Manoeuvre, CM and Deep Thoughts

[Henri]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

I would think that good-ol Saddam is a student of history and therefore prone to apply it to the present (a dangerous practice) and hoped to pull off a Hitler, slow nibbling of ground until we get what we want.

In fact Saddam has gone to great lengths to let it be known that his idol is Stalin.

Henri

[The_Capt]

Even Better!

[CavScout]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

As to Saddam; Even more inclined with Manoeuvre, if he had soley indicated an intent to "dominate the Middle East" starting with the mission into Kuwait and allowed (nay encouraged) a Manoeuvrist Commander in the theatre to see that the Saudies were unprepared and no Americans weren't there, that commander could have then conducted "Operational Manoeuvre" to accomplish the intent of his Supreme Dictator and been overtop of the Saudies and any American forces long before they had months to build up enough forces to defeat him. Remember this is a "what-if" scenario but I have found you can learn just as much from watching how somebody lost as you can from how another won.

So you describe "Maneuver Warfare" as having less rigid orders?

[Henri]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Since that is the primary goal of Maneuver Warfare, it can be seen as a total success (militarily).

Steve

True, Steve, but a small quibble. The first thing that the Allies did was to destroy the communications capabilities of the Iraki army, thus making it practically impossible to transmit orders to units, who were left to fend off on their own without any guidance.From this point on, the resuot was inevitable.This is pure maneuver warfare, in the sense of the indirect approach: destroy the enemy's communications thus paralyzing their military.

But I do agree that after that the battles still had to be faught, although against an enemy who was blindfolded.

As an aside, it is interesting to note that the book by Leonhard has a whole chapter on the Gulf War, where despite the success, he levels some serious criticism of the way in which the war was fought (and I confess tht I haven't read that chapter...)

Henri

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Henri:

True, Steve, but a small quibble. The first thing that the Allies did was to destroy the communications capabilities of the Iraki army, thus making it practically impossible to transmit orders to units, who were left to fend off on their own without any guidance.From this point on, the resuot was inevitable.This is pure maneuver warfare, in the sense of the indirect approach: destroy the enemy's communications thus paralyzing their military.

The "first" thing they did was go after the air force and AA sites. Once they were free in the air they started attriting the Iraq military, from top to bottom. How one can claim this as "maneuver warefare" is beyond me.

That's like claiming the naval bombardment (air war)of a beach prior to a beach landing (ground war) is somehow maneuver.

[Vanir]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Lee at Gettysburg? What were the attacks on Little Round Top for?

I'm pretty sure he was referring to Picket's Charge, which was the decisive action.

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You've never heard music until you've heard the bleating of a gut-shot cesspooler. -Mark IV

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Vanir:

I'm pretty sure he was referring to Picket's Charge, which was the decisive action.

How do you define decisive? Had the flank been turned at LRT, Gettysburg would have turned out quite differently. Pickett's charge seems to me to be a last gasp after the battle had already been lost.

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[CavScout]

Originally posted by Vanir:

I'm pretty sure he was referring to Picket's Charge, which was the decisive action.

Picket's Charge was a result of Lee being unable to turn the flank. If Lee had routed Chamberlin's men, I doubt Picket would have been asked to do what he did.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

How do you define decisive? Had the flank been turned at LRT, Gettysburg would have turned out quite differently. Pickett's charge seems to me to be a last gasp after the battle had already been lost.

I agree.

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Lee at Gettysburg? What were the attacks on Little Round Top for?

another quote from CavScout:

Originally posted by CavScout:

Some point out the "left hook" by allies as some great indicator of "Maneuver Warfare" but "turning the flank" has always been a goal in combat.

You answered your own question.

That was the point of LRT.

The entire Gettysburg campaign and battle (not just day three) was a classic example of attrition warfare.

There was no reason to even attack the union lines to begin with other than an effort to beat the Unions on the field again in the hopes of a negotiated peace. The town or ridge was not strategically meaningful in any way.

LRT was just a method to carry out Lee's plan of attrition. Pickets charge was a desperate and foolish attempt motivated more by pride and stubborness than anything else.

If Lee had been very interested in maneuver warfare, he would have left the Union army in posession of Cemetary Ridge and attempted to strategically outflank them and get between them and Washington, forcing the Union to attack the Confederates on the ground of Lee's choosing.

Jeff Heidman

Jeff Heidman

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

How do you define decisive? Had the flank been turned at LRT, Gettysburg would have turned out quite differently. Pickett's charge seems to me to be a last gasp after the battle had already been lost.

Absolutely correct. Pickets charge was not even in the ball bark of the decisive action.

I would even go so far as to say that LRT was not really decisive. The battle was probably lost when the Confederates failed to push through the ridge on day one.

But Lee's strategy as a whole was basically one of attrition. His goal was to find, fix, and destroy the Union army. Where he did that and under what circumstances were not overly important to him.

Jeff Heidman

[Spook]

Guys, all of you citing "Lee and Little Round Top" are missing the point.

Lee DID NOT instruct that LRT be attacked. Nor did even Longstreet. Lee DID want to flank the Union position on July 2 which was PRESUMED to extend down to the Codori House on Cemetery Ridge. But that's another story.

LRT was attacked because Gen. Hood intended his division to "drift" that way even though he wasn't allowed to march south & east of it as was his desire. And he was wounded very soon after his division started attacking in front of Houck's Ridge, so even Hood wasn't in charge of the LRT engagement.

Of course I meant the July 3rd frontal assault in my attrition example. That was Lee, and Lee alone pushing for that. Even so, Lee was begged upon by Longstreet (July 1, late in the day) to "move around" to the right of the enemy position south of Gettysburg. In the grand scheme of the Gettysburg Campaign, Lee opted for attrition instead of maneuver when contact with the AoP was made. There were reasons for this (the lack of sufficient cavalry among these), but it certainly wasn't his only option.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

You answered your own question.

That was the point of LRT.

The entire Gettysburg campaign and battle (not just day three) was a classic example of attrition warfare.

There was no reason to even attack the union lines to begin with other than an effort to beat the Unions on the field again in the hopes of a negotiated peace. The town or ridge was not strategically meaningful in any way.

LRT was just a method to carry out Lee's plan of attrition. Pickets charge was a desperate and foolish attempt motivated more by pride and stubborness than anything else.

If Lee had been very interested in maneuver warfare, he would have left the Union army in posession of Cemetary Ridge and attempted to strategically outflank them and get between them and Washington, forcing the Union to attack the Confederates on the ground of Lee's choosing.

No, my point was Lee tried to turn the flank by going after LRT. It happened to fail. Why is that flank maneuver "attrtion warfare" but a similar but sucessful flank turn in the Gulf is considered "maneuver warfare"?

It seems that some define "maneuver warfare" as anything that works. If it didn't work it must have been "attrition warfare".

Cav

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"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "'Wehrmact penis envy.'"--D. Bolger

Co-Chairman of the CM Jihad Brigade

Founder of the CMers who like playing the Allies Club

[Spook]

If Lee had been very interested in maneuver warfare, he would have left the Union army in posession of Cemetary Ridge and attempted to strategically outflank them and get between them and Washington, forcing the Union to attack the Confederates on the ground of Lee's choosing.

Desirable in theory, Jeff. The problem is, that without Stuart's presence until mid-July 2, that wasn't going to happen. The Union cavalry screen was too "thick" both to the north & south of the Union positions on July 2-3 to allow that Lee's ANV would be able pull off a strategic "shift" into an advantageous position, without Meade & the AoP knowing of it.

Lee could just as well had pulled his forces back to Cashtown and hoped that Meade would attack him head-on there. Or "stood down" in place at Gettysburg until Stuart & the rest of Longstreet's troops had come up. But recognizably, that's yielding the initiative to the Union side.

[Faust]

I guess one way to find out the "Attrition and Manoeuvre" aspects of CM is to do a small QB, your own side defend with all Elite units, the other side Conscript and/or green, and do a raid/manouuvre in the enemy's rear. Sounds easy. I tried it. It ain't easy! Unfortunately, quantity outperforms quality.

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by CavScout:

No, my point was Lee tried to turn the flank by going after LRT. It happened to fail. Why is that flank maneuver "attrtion warfare" but a similar but sucessful flank turn in the Gulf is considered "maneuver warfare"?

I did not say that the flank maneuver was attrition warfare, I said Lee's tactics in general were an attempt at attrition warfare.

In fact, I specifically likened my response to that question to your response to the question of the gulf war. I think that measn I was agreeing with you.

The Gulf War was a fine example of attrition warfare. The overreaching goal was the destruction of the enemies force in the field.

It seems that some define "maneuver warfare" as anything that works. If it didn't work it must have been "attrition warfare".

Cav

Maybe. It wasn't me though.

Jeff Heidman

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

"idiotic "head-on" attrition"

There they go again.

Frontal attack does not equal idiotic. I prove it out of the battles of Napoleon.

At Jena he attacked frontally against an inferior force and won decisively because the defenders were scattered. At Wagram he attacked frontally and won decisively by breaking the enemy center. At Borodino he attacked frontally and won, a more even battle. At Dresden he sortied against the enemy center, when the enemy was too spread trying to threaten his flanks, and won. At Ligny he attacked frontally and broke the enemy center. At Waterloo he attacked frontally and lost, but it was, in the words of the defender, "the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life".

Even at Austerlitz, probably the greatest success of grand tactical "manuever" since Cannae, the decisive movement was a frontal attack on an enemy tricked into turning Napoleon's flank, or in other words a frontal attack on an enemy attempting a flank march while near contact.

And his largest defeat, Leipzig, was a frontal attack by the combined Allies, that he could not stop because of weight of numbers.

"Oh, but that was only in that era". Grant in the Wilderness, U.S in WW II at St. Lo and in Lorraine, Ridgeway in Korea - all succesful use of frontal attacks.

It is no more correct to equate frontal attacks with "idiocy" than to equate running between the tackles in football with "idiocy". It is one of the options open to whoever has the initiative or an odds edge or both, and it is also often a highly effective way of seizing or maintaining said initiative (ask the Russians, post Kursk through Bagration or even down to the end of the war).

Nor does attrition equal idiotic. If you want to establish such a proposition, you have to actually argue it. Pretending it is true by definition, or trying to make it seem true by endless repetition of question-begging statements, will not suffice to make it so.

Have their been dumb frontal attacks in history? Sure, and Pickett's charge is fine example. Have their been dumb flanking attempts in history? You betcha, see Austerlitz above.

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by Spook:

If Lee had been very interested in maneuver warfare, he would have left the Union army in posession of Cemetary Ridge and attempted to strategically outflank them and get between them and Washington, forcing the Union to attack the Confederates on the ground of Lee's choosing.

Desirable in theory, Jeff. The problem is, that without Stuart's presence until mid-July 2, that wasn't going to happen. The Union cavalry screen was too "thick" both to the north & south of the Union positions on July 2-3 to allow that Lee's ANV would be able pull off a strategic "shift" into an advantageous position, without Meade & the AoP knowing of it.

Knowing about it and doing something about it where two different things. Lee had already succeeded in drawing the Union Army away from Washington. He had the option of attempting a flanking move, and if it didn't work, so what? He can keep jockeying for position.

Certainly almost anything would have been better than the chosen course of action.

The point however, is not what we can hypothesize could have done, it is what he *did* do, and why.

What he did do was to accept the Union Army's offer of a set piece battle when they had the advantageous ground.

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"idiotic "head-on" attrition"

There they go again.

Frontal attack does not equal idiotic. I prove it out of the battles of Napoleon.

Maybe I did not read him correctly, but I do not think Spook said that *all* frontal attacks are idiotic, I think he said that some where.

Your football analogy is excellent, IMO. If your guards can blow away their tackles, why shouldn't you run between them all day?

Similarly, as a high school football official, it pains me to watch a team "committed to the run" get pounded because some coach is not imaginative enough to think up something else when he does not have the horses to accomplish what he considers "good old-fashioned football".

Jeff Heidman

[Spook]

Maybe I did not read him correctly, but I do not think Spook said that *all* frontal attacks are idiotic, I think he said that some where.

You read me correctly, Jeff, thank you. I did not intend to mean that either "attrition" or "head-on attack" are inherently idiotic methods at all times.

What I meant in the three ACW cases were that the frontal attacks done in each battle were conducted in a relatively idiotic fashion, and for no gain.

Go back to my three examples---Fredericksburg, Gettysburg (July 3rd), Cold Harbor. Other examples abound through the 19th/20th centuries like Waterloo and ultimately a large portion of the WW1 trench fighting.

In these cases, all that the head-on attacks in the noted battles produced were massive losses to the attacker with little to no material gain, or without proportional damage to the defender.

But I am not intending to use my examples as to advocate one war "method" over the other. I merely used my examples to cite when a method DIDN'T work (except when relating the Gulf War). Recall that I cited the Ardennes as a failure in maneuver in turn. The CONCEPT of maneuver was there, but the MEANS to apply it effectively weren't.

We can go round & round again in this circular argument, but what it really comes to is this: in the present day, do our field commanders have the means, and seek the flexibility, so to know which attack "doctrine" is appropriate to apply? THAT is the real issue here. Otherwise, all of the referencing of historical examples here is meaningless.

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by CavScout:

I think you have hit upon a great point. Many of what is cited as examples of "maneuver" have been against enemies of questionable quality.

E.g., Germany. All of Germany's decisive victories were against second- or third-rate militaries (Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and Greece) or against nations that were so divided politically as to be able to put up an effective defense (France and Yugoslavia again). Every time they came up against anyone even approximately their equal, they lost. In a real sense, they were typical bullies.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by CavScout:

It seems that some define "maneuver warfare" as anything that works. If it didn't work it must have been "attrition warfare".

Ha! I think you're right.

Michael

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Fair enough on "I didn't mean all", except there is a definite tendency that way in misidentified examples. For instance, in the same post in which the fellow agrees he didn't mean all, he calls Waterloo an example of s dumb frontal attack that caused terribly losses for the attacker and no corresponding damage to the defender.

The problem with this lovely notion is that it is not true. It fits and reveals the pre-conceived idea that all frontal attacks are stupid and fail because they deserve to. But Napoleon, not exactly the dumbest general in all history, looked over that field and decided on a frontal attack. And the Duke of Wellington, an acknowledged master of defensive warfare in the era, himself called in the "nearest run thing you ever saw in your life", which hardly sounds like a fruitless and idiotic attacker loss, easily repulsed.

If any of you doubt it, try something like the Battleground Series BGW version, firgue out what Napoleon's plan actually was (it becomes reasonably apparent with the terrain in front of you) and impliment Napoleon's actual plan. You will find it was in fact quite dangerous to the defenders.

In the historical event, it took a number of passages of arms breaking their way - notably the perfectly timed charge of the heavy brigades, and the result of their clash with the French Cuirassiers supporting the French infantry - for the British line to hold at all.

I can explain more at length to anyone who cares to know, but the point remains. The fellow sees examples of stupid frontal attack everywhere because he is predisposed to regard every frontal attack as stupid, so he sees them when they are not really there. That does not mean there aren't any, obviously.

On the subject of Gettysburg, while the 3rd day was obviously a mistake, it is not so clear Lee had the freedom of action monday morning recommends to him, or that Longstreet recommended at the time. People overlook the logistic aspect of campaigns in the era of armies moving on foot.

Lee had just completed a long flanking march through mountain valleys with quite limited supplies throughout them, and was undoubtedly eating out such food as existed within foraging distance of his line of march. He is often criticised for not having the cavalry with him, but its forays to the north and east had at least allowed Rhodes and Early's divisions to forage in the lower, more fertile territory east of the mountains.

The flank march south that Jeff recommends was recommended at the time by Longstreet, and it may well have been a better course. But it meant trying to supply the army in a hostile countryside that large portions of the Union army has just marched through, which would thus probably yield rather little in the way of food. The men in the meantime were probably living on dried peanuts and hardtack.

The success on the first day opened the possibility that Lee might successfully dislodge the AoP, prevent its concentration, and thereby gain very useful space east of the mountains, with all the improvement in the supply situation that would have involved. It is not too surprising that he ordered an attack on the 2nd day, therefore. He hardly knew as much as we do today, about how much of the AoP had arrived in time for the next day's battle.

None of which excuse the stubborn attack of the 3rd day. But the point is that wide manuevers over any portion of a map are not always practical for a foot-bound army, especially one that has just made a long march through relatively uninhabited mountain country. In case anybody forgot, the battle started when Heth's men went toward the town looking for *shoes*, because many of them had worn out the ones they had in the march north.

For what it is worth...

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

E.g., Germany. All of Germany's decisive victories were against second- or third-rate militaries (Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and Greece) or against nations that were so divided politically as to be able to put up an effective defense (France and Yugoslavia again).

How was France so divided politically that it could not put up an effective defense?

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

How was France so divided politically that it could not put up an effective defense?

A fair question. An adequate answer would involve all the entangled national policy going all the way back to the end of the First World War, and would be impractical for me to attempt here. I would instead point you to a book on the subject like To Lose a Battle: France 1940 by Alistair Horne.

Michael