as it's player vs player. It probably won't work well with AI, but then present technology is incapable of creating the level of AI needed to do what you are thinking of. Present AI can make associations at best, but usually needs some form of distinct parameters to operate within. What you are looking for would require AI that was capable of jumping outside of its own parameters if it meant a better chance of attaining its objectives. Heck, a lot of people are incapable of doing that!

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

First let me say that I understand the doctrinal issues you are talking about, to be tangential to the more general debate about strategies. You are talking about modes of command and delegation, and the same words wind up being used simply because one motive for delegated decisions is seeking flexibility, etc.

On your "for the future" question as the battlefield gets more information intensive, I can give you a prediction and a subject to look at.

Instead of the level at which decisions are made, the command problem will become who is talking to, sharing info with, cooperating with whom.

Especially "up or down", and for "fire or movement". That is, not is decision A made by the captain or a sergeant, but is the sergeant on the com-link right here - in this tactical situation - *with*: a team E-4, or the lieu, or the battery, or that tanker? Connections between positions, rather than individual positions.

He has initial access to some important tactical information. Where does it go first? It will spread of course, but there is going to be an "information management" programming and command problem, much bigger than any the army has faced at the tactical level before.

The team has to adapt to the new information, downward - the information has to be conveyed to broader decision-makers and integrators - upward. Some of these will require actions to preserve friendlies besides the team itself, especially movements out of threatened areas. Some will require fire from outside assets.

Another trade-off to worry over is that there is some danger in "wiring" too much predictability into adaptive reactions, but speed is likely to be vital, and one will probably get "the more wired-in the faster". SOPs that can be changed might help that though.

Just some scattered thoughts for what they are worth...

[Wolfpack]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

Instead of the level at which decisions are made, the command problem will become who is talking to, sharing info with, cooperating with whom.

Especially "up or down", and for "fire or movement". That is, not is decision A made by the captain or a sergeant, but is the sergeant on the com-link right here - in this tactical situation - *with*: a team E-4, or the lieu, or the battery, or that tanker? Connections between positions, rather than individual positions.

He has initial access to some important tactical information. Where does it go first? It will spread of course, but there is going to be an "information management" programming and command problem, much bigger than any the army has faced at the tactical level before.

The team has to adapt to the new information, downward - the information has to be conveyed to broader decision-makers and integrators - upward. Some of these will require actions to preserve friendlies besides the team itself, especially movements out of threatened areas. Some will require fire from outside assets.

Well, if we're talking about the future, and how information is transferred between units and commands in the Army, I can offer a bit of insight on the future (and a bit in the present actually)in the US Army.

With the Force XXI systems that are now in place in at least the greater part of III Corps, the commands will all have access to the computer systems that relay nearly instantanious information on friendly and known and suspected enemy information to commanders down to (IIRC) Company level presently, but I think it was planned to eventually have smaller versions with access to information of a more tactical nature in individual vehicles. I was an operator on one of the systems, the MCS (Maneuver Control System) which tracks all movement and contact info, while others like AFATADS (Pardon me if that's the wrong letters, it's been a while ) Which is the artillery system, plot all the information for the other aspects of the battle (Fire missions ect) All the company level assets have updates posted up the line automatically up to Corps level (Possibly higher, but as of now, it was only up to Corps level) The fully updated maps including all boundries, further orders, areas, positions, ect are transmitted back down the line. In theory, updates would be recieved within minutes if not sooner. At the moment, a lot still has to be plotted manually, changes in boundries and other zones were pretty much a pain. Another problem was the system going down hourly. But the principle is really an important one, in that a company commander will have access to more information than ever before, allowing him to better understand his situation and make much more informed decisions while following his orders. We had some interesting experiences during our exercises, and in general, the system allowed all levels of command to respond to changes in the situation much faster than is presently possible.

Sorry if this was a bit unintelligable, it's pretty late, and I've been out of this for about a year now, so my memory may be faulty in parts.

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It is nearly always better to be beaten and learn, rather than to win and take no new knowledge from that victory.

[GriffinCheng+]

The "Attrition" thread and its inheritence are very good read and stimuates a lot of thoughts.

Side note

Appearently, the software designers of the piece Wolfpack describes have not seen CMBO yet.

BTW, it is on my thoughts right now about whether the VL plays determining role in CMBO, human-to-human MEQB type in particular. I am starting another thread on this.

Griffin.

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"When you find your PBEM opportents too hard to beat, there is always the AI."

"Can't get enough Tank?"

[The_Capt]

Steve,

I would ask we don't shut this one down as it is tangent to the continuing argument over Manoeuvre and Attrition raging around us. The question is not what they "were" or what they "are". I belive we all coming to terms with these concepts. It is a question of the future and how we will apply them. CM with FOW turned off is actually a desired end state in terms of information available to a field commander. The question is "How are we going to use it". This question is perhaps the most critical since the introduction of Total Warefare. Information Warefare will be more critical to future conflict than any here really understand and CM is a great vehicle to demonstrate this.

LCol Leonhart was a guest speaker at staff school and he gave some really deep insights into the future of warfare, which rocked the foundations of what we thought was the "Manoeuvre solution". In a true conflict in which we have "Information Superiority" Attritionist doctrine and methodology is better employed towards achieving Manoeuvrist objectives. We are looking at a hybrid evolution and I believe it stares us in the face every time we boot up and play.

[Forever Babra]

I don't think it's too great a leap of logic to suggest that when the commander has more info than the men on the ground, he is going to take a more active role in their movements.

[Henri]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

This again underscores that Maneuver Warfare is NOT as easy to practice as it is appears to be.

Steve

Very important comment.

As a matter of fact, this is precisely the reason why the Soviets were for the most part unable to practice maneuver warfare early in the war. Stalin's purges of 40,000 officers made it impossible to use Lobachevsky's theories efficiently until later in the war after the officer corps got some experience under their belt.

The Marine Corps warmaking manual rightfully stresses the need for proper training in order to apply the concepts of maneuver warfare.

You have to learn how to walk before you can learn how to dance

Henri

[The_Capt]

It also was no great leap of logic that a machine gun and breech rapid fire artillery will render the horse cavalry as irrelevent but guess what?

The shift of mentality required to take that leap is unbelievably enormous and has implications on training, doctrine and even who we choose to lead an armed force.

Training of subordinates to exercise Manoeuvre has been an absolute nightmare. To actually teach a junior officer that "disobeying an order" is a good thing in the right circumstances is almost as hard as teaching a senior officer that true sins are ones of "ommission" not "commission" and when a jr officer takes initiative we do not stomp on them even when it goes bad, we instead analyse why they did it and allow them to learn from it.

This is leading down a totally different path in what is wrong with the military and how Manoeuvre and military mindset (most that is) do not mix well. The officers who are in fact the best warriors for Manoeuvre are in fact the ones who do not go anywhere and wind up with all the ****ty jobs in peacetime. The when operations start up you are stuck with a senior officer Corps wholly unprepared to deal with rapid fire decsion making....Ok now I am on a Canadian military rant....time to count to ten and remember this is just a game.

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

This is leading down a totally different path in what is wrong with the military and how Manoeuvre and military mindset (most that is) do not mix well. The officers who are in fact the best warriors for Manoeuvre are in fact the ones who do not go anywhere and wind up with all the ****ty jobs in peacetime. The when operations start up you are stuck with a senior officer Corps wholly unprepared to deal with rapid fire decsion making....Ok now I am on a Canadian military rant....time to count to ten and remember this is just a game.

I can attest that the same thing happens out here in the civilian world too. To cut a long argument short, I have long since reached the conclusion that we as human beings have not yet succeeded in escaping human limitations. Or to put it another way, stupidity, like gravity, appears to be a force of nature.

Michael

[Forever Babra]

All leaps of military doctrine require a pioneer, someone to step forward and say "Let's do it this way". That pioneer also has to be in a position to actually implement the change, a Bruchmuller, a Guderian.

Until then, keep manoevering

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When it's my turn to march up to Glory,

I'm gonna have one HELL of a story...

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

A few years ago I read a book about Israel's Six Day War in 1967, and the author made essentially the same point. As he describes it, Israeli junior commanders basically had three directives:

1. Get behind the enemy.

2. Stir up whatever trouble you can.

3. Keep headquarters informed about what you're up to.

This tactic brought them brilliant success in that war. But I have since wondered how well it would have worked against a more experienced, disciplined, and determined enemy. I can see how it could lead them into traps where they could be annihilated in detail.

Michael

I think you have hit upon a great point. Many of what is cited as examples of "maneuver" have been against enemies of questionable quality.

[The_Capt]

Of course who better to defeat by these means? A quick easy (read cheap) victory against a poor opponent.

In fact one of the best cases for true Manoeuvre not happening, was in the Gulf.

Not on our side but on good-ol Saddams. If he had been a true military genius instead of a raging control freak, with distinct thug-like qualities, he would have hit hard and first against a weaker opponent. Yanks and Saudies (sp?)

Not only would have this strategic Manoeuvre supported a clear intent (which he did not have) of ruling the Middle East but would have;

a. Forced the Coallition to operated from another location, Turkey maybe.

b. Gained control of 40% of the worlds oil.

Too far, perhaps but it sure beat taking a tiny bite and getting slammed. Saddam really blew the estimate on that one. He guessed wrong on the reaction of just about everybody and didn't have the balls to take steps to render that reaction moot.

I would think that good-ol Saddam is a student of history and therefore prone to apply it to the present (a dangerous practice) and hoped to pull off a Hitler, slow nibbling of ground until we get what we want.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

Of course who better to defeat by these means? A quick easy (read cheap) victory against a poor opponent.

In fact one of the best cases for true Manoeuvre not happening, was in the Gulf.

Not on our side but on good-ol Saddams. If he had been a true military genius instead of a raging control freak, with distinct thug-like qualities, he would have hit hard and first against a weaker opponent. Yanks and Saudies (sp?)

Not only would have this strategic Manoeuvre supported a clear intent (which he did not have) of ruling the Middle East but would have;

a. Forced the Coallition to operated from another location, Turkey maybe.

b. Gained control of 40% of the worlds oil.

Too far, perhaps but it sure beat taking a tiny bite and getting slammed. Saddam really blew the estimate on that one. He guessed wrong on the reaction of just about everybody and didn't have the balls to take steps to render that reaction moot.

While he probably would have been more effective if he did that, if he could, but why would you call this "maneuver"? Running an arguably superior armor force over Saudis and their allied American para-troppers doesn't smack of anything special to be called "maneuver".

[Spook]

Your Gulf War "what if" is a good example in a way, Capt. But given the demonstrated qualities of the Iraqi military (before & during the war, like against Iran) and its limited understanding of combined arms operations, the effectiveness of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia will always be speculative. Against the Saudis alone, perhaps viable. With the USA & other NATO-based troops added in, not impossible, but much less viable.

What I find useful about this thread and its contribution to the new "Maneuver vs. Attrition" debate is that now an added factor is being discussed that was downplayed earlier: the nature of the enemy.

For me, trying to determine whether to use a maneuver-based method or an attrition method is pointless unless the following is first defined:

1) What is your objective?

2) What is the nature of the enemy? What is his estimated numbers, mobility, firepower, deployment, and doctrines (as best as can be known)?

3) What is the nature of the battlefield? What terrain, weather, climate constraints?

4) What are your force's capabilities?

Regardless of what scope the battle is (tactical, grand-tactical, operational), only when the points above are addressed can a reasonable plan for maneuver or attrition be made. And as Capt noted earlier, a commander & his subordinates have to be flexible enough to shift from one "doctrine" to the other if it is to their advantage.

Let's use the Gulf War's ground campaign (VII Corps sector) again as an example. The ground war kicked off with an initial attritional "shock" that shattered the depleted & demoralized Iraqi frontal units deployed along the Iraqi border. The VII Corps soon broke free to maneuver up north such as to "flank" the Republican Guard formations closer to Basra. However, when the VII Corps turned east to attack the RG, the RG had "rotated" to meet the US & UK troops. So in the final armor battles, it actually became an "attrition" situation.

But in this particular case, the attrition fell virtually onto one side. The Iraqi RG tanks didn't have thermal imaging, laser rangefinders, enhanced AP ammo, sufficient C3I, or close air support in multiple echelons. The US/UK side did.

The Gulf War situation was hardly an "average" war situation in its circumstance, and Saddam did much to hang his own troops out to dry. But both attrition & maneuver methods played their role quite emphatically.

[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 02-02-2001).]

[Guest Big Time Software]

CavScout wrote:

While he probably would have been more effective if he did that, if he could, but why would you call this "maneuver"? Running an arguably superior armor force over Saudis and their allied American para-troppers doesn't smack of anything special to be called "maneuver".

I am pretty sure the Capt meant in the Big Picture sense. A quick push into Saudi Arabia, even if costly, would have been far more in keeping with Maneuver Warfare thinking than hunkering down and waiting for the bombs to fall. As the war played out in real life, Iraq's forces were ground into the sand. They had little chance to do anything but die. Ultimately I think they were doomed, but the lack of imaginiation meant that they were crushed all the more easily.

BTW, the Gulf War is a perfect example of the two sided coin of Attrition and Maneuver. The air campaign against Iraq was pure operational Attrition warfare at its finest. Crush the enemy's forces as hard as you can, don't leave anything of military value left untouched. Target spotted = planes launched = bombs dropped = target destroyed (hopefully). Seek and destroy on a routine basis.

However, there was a strategic goal to all of this Attrition warfare. And that goal was as true to the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare as can be. Destroy every imaginable means of the enemy's war making capability using the least risky and costly (in human terms) method possible, THEN and ONLY THEN engage the enemy in a head to head land based confrontation which itself uses Maneuver Warfare principles as its foundation. The Coallition Forces never once lost the iniative in any meaningfull way. They called the shots from the start all the way until the end. And the numbers don't lie. Iraqi armed forces were slaughtered in huge numbers for a *statistically* insignificant loss of friendly life. Since that is the primary goal of Maneuver Warfare, it can be seen as a total success (militarily).

Steve

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

However, there was a strategic goal to all of this Attrition warfare. And that goal was as true to the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare as can be. Destroy every imaginable means of the enemy's war making capability using the least risky and costly (in human terms) method possible, THEN and ONLY THEN engage the enemy in a head to head land based confrontation which itself uses Maneuver Warfare principles as its foundation. The Coallition Forces never once lost the iniative in any meaningfull way. They called the shots from the start all the way until the end. And the numbers don't lie. Iraqi armed forces were slaughtered in huge numbers for a *statistically* insignificant loss of friendly life. Since that is the primary goal of Maneuver Warfare, it can be seen as a total success (militarily).

While the results may have been the "goal" of "Maneuver Warfare", it is difficult to argue that it was "Maneuver Warfare" that got you there. Even so-called "attrition" warefare aims for the same results. The Allied Forces applied superior firepower against the enemy. In my mind, this is more applicable to "attrition warefare".

Some point out the "left hook" by allies as some great indicator of "Maneuver Warfare" but "turning the flank" has always been a goal in combat.

[Spook]

Some point out the "left hook" by allies as some great indicator of "Maneuver Warfare" but "turning the flank" has always been a goal in combat.

Well, in qualification, it would be the goal of any sensible commander. But historically this wasn't always the case. Burnside at Fredericksburg, Lee at Gettysburg, and Grant at Cold Harbor are examples in the ACW alone of idiotic "head-on" attrition.

Now let's drift closer to topic for CM by using a good example of a WW2 maneuver failure: the Ardennes.

In certain respects, the Ardennes plan could be considered as compelling. Its basic idea, to attack UNEXPECTEDLY through a poorly defended sector with concentrated force so to sweep behind the northern Allied armies and entrap them, follows along strong "maneuverist" tenets.

But the attack failed. In fact, it had a basically 0% chance of success IMO. It violated my earlier points #2, #3, & #4 in this way:

1) The Germans lacked sufficient "mobility" & logistics to keep up the speed.

2) The terrain & weather worked more AGAINST the German attack than for it. The road nets were usually inadequate, and the poor weather made the unpaved roads almost unusable.

3) Worst of all, the ability of the US forces to respond was grossly underestimated. How can you outflank an opponent who is relatively more mobile than you, is able to respond quicker, and has control of the air? I am firmly of the opinion that any German units that did get over the Meuse would have been cut off & annihilated instead.

The point to all this (as Steve & others have also pointed out) is that there is a time & place for either "doctrine" to apply. The trick is to first address the issues I noted earlier, and then to have the necessary intuition & flexibility in using either "doctrine" for guidance.

[The_Capt]

Some point out the "left hook" by allies as some great indicator of "Maneuver Warfare" but "turning the flank" has always been a goal in combat.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Spook:

Well, in qualification, it would be the goal of any sensible commander. But historically this wasn't always the case. Burnside at Fredericksburg, Lee at Gettysburg, and Grant at Cold Harbor are examples in the ACW alone of idiotic "head-on" attrition.

Lee at Gettysburg? What were the attacks on Little Round Top for?