CAS and its effectiveness revisited

[Guest tero]

I found some new evidence to put the alledged effectiveness of CAS in doubt. These figures are for USAAF only as I have not located any compatible comparative data on RAF yet.

At

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_list_of_tables_operations.html

I found the official figures on sorties, expended ammunition and bombs and the numbers of lost USAAF aircraft. I really find it odd the real historians claim these figures are indeterminable.

Number of bombing and strafing sorties flown by fighters in Europe during Normandy June and July (if we count them as being flown during the fighting in Normandy) was in fact 20,418 sorties, not 2,891 as the source at http://militaryhistory.education.webjump.com/ claimed. The total number of bombing and strafing sorties in 1944 is 79,590 and 87,244 in 1945. Granted these figures include all bombing and strafing sorties conducted in the entire ETO but since the grand total of sorties in ETO during the period June and July was 170,974 and a fair proportion of them (even 8AF) were flown in support of Overlord I deem that 20,418 to be fairly close to the true number of CAS sorties flown by the Americans.

The targets destroyed during Normandy according to aafsd_list_of_tables_operations.html are as follows:

Motor transports 1,945; AFV's 155; locomotives 194; rairoad cars 2,117; bridges 32; gun emplacements 34; dumps 4; factories et al 42; railroad cuts 107; vessels and barges 3; horse drawn vehicles 365.

NOTE: almost twice as many horse carts as AFV's

http://militaryhistory.education.webjump.com/ lists "motor transport destroyed" 2,520 and "armor destroyed" 134 and "total claims" 2,654. If we cound the cathegories from the official source we get 155 AFV and 1,945 motor transports, total destructions 2,100. The claims per sortie is counted as 0,92 but the "real" ratio is 0,103 if we count only these cathegories. If we take all into account the "real" kill per sortie ratio during Normandy is close to 0,24.

Unfortunately I have not been able to verify the RAF figures found in http://militaryhistory.education.webjump.com/

Nevertheless in light of these offical figures I must conclude that the relative effectiveness of CAS in Normandy and beyond is far from the established, propacandistic version put down into the annals of WWII.

More food for though.

I found this thesis on RAF doctrine at

http://home.istar.ca/~johnstns/tacair/ass.html

CABRANK and its use:

"CABRANK Because of limited flight time, in order to keep a CABRANK filled, there had to a continual rely of aircraft directed to a CABRANK. CABRANKs were considered a profligate arrangement and were sparingly used, except at what were deemed to be critical junctures. They were generally only established at the points of major offensives."

On the breakdown of RAF sorties:

"Impromptu vs Pre-arranged Requests Unfortunately it is not clear from the records, but probably about 60% of the Composite Groups' sorties were consumed by armed reconnaissance, 25% by pre-arranged targets, and 15% by impromptu requests.

Armed Reconnaissance There was a slowly dawning realization during the campaign that of all the mission profiles flown by 2nd TAF, "armed recce" was doing the most damage to the Germans. However, there is little discernable pattern to where the armed recces were sent. In large part, they appear to have been simply "shotgunned" out on the basis of availability and what were perceived to be fertile hunting grounds."

Artillery support vs CAS

"It seems that in the heat of battle practice ran away from doctrine. Arguably this reflected the difficulty of the moment, and the limitations of the doctrine in the first place. Certainly the Army critics would view it that way. However, the one thing the Allied armies were not short of was fire support. Indeed, it seems quite clear that the artillery was the most effective of the combat arms by far in all of the Western Allies' armies. This, and the fact that Armed Recce rather than close support proved to be the most fruitful mission profile suggests that close suport was indeed, in most cases, a dispersion of effort.

In retrospect, Slessor's original arguments would seem to have been right all along -- tactical air power should concentrate upon operational level targets, rather than tactical ones. Sometimes, in crucial battles, the operational level targets may lie right upon the front lines, but generally they do not."

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-15-2001).]

[Guest Germanboy]

tero - excellent post. I also found a couple of nice pictures of Germans on horses, horse-drawn carts etc.pp in Russia. Just have to scan them. None in combat though

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Guest tero]

>I also found a couple of nice pictures of Germans on horses, horse-drawn carts etc.pp in Russia. Just have to scan them. None in combat though

There has to be some out there.

I have a picture taken during the summer of 1944 of a Finnish horse drawn field artillery piece (76mm?) in the middle of forrest road firing and hitting a tank (according to the caption anyway). The horse limber is not in sight but it must be near by.

But lets keep this thread focused on CAS and not dead horses.

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-15-2001).]

[Sirocco]

"It is also worth mentioning that the commander of the 3rd Company of the 503rd Tiger Battalion... described... how one of his 57 ton tanks was literally turned upside down by the force of the explosions, and how one of his men was drive insane and two more committed suicide during the attack. Four of his Tigers were destroyed and the rest had to be dug out of the earth and debris which covered them."

- Steel Inferno, Michael Reynolds, p.174-175

This was part of a preparatory raid for Operation Goodwood by 1,500 British and American heavy bombers. The important thing to note is not how many Tigers were knocked out, but how many were buried by the severity of the bombing, were then dug out and were subsequently serviceable. I can only presume the knocked out Tigers were victims of direct hits. But what are the chances of a fighter-bomber getting a direct hit..? I have to assume that most bomb or rocket attacks were either complete or near misses.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[tailz]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sirocco:

This was part of a preparatory raid for Operation Goodwood by 1,500 British and American heavy bombers. The important thing to note is not how many Tigers were knocked out, but how many were buried by the severity of the bombing, were then dug out and were subsequently serviceable. I can only presume the knocked out Tigers were victims of direct hits. But what are the chances of a fighter-bomber getting a direct hit..? I have to assume that most bomb or rocket attacks were either complete or near misses.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Goodwood's bombardment is not an example of CAS, but the misguided use of the strategic force (later repeated prior to Cobra) And the odds of a fighterbomber getting a 'hit' would be quite good I would assume... it was their job, practiced day after day... ask any German tanker that was the victim of a Tiffy run. 'Buried'?... I think the author was taking dramatic/creative license... As the results of Goodwood would show, the bombing was not that effective overall, and hindered the advance as much as helped it. (not to mention killing Canadians at the start line)

Tailz

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Problem one is the terminology. Some writers mistakenly refer to everything tac air does as close air support, probably because they mentally drop the "close" and include all of the effects of air support. The proper distinction is between the mission of interdiction and the mission of close air support. In layman's terms, the first of those means the fighter-bombers go hunting along the roads behind the enemy lines and shoot up anything they spot. The latter means looking for targets within weapons range, "in contact", of friendly forces, on call or by smoke grenade or air-panel signal, etc. It appears the Brits called the interdiction mission "armed recce".

Of the totals mentioned, the 20000 sorties by tac air over Normandy certainly do *not* count as all CAS. Most of those are interdiction missions. The 15% of the British sorties listed as in response to improptu requests is more like the CAS total. If the U.S. was flying those at the same rate, it might mean 3000 sorties of CAS in the Normandy fighting. If the U.S. was flying less interdiction and more CAS, 6000 maybe, at the outside.

The conclusion is that true CAS missions were conducted at a rate of 50-100 a day along the Normandy frontage. That works out to one or two pairs of fighter-bombers per division per day, or a perhaps a 25-50% chance of a battalion in the front line receiving CAS sometime in a day's fighting (in doctrinal deployments anyway). Higher on clear days, to be sure - the Normandy fighting occurred in a period with considerable overcast.

A company's chances of getting a Jabo's support on the front line, an a clear day in Normandy, in a particular hour of combat? 10% at best. By contrast, it could count on support from the plentiful Allied artillery.

But if the conclusion from that is that tac air didn't do much, that would be quite wrong. Its contribution was just made via the interdiction mission, not the CAS one. Area fire by artillery behind the front was quite ineffective. Fire on targets the engaged forces could see was comparatively easy for the artillery. But the planes could see their targets on the rear area roads, when no FOs or gunners could. It is not surprising that is where they made a serious difference.

And it is a serious difference. The figures for locomotives and rail cars amount to 4 trains a day blown up, which might mean 10-15% of all the supplies the Germans were getting. And the cumulative total of more than 2000 vehicles is even more important. You may not realize it, but that figure could easily amount to half the transport of the German force in Normandy, and the impact of the lose of so much of its transport, on the ability of the German force to manuever or to supply itself in place, let alone to supply itself while trying to move after the breakout, would be enourmous.

The effect of tac air success in interdiction would be felt in vehicles lost to mechanical failure for want of parts, attacks prevented by lack of fuel, inability to move forces rapidly over roads to meet an attack, etc. Not big booms on the tactical battlefields of CM scale fights.

The CAS 5-10% presence could be there, certainly. It just was not anything like the importance at the front line, in the usual scheme of things, of the 105mm tube artillery (or 25-lbers) and the 81mm (or 3 inch) battalion mortars.

[Guest tero]

>Problem one is the terminology. Some writers mistakenly refer to everything tac air does as close air support, probably because they mentally drop the "close" and include all of the effects of air support.

Then again the source does only say "strafing and bombing missions" without any regard to the nature of the mission as such.

>Of the totals mentioned, the 20000 sorties by tac air over Normandy certainly do *not* count as all CAS.

No they do not. But if you took a look at the "destructions" chart it bunched clear interdiction targets with CAS targets. Some 200 trains and some 100 rail cuts do NOT indicate that some 80% of the missions can be racked up as interdiction cathegorically.

>Most of those are interdiction missions.

Based on what assumption ? Not according to the target profiles.

>The 15% of the British sorties listed as in response to improptu requests is more like the CAS total.

What happened to the 25% pre-arranged targets ?

>If the U.S. was flying those at the same rate, it might mean 3000 sorties of CAS in the Normandy fighting. If the U.S. was flying less interdiction and more CAS, 6000 maybe, at the outside.

Based on what ?

>The conclusion is that true CAS missions were conducted at a rate of 50-100 a day along the Normandy frontage.

Sorties made by a single plain or or sorties comprising of, say, 500 planes (making it in effect 500 sorties) ? Please get YOUR terminology straight.

>That works out to one or two pairs of fighter-bombers per division per day, or a perhaps a 25-50% chance of a battalion in the front line receiving CAS sometime in a day's fighting (in doctrinal deployments anyway).

But the missions were NOT designed with a pair of planes in mind ! They were flown by the Squadron.

>Higher on clear days, to be sure - the Normandy fighting occurred in a period with considerable overcast.

According to different sources the overcast days were not THAT common.

Must dash. More later.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sirocco:

"I have to assume that most bomb or rocket attacks were either complete or near misses.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Was that the same bomb raid that dropped short and killed several dozen Poles and Canadians? All kinds of dangers inherent in "dumb" weaponry back then. Keller was the only Canadian general wounded in action in WW II when Third Div HQ got pasted. An American general, McNair, got killed during the carpet bombing for Cobra.

[GriffinCheng+]

The air "support" Germans faced during Operation Goodwood and Cobra was also known as "carpet bombing" where bombs were laid upon an area. Caen was effectively turned into rubbles in this process.

Interdication by air was practiced by both sides way back early in the war. It was used to interrupt or destory troop movements and worse, supplies.

CAS was described by Germans early in the war as "flying artillery", and that infamous Stuka dive-bombing picture comes into mind. When a troop met with an enemy strongpoint or tough resistance, aircraft was called in to deal with them. As the war developed, CAS meant more than just "bombing". Specialized aircraft like IL-2, Hs-129, Ju-87G, Fw-190F/G, Typhoon, etc were deployed to "strike" enemy targets, with certain "precision", in the front.

Remeber the part in "A Bridge too Far"? The British commander laid a purple smoke grenade to direct fighter-bombers when his tank columns got nailed by hidden PaKs in the woods. That is CAS.

My $.02.

Griffin.

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"When you find your PBEM opportents too hard to beat, there is always the AI."

"Can't get enough Tank?"

[This message has been edited by GriffinCheng+ (edited 01-16-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

When tac air breaks out its strafing and bombing missions, it is seperating them from their air superiority/fighter sweep, bomber escort, and V-1 interception missions, and the like. Most of the planes in the command were not dedicated ground attack aircraft at all, and the ground attack aircraft were all capable of multiple missions.

The target mix of 2000 trucks and 200 trains most certainly does mean that most of the bombing and strafing missions were interdiction. Interdiction does not mean "trying to blow up a bridge", as I suppose it might to some contemporary air tasker. It means destroying anything moving on the lines of communication of the enemy forces. The supplies of the forces at the front are the target, and the idea is to prevent their arrival and destroy their means of delivery. That is "interdiction".

As for the pre-arranged targets, for a target to be pre-arranged it has to sit still, and most CAS targets do not fall into that category. Bridges sit still, and railroad marshalling yards, and culverts or railroad cuts. V-1 launch sites too. All of which tac air was going after. If you "pre-arrange" to blast a Panther platoon or attacking infantry company, they are miles away under a camo net or in foxholes when you arrive bright and early at 10 o'clock the following day. The closest thing to a CAS mission that might be "pre-arranged" would be so kind of counterbattery work, but even that is unlikely because batteries moved. It would be much more likely to actually catch them as a target of opportunity called in by an L-5 spotting plane while they were firing.

When I spoke of the number of "true CAS missions", I meant the number of fighter bombers delivering real CAS to forces in contact on an average day. Of course squadrons flew missions. They also broke up to go after targets, but WW II fighter aircraft always operated in at least pairs (to protect each other in the air if it became necessary), hence my estimate about the number of pairs of FBs that might be expected to support a ground unit of a given size.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by GriffinCheng+:

Remeber the part in "A Bridge too Far"? The British commander laid a purple smoke grenade to direct fighter-bombers when his tank columns got nailed by hidden PaKs in the woods. That is CAS.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Don't know how it ended in the movie, but in Real Life, according to Ryan, the air support was ineffective and the Irish Guards had to 'persuade' a German officer to point out where the guns were, then to destroy them by other means. That also was CAS

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[GriffinCheng+]

IIRC, the sequent goes like this:

"First the British laying heavy artillery bombardments onto the suspected German positions. But they caused little damange to the dug-in and well-hidden Germans.

Then the British column shows up, make up of mostly Shermans, I think, down the road. The hidden German PaK and squads wait patiently for the front to pass by and then, score a flank kill on the third Sherman in the column.

All hell breaks loose, PaKs, MGs and rifles roar from the woods. A number of tanks and HTs are burning and soliders escaped from burning wrecks are either pinned or running in panic. Some tried to fire back but only to add to causalities.

The British commander in an AC sees the chaos orders a purple smoke grenade is laid near to the German position and the radio calls for air support.

Next, as the combat mounts, the Allied air cover arrives. This time the Germans are on the run: PaK are KO'ed, soliders are running in panic or get killed as the bombs drop into the woods. Now the British soliders regain the grip. They advance into the German position with the support of MG and tanks, capturing all surviving Germans."

It is just from my rusty memory so I decided to go home and play it again on my DVD player.

Griffin.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Don't know how it ended in the movie, but in Real Life, according to Ryan, the air support was ineffective and the Irish Guards had to 'persuade' a German officer to point out where the guns were, then to destroy them by other means. That also was CAS

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

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"When you find your PBEM opportents too hard to beat, there is always the AI."

"Can't get enough Tank?"

[Sirocco]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tailz:

Goodwood's bombardment is not an example of CAS...And the odds of a fighterbomber getting a 'hit' would be quite good I would assume... it was their job, practiced day after day... ask any German tanker that was the victim of a Tiffy run<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The point I was making was that tanks generally require a direct hit to knock them out while thin-skinned vehicles can be knocked out with near misses.

And the chances of getting a direct hit would be good..? War isn't a videogame. Put yourself in the seat of a WW2 fighter-bomber, dropping down at speed from altitude, aiming at a tiny target on the ground, in cover, possibly moving, with ground fire coming up at you. Now what do you think your chances are of hitting that..?

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Sirocco]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by GriffinCheng+:

IIRC, the sequent goes like this:

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The more you read about Market Garden, the more a work of fiction it seems to be!

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[tailz]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sirocco:

The point I was making was that tanks generally require a direct hit to knock them out while thin-skinned vehicles can be knocked out with near misses.

And the chances of getting a direct hit would be good..? War isn't a videogame. Put yourself in the seat of a WW2 fighter-bomber, dropping down at speed from altitude, aiming at a tiny target on the ground, in cover, possibly moving, with ground fire coming up at you. Now what do you think your chances are of hitting that..?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm not denying that it was an aquired skill, but a skill that (obviously) the allied pilots had. (and the Luftwaffe certainly had a mastery of it during the initial years) As for the chances of a direct hit... the stats on the thousands of vehicles (tanks, SPG's etc, in addition to 'soft' targets) speak for themselves. Allied air severely hampered the progression of German armour to the Normandy front, as well as turned Falaise into a cauldron of destruction. It wasn't just 'luck'...

Tailz

[Sirocco]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tailz:

I'm not denying that it was an aquired skill, but a skill that (obviously) the allied pilots had. (and the Luftwaffe certainly had a mastery of it during the initial years)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, if airpower in WW2 was so accurate, why, in 1991, when Iraqi armour was out in the desert, did we need a ground war..?

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Banshee]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sirocco:

Well, if airpower in WW2 was so accurate, why, in 1991, when Iraqi armour was out in the desert, did we need a ground war..?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You have a fundamental lack of understanding of war and airpower.

Airpower will make ground wars easier (by isolating the battlefield, limiting supplies, and demoralizing/destroying troops in place) but it will never, ever ,replace troops going in and occupying the ground that the enemy occupies.

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Veni, vidi, panzerschrecki

[Guest Wildman]

Couple things.

9AF was the point for interdiction and CAS sorties. And the majority were Interdiction. CAS required a AAF officer (pilot) in the field with his radio to call in the strike. Interdiction was kill everything east of Caen, etc.

8AF was redirected from daylight bombing in Germany to the transportation net in France. It was directed at Marshaling Yards, Bridges (although the 9AFs fighters did most of this), docks, railroads, etc. This is where the "buring" of the Tiger tanks happened. Although the only record of buried tanks was from the shelling from the battleships, however, I could be wrong there.

CAS was infrequent compared to today, and the AAF made no distingtion between CAS and Interdiction at the time.

I reality CAS at the tactical level is difficult today and extremely difficult then. Even now fighters are not cleared to fire within approx 10klicks of the FLOT. In the Gulf they were issued kill boxes XXmiles behind the lines, and that is by definition INTERDICTION.

---

[CavScout]

I think it is tough to compare CAS of today versus that of WWII.

You fly a bit slower in a P47 over a modern jet fighter.

Then there is the lack of SAMs and such.

[tailz]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sirocco:

Well, if airpower in WW2 was so accurate, why, in 1991, when Iraqi armour was out in the desert, did we need a ground war..?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Dunkirk... The classic attempt to win a ground battle with airpower alone. Goring, feeling his Luftwaffe wasn't getting a starring role in the rapid conquest of France, affirmed it would destroy the remnants of the British Army at Dunkirk. (while the exhausted panzer forces sorted themselves out and waited for supplies to catch up.) In the end, it only proved you can't win a ground battle with airforce alone. Airpower can knock the enemy on his or her can, but in the end, you need a guy with a gun to take the turf.

[Michael Dorosh]

Correct for the most part - Pantelleria was the only exception I can think of - the entire garrison of the island was induced into surrendering by airpower alone IIRC. So I wouldn't say never ever

That was a truly rare exception, however.

To address the original question - the Canadian national news last night had a piece on Iraq today - tons of American and Japanese goods for sale everywhere. They asked the question "who won"?

I don't think the ground war went far enough.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Banshee:

You have a fundamental lack of understanding of war and airpower.

Airpower will make ground wars easier (by isolating the battlefield, limiting supplies, and demoralizing/destroying troops in place) but it will never, ever ,replace troops going in and occupying the ground that the enemy occupies.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[Sirocco]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Banshee:

You have a fundamental lack of understanding of war and airpower.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Banshee, you made exactly the point I was making. Airpower isolates battlefields. It denies an opponent supplies. Tanks are useless without fuel, ammunition and spares. It has always been the case that airpower did that, rather than destroying tanks outright, per se.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Sirocco]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CavScout:

I think it is tough to compare CAS of today versus that of WWII.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It seems the point I was making was lost. I was using a rather general comparison to show that fighter-bombers don't dominate against tanks as some here seem to believe.

And BTW, I would expect the modern optics, better weaponry and countermeasures available to pilots today compensate for the increase in speed and AA.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[tailz]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sirocco:

It seems the point I was making was lost. I was using a rather general comparison to show that fighter-bombers don't dominate against tanks as some here seem to believe.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

General comparisons of what? Fighter bombers (ie Typhoons) slowed the movement of German armoured forces to a crawl during the Normandy campaign. (and not just by railway/bridge destruction... they were getting shot apart on the 'drive to the beach'... had to travel at night, because day travel was suicide.) If it was German and moved by day, it could be guaranteed of becoming a target for FB's. Even staff cars got chased down!! (Rommel) The modern version of the fighter-bomber... AH-64 or the A-10, so without Air Superiority (to keep the FB's away), air assets can and will dominate armour.

The joys of combined arms warfare.

[Kanonier Reichmann]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

>

I have a picture taken during the summer of 1944 of a Finnish horse drawn field artillery piece (76mm?) in the middle of forrest road firing and hitting a tank (according to the caption anyway). The horse limber is not in sight but it must be near by.

But lets keep this thread focused on CAS and not dead horses.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think you're flogging a dead horse there mate. Sorry, couldn't resist...

Regards

Jim R.