American 76MM tank cannon- Why?

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman:

There doesn't seem to be a lot of information around on US TD's. Everytime Slapdragon goes off on one of his 20 to 1 uber Hellcat tangents I try to find some info and come up nearly empty.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually, it is because most of the historical data is not in comic book form, thus placing it outside of your reach. You may want to modify the 20-1 since that represents the highest kill ration scored by a US TD unit (704th) and not the average of all TD units.

Seriously, just read the books I cited in the earlier threads. Some are hard to find but rewarding. Mpost people just do a google search and then think that all the information in the world is exhausted, but that is far from the truth. Evans is a great set of oral histories on the Hellcat. "Gare la Bête: A History of the 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 1942-1945" by Calvin C. Boykin . "Seek, Strike, and Destroy:

U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel is a short work on tank destroyers, especially on some of the failures in there employment. Jim Montgomery is another great birds eye view on tank destroyers in his "B Company: 776 Tank Destroyer Battalion in Combat" especially since he has African experience recounted. A totally charming book on the tank destroyers is "Seek, Strike Destroy: The History of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion" by Tom Sherman and is very well told.

From a technical point of view, each TD unit has NARA records which you can get upon request by knowing their docut numbers and visiting the NATA research library. These included daily logs, and the more accurate weekly recounts that modified claims to confirmed kills.

For some easier venues that require less analysis, but which are further away from original data, try "US Tank Destroyers in Combat 1941-1945" by Steven J. Zaloga. Chamberlin and Ellis are good light reading for your visits to the John, and they even give you a nutshell comment on the M-18 including a fairly accurate estimate of the kill to loss ration for that TD and what the US Army thougfht of it.

For still lighter reading, may I suggest GI Joe "Hell on Wheels" Comic #145 where Joe and his TD crew (damn versatile he was) take out about a hundred tanks, trucks, planes, and everything else.

[Username]

Theres lots of uber TD info next to the file with all the extensive info about the german nafferwaffleflingynugey.

[lcm1947]

Excellent view point Machineman and makes sense. I kind of thought them unneccessary myself and sure wouldn't have wanted to be in one but thought maybe they were effective in some role but I think what you said is right on.

[Michael Emrys]

Okay, so the picture that is starting to form for me is that the real conflict was not between Shermans and Pershings, but between Pershings and TDs. American TD were not true TDs in the sense that the JPzrs IV and V or the SU-85s and SU-100s were. That is, armed with a gun big enough to kill any likely opponent and enough armor to stand up to that opponent. The American TDs were too lightly armored and with the exception of the M36 not armed well enough to be called a sure thing (and there are questions even about the 90mm).

Soooo...is the consensus then that we keep the Shermans to support the PBI (who incidentally were getting killed in numbers that vastly outstripped the poor bloody tankers), but send along the odd Pershing just in case those naughty Germans managed to bring something tougher than a PzKW Mk. IV to the party? (This is in our imaginary ideal tank battalion.)

Michael

[PJungnitsch]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Soooo...is the consensus then that we keep the Shermans to support the PBI (who incidentally were getting killed in numbers that vastly outstripped the poor bloody tankers), but send along the odd Pershing just in case those naughty Germans managed to bring something tougher than a PzKW Mk. IV to the party? (This is in our imaginary ideal tank battalion.)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Better yet would be welding a roof on an M36 turret w/90mm and dropping it into the Sherman chassis (which did fit and was done) so they could cope if the Pershing was late to the party.

Pretty much the same as what the Soviets did with the T-34/85 and the Stalin.

[Andrew H.]

The real problem with TDs was the TD doctrine, not the actual TDs themselves. It was the TD doctrine that prevented regular Shermans from being upgraded with more powerful guns; that's the biggest problem with the doctrine. If the M10 were just used as adjuncts to regular tank battalions, or as replacement for towed TDs (i.e., AT guns), there wouldn't have been as much of a problem. As it was, the Sherms stayed undergunnned for too long.

It's true that TDs were lightly armored, but vs. most German tanks, so were Sherms; I'm not sure that was much of a disadvantage.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username:

... Britian developed some heavy armor and a decent tank gun.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Who are you? And what have you done with Lewis? :confused:

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman:

Better yet would be welding a roof on an M36 turret w/90mm and dropping it into the Sherman chassis (which did fit and was done) so they could cope if the Pershing was late to the party.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course the counter-argument to that is that the 75 was a better infantry support weapon, if for no other reason than it could carry a lot more ammo. Besides, the 90mm graft on does nothing to solve the insufficient armor of the Sherman. It still can't go toe to toe with the biggies.

Michael

[lcm1947]

I keep hearing that the 75mm that the Sherman shot was a good infantry killer. Wouldn't the say 90mm be even better? Or the 76mm? Is it actually the 75mm itself because of the actual round or what? Or am I not understanding something?

[Charlie Rock]

Tank Destroyers were a Gen McNair sponsored idea. To keep divisions mobile and agile a couple of general support TD units jumping from place to place would be a better substitute then everyone lugging around towed AT units.

The short answer is no, not really. The problem was TDs were used, like the rest of the army, in the attack. If the defender gets the first shot in and your armor is thin that's bad for you. One of the more common mistakes was trying to use a TD as an assault gun.

Having said that, TDs were fairly effective in the Battle of the Bulge. Visibility was less, they were on the defense, and could find some good ambush positions in the terrain of the area. Then a 76mm or 90mm could be effective. SO with a TD, you had to get the first shot in.

I think TDs would have had a better post-war reputation if the allies were on the defensive more, and could have used the tactics the TDs were designed for. It fared poorly when misused as an assault gun.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman:

Better yet would be welding a roof on an M36 turret w/90mm and dropping it into the Sherman chassis (which did fit and was done) so they could cope if the Pershing was late to the party.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I gave it alot of thought and yeah. It would have been the way to go. It would have released alot of HVAP 76mm to shermans also. The M18 was too specialized and probably stopped Chaffee replacement of M5 in Europe.

The TD thing was really built around big panzer counter attacks happening every other week. Sorry. Didnt happen

Lewwis

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Charlie Rock:

I think TDs would have had a better post-war reputation if the allies were on the defensive more, and could have used the tactics the TDs were designed for. It fared poorly when misused as an assault gun.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

They were mostly used as arty.

The post war they got pink-slipped. They really had to carry bigger guns than the opposition. Its the truth. They came to the party light handed.

Sorry.

Lewis

[dalem]

One of the authors I have packed away noted that the U.S. idea of a lightly-armored and quick TD platform was bound to be a failure as long as it had to carry a gun to match the enemy tanks: in that case it simply couldn't be light enough to make it anything but a thinly-armored big target. Once the AT missile appeared on the scene however, which required a far less robust platform, the concept became more reasonable.

-dale

[Charlie Rock]

If you take a look at what people consider to be effective TDs, vs ineffective, it wasn't the gun, it was the armor.

What makes a jagdpanther a better AT platform vs a M36?

By the end of the war, higher velocity rounds were coming on line.

I think the quote is that you don't need a tank destroyer, you need a tank that can destroy another tank.

No, that wasn't exactly it. Something like that though.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Charlie Rock:

If you take a look at what people consider to be effective TDs, vs ineffective, it wasn't the gun, it was the armor.

What makes a jagdpanther a better AT platform vs a M36?

By the end of the war, higher velocity rounds were coming on line.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Nope.

Armor is only good to keep the enemy away if your weapon can destroy them. Its just bullet proof speed-killer otherwise.

the germans wanted to use Jagdpanther EXACTLY like the the US TD policy. I have never read if they did. Could be they just got so involved in any battle that pulling out wasnt an option.

Lewis

[ 08-23-2001: Message edited by: Username ]

[Charlie Rock]

Speaking as a former member of an antitank unit, armor is always good.

Armor is only bad when it's on the other guys tank.

Seriously, it's apples and oranges. One school of thought was that they were highly armored AT guns, a generally defensive application. Ambush and slug it out. The other was of a hit and run philosophy. Rapid turret and high speed. Another defensive philosophy. If the defender is going to get the first shot in, plan B is armor plate.

A TOW on a jeep is a great thing. Until you attack with it. Less so if they see you coming.

A TD is a great thing if you get the first shot off.

[Username]

Stugs probably were the best AT weapons on the eastern front.

They had armor that took hits from MOST soviet weapons from 500 meters and could DESTROY sov vehicles twice that range and sometimes greater.

When the stugs stopped resisting hits, and the range they could do damage decreased, then its reign was over.

Lewis

[von Lucke]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman:

In heavier going, say for the conditions the Germans or Soviets faced on the Eastern front, lightly armored TD's without overhead protection would have been deathtraps, unless used for indirect fire like a SU-76 or maybe as a type of fast tracked reconnaissance vehicle, like a Lynx.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yet this is exactly what the Germans did when they introduced the Marder series and the Nashorn on the Eastern Front.

Really more self-propelled anti-tank guns then panzerjaegers, they where lightly armored, with only an adequate gun (heh, the first ones mounted captured Russian 76mm guns!), and worked best from ambush --- or, in the case of the Nashorn, long range. But as has been pointed out, when used on the defense, light armor gives way to first shot advantage --- a luxury you don't have when probing forward on the attack. The Americans really needed a domestic version of the Tiger to succeed in the TD role: Heavy armor, big gun, reliable Detroit engine.

But, c'est l'guerre...

[Cani]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by dalem:

'catastrophic'? For whom? Whoever made this remark needs to look up "hyperbole" in the dictionary.

Ahh, I see that it is from a book that has been recommended to me a billion times. Now I wonder if I should keep it on my list....

-dale

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: dalem ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think that any person who took part in WWII will add subjective thoughts when they write a book about what happened. Belton Cooper repaired tanks. He saw what happened to the M4 tanks every day, so obviously he was a bit frustrated when he learned that the M4 could have been replaced. Catastrophic for the allied powers? No. Catastrophic for american tank crews and WWII as he knew it? Yes.

Patton emphasized speed over anything else. He was quite upset when the tank crews added sandbags at the front of the M4.

[rexford]

While U.S. 90mm HE has more explosive than Sherman 75mm HE, 75mm high explosive puts out a greater number of effective fragments at all distances from impact.

Sherman 75mm HE is better than 90mm HE in terms of casualty production, and probably rate of fire, too.

And as German ballistic data and independent analysis shows, the slower HE rounds from 75mm armed Shermans have an advantage against troops in the open that 90mm HE would not.

75mm armed Shermans were an exceptional infantry support weapon.

Tiger tanks were very effective against Russian anti-tank guns, as evidenced by large numbers of ATG in Tiger kill totals, due to crushing overrun maneuvers and great accuracy hitting guns with direct shots.

90mm HE would have some advantages due to a heavier round with more HE filler, but 75mm HE put out a higher fragment density.

[JasonC]

Ok, I've missed three pages of the cliche party. Time to sort out some of the nonsense from the realities.

First, the point has been made that the main problem with the TD idea was that the US was attacking all the time. This is largely true. It is also the sort of pseudo-problem armies kill to have. "Oh gee, part of our force structure doesn't work perfectly because the enemy is flat on his back and can't hurt us".

The fact of the matter is the TDs worked fine on defense - once they had the decent SP ones, meaning post North Africa (instead of gun-armed halftracks, etc). The Germans got clocked in practically every armored counterattack they threw at the Americans after Tunisia. TDs did a lot of the clocking. A ratchet that only goes your way is a good thing.

Then there is the idea that the US only had 75mm guns in Shermans for the whole war, and probably had around 5 of them for every 3-4 Panthers or Tigers they were bouncing their shells off - perhaps like a CM armored meeting engagement. Not remotely. US 76mm Shermans, not counting ones sent to the Brits or the Russians, outnumbered Panthers plus Tigers available for all fronts. Which means they outnumbered the ones the Germans could send against the Americans by 3 to 1 or more, because most of the German armor for most of the war was in the east.

All told, the western Allies fielded over 20000 upgunned tanks against less than 1/5th that number of uparmored German AFVs that could be sent against them. Being very conservative. In addition, a sizeable portion of Shermans had 105s, nearly 5000. The overall average mix for a US armor division force (more armor battalions, fewer TD ones) was about 50% plain 75mm, and for the supports available for infantry formations it was lower, more like 40%. The portion with only plain 75mm was of course higher earlier on and lower later on, but you won't get those averages out of some fantasy like "no Sherman 76s until maybe you get 1 per platoon in '45."

When you already have 5 or 10 AFVs with improved AT guns for every enemy you see with improved armor, it is rather less critical that your *other* 5 or 10 AFVs have 75mm guns.

Next there is the issue of lead times for changes. From the time requests were put in for improved TDs to the time they were available only ran about 6-9 months. And such requests were put in during the fighting in Tunisia. There is no earthly reason Shermans couldn't have been upgunned to 76mm earlier and more thoroughly, and the failure to do so was indeed a scandal. More effort should also have been expended on providing an ample supply of HVAP for them, too.

There were also delays in getting existing 76mm Shermans because of shipping space issues. The armored divisions that arrived in theater late were fully equipped with 76mm Shermans, some of which had been waiting around for the completion of division assembly for months. To send the tanks to the units in theater immediately would mean the later movement of the division would require additional tonnage, since two tanks would have to be sent. This was a false economy; the tanks would have been more useful earlier.

There is then the idea that these issues resulted in every US tanker dying. Um, no. Casualties in US armor battalions were typically 1/3rd or less what they were in infantry battalions, and on the order of 100 KIA or less for one battalion for the whole war. Tankers were in greater danger than personnel not in combat units, but distinctly safer than the average infantryman or airman. Why? Because they were armored.

Then there is the comment by one fellow that TDs were used "mostly as artillery". In North Africa, that was true. They were gun armed halftracks in open desert. Too big to hide easily, non-turreted, open topped, 7mm walls, and slow. They were used along with field artillery and SP guns as part of a "gun front" for defenses, once the US learned some tactics. The rest of the time they fired indirect, as ad hoc 3" "artillery". With later M-10s, M-18s, and M-36s it was not remotely true.

They were used defensively in the role intended, and did that job quite well. They were effective in stopping the July counterattack by Panzer Lehr, in stopping the Mortain counterattack, in the Bulge, and in Nordwind. On the attack, they were used as additional medium tanks, sometimes in place of and sometimes tasked along with, regular armor.

On the attack they had three problems compared to tanks. An inadequate HE load, no big drums of MG ammo to hose everything (a very common tank role), and no tops to drive through artillery barrages in the enemy defended zone with impunity. Not "weak armor". It didn't have anything to do with tank dueling - at tank dueling they worked just fine.

Then there is the whole line of argument that supposedly the Pershing was the answer and everything should have been concentrated on that from 1943 on. This is quite dubious. The Pershing was still a "teething" tank in the Korean war. It proved quite underpowered for its weight and broke down regularly, especially if asked to climb hills. Its problems were not fully resolved until an improved engine was designed for it, (which required a modified hull too) creating the "Patton". In Korea, tankers made much more extensive use of "Easy Eights" (Sherman 76mm HVSS), because they could handle the rough terrain better than Pershings could.

Easy-eights with tungsten, and either Hellcats or upgunned Chaffees (thus "with top and MGs" - the idea behind the later Walker Bulldog) would have been better things to shoot for in 1943, for tank dueling ability. The delay in upgunning the 75mm Shermans was the single biggest US armor force mistake of the war. But the US still fielded a quite capable armor force (including building most of the British force), and in case everybody forget, the one that won the Western campaign.

Not because "the 75mm was sufficient". But because the mix fielded was not in the least all 75mm. Nor, in case everyone forgot, was the German AFV fleet made of Panthers, or Panthers, Tigers, and Jadgpanthers as some on this thread seem to imagine. The bulk of the fleet were Panzer IVs or StuGs (half) - that level of capability - with most of the remainder Panthers (a third). The whole fleet was outnumbered, and seriously so, by the upgunned Allied AFVs alone.

In Normandy, in a tank battalion, facing a Panther or Tiger sitting astride a narrow road, with bocage on either side and routes around blocked by faust teams - you bet it sucked to have only a 75mm Sherman, not 76mm tungsten rounds. But that was an espisode in the war for a few units, that lasted less than two months. In the Bulge, you bet is sucked to be stranded in St. Vith with the remaining half of a tank company, with two full tank battalions coming at you, some of them King Tigers and a number of them Panthers. But only a handful of tactical passages in the whole war were anything like that, and you would have lost those fights against Panzer IVs.

Most of the time, US tankers had some 76mm guns along, either from TDs in their task force (they were not remotely "kept seperate", as any reading of the unit histories will tell you), or Sherman 76s, or both. They had other tanks in their mix with 75mm or 105mm. Occasionally they had an uparmored "point tank".

And they usually had these things against pure infantry, or occasionally a few armed haltracks, SPAT, or StuG. Against Panzer IVs they had those things plus numbers. Against Panthers or Tigers they usually had those things plus numbers, whole squadrons of fighter bombers, and time-on-target shoots by 30 CM FOs at a time to strip the German infantry off of them and make them blind. Sometimes they had all of the above against just the infantry. You don't see these things in CM, even though the real war was full of them, for the same reason Tony Blair vs. Mike Tyson would not be considered a challenging heavyweight boxing match.

Another fellow made the comment that a TD should be more like the SU-85, with lots of armor and a gun that will kill anything. The 85mm in the SU-85 was less powerful as an AT gun than the 76mm in US TDs (close without tungsten, not in the same league counting it). The SU-85's maximum armor was 65mm thick. It was made obsolete in all respects by the T-34/85. The SU-100, which did have a significantly better gun, did not come out until the winter of 1944-45. It only had 45mm of armor. Both were based on a standard T-34 chassis. Upgunned yes - uparmored no, not really. I'd take a Hellcat with HVAP over either.

[PJungnitsch]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Yet this is exactly what the Germans did when they introduced the Marder series and the Nashorn on the Eastern Front.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

They knew they were building deathtraps, but Marders and Nashorns were thrown together as 'stop-gap' vehicles, just to get SOME mobile anti tank capability out there. All the newer models took pains to be as low and as heavily armored as possible ie Jagdpanzer IV, Jagdpanther, Hetzer. Low to conceal in ambush positions, and armored so you don't have to gamble on always getting in the first killing shot.

As Jason points out, the US had so many other advantages that the deficiencies of the lightly armored, open-topped US tank destroyers (or the Sherman 75's) were simply not nearly the problem they could have been.

But as I've stated before, you don't always have the opportunity to fight an enemy that is outnumbered and short of fuel and supplies under conditions of complete air superiority and crushing artillery superiority. Skies filled with German tank hunting aircraft would have doomed the tank destroyers, as would have artillery barrages on the scale the Allies had. And this is what I think doomed the US tank destroyer concept after the war.

It's not that the Allies won the war in the west, that was going to happen no matter how many bad decisions they made, it's why it took so long and cost the casualties it did when they had such overwhelming odds on their side.

[von Lucke]

Well, if yr going to take the broad view (the very broad view) that "we won, they lost, so the TD concept was obviously valid" stance, there's not much to be said in counter-argument, because at that level, yr right.

But, since I feel argumentative right now: In WW1 the French armed some of their infantry units with pikes and told them to go over the top against HMG's. You could also say this was a valid tactical concept because the French were on the winning side of WW1. Doesn't make the guy holding the spear feel any better about his job of the moment though...

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman:

As Jason points out, the US had so many other advantages that the deficiencies of the lightly armored, open-topped US tank destroyers (or the Sherman 75's) were simply not nearly the problem they could have been.

[skip]

It's not that the Allies won the war in the west, that was going to happen no matter how many bad decisions they made, it's why it took so long and cost the casualties it did when they had such overwhelming odds on their side.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But how many casualties are we really talking about, and under what conditions? If the US had upgunned all Shermans to 76mm in 1943, how many fewer casualties would there have been? A dozen? A hundred? Did many tankers really die because their 75mm shell bounced when a 76mm shell would have penetrated, and they were then killed by the tank that they failed to penetrate? This is the kind of data you need to support any sort of causalty claim.

[And I know it is more complicated than this; you would also have to figure out how many German tanks may have escaped being killed due to the 75mm gun and lived to fight another day. But this then gets pretty speculative.]

Moreover, you would also have to figure out how many additional casualties there would have been due to the use of the less effective 76mm HE shell. Given that AT guns killed a lot of tanks, there is probably a (small) number of additional casualties that would have been caused by using 76mm shells.

It's unrealistic to assume that the US could have started manufacturing many Pershings much earlier than they did, given the difficulties of bringing new production online. Indeed, one feature of the Sherm was that it made significant use of already existing materials -- in particular, the various engines used in Shermans were all minor adaptations of already existing engine designs, (aircraft engines, bus engines, car engines, etc.) which had the notable advantage of having already been in use for several years. Which means you avoid the reliability and teething problems that plagued the German big tanks (and the Pershing, according to Jason).

Plus, it's unrealistic to attribute too much prescience to weapons designers: in some sense it would have been much better for the US to start working on the atomic bomb in January 1933. But no one could really be expected to know that.

[Username]

jason seems to be railing against something. I am not really sure if he is just using this thread to settle old business or start new troubles. But its funny how he is spouting off and you never know to who or about what.

rexford is great too, throwing in non-sequitars about fragments, etc. hey rex. put your book on CD rom and sell it for 12 bucks. Ill buy it for 12 bucks.

Anyway, the TD policy IN THE ATTACK works with 30 battalions of 105mm and 36 flights of Jabos supporting it. Wouldnt that make an interesting scenario.

I am presently trading emails with a vet that served in TDs both towed and SP. Very enlightening info too. He claims the hellcat drew air through the fighting compartment to the engine! This made for frigid cold weather fighting. He said the rear deck blew up hot air and they hung out there when it was cold. he claims that they always fought in small groups, roadblocks, etc. He also says firing on the move was ineffective and that under no circumstances would they allow themselves to be targetted. I will post the emails in a thread once we finish. He has a nasty virus on his computer that my software caught in an attached doc he was sending. if anyone has questions they want asked, please put them in that thread.

Now back to "the world according to JasonC".

Lewis