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Where are all the Allied SMGs?


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No, more than one Australian division served in North Africa. I know the 7th and the 9th Infantry divisions did so, for example. New Zealanders and South Africans also fought there, along with Indians, Free French, and Polish forces.

[ 06-27-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

You mean like indiscriminately slamin’ Guy Sajer or Paul Carrell :D<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yeah, I knew I should have edited that out!

:D You got me good. Hey, do as I say, not as I do! ;)

But I never did say anything about Carrell; I've never read him. As for Sajer, I have always referred people to my GD site and let them judge for themselves. I don't think I was indiscriminate.

Nonetheless, I have been known to throw out generalizations....doesn't make it right!

:eek:

[ 06-27-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Well, I think 36,000 SMGs in an army of ~4 divisions is rather a lot. I'd expect that is one man in 3-5, or 2-3 per squad even if they were no more common in the infantry than in other parts of the formation. It is also more than 1000 SMGs for every infantry-type blahblahblahblah.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Reread my post. The Sten was a throwaway weapon. Unless you have some kind of data on wastage rates, the rest of the discussion is pointless.

And what math did you use to figure 1000 SMGs per battalion of infantry? You don't even know what First Canadian Army comprised!

Are you including all the Infantry Reinforcement Holding Units, the divisional battle schools, the Canadian Forestry Corps, the Provost units in England, the various Detention Barracks, all the Field Engineer Squadrons and Ordnance Parks, and No. 1 Canadian Tobacco Depot?

Let's not get too ambitious with the calculator!

If you have indeed factored all this in, please let me know the War Establishment of a Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Holding Unit, complete with breakdown of weapons on issue. I am dying to get my hands on this info.

[ 06-27-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

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"Reread my post".

Done. Change none of my conclusions a whit. I read it the first time.

"The Sten was a throwaway weapon".

Might matter for relations between production figures and number in a unit (stock vs. flow considerations), but hardly does so when you quote a number actually present (stock vs. stock).

"Unless you have some kind of data on wastage rates, the rest of the discussion is pointless".

Non sequitor of the typical Dorosh variety. Unless everything is known, nothing is known. Worse, unless everything is known by Mr. Dorosh, nothing is known by anybody. This is a bit of bad rhetoric, not of logic. If they have 36,000 Stens on hand, that is the number on hand, regardless of the number lost to wastage over the previous year.

The wastage rate would only be relevant if one were trying to "map" all the production onto all the "establishment strengths", aka the number on hand at a given point in time. But you provide a figure for the number on hand at one point in time, and no wastage considerations are needed to use that figure, as it is already a "stock".

Even then, the relevant question would be the -relative- wastage rates of Stens and MP40s, not of the absolute wastage rate of Stens. A subject I did address, when I pointed out that all SMGs have low "life expectancies" because the men using them do, and that furthermore the wastage rate was likely to be higher for a retreating side than for the side advancing. Also, Thompsons were certainly not throwaways, and nearly match overall German MP production on their own. There simply is no avoiding the general point that the Germans had fewer SMGs overall.

"And what math did you use to figure 1000 SMGs per battalion of infantry?"

I quote (you, in case you forgot to read what you told me to go re-read) "for two infantry divisions, one armoured division, two armoured brigades, and ancillary troops of all descriptions". That is an establishment with around 30 infantry-type battalions, including infantry, MG, infantry-type recon, and engineers. Under 36 of them anyway. And since 1000 is more than the front line infantry strength of one, that means there was no absolute lack of Stens in the whole formation. I explicitly said "that does not mean that is where they were", merely that they were available.

You ignore the other figure I gave, of one per 3-5 men, which implies a total numerical strength of 108,000 to 180,000 men for the formation. The establishment strength of the combat units you named is on the order of 62,000 (18500 for an infantry division, 15000 for an armor division, ~5000 for an armored brigade). Allowing 2x to 3x that divisional strength for "ancillary troops of all descriptions" strikes me as generous, especially in a matter of small arms available, which clerk typists might not count full for.

"Are you including all..."

I take the number in the combat formations at full TOE, and I generously allow 2-3 times that number to account for the rest of the higher and rear echelons. In a matter of small arms availability, that is perfectly adequate, and it is also a wide range.

Since there are only around 30 infantry-type battalions in those formations you listed, and since by your own account they were ~3000 Stens above TOE, that is enough for not "a couple extra" per platoon, but more like a couple extra per squad - thus enough to bump the line squads up to 4 Stens apiece, if the rear area and other arms were at TOE. Perhaps it is just a coincidence that that would mean the "rush with grenades" team in each squad could be Sten armed. It is also close to what CM gives British airborne, which I mentioned as a more believeable mix for realistic field conditions.

Overall, you have presented nothing against any of my conclusions. Your "argument", such as it is, seems to be that because you do not know all the details of rear area establishments of Canadian training units, therefore Germans magically had 3 times as many SMGs in front line infantry units despite the Allies making 6 times as many overall. Then you pretend that anyone disputing that, rather than those saying it, are the ones making heroic assumptions.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Many crews were armed with M1 carbine (not tank crews who used M3 SMG)....Still, it was harder than people imagine for a US solider in Europe to dump the garand and pick up a SMG in all but the heaviest action...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

These are both good points, Slapdragon.

It is interesting to note, however, that it was easier for a Canadian to get his hands on US weapons (though not necessarily ammunition) than German (or Chinese) ones. Americans (I presume mainly officers or senior NCOs) were very willing to trade .45s and M1 carbines for liquor (and Canadian officers received an issue of alcohol, something Americans could only envy in both WW II and Korea).

A Korean War veteran friend of mine tells me that between 1/3 and 1/2 of weapons in Canadian battalions in Korea were obtained from the Americans. Bercuson tells us the same things in his recent history of Korea.

The myth of "scrounged" Chinese burp guns remains, according to him, just that.

I think the point here is that while individual weapons were indeed charged to specific soldiers, there must have been some leeway when it came to officers (those who found themselves with the luxury of divesting themselves of their .45s and M1 carbines), or else there were a lot of enterprising supply sergeants.

None of which dilutes your point that the average dogface would have been in for it by losing his personal weapon.

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Funny, I heard many veterens quoted in Canadian made books saying that, in world war 2, the only weapon American infantry weapon the Canadians thought was worth buying was the Thompson. They always said "Our Lee Enfields were reliable, accurate and fast firing, it was better than the mouser, and thats all that mattered."

Lee Enfields were popular with the Troops, as wiht the Bren, but not the Sten :(

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Smack:

Funny, I heard many veterens quoted in Canadian made books saying that, in world war 2, the only weapon American infantry weapon the Canadians thought was worth buying was the Thompson. They always said "Our Lee Enfields were reliable, accurate and fast firing, it was better than the mouser, and thats all that mattered."

Lee Enfields were popular with the Troops, as wiht the Bren, but not the Sten :(<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I talked to a Calgary Highlanders veteran in April who swore by the Sten - he absolutely loved it. He also won the MM and the DCM, which was a rare feat indeed. He went on to fight in Korea, too.

But you are right - most of the other Canadians (read Whitaker's book on Dieppe for some quotes on this) called it the Plumber's Nightmare (some vets have used the term Plumber's Abortion to me also).

William's book The Long Left Flank has a neat quote about Americans - I think you are right in that Canadians didn't envy the Americans much. They thought the American winter clothes weren't that good, for example. They looked down on a lot of American stuff that was in actuality pretty good, but you make a good point in that what they had was good enough to beat the Germans.

SMGs don't count for much when you have 25 pounder artillery on call at a minute's notice, and 4.5 and 5.5 artillery on call if you really need it as well.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mr. Johnson-<THC>-:

ummm, wasn't the "burp" gun the MG42?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, I think most grogs will agree that the reference belongs properly to the German MP-38 and -40 with occasional references to the US M-3 as well by some troops.

I don't recall a nickname other than "spandau" ever apllied to the German MG's and even that was about as accurate as "schmeisser" for the SMG's.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

No, more than one Australian division served in North Africa. I know the 7th and the 9th Infantry divisions did so, for example. New Zealanders and South Africans also fought there, along with Indians, Free French, and Polish forces.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

However many aussies it was, they all went home in 1942. The NZ division was also almost pulled home but Churchill promised RN support for Singapore and teh Repulse and Renouwn were destroyed instead - probably just as well for us IMO!

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Ya, I am a fan of the Enfield. What else have you heard from veterens about it? I only have quates from certain books about the Lee Enfield. I am trying to build a case in its defense, as ALOT of my American buddies (really good guys) seem to believe that the Canadians and British were wrong to not use the M-1 and the soldiers didnt like the Enfield!

Thanks Micheal

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Actually, what I find more interesting than where all the Stens went is why the Japanese didn't really spend the time and effort to produce an SMG. Can you imagine fighting the Japanese in Burma or Guadalcanal with 15 man SMG squads? :eek: It would seem to be the ideal weapon for that environment too.

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Somebody, I don't know who cause all I did was skim the post, said I shouldn't throw out information like the kind I had posted. Ok, then tell the VETERANS who said that cop to not post as well asshole. Thank you suckerduck for your time. smile.gif

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Getting back to Jason's main points we have a series of assumptions and deductions from the evidence that he has gathered (production figures for SMGs - which may or may not be accurate),

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

So, where were they, and where are they? Tank crews? Gun and infantry teams? Drivers? Rear echelon you-know-what-ers? If so for a large numbers, it raises two additional interesting questions.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The assumption here is that the 4 1/2 times as many SMGs in use by the western allies are all assigned to the various Allied troops described in a proportion greater than the Germans may have assigned to these same troops (perhaps 4 1/2 times greater since that is the ratio from the production figures?). Therefore, the "interesting" question that is raised:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>One, isn't it rather distorting to disallow these "side arms" to fire (e.g. mortar crews, etc) while infantry does, when the weapons mix varied along the lines of this rule? (I.e. Allied crews more likely to have SMGs, German crews more likely to have rifles?).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This statement uses this logic: IF the Allies produced more SMGs than the Germans THEN all these 'extra' SMGs must have been assigned to the various service troops described in a ratio greater than the Germans assigned to their service troops. THEREFORE, it is unfair to the Allied player in CMBO to remove the ability of mortar and gun crews to fire these 'secondary' weapons since the German player gets to use the SMG to its full advantage and the Allied player does not.

Naturally the IF, THEN statement is loaded with some very BIG assumptions that are presented as a 'rule' as Jason said (none of which backed up by any TO&E data). This assumption being that more Allied gun crews were issued SMGs than German gun crews and that the ones issued were done so in a larger ratio - and we come to this assumption SOLELY based upon some production figures for various SMGs in use by the warring powers and some reasoning based upon these production figures. This assumption ignores (of course) the notion that the Americans had a purpose designed weapon for these types of troops (the carbine) and does not show us any TO&Es to prove that SMGs were in fact used by any of the combatants in the manner and ratios put forth as fact.

Even taking these assumptions at face value, there are other issues as well. Game related issues that have been discussed in depth before. Presumably where Jason sees the Allies making full use of this 'feature' of gun crews is in mass SMG rushes when their primary weapon has run out of ammo or perhaps after they have bailed out of a tank. The 'gamey' crew rush complete with SMGs locked and loaded.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Two, how many of these abundant SMGs found their way to the front?[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This one really isn't all that relevant since CM uses TO&E information. If you were to start straying off into 'field' TO&Es you could start getting all sorts of wierd and inventive combinations based upon ... what really? Common knowledge or possibly the same type of reasoning displayed here? I'll take a pass thank you.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

How many of the produced US SMG's were shipped Lend Lease?. I have seen photos of UK, & Soviet personel with Thompsons.

Regards, John Waters<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Lots. They didn't use Stens at all in Italy, the Thompson was used by all Commonwealth section commanders.

To answer the other question - the Lee Enfield was valued over the M-1 because it was bolt action.

In WW I the British actually put magazine cut-offs in the Lee Enfield so they would only hold one round at a time. They were big on ammo conservation and individual marksmanship. Which is why they did not adopt the FN until well into the 1950s - and with much controversy.

Dunnee - you ARE the weakest link. Goodbye!

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The Allies have units with 1/10 SMG (standard), and with 1/3rd SMG (airborne only). I consider this rather silly, and also think the loadouts in the airborne squads are probably closer to ad hoc realities than the vanilla "TOE", pure rifle, types.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I agree and for reasons distinct from any consideration of production figures. Anecdotal evidence certainly supports a greater than TOE number of SMGs in British platoons. Typically the Brits admired the "Schmeisser" and officers especially acquired them when they could, that and the Italian Beretta. Many 1st Airborne officers jumped into Holland with their trusty "Schmeissers".

Having said that I have little doubt that the rifle was preffered in most situations. SMG use didn't ever seem to reach the levels of official German TOEs. This raises the question of why the superiority of SMG infantry in CM compared with reality? I wonder if the simplicity of the CM firepower model doesn't in some way detract from the effectiveness of the rifle. For Brit troops it seems that the SOP was to carry the rifle but the ready availability of SMGs meant that in situations where they were required, they were used. For example in night or urban

type operations. In those cases I consider the airborne squad types in CM to be a perfectly reasonable simulation of historical practice (though I'd have a hard time documenting it :D ).

Personally I think the British squad should have 1 extra SMG and the same for the PltHQ. That and the airborne squads being considered less gamey.

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Simon, there is also bonafide (as opposed to anecodal) evidence that infantry platoons were issued extra Stens.

I only have one truly solid bit of evidence of them being used - when the Calgary Highlanders crossed the Albert Canal in September 1944, they sent just one section over a damaged lock gate. All ten men were armed with Stens - it was a night operation - save one, who had a Bren. The sergeant leading the patrol was nominated for the VC but Monty personally turned it down and gave him the DCM instead. Now that I remember that, I think I should revisit the "worst commander" thread come to think of it.

None of which shows any link between production figures and actual usage (as ASL Vet points out).

Would be interested in knowning if the officers who jumped with Schmeissers were the same ones who jumped with hunting horns and umbrellas...(!)

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

I agree and for reasons distinct from any consideration of production figures. Anecdotal evidence certainly supports a greater than TOE number of SMGs in British platoons. Typically the Brits admired the "Schmeisser" and officers especially acquired them when they could, that and the Italian Beretta. Many 1st Airborne officers jumped into Holland with their trusty "Schmeissers".

Having said that I have little doubt that the rifle was preffered in most situations. SMG use didn't ever seem to reach the levels of official German TOEs. This raises the question of why the superiority of SMG infantry in CM compared with reality? I wonder if the simplicity of the CM firepower model doesn't in some way detract from the effectiveness of the rifle. For Brit troops it seems that the SOP was to carry the rifle but the ready availability of SMGs meant that in situations where they were required, they were used. For example in night or urban

type operations. In those cases I consider the airborne squad types in CM to be a perfectly reasonable simulation of historical practice (though I'd have a hard time documenting it :D ).

Personally I think the British squad should have 1 extra SMG and the same for the PltHQ. That and the airborne squads being considered less gamey.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

For political reasons, the Carbine made it up front more than the SMG unofficially. I am currently basing this assumption on two points. #1: a SMG gunner needed special training and a skill digit change to officially be issued with that weapon instead of a Garand (which was default), but carbines did not require a skills digit change because they were considered rifles, so a rifleman could use the carbine (of course I am not suggesting that a soldier could not pick up an M1 or M3, just that an infanbtryman was officially a "rifleman" and was suppose to recieve a course and a change to "submachinegunner" when they switched weapons. #2 Carbines become more prevalant in combat photographs pact October 1944, until it is common to see them in ordinary soldiers hands on patrol. (Indeed, by Korea, although the Army officially wanted to keep Rifleman away from automatic weapons, carbines became the answer to the "burp gun" problem faced by US soldiers on night patrol.

I do not doubt at all that it would be easier for Canucks to get US weaponsin trade because they would be trading with rear area types. A dog face who trades his rifle is in deep ****. A rear area type who grabs a rifle from a pile of "returning weapons" (those are weapons turned in or recovered from dead or seriously wounded soldiers by graves registration or medical units and not returned to unit armories because of distance or difficulty in tracking the weapons owner) and uses it to trade for comforts.

Also a US dogface was reluctant to carry a German weapon because several armies in ETO had strict rules against "non issue weaponry" which only the commanding Generals could afford to ignore. While a pistol might be retained, an enemy SMG or rifle would have to be hidden, and carried WITH the issue weapon. In particular 3rd Army was very tough on this, while the arnored infantry might be a little easier. on it because the SMG could get ditched in a track.

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"japanese tactics that allowed them to be successful"

The "successful" Japanese achieved a whopping 1 to 10 kill ratio, a colonial era figure. Their most successful "tactic" was tunneling. They fought very bravely and stubbornly, but they got their clocks cleaned, because they were woefully outnumbered, underarmed, unsupplied, faced terrific fire support, and their offensive tactics were lousy.

They were used to fighting underarmed Chinese levies who ran away at the first sign of a charge. Trying that against US Marines resulted in stacks of bodies and no gains.

The single biggest improvement they made during the war was abandoning the Banzai charge - with fighting up in the hills and caves instead of right on the landing beaches the runner up.

Their primary killers were the Nambu LMG fired from bunkers, and dropping arty on positions where they were underground and the Allies were up top, out in the open. On the whole, though, the Japanese were completely outclassed, in land fighting too.

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In answer to ASL Vet, I am interested in his theory of the use of Allied SMGs. Does he think they were used as crowbars? Hoes for kitchen gardens? Ad hoc wheat scythes, perhaps?

1 SMG per infantry squad simply will not soak up the SMGs we know were produced. Nor will slightly higher usage in comparatively small formations like the Airborne, Rangers, or Marines. If the usage figures for the Germans are even close to correct, then somebody had a ton of the things.

Personally, I think they were probably used up front rather more than CM depicts. I also think they were probably more common in the hands of teams than colt .45s.

Do I want gamey crew rushes with SMGs? No, certainly not. But I do think when gamey German SMG rushes sweep onto a mortar team (et al), they would not defend themselves with strong language, as they do in CM today.

It is also noteworthy that common German squads manage to fire 2 MG42s as well as all their side arms, MPs and rifles alike, while a US para squad with organic .30 cal has a seperate slower 3-man team for the MG, with lower ammo and no firing side arms.

I have also mentioned repeatedly what I consider the primary drawback in CM modeling of SMGs, their equality in ammo expenditure with mostly rifle-armed squads. But that is a seperate issue from CM not modeling the existence of large numbers of SMGs we know existed, simply because they are Allied.

The second issue compounds the problem created by the first. Instead of a drawback in modeling the trade-off between rifle accuracy and SMG rate of fire, we get overmodeled SMGs on one side and magically disappearing ones on the other (if they were in teams, then teams unable to fire compounds this), netting to a serious balance issue.

As for how to handle teams, I'd model their side arms the same as for infantry squads, but (1) give them low ammo for the side arms, (2) have them fire them only at close ranges, like 100 meters or less, and (3) reduce the fp per weapon by perhaps half compared to regular squads, to reflect fewer men up and firing, as well as relative inexperience. If that is too hard in programming terms, I'd at least do something like that for completely bailed teams or completely out of ammo ones.

Of course, that is in the category of suggestions to BTS. To designers, I have already (long since) suggested that SMG heavy squads get less ammo and mostly rifle squads more, in the 30-50 range. And I have also suggested, here, use of the Allied paratroop infantry types to reflect ad hoc weapons mixes with more SMGs, whether the troops being represented were Paras or not.

For the Germans, I also tend to use the Rifle 44 and 45, and Security infantry types, with 2-3 MPs per squad rather than 5-8. VG rifle squads are OK too.

I know from experience how much better the other types work, and have written about it extensively (to loud howls of supposed disagreement I might add, all of it false in my opinion). But such silliness gets old after a while.

The "thesis" that German infantry fought better because they had lots of machine pistols, and the Allies didn't know that machine pistols worked better and thus didn't have any of them - which is implicit in CM game systems as they stand - I find simply does not stand rational scrutiny. The Germans did not have more machine pistols to begin with. Like other technological reductions, it is an after the fact false explanation.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Smack:

Ya, I am a fan of the Enfield. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Me too - I've only fired 3 types of WW1/2 vintage rifles - a 1977 Mk4*, a 1944 Moison Nagant, and a 1915 SMLE - and the SMLE was by far the smoothest easiest one of them.

The Russian rifle was a cut down version with a fixed folding bayonet. It had a HUGE muzzle flash, kicked like a mule, and the action was difficult to use and as rough as guts.

The Mk4 was, of course, similar to the SMLE, but nowhere near as smooth!

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