American 76MM tank cannon- Why?

[von Lucke]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Grisha:

Now, it's very hard to belief that a country with even more production potential, resources, and the gift of total isolation from the war couldn't have made a better medium tank by 1944. Either somebody was looking to make more money, or the US Army Command wasn't listening much to their soldiers' opinions.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In Sept '42 the Ordnance Department requested a 90mm gun be developed for mounting in the T20 tank series of pilot models. In March - April '43 they started mounting prototypes in the T23 series. Unfortunately, with the introduction of the German Tiger, R&D decided to try for a "heavy" medium tank that could (theoretically) match it. This wouldn't come about until Jan '44 with the T25 --- which would eventually be scrapped in favor of the even further up-armored T26 in March of '44. Most of the mechanical delay seems to have been in designing (and re-designing) a transmission strong enough to move the tank, yet light enough to keep weight under 45 tons --- the gun was never an issue. (This is the model that, in Dec '44, would be redesignated the M26 Pershing).

Meanwhile, in Sept '43, the Ordinance Department had urged immediate production of 500 T25's and another 500 T26's for delivery in 1944. This was opposed by both the Armored Force Board, who would have prefered an 90mm gun mounted in the M4 Sherman series, and by commander of Army Ground Forces (the infamous Gen. McNair) who didn't consider an 90mm gun desirable in a tank since it would encourage tank units to stalk enemy tanks, a role assigned to TD units. Instead, Army Ground Forces tried to short-circuit the whole project by requesting the T25's be re-armed with 75mm guns and the T26's be re-armed with 76mm guns. This inter-departmental back-biting wasn't resolved until June '44 when a statement came from SHAEF (Ike himself) saying that they required no new vehicles with 75mm or 76mm guns in 1945; instead they wanted tanks with 90mm and 105mm guns in the ratio of 1:4. Army Staff upheld the request, and the T26 (soon to be the M26) was recommended for production by July '44. However, Army Ground Forces still had another delaying tactic up it's sleeve: The T26 would not be approved until the Armored Force Board had also tested and approved all production modifications --- as the Ordinance Department had already done!

It wasn't until Dec. '44 that the T26 was finally approved (for "limited procurement"), and the Ordinance Department recommended that the initial run of 20 prototypes be shipped straight to Europe for combat testing. Once again, Army Ground Forces opposed the idea, and asked that they first go to Armored Force for testing and certification of battleworthiness. However, within the month, the Germans launched the "Bulge" offensive, and the General Staff saw fit to intervene in this almost interminable squabbling, and ordered that all available T26's be shipped to Europe without further testing. The re-designated M26 arrived in NW Europe in Jan '45, and made it's way to the front line by Feb.

So what does this all boil down to? Just another case of bureaucratic penis measuring, while forgeting what they were hired to do in the first place: Build a better tank and get it into the hands of the soldier!

[ 08-20-2001: Message edited by: von Lucke ]

[PJungnitsch]

That's about the best summary of the situation I've read. Instead of throwing all their weight behind the Pershing, or alternately upgunning the Sherman with the 90mm so it could at least throw a good punch, interdepartmental squabbling and tank destroyer doctrine doomed the Sherman crews to fight with the med velocity 75mm and 76mm.

BTW, for anyone near Calgary, AB, there is nice upgunned ex-Israeli Sherman at Olds, sitting outside the Legion. Supposedly it fought in Europe, was sold to the Israelis who upgraded it and eventually sold it back when it became obsolete.

[Harry Yeide]

Keep in mind that Army Ordnance told everyone that the 76mm gun would kill anything the Germans had, and it wasn't until Normandy that the rude surprise took place. It's no suprise at all that the brass did not want a bigger gun when the experts told them the 76mm would do the job. And with HVAP, it basically did. Some tank battalions began receiving extremely limited supplies of HVAP by September 1944.

[Bobbaro]

Does this make one think about the quality of the stay at homes of the military, think about the also rans that are not hot enough for the front lines. And the fellows relieved for lack of combat savy,who are kindly given safe jobs back in the rear echelons. Perhaps the former are the worse. They have risen to the top through political expertise and perform accordingly; penis measuring their way through the ranks. It is the fall out effects of peace on the military. McNair and Lee, two weiners.

Are we any better off in present circumstances. Not likely. Good luck young men.

[Kong]

Could someone please explain then what the "Long 76mm" was?!?! Just ran across this referenced in a book about the Battle of the Bulge.

[Guest Babra]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by kking199:

Could someone please explain then what the "Long 76mm" was?!?! Just ran across this referenced in a book about the Battle of the Bulge.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Long 76mm as opposed to short 75mm.

[Cani]

In an excellent argument that the M26 heavy tank should be used General Rose and other field commanders resisted the higher-ranking Patton. The experiences in North Africa at Kasserine Pass and also in Sicily had convinced them of the superiority of German armor and the need for a heavy tank to offset it. However, Patton persisted in his view; he was not above a hassle. He insisted that we should downgrade the M26 heavy tank and concentrate on the M4. Patton's rank and authority overwhelmed the resistance of the more experienced commanders, and the decision was made to concur with Patton's view. SHAEF immediately notified Washington to deemphasize production of the M26 heavy tank and concentrate instead on the M4 medium tank. This turned out to be one of the most disastrous decisions of World War II, and its effect on the upcoming battle for Western Europe was catastrophic.

[JonS]

Cani - is that more or less a direct quote from Belton Cooper?

His is a good book, but I sometimes wonder about the veracity of his speculations and strategic thoughts. When he stays in his lane and talks about armoured recovery and repair his writing is great. Otherwise ... :confused:

[Cani]

Yes, found it in his "Death Traps, The Survival of An American Armored Division in World War II". I too have a hard time to accept some of his statements, but it's worth the reading.

[lcm1947]

I would love to know Patton's reasoning on the belief that the M4 would be more of an asset than a heavy tank? Bet the actual tankers would have argued that one. Course what do they know. I know Patton was or supposed to be a great general but so was Grant but I wonder if they really were so great or just at the right place at the right time?

[dalem]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Cani:

SHAEF immediately notified Washington to deemphasize production of the M26 heavy tank and concentrate instead on the M4 medium tank. This turned out to be one of the most disastrous decisions of World War II, and its effect on the upcoming battle for Western Europe was catastrophic.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

'catastrophic'? For whom? Whoever made this remark needs to look up "hyperbole" in the dictionary.

Ahh, I see that it is from a book that has been recommended to me a billion times. Now I wonder if I should keep it on my list....

-dale

[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: dalem ]

[Gordon]

Talking about Patton and his opposition to the T25E1 program, New Vanguard # 35 "M26/M46 Pershing Tank" by Zaloga, Bryan and Laurier has a great quote:

"Although Patton was unquestionably the finest practitioner of mechanized combat in the US Army in World War II, his technical judgment was frequently poor. General Bruce Clarke, who commanded US armored units during the tank battles in Lorraine in September 1944 and at St. Vith in the Ardennes in December 1944 later remarked: 'Patton knew as little about tanks as anyone I know'."

Just FYI,

Gordon

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by dalem:

'catastrophic'? For whom? Whoever made this remark needs to look up "hyperbole" in the dictionary. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

For the guys who got killed in the Shermans because of that decision? If your job is to scrape their remains out of the tank, I think you ought to be forgiven a bit of 'hyperbole', if that is what it is.

[Username]

You really think Patton had that kind of pull? I agree that he probably was opinionated about mobility but he wasnt the guy with the juice.

After Africa, Gen Devers reported to McNair. He said that the TD policy was crap and that heavy tanks arent needed. Considering the sherman and stuart were better than most of the tanks the germans were using, he wasnt that far off. But McNair was a guy with a crusade. He was the main champion of the TD policy. He ignored the TD remarks but used the report to put the whammy on heavy tank development. He also decided that half towed and half SP was the way to go for the TD policy. The 75mm halftracks in africa (SP) didnt do very well and he wanted to hedge his bets with towed units! As the war in the ETO progressed, these same towed units were hastily converted to M36 and M18.

The fact is, tank warfare was evolving on the eastern front. Both sides were moving towards fleets of tanks that consisted of both light, medium and heavy tanks. Tank destroyers and assault guns were also evolving. Even Britian developed some heavy armor and a decent tank gun.

The US policy about shipping tanks was BS. What good is a surplus of tanks that cant fight? If the US had just a heavy tank company in each of its armored divisions, the war would have been over in 1944. McNair, by the way, decreased the number of trucks in US divisions early in the war because he felt that it would be a strain on logistics to ship them overseas. After the US landed, they increased the number of trucks because many divisions didnt have the load lift capability.

McNair was an idiot. In his final act of stupidity, he was caught in a fratricide incident (this pissed off his superiors because they wanted to use him as a ruse. He was to supposedly replace Patton and fool the germans).

US bombers unloaded short over the lines and blew him to pieces. They found a half of a shirt with three stars on it. Good riddance.

Lewis

[dalem]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

For the guys who got killed in the Shermans because of that decision? If your job is to scrape their remains out of the tank, I think you ought to be forgiven a bit of 'hyperbole', if that is what it is.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I see your point, but in the large scale, it's a war - soldiers die. Would fewer but more aggressive tank crews in proper heavy tanks have died than the real numbers that died in the M4s? I don't know. I agree that the decision to hold back a heavier tank in favor of the M4 was a bad one (whoever made it), but 'catastrophic' on the large scale? No.

-dale

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by dalem:

but 'catastrophic' on the large scale? No.

-dale<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You are fully correct in that assessment, as evidenced by who won the war. But I think you could say it was catastrophic on the small scale.

'The South Albertas' has a very poignant reminder of this. Whenever the author relates the death of a member of the regiment during the war, he gives info on when he entered the regiment, his age, previous job, his family circumstances and where he hailed from. Makes you stop and think.

[Dan Robertson]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Triumvir:

Incidentally, the 76mm on the Walker Bulldog is, if I'm not mistaken, the same as that on the 76mm Shermans, and there's a sabot round for it that has 1433m/s muzzle velocity!

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You are msitaken, they are different weapons the Walker Bulldogs cannon is 63 calibers long.

The sabot round was deffinatly a 1960's design. For most of it carear it used an APCR round (HVAP) which used the same core as the WWII HVAP.

[Andrew H.]

The biggest mistake that the US Army made wrt armor was not substituting the 76mm gun for the 75mm gun much earlier. What they needed was about 3 76mm Sherms for every 1 75mm Sherm. What they had was no 76mm Sherms in Europe in June '44. Even by the Bulge, many units involved in the fighting had no 76mm Shermans.

Of course, a heavy tank coy. per battalion wouldn't have been bad either. But there are legitimate logistical reasons for wanting to go slow on developing a completely new tank. There are none for not upgunning a proven tank with a proven gun. Of course, having a few fireflies would have been even better.

IIRC, Patton was a big fan of the Sherman because it was incredibly reliable for the kind of sweeping fighting he did, where it was more important to be able to quickly encircle disorganized troops than to penentrate Jagdpanther frontally at 1000 meters.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

The biggest mistake that the US Army made wrt armor was not substituting the 76mm gun for the 75mm gun much earlier. What they needed was about 3 76mm Sherms for every 1 75mm Sherm. What they had was no 76mm Sherms in Europe in June '44. Even by the Bulge, many units involved in the fighting had no 76mm Shermans.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The biggest mistake was the TD doctrine. It stated that TDs were to fight the armor and the tanks were for exploitation/manuver/etc.

This made the tanks timid of enemy armor and gave them an excuse to avoid butting heads with other tanks. The TDs were not fit to face down armor and the envisaged role they were to play never came about.

If the shermans were given 76mm, then what is the point of lightly armored TDs with 76mm?

Luckily, the US didnt have to face down much armor till later in the campaign. By the end of 1944, everyone had 20-20 hindsight and time was running out anyway.

The US had a shortage of tankers before they had a shortage of tanks.

Lewis

[dalem]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

You are fully correct in that assessment, as evidenced by who won the war. But I think you could say it was catastrophic on the small scale.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I couldn't agree more with you here. And the only reason I took the large scale view is because that's what I think the author of that comment was referring to. But on the human level it's a different story.

-dale

[rexford]

American planning prior to Overlord indicated that the 76mm gun firing APCBC was sufficient to penetrate the front hull of Tigers beyond 1000 yards, and the same range for Panther mantlet. No need for 90mm gun on tanks when 76mm takes care of German heavies.

Shatter gap changes ranges to 50 yards against Tiger front and 200 yards against Panther.

Firefly 17 pounder firing APCBC could not penetrate glacis of Panther, but could penetrate mantlet. And could defeat Tiger front hull, and mantlet.

American calculations indicated that 76mm gun was all that was neeeded.

[rexford]

Rush job on 76mm HVAP was necessitated by poor showing of 76mm APCBC in France.

Didn't M10's fight Panthers or Tigers in Italy prior to June '44? American calculations left out shatter gap and other factors.

In initial combat against Panthers, M10's get a few penetration against Panther:

1. through hull MG

2. ricochets off mantlet

At really close range, where initial M10-Panther combat took place, most hits land where they are aimed, namely the glacis plate. A few land on MG ball and drive it in, a few hit bottom of mantlet and bounce through hull top and kill crew members.

[rexford]

76mm HVAP could not penetrate Panther glacis at practically all combat ranges, and the firing test penetrations appear to be fluke hits against badly flawed and microscopically cracked glacis plates.

[lcm1947]

I know TD's were designed to kill tanks but were they successful? I don't really know except for my experience in the game and if that is correct man did somebody screw up. I mean sure you get lucky every once in a while but damn who would actually go gunning for a Panther in one of those things? Maybe I am all wet but were they actually really successful? Any TD guys know or anybody for that matter?

[PJungnitsch]

There doesn't seem to be a lot of information around on US TD's. Everytime Slapdragon goes off on one of his 20 to 1 uber Hellcat tangents I try to find some info and come up nearly empty.

They did seem to improve considerably throughout the war, which is complicated by the fact the opposition grew less and less as things drew to a close. The impression I have right now is that late in the war in a 'scavenger' role, picking apart the collapse of an opposing army with no airpower, little fuel, and low on artillery, tanks and trained manpower they did ok, although with a lack of tanks to fight they often used in an infantry support role blasting strong points, for which they would have better been a tank or Stug.

In heavier going, say for the conditions the Germans or Soviets faced on the Eastern front, lightly armored TD's without overhead protection would have been deathtraps, unless used for indirect fire like a SU-76 or maybe as a type of fast tracked reconnaissance vehicle, like a Lynx.

I think that was the conclusion post-war, that any success they had was a product of the very favorable condions at the time, which would be unlikely to be repeated facing the Soviets or anyone else.