"SMG Gap" A Proposal

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Germanboy has a problem. First he hears things that aren't said....

Last, on the subject of the idea that the U-Boats got 'em all...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Who's has the problem hearing things now?

I said that that was one of only many factors you can't account for. It is possible not a single SMG got lost on the North Alantic run. It's possible 1 million were lost.

Don't pretend you have any idea what the figure was.

Don't pretend you have taken all factors like this into account, either.

[ 07-02-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JasonC]

So, taking your own figures, you think the MP40 has 2.4 times as many bullets, 92% of the firing time, and 2x the killing power per unit time. But CM gives it 2.8 times the killing power per unit time (and thus implicitly has the M-1 firing slower) plus equal firing time. Off by 1.4/.92 = 1.52 times. Which would be corrected by 35 shots vs. 50 (1.43), or 30 shots vs. 45 (1.5).

It doesn't matter how you slice it. You are not going to get 2.8 times the cumulative firepower out of a less accurate gun with less than 2.8 times the bullets.

And incidentally, I think you are using the wrong weight for the M-1's round. 27.4g is indeed the exact weight of the standard 30-06 springfield cartridge, but that is a bullet of 180 grains. The wartime cartridge, the M2, was only 152 grains for the projectile, 15% lighter than the common 30-06 round used today. I mentioned that once already but it seems it went unnoticed.

I also note in passing that the weight of the 9mm with mags is 20 grams (640g / 32 rounds). And I also point out (again) that M-1 men often carried additional bandoliered ammo (up to 200 rounds), that the same rounds were used for the BAR, etc.

[ 07-02-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

I know that less than half were sunk, which is all I need for my conclusion. Those dang inequalities again! "But you can't possibly know that less than half were sunk". Sure I can, by overall sinkings and the law of averages. "But that is unscientific". Works well enough for marine insurance companies...

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

So, taking your own figures, you think the MP40 has 2.4 times as many bullets, 92% of the firing time, and 2x the killing power per unit time. But CM gives it 2.8 times the killing power per unit time (and thus implicitly has the M-1 firing slower) plus equal firing time. Off by 1.4/.92 = 1.52 times. Which would be corrected by 35 shots vs. 50 (1.43), or 30 shots vs. 45 (1.5).

It doesn't matter how you slice it. You are not going to get 2.8 times the cumulative firepower out of a less accurate gun with less than 2.8 times the bullets.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

First off slow down, and say to yourself, "firing data has more to do with suppression that killing power." Repeat this 150 times, then write it down for further reference. Killing power matters, but suppression is more important, and fire power is a nonlinear curve, which means that you do not have a 1 to 1 relationship. However, you are correct that I was demonstrating that, within in its long / medium / short range bands a submachinegun is half again to two times the killing power of a rfile.

For my money, this is ball park distance, and I do not even know the data system and exterior variables used by BTS to generate their data. For example, the unit quality template in nonlinear, and gets laid over top of my numbers, and may change the 1-1 ration of my figures.

The fact that I can show a definate advantage for the SMG over the rifle, even a 2 to 1 advantage, should tell people that their are flaws in your arguments. First off, the SMGs "unit of fire" is not significantly different than the rifle, although at various times during the war it is ahead or behind the rifle depending on the issue of magazine or spare loose rounds. For example, the official basic load for the STG/MP44 was 6 magazines of 30 round each. The 7.92x33mm "pistolenpatrone 43 mit Eisenkern" round massed 16.5 gra,s per round, a full magazine of 30 massed .7 kg. The MP-44 has an ROF of 120 rpm, thus giving it an ammo usage factor of 1.5, not so good, but an amazing 1680 killing power and 120 suppression power. The Germans of course, in 1945, recognized the issue of how fast soldiers ate ammo, and upped magazine issue to 12 magazines for a figure of 3.0 for the weapon. The only weapon in the US arsenal which came close to countering this was the M2 carbine at close range, and the BAR, both of which saw increased use near wars end.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

And incidentally, I think you are using the wrong weight for the M-1's round. 27.4g is indeed the exact weight of the standard 30-06 springfield cartridge, but that is a bullet of 180 grains. The wartime cartridge, the M2, was only 152 grains for the projectile, 15% lighter than the common 30-06 round used today. I mentioned that once already but it seems it went unnoticed.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was noted, but it was also noted by Mr. Dorosh and other than you are taking the wrong numbers from your copy of shooters digest and trying to use them. The round mass quoted to you (27.1 grams) is indeed the correct figure for the "cartridge, caliber .30, Ball, M2". The round has a 9.9 gram bullet propelled by 3.25 grams of IMR 4895 Ball type powder, and was the only round commonly issued with the M1 Garand. The BAR would get from time to time M2 Armor peircing rounds, which mass a tad more (27.6 grams), and most squads had a box of M3 Rifle Grenade blanks about them which mass 16 grams each. The 170 grain hunting rounds could be any of a number of hunting rounds, and were not quoted. In addition, basic loads issued were all that I quoted, since both rifleman and subgunners would carry loose rounds into combat, it was a moot point, as you still have a 10.68 gram mass per round for the German (and Commonwealth) subgunners, but a 27.1 gram mass per round for the rifleman, allowing the subgunners to pack 2.54 rounds per weapon into combat no matter how many extra boxes you wish to hump onto their backs.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

I also note in passing that the weight of the 9mm with mags is 20 grams (640g / 32 rounds). And I also point out (again) that M-1 men often carried additional bandoliered ammo (up to 200 rounds), that the same rounds were used for the BAR, etc.

[ 07-02-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hard to figure out what you mean by this one. A Sten magazine, loaded, masses .64 kg when it has 32 rounds of service ammunition in it. A 9x19mm round in common use (I quote the mass of the standard Pistolen Patrone 08 in German service) is 10.68 grams. The rest is the mass of the resusable feed device. Before you see this as a cosmic victory, an M1 en bloc clip, loaded with M2 ball (which I have) and placed on a scale masses .26kg with 8 rounds in it. All of which is moot because it does not matter what the total carry mass is but what the standard issue during the war was.

No need to point out, as I said, bout spare ammunition, because you have not proven that submachinegunners never carried spare ammunition which would suddenly make it a valuable revelation. My suggestion is reread Mr. Dorosh's post on this subject.

So, what we see from the above and previous is that, using one method of figuring surpression (based on number of rounds spit out) and killing power (based on round mass, diameter, number of rounds spit out) based on the findings or the five major infantry firepower research projects that would lead to the MP-44, the M-16 and M16A2, the SAW M249, the AK-47, and most other modern weapons and based on WW1 and WW2 data (mostly the conclusion is that aimed fire is less important that suppression through controlled automatic fire) the the submachinegun is a powerful tool at the ranges it was designed to operate, uses ammunition at a high rate but allows the carrying of more ammunition, and if overmodelled in CM, is not overmodelled by much (assuming that we even have all the variables laid out that BTS took into account).

The question of point value per SMG unit dpends on how they are used in the average fight, which is a playtest issue, but the historical facts say the game is pretty well modelled.

[Slapdragon]

I want to point this out again, just to make sure it is seen. The grain weight of a bullt is the not the mass of a cartridge. A cartridge consists if a brass case fitted with a copper or soft metal primer, an amount of powder, and a bullet. A 151 grain military jacketed bullet may be 151 grains in weight compared to a 170 grain hunting bullet, but that does not much effect the mass of the entire round. In other words, people arguing that an M2 ball round is significantly different in mass than a hunting round (my Core-lokt 170 grain jacketed soft nose bullet from my shooting closet tips the scales at 27.8 grams, compared to 27.1 grams for an M2 ball round made by PMC and used especially by M1 owners because it matches the original design ballistics for the WW2 M2 Ball, mass taken by using my wife's scientific scale that she uses to measure sea life and what not) have read to many gun magazines. When you read the bullet weight on the side of a box of cartridges, you are reading the weight of one part of the entire round, bit the mass of the entire cartridge, which is not included on the side of the box or in a shooting book, but must be either measured or gotten from military manuals.

[Mark IV]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

I would like any of the critic chorus to address what they think would be *innaccurately* modeled if my proposals were acted upon, and how all-fired serious it would be. Just how, exactly, would an Germany FJ platoon with 35 shots instead of 40 (from 6 LMGs, 8 MP40s, 9 MP44s, and 10 rifles), grossly misrepresent the historical realities of the FJ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think there is some interesting discussion here, but... "how all-fired serious it would be" IF your "proposals were acted upon"?

I trust some of it was monitored by those responsible for producing CM2. I certainly hope they haven't been persuaded to delay plunking a T-34 into my living room by so much as an hour, so that Fallschirmjaeger squads in CMBO may have 35 instead of 40 shots, which any scenario designer could accommodate with a click or two right now, if he felt it was warranted.

I know that aimed MP40 fire under 100m, certainly under 50m, can be accurate, and fired in 3-round bursts, not conspicuously consumptive. As the range closes they are wicked in trained hands, not in the least part because of the confidence they inspire in the shooter, and the suppression they induce in the shot-at.

So anyway, all other things being equal, if the effects of the change are by your own admission unimportant...

?

'Nother case of grenades with that?

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Germanboy has a problem. First he hears things that aren't said, and then he ignores things that are. On marksmenship, I never said anything about "small squares". I said if you can't hit a man sized target at 200 yards with a properly zeroed rifle you can't pass basic rifle marksmenship, which is true. I know I did, and I'm no great shot. And nobody disputes that the accuracy of rifles is much higher than that of SMGs, nor does anyone dispute that SMGs are innaccurate at medium ranges.

The relevant facts for the claims on the thread - that rifles are more accurate than SMGs and by large amounts at medium range - are not in dispute. Germanboy needs to pretend otherwise because he needs to manufacture irrelevant disagreements about side matters to avoid engaging on the central point involved in the accuracy discussion. Which is that CM as it stands effectively gives higher accuracy to SMGs than to rifles per bullet fired, which everyone knows is off.

On ammo weight, I started with two to one carried loads, which incidentally is what BTS said quite a while ago - it was disputed; I gave the weights of the projectiles in basically the same 2:1 ratio - it was disputed on the grounds that it was cartridge weight that was wanted; I then quoted the cartridge weights in the same 2:1 ratio, which incidentally shows that the projectile weights are not in the least misleading, and Germanboy just flat ignores it. Then he pretends I didn't address the issue. Four times the firepower with lower accuracy and equal CM shots would require four times the ammo carried, not twice. With only twice ammo carried, four times the firepower with lower accuracy, due to higher rate of fire alone, means running out of that ammo faster.

Slapdragon does the above "irrelevant" act one better by reposting himself without any comment on my response to his statements. Jarmo accurately condensed my main point about implied accuracies and CM ammo levels.

John Waters providesa more interesting comment in passing, when he states as fact an increase in automatics in German infantry from 1/11 early on to 1.3 to 1 in VG formations late. While I agree that was the direction certainly, there are a few problems with this. First, it would seem to be TOE information rather than weapons provided, not the same thing. Second, CM does not give 1.3 automatics per rifle in VG companies, it gives 69 automatics to 21 rifles or pistols, thus 3.3 to 1. 1.3 and 3.3 are different, last time I checked, and 3.3 is larger.

Third, the Germans issued only 1 automatic out of 6 weapons issued for the whole war average, because that is all they made. The late war average is undoubtedly above that figure just as the early war figure was probably below it. But the CM standard "rifle" infantry types with 3/9 to 4/8 automatics are a more believeable late war average (1/3 to 1/2), given that overall war-long 1/6 average as a "budget constraint", than 3.3 to 1. Particular units might still have 3.3:1 of course. I'd find it much easier to believe Mr. Water's 1.3 to 1. Which incidentally would fit with every other VG company having one SMG platoon, with the other five VG rifle - rather than 2/3 having pure automatics and the rest of the formation half automatics. In other words his 1.3 figure is more consistent with using VG rifle squads - which is one of my recommendations - than with using the CM structure of VG companies.

Fourth, we know German infantry was not equipped at TOE in small arms generally in the late war, from the MG returns, which were kept track of carefully. TOE in MG42s was two per squad for every vanilla line squad in the Heer infantry (TOE of 63 MGs per battalion). But we know for example that even the FJ only had about 1 per squad in Normandy, according to detailed returns from the divisions, in OOBs available on the web. Their average MGs per battalion was no higher than for Heer infantry. What one actually sees is MG returns varying from 50% of TOE to 90% in a few units.

If one imagines 50%-90% of TOE in automatics generally, what would one see for Mr. Waters 1.3 to 1 as TOE for VG formations? You'd see a range from the number of automatics in three platoons of rifle 44s, and the number in 3 platoons of VG rifle. What about if we applied 50-90% of TOE in automatics to the CM 3.3:1 VG structure? Then the range would be from security or rifle 45 squads on the low end, to about the existing VG structure for a few formations on the high end. With a mean of 40-50% automatics. What reason is there to think the Germans were always at TOE in MPs when we know most of them weren't, in MGs?

Last, on the subject of the idea that the U-Boats got 'em all, that hardly applies to the trip across the channel for the Stens. If half of the US ones sank (and it was certainly less than half) then the western Allied SMGs would still amount to several times what the Germans could field in the west.

You can knock off 600K for US vs. Japan (1/3), and 200K for Burma et al (Brits), and 400K for partisans (all early Mk. Stens), and a laughable 600K for U-boats (half the US production not sent to the Pacific), and you've still got 2 million left - which is more than Germany had for both fronts. Ignoring every German MP lost to similar causes on their side. Once again the mere debators fail to grapple with the numbers, and instead wave their hands about possibilities that do not explain the case.

There are two obvious possibilities that will explain the case. One, SMGs were not as effective as CM shows them to be, because of the simplifications of the CM ammo system. Then the Allies had SMGs available but preferred to use rifles even after front-line experience. (It is too much to expect everyone who has played CM three times to be smarter than the participants on the point, after all).

Or two, that the Germans were below their TOE in autos (evidence? MG returns for one) and Allied squads were above their TOE in autos (evidence? Mr. Dorosh's extra 3000 Stens in a formation of 30 infantry battalions for one).

Or both. Case one is addressed by my ammo proposal (shots per squad 30-50 instead of a uniform 40). Case two is addressed by my troop use proposal (Allied paras kosher, German types with 1 MG and rifles in each squad recommended).

I would like any of the critic chorus to address what they think would be *innaccurately* modeled if my proposals were acted upon, and how all-fired serious it would be. Just how, exactly, would an Germany FJ platoon with 35 shots instead of 40 (from 6 LMGs, 8 MP40s, 9 MP44s, and 10 rifles), grossly misrepresent the historical realities of the FJ? Just how, exactly, is it completely unbelievable that a US platoon might have 3 extra Thompsons and 6 M-1 carbines, in place of 9 of the rifles?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

First off, although I do not always agree with germanboy, he is one of the most respected thinkers on this forum.

Second, your assumption that lots of SMGs were lying around is not backed by cite, fact, or even a random secondary source. What is happening is you want stronger US squads, and are looking for the loop hole to make them. You quote distribution of SMGs, numbers lost in the atlantic, etc, now lets have some cites so we can look at your research. I gave you in the rough the major reports that discussed firepower distribution in the squad, use of automatic weapons, firepower and suppression in combat, etc, now you need to do more than just show us a gun and say it was smoke a couple of hours ago.

Three, the Allies and the Germans were both constantly below TO and E. The Germans still managed to increase the ratio of automatic weapons at the front during the waning months of the war, as in fact, did the US (by issuing BARs primarily, according to Dupuy. Possibly by issuing carbines, but as I said I have nothing but real narrow proof on that).

Four, it seems you are still asking what happened to all those SMGs. Part of thst is wrapped up with the above request you document where stuff went with good solid citations. But most of it revolves around failure to read previous posts. As I explained at length (and was not read -- you can always tell who does not read posts, they complain about everyone not reading theirs) the Army Ground Forces was only one part of the United States Armed Forces, and you have not accounted for the millions of men in the Army Service Forces, Army Air Corps, Navy, Marines, and for the millions of weapons delivered by Lend Lease to something like 116 countries, including hundreds of thousands of stends just dropped into occupied Europe (and so commonly captured that the Germans issued them to a number of divisions).

US divisions just did not receive an extra twenty thousand submachineguns, and there is no evidence that these invisible subguns made it up front at all. The only thing we have is a spurious logic chain: bad art.

The spurious chain is:

Well, the made a lot of those subguns (maybe they did). They had to use them somewhere (certainly). I bet they were issued to line units (unproven and, knowing all the places weapons went, unlikely). Those line units probably had a gob of those things (far and away unproven). I would have picked up one if I was a soldier (not relevant). It makes logical sense that a soldier would want one (he he he, no it does not. The M1 SMG had to be forced on people because the bugger was heavy). Commanders would want lots of automatics (ture, but they wanted more BARs, not submachineguns, although it was discussed that the M1 carbine was like because it was rifle like).

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

.

Jason has a knack for asking the right questions, something that is very important for a researcher (the question of what happened with all the Allied SMGs is indeed very interesting, and I learnt a lot from the debate), but he also has a knack to give the wrong answers because he focuses almost exclusively on the numerical evidence, only using qualitative evidence to support his argument, instead of using it as evidence in its own right. That's my opinion, anyway.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Damn Germanboy, I just noticed your attempt to broach the issue of quantitative and qualittative measurements and how they differ in discussion of history. One step at a time man, circuits will blow if you roll this out...

[Vanir Ausf B]

If I may, I would like to bring up something that has nothing to do with the weight of a M1 round, but a lot to do with SMGs in CM.

Slappy posted something that caught my eye:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

2) The accurate shooting range for soldiers in combat, with a few exceptions, was far shorter than expected. German studies indicated that long range for infantry action was 300 meters, and that 80% of all infantry action ocurred at 100 meters.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I had just been thinking that to my somewhat unscientific observations of my own CM games, at least 80% of all infantry squad vs. infantry squad firefights occurred at 100m or less. It's great to know that CM models this aspect of combat so well. It's not so great to realize that CM's unit pricing system does not take this into account.

Compare a British rifle squad to a British Para squad:

Rifle

8 Lee-Enfield rifles

1 Sten SMG

1 Bren LMG

Firepower at 40m: 161

Firepower at 100m: 89

Cost: 29 pts

Para

5 Lee-Enfields

4 Stens

1 Bren

Firepower at 40m: 248

Firepower at 100m: 98

Cost: 29 pts

Exact same price, but the paras are obviously going to be the more effective unit 80% of the time (they get the gammon bombs free too). So why does the CM pricing system value a Lee-Enfield and a Sten the same? Is the wild popularity of VG SMG squads any mystery?

Setting aside any argument about whether CM models SMGs properly, I think the pricing system should be tweaked to be more representative of the weapon's actual in-game effectiveness. The current "1 rifle = 1 SMG" pricing is out of whack IMO. This doesn't sound like something that would eat up days of Charles's time either.

And if anyone says that the best solution is to stop playing QBs I'm going to throw a heavy object in their general direction.

[ 07-03-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[JPS]

Vanir,

I fully agree with your last observations. However, it should be noted that JasonC presented the exact same observations (and proposal to fix unit prices accordingly) a long time ago in great detail, and if I remember correctly, BTS explicitly refused to tweak prices. Then JasonC offered the more sophisticated solution of adjusting the ammo loads, which I think deserves credit (as does his related analysis of firepower per bullet vs. firepower per unit of time vs. firepower over ammo load).

For whatever its worth,

Jukka-Pekka

[JPS]

Slapdragon,

could you elaborate whether the "80% of all infantry action occurred at 100 meters" refers to expended ammunition, casualties caused, casualties taken, or something else?

Best regards,

Jukka-Pekka

-----------------------------------

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

2) The accurate shooting range for soldiers in combat, with a few exceptions, was far shorter than expected. German studies indicated that long range for infantry action was 300 meters, and that 80% of all infantry action ocurred at 100 meters.

-----------------------------------

[Vanir Ausf B]

Yes, I know JasonC has posted on this topic before and I don't mean to steal his ideas (though he wasn't the first person to comment on the dominance of SMG squads in CM), but I think this thread is becoming lost in arguments over minutia and I wanted to steer it back to the relevant.

I'm also aware of BTS's stance on it and I have a little bald spot on my head from scratching it wondering at their reasoning. To anyone who has spent a lot of time playing this game (that I have talked to) it is clear that SMG heavy units regularly rip up rifle heavy units. Engaging SMG units at long range is not economical from an ammo usage standpoint as a rifle squad can blow through its whole load at enemy infantry in tree cover 250 meters away and only inflict 2-3 casualties (if lucky) and some suppression. So now you're left with an out of ammo squad that has revealed its position, and for what gain?

[ 07-03-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Vanir Ausf B]

SMG squad effectiveness is likely to decrease a bit in CM2 as changes in the infantry movement model and MG effectiveness make the "SMG rush" less viable. However, this will not decrease their effectiveness on the defense, nor do I think this will change the typical squad vs. squad engagement range to any significant degree. Slappy's numbers suggest this is fine and good, but the fundamental pricing imbalance will remain only slightly mitigated.

[Jarmo]

There was also a mention in the direction of longer range rifle fire being made a bit more effective. Or less ammo consuming or whatever. Whether these create changes actually are enough to make rifles more desirable remains to be seen.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JPS:

Slapdragon,

could you elaborate whether the "80% of all infantry action occurred at 100 meters" refers to expended ammunition, casualties caused, casualties taken, or something else?

Best regards,

Jukka-Pekka

-----------------------------------

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

2) The accurate shooting range for soldiers in combat, with a few exceptions, was far shorter than expected. German studies indicated that long range for infantry action was 300 meters, and that 80% of all infantry action ocurred at 100 meters.

-----------------------------------<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not much more to say about it, but the first study on cartidge use and battlefield effectiveness to bew done scientifically was the German 1933 study which looked at the 8mm Mauser cartridge (7.92x57mm Patrone Ss). It took field books for several thousand actions during the great war and analyzed them, then threw in as much wound data as it could find. While having some methodology flaws, this study discovered that:

1) The Mauser rifle was considerably over matched in its wound ballistics.

2) While the cartridge was an effective wounding range out pat 600 meters, it was extremely rare to engange anything past 300 meters.

3) Actions in which combatants fired at over 300 meters could only be described in reports as harrassing.

4) Machineguns did most of the fighting at all ranges.

5) When all nonpositional actions were tallied (no one wanted to discuss fighting from a tranch anymore) 8 in 10 fights occurred at less than 80 meters, but soldiers still did not aim their rifles much.

6) Savvy commanders had long held fire until the enemy was less than 100 meters away to achieve shock and suppression, but this was now a proven fact.

This study resulted in the start of work on developing a standard or alternate infantry cartridge and rifle, which would one day result in the MP43-44-StG45.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Jarmo:

There was also a mention in the direction of longer range rifle fire being made a bit more effective. Or less ammo consuming or whatever. Whether these create changes actually are enough to make rifles more desirable remains to be seen.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ya know, I thought Steve had said something like that as well, but a few days ago he said there were no changes to be made to the ammo model, so I figured I was imagining things. Good to see it's a mass hallucination (I hate it when I'm the only one going nuts).

[ 07-03-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[rune]

My only comments on this.

1. Not all smgs were sent over-seas. How many were used in training and how many were just plain stored in Armorys? I know in the mid 60s some reserve units STILL had some in the Armories.

2. I believe the smg was the weapon of each tank. How many tanks had a thompson or sten inside?

3. How many were lend lease?

Rune

[Tero]

Here is some fuel to the fire. I found gen. Depuys interview at

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=104

There are over 200 pages but I post here the juicy bits I found.

And I quote:

At the time we were doing the Parapet Foxhole or PARFOX experiment we discovered that the

platoon that attacked with one squad and a light machine gun in the overwatch and two squads attacking, was about forty percent as effective as a platoon that had two squads and a machine gun suppressing and only one moving. The reason was that the fire superiority, as they called it in

World War II, we now call it suppression, was maintained. As You know, the problem with

infantry is that while you may get fire superiority through suppression, just at the time when you need it the most, during the assault, when the troops all rise up out of their foxholes or from behind a hedgerow and move forward, you lose it. So, the enemy then comes up out of his holes and starts to fire at you, and you lose the suppression.

So, marching fire obviously was designed to overcome that problem, but somewhere in the

transmission between the lessons learned and our unit, marching fire became the tactic through which you attacked. In other words, we lined up two battalions with two companies up and they went across the line of departure, using marching fire. It might have worked if the enemy was not well dug in, not well camouflaged, and very weak; but, if the enemy was professional, as the Germans usually were, was well-hidden, and was in very good positions, marching fire as often as not, just wasn’t sufficient. We marched into their killing zones. We didn’t learn about overwatch suppression until later in the war.

INTERVIEWER: Did the training programs include live fire?

GEN DEPUY: They included infiltration courses, live fire exercises, and overhead fire, all against fixed targets. The enemy doesn’t shoot back, and so, you don’t learn a whole lot, and of course, they were normally not done above maybe, platoon level, or company level at the most. Then, once in awhile we would fire the “mad minute” to impress us with our own firepower. However,

the M-l rifle, coupled with the rifle marksmanship program, worked to discourage active firing in combat by the average soldier. He was trained to shoot at and hit a target, but in combat, in the attack, he rarely ever saw a target. So, he was indisposed to shoot. The Germans, on the other hand, used machine pistols which were area weapons. That is, they sprayed the area ahead of them and achieved fire superiority which we now call suppression.

INTERVIEWER: During this training were you equipped with the same weapons and gear that

you had when you finally went to war?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, essentially we had M-1s and Browning Automatic Rifles (BARS), and that

light machine gun that we had until very recently, with the aerated barrel, the air-cooled lightmachine gun. We had eight heavy water-cooled machine guns. We had 105 millimeter infantry howitzers in a cannon company. The antitank company changed from 37 to 57 millimeter towed guns, and the mortars were always 60mms and 8lmms, so we really didn’t change weapons during that whole time. However, we did pick up tanks in England, and tank destroyers in France.

INTERVIEWER: What did the troops have on their backs? What was the basic load for an

infantryman?

GEN DEPUY: The first thing we had were fatigues that were impregnated against chemical attack. These fatigues were fixed up so that if the enemy used mustard gas it wouldn’t penetrate. Also, you couldn’t sweat through them. So, they were really awful hot and, God, after a few days, you could smell soldiers a mile away. Finally, they decided that there wouldn’t be a chemical attack, and we got out of the impregnated clothing - it was the greatest relief. It was almost the

greatest relief in the war. They carried a blanket and a shelter half, which they didn’t need,ammunition, grenades and pyrotechnics, extra bazooka ammunition, and lots of extra machine gun ammunition. Every rifleman came in with a little extra which they dropped in the assembly area, plus mortar ammunition. When they got off the ships, they were loaded because they weren’t expected to go directly into an assault, and they didn’t. So, we brought a lot of stuff when we came in, which we dropped in the final assembly area. It became sort of the first reserve of aammunition. I might add that I think we still had some of that ammunition when the war was over because, as you know, the infantry in World War II didn’t shoot much small arms ammuniton, except the machine guns. So, that was about it.

....

After about 10 minutes of fire the battalion moved forward. When the lead companies crossed the second or third hedgerow they came under very heavy small arms fire and were caught in an open field. I do not believe that any of our troops fired their weapons after the first few minutes.

When the attack stopped the Germans threw a heavy barrage of mortar fire into the first and second small fields between the Line of Departure and the forward line of troops. Casualties were very heavy. We had walked into his killing ground. After 30 minutes the lead companies came back to the second hedgerow and that was it. The other battalion had only slightly more success but was also repulsed. An effort to move the reserve company around the left flank resulted in a

single file movement up a sunken road into some German machine gun fire which terminated the first attack of the 1st Battalion, 357th Infantry - all in all, a dismal affair.

But, what we finally learned, which is what all seasoned soldiers finally learn, is not to attack them where they are. The way we cracked those positions was simply by finding a hole somewhere around the flank. Find a hole, get through that hole and get in their rear, and then the whole bloody thing would collapse. Then you’d have them in the open. That’s the kind of thing I wished we had learned during the two years we were training in the United States and during the

three months we were training in England.

INTERVIEWER: Could you overwatch from your hedgerow?

GEN DEPUY: We didn’t do that very well. You see, one of our training deficiencies was that almost all suppression was done by indirect fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by small arms. Occasionally, we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally, light machine guns. Really, they didn’t think much about using riflemen for suppression. They just thought of using riflemen for maneuvering and sharpshooting. The M-l rifle was a precision weapon but there were no precision targets. This problem was not confined to the 90th Division. You have read SLAM Marshall and know that even in the IOlst only 25 percent of the troopers fired.* And, we only had eight heavy machine guns in a battalion. So, it didn’t work very well. We didn’t do direct fire suppression very well in my outfit until the latter part of the war.

INTERVIEWER: In that fight, the regimental history indicates that “Charlie” and “King”

Companies repulsed 14 counterattacks accompanied by tanks during the day. Can you describe the kind of tempo that we are talking about in such fights?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I wasn’t there with “K” or “C” Company, but my guess is that what they

were talking about was maybe, two or three assault guns. We are not talking about what you would visualize as a large tank attack. There might have been a Mark IV tank or two, but in all probability, what happened was that the Germans used some self-propelled 76 millimeter assault guns combined with their airborne infantry. They were better trained and they maneuvered. They were professionals. They simply suppressed and moved, suppressed and moved. They gained fire superiority, and then gobbled up chunks of those companies up there, which, by that time, probably were not returning fire.

INTERVIEWER: Now, if there were 14 attacks, and again, I’m looking at the unit history, that would indicate that the Germans came in and hit, and then perhaps, went back to figure out another place to come in and hit again, as opposed to coming in and actually biting off a big piece of ground and trying to hang on to it.

GEN DEPUY: I think that when reports are coming in from company level, which is what we are talking about, you have to realize what kind of a report you’ll get. All probes are considered to be attacks. So, my guess is that of the 14 attacks, five, six, or seven of them were merely the Germans looking for a hole. They were probing for the flanks. And, they were pretty good at that.

They probably also ran their assault guns up a little bit from time to time, and fired while probing. There were probably only two or three rather large attacks. When I say large attacks, by the way, let me tell you, I’m only talking about 200 or 300 people at the most. Some of those large attacks

might have been as few as 50 to 100 men.

INTERVIEWER: Did they usually include artillery?

GEN DEPUY: Some artillery, but nothing like we had. Some mortars, some assault guns, and a lot of small arms fire by the Germans. A lot of machine pistol fire, a lot of maneuver, and some hand grenades or potato mashers.

INTERVIEWER: Were there things that the Germans did during these particular operations that You haven’t mentioned already that stuck with You? Are there some things they did that led You to adopt some of your philosophies on defense?

GEN DEPUY: I was impressed with several things. First, I was impressed with the positions that the German infantry soldiers constructed. I was impressed with the skill and the care that they took in finding positions which had cover and natural concealment. They were almost impossible

to see and yet, they afforded fields of fires exactly where they needed them in order to stop us. In other words, their fieldcraft was super, and You may remember that in the 1st Division, I spent a lot of time on that. MY favorite battalion in the 1st Division really was the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, because they did more of that than anybody else. George Joulwan and Jim Madden really put in imaginative positions wherever they went. That idea caught fire with the soldiers of

that battalion more than it did with the others. They were doing precisely what I think infantry should do. I took that lesson with me to the 8th Infantry, the 30th Infantry, and the 1st Division, to

the dismay of some people, but, nonetheless, that was a pet pigeon of mine. And, that’s where I got it.

The second thing that I learned was about the depth of German positions. We just had one line. The Germans had a little zone defense so that they had elasticity and resilience. You could not punch through it very easily. They didn’t do things in a linear way. They took pieces of terrain and knit them together into a position from which they were able to fire in all sorts of directions. They

used the terrain, they used cover and concealment, and they used imagination. In Normandy our people always lined right up on one hedgerow and then down another hedgerow. You know, one line. And, if you observe many units in the American Army today, you will find that that still isexactly what we do. The linear mentality in the defense. Now, hopefully, we’re getting better, but

it’s a natural thing to do. It’s the way a layman imagines a war - a line. So, I learned that from the Germans.

I guess I was impressed with their use of just one, two or three mechanized vehicles like assault guns or tanks. Only two or three times did I see them use a lot of tanks in what we would call a tank attack. But, most of the time, when you ran into German positions, you would run into a mixture of infantry and some kind of tracked fighting vehicles. Sometimes they were only little

vehicles with 20 millimeter cannons, often 20 millimeter antiaircraft guns. Whatever they could find, a self-propelled B6mm, a self-propelled 76mm, or a self-propelled 57mm, they integrated into their defenses. And, they moved them around a lot. They wouldn’t just sit in one place. We’d hear

them moving; they’d be over here firing at us, and then, the next time, they would be over there firing at us.

INTERVIEWER: Could you give us your significant impressions on German and US equipment, weapons, vehicles, and tactics?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I thought the German machine pistol, which was an area suppression

weapon, had great advantages, whereas we were trained for point targets with rifles. So, the Germans, it would seem to me, were ahead of us there. Also, their tank guns and antitank guns were superior to ours. If you’ll read the history, you’ll find that the Germans were behind the Russians at the beginning, but they then caught up and

surpassed everybody at the end of the war, in terms of the size of their antitank and tank guns up to 66 millimeters. Their weapons were manufactured in such a way that they were easier to maintain and they operated better in the mud, in dampness, and in cold weather. You asked a moment ago whether or not we used their equipment or they used ours. We really didn’t use their equipment ven/ much because we had such a plentitude of our own, and our supply system was geared to our types of ammunition, and so on. Most units picked up a few German Volkswagens and trucks and things for fun, but not very seriously. I might say that we did, in fact, like the German Panzerfausts and that was because our 2.75~inch rockets didn’t have the penetration

capability of the Panzerfausts. A lot of units did pick up and carry the Panzerfausts with them. [see photo, page 671

INTERVIEWER: Was there anything about their tactics, good or bad, that impressed you?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, the infantry tactics of the Germans involved a lot of direct fire suppression that our tactics didn’t. They didn’t have as much indirect fire suppression, as much artillery, as we

did, but they had mortars, and direct fire suppression, coupled with a lot of movement. They also did a lot of talking. You could hear the German sergeants, Feldwebels, shouting to their men all the time during an attack, giving instructions, “Go this way, go that way, more fire over here, put

fire by the corner of the field.” Our fellows didn’t talk it up very much. If you don’t talk it up, it means that nothing much is going to happen.

So far: German SMG's 6 - American SMG's 0

[ 07-03-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

So far: German SMG's 2 - American SMG's 0 <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What!? I didn't see any comparison of American and German SMGs in that.

Please try to refrain from turning every thread into some nationality "Germans kicked more ass" debate as you always do. We're trying to get something accomplished here.

[Tero]

>What!? I didn't see any comparison of

>American and German SMGs in that.

I amended it to 6 - 0

And it is not comparison. Just the number of times the German SMG is mentioned more than the American SMG's. He WAS a CO of an American unit at the so he should know something about things like OOB and tactics and doctrine during the early period of the Normandy campaign.

>Please try to refrain from turning every

>thread into some nationality "Germans kicked

>more ass" debate as you always do. We're

>trying to get something accomplished

>here.

Please read the quote through more slowly thoroughly, not just the first and the last sentence. There is a lot of relevant tactical and doctrinal info in his replies concerning the use of small arms and their effects in real life in attack and defence. I posted this just to bring in some new blood to the academic ammo load/ROF debate.

It just so happens that he happened to be an officer in the American army fighting against Germans.

Was my national bias argumentation so convincing you start seeing it everywhere ?

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Was my national bias argumentation so convincing you start seeing it everywhere ? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Don't tempt me.

Actually, it is interesting stuff, though trying to extrapolate US and German OOBs for the entire ETO from what he writes there is a huge leap of logic. I don't think he mentions American SMGs once. Does that mean US troops didn't use them at all? Noooooo...

[Tero]

>Don't tempt me.

I won't. Just trying to remind you how thin the red line is.

>Actually, it is interesting stuff, though

>trying to extrapolate US and German OOBs for

>the entire ETO from what he writes there is

>a huge leap of logic. I don't think he

>mentions American SMGs once. Does that mean

>US troops didn't use them at all?

>Noooooo...

I agree it is only one man explaining his experiences. But something can be extrapolated about the effects of the small arms. He does mention that only 25% of Screaming Eagles (101st ) fired their weapons in anger.

Another interesting remark was the bit "as you know, the infantry in World War II didn’t shoot much small arms ammuniton, except the machine guns."

The obvious OOB issues aside his words are cold water on the "SMG's were useless in combat" faction.

I have a vague notion that most of the Allied SMG's and carbines went to airborne divisions and truck drivers because of their compact size and they did not require marksmanship skills in using them (meaning the truck drivers, NOT the paras ).

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

I don't think he mentions American SMGs once. Does that mean US troops didn't use them at all? Noooooo...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

He mentions a lot about suppression from small arms and how the US was a lot worse at it than the Germans. What I also found very interesting is that the Germans talked more. Reminds me of my Sunday footy (soccer for North Americans) games, where often the team that talks to each other plays better even if player by player it would be weaker.

Surmising here: if you have a lot of short-range weapons, you probably have to talk a lot more to achieve favourable positioning of your squad, since every single weapon is much more important than if you have a higher number of guys with lower firepower per soldier. So C&C would be an element that could affect effective (as opposed to raw) firepower dramatically. Would that be correct? Since I have never been properly trained in infantry combat, I don't know.

[Tero]

>Surmising here: if you have a lot of

>short-range weapons, you probably have to

>talk a lot more to achieve favourable

>positioning of your squad, since every

>single weapon is much more important than if

>you have a higher number of guys with lower

>firepower per soldier.

The Finns found the Germans loudness a serious drawback during combat. They were broadcasting their intentions to the enemy as effectively as to their own troops. As German was tought more than English back then in Europe this is something that has to be taken into account.

Apart from that I think them shouting more might be also about experienced NCO's wanting survive among unexperienced troops by telling the exactly what to do and where to aim the fire. Also the Prussian parade ground tradition comes to mind.

>So C&C would be an element that could affect

>effective (as opposed to raw) firepower

>dramatically. Would that be correct?

Essentially, yes. The fire is concentrated in the spots that count, not spread about the landscape. But you must not forget the basic training of the troops. It is a vital factor too. It is not only what to say but also what the other guy thinks you mean when you say it. No time for "say again after fire at the...what" during a fire fight.

[Jeff Heidman]

Germanboy,

While I found the post rather interesting, and it certainly a convincing singular point of data suggesting that the Germans really did use high-supression weapons more, I think the issue of communication is seperate from the issue of weapons.

Greater communication is the mark of a superior training and superior leadership, irrespective of the weapons used. One thing a consistent study of German small unit tactics will repeatedly reinforce is the high level of professionalism amongst the mid-grade NCOs in the German Army. That is how they managed to take divisions that had been shattered and rebuild them into credible forces in a relatively short time. They were very good at using a cadre of experienced NCOs and junior officers to make a green unit fight better than expected.

I shudder to think what would ahve happened had Goering been less of an idiot and released those 1 million Luftwaffe excess personal straight to the Heer for integration into existing divisions as replacements.

I think just hearing the voice of your NCO must be very reassuring, even if you can't tell what he is saying. The consistent view of combat is that it is chaotic and confusing. I imagine hearing someone who sounds like they have a clue still barking out orders must be somewhat comforting.

Anyway, as someone who argued (and will continue to argue) that the Allies could and should have had a little bit greater variance in squad weapons composition, I thought the post was pretty convincing that in this unit at least, paying fast and loose with TO&E did not happpen.

I think the best thing I have heard Slapdragon say is that the point is relatively moot. The crux of the matter is on hold until CM2 comes out and we see the differences that the changes will involve. Steve's post on the matter implied that there would be changes, and this certainly suggests that at some level they have recognized an issue that could use some work.

Until then, anyone who found Jason's argument convincing could do well to reduce the ammo load of SMG-heavy squads in user made scenarios. Or, if the two sides are agreeable, even tweek them in already amde scenarios prior to play...

Jeff Heidman