Armor in Normandy and "the usual story"

[JasonC]

I was interested in how much fact there is behind the usual story of the role of German armor in Normandy, and how much of that story is just polite fiction to save inter-allied relations or the reputation of a certain commander. By "the usual story" I mean something like this. The British attacks drew the bulk of the German armor to the Caen area. Heavy fighting there attrited the German armor. This made possible the American breakthrough in Cobra, essentially because the German armor had already been defeated by the British.

So phrased, the story is vague enough to be true under a wide range of facts. There is no doubt whatever that (1) the Brits hammered away on their part of the front from late June on, (2) that several German armor divisions defended against these attacks, taking armor losses in the process, (3) that German armor in the whole theater was attrited by the time of Cobra. Insofar as that is all the usual story says, it is obviously true. So what are the questions?

Well, what did "the bulk" of the armor sent against the Brits consist of? How much, and how much wasn't? Did the US sit around from late June until Cobra waiting? Did they face any armor? Was any of it "attrited"? How much was left at the time of Cobra, and what happened to it? How much did the Brits attrite the German armor? What about types as opposed to numbers?

In other words, the issue is an accounting of German armor strength in Normandy - by deployment and time and causes of loss. Such an accounting, rather than confirming or refuting "the usual story", will put numbers on vague categories - and let each decide how much they support it. I have used common web sources for the raw data to analyse this question, especially these (and links off of them, other levels of the same sites, etc)

http://home.swipnet.se/normandy/index.html http://www.strategos.demon.co.uk/D-Day/Epsom.htm http://www.geocities.com/MotorCity/8418/21agt-1.htm http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/online/Bookshelves/WW2-EAME.htm

The synthesis made out of it is my own, and none of the above are responsible for my conclusions.

There are some uncertainties from categorization that should be mentioned up front. Not all German armor neatly divides into "used against the Brits" or "used against the Americans". The 2nd Panzer division was on the Allied army boundary near Caumont, for instance. It lent its Panther battalion to forces fighting the British in Operation Epsom, and lost a number of them. Later it was one of the main units in the Mortain counterattack vs. the Americans. Panzer Lehr was opposite the British in June, but sent to the US sector in July. 1st SS mostly fought on the British front, but still had a strong KG to add to the Mortain attempt. Those are the larger "switch hitters". Then there is the issue of time of engagement. Some armor wasn't committed until Cobra, in an attempt to stop it. This includes the 116th Panzer and the 341st StuG brigade. They fought the Americans, but after the main attrition period.

The way I have handled those cases is to consider the tanks that did fight against the Americans in that category, using remaining strength for the switch hitter cases. I counted the full strength sent against the Brits, and the reduction preceeding the switch is credited to them. I will have some comments about the portion of the armor facing the Americans not committed until later on, in the appropriate place for it.

So how do the strengths really divide up? 1225 AFVs can be accounted for sent to face the British. 1100 can be accounted for sent to face the Americans. That is 10 to 9. In my book, that is barely enough for a literal "most", but more accurately described as "about half". There was a noticable weighting of the heavy types in front of the British, though. They faced the Tigers (125), a large weighting of Panthers (400), about their share of Pz IVs (500), and few StuG plus Jadgpanzer (170) - with most of the last StuGs. The handful of Brumbars in Normandy were also in their sector of the front (30). The Americans faced around 300 Panther, 400 Pz IV, and a much larger portion of StuG and Jadgpanzer (400) - with about 20% of the last category the better Jadgpanzers.

Otherwise put, on the more open ground in the British sector you were about 25% more likely to find both turrets and front armor plates sufficient to stop a short 75mm AP round, on any given AFV - but only around 11% more likely to see an AFV. But this is somewhat misleading for the attrition period, because a portion of the armor facing the Americans was not engaged until the breakout period. Subtracting those (~175), the weighting of the two fronts is about 4 to 3. So it is correct to say AFVs were more numerous, more heavily armored, and more likely to be true turreted tanks, on the British front. But by relatively modest amounts - 5:4, 4:3.

What is behind the usual story saying otherwise? It is easy to see the clustering of Panzer divisions around Caen on an operational map. 21 Pz, and 1, 9, 10, and 12SS all fought there. Sometimes 2 Pz helped, and Lehr fought there early on. Even 116 Pz, which did not engage at all until the breakout and then in the American sector, was stationed as a reserve behind Caen at one point.

So what armor fought in the American sector? 17SS, which was a Panzergrenadier division only, but also had the 902 StuG brigade attached to it for most of the fight. 2SS was the reserve behind the St Lo sector and engaged in July. Lehr switched to the US sector and counterattacked there on 11 July. The 12th FJ StuG brigade fought with the parachute corps in front of St. Lo. 2 Pz was on the army boundary and faced the US 1st Infantry division. Then during the breakout period, 116 Pz and the 341 StuG brigade were thrown in trying to stop it. When that failed, 2/3rds of the remaining armor in the theater was thrown into the Mortain counterattack, including the still strong 2 Pz and a large KG from 1SS. There were also minor numbers of StuG in some of the infantry divisions.

How much did the British attrite the German armor in front of them? Plenty. I can identify reductions in "operational" category AFVs in the British sector totaling 830 AFVs. 180 of them were left in short term repair by the time of Cobra, the rest were effectively out of the battle for good. So over 45 days, the Brits reduced the armor in front of them 2/3, 1/2 of it permanent. If you go through the details, you will find the reductions occurring for at different times for different formations. 1SS and 21 Pz lost significant numbers in Goodwood. 12SS took its heavy armor losses early, both in Epsom and in the July 9-10 attack. 9SS lost significantly between that attack and Goodwood. 10SS was already depleted, but lost nearly half its remaining operational AFVs a few days before Goodwood proper was launched. 2 Pz took significant losses to its Panther battalion in Epsom. Etc.

Attrition on that scale certainly mattered for the success of Cobra. Obviously, if overall German armor strength in the theater had been much higher, the breakout would have been much harder to achieve and less decisive than it proved. However, this must be kept in overall perspective. 45 days of hard combat caused attrition to the German armor in both sectors of the front. At the time of the Mortain attempt, only about 650 operational AFVs remained to the Germans, and after it only about 300 "runners" were left. With 2325 identified AFVs and 650 runners at Mortain, the reduction is 1675 AFVs. 830 on the British sector before Cobra is almost exactly half of that.

It is not hard to see how the Americans could have accounted for the other half. 17SS and its supporting StuGs were in heavy action from D-Day on. One counterattack staged by the unit, at Caretan, failed, and coincided with a large reduction in "running" StuGs. The unit was later ground down over a long period. The same happened to the infantry divisions and the FJ, with their small numbers of attached StuG. Lehr lost up to half its remaining armor in its failed July 11 counterattack. It was later the target of the Cobra breakthrough. 2SS had been fighting throughout July to shore up the St Lo front. Then another biggie came with the breakout itself. 116 Pz (fresh) as well as other available units (in KG, etc) were thrown into the gap and had their armor cut in half in a matter of days. In the first breakout week, 2nd Armored alone fought elements of more than ten divisions, in sequence.

The US was hammering throughout July, just as the British were. The US main effort had been toward Cherbourg in June, but after its capture the target was St. Lo. In the course of the push for it, the Americans took heavy losses in difficult hedgerow fighting. But they also largely destroyed the German paras, the infantry divisions in the area, 17SS, most of Lehr, and reduced 2SS somewhat. This was a matter of one long offensive lasting two weeks, instead of three shorter but sharper offensives of a few days in the British sector (from Epsom to Goodwood). Cobra itself began as just such an offensive, after a week of pause. It was also less than a week after the end of Goodwood.

It is true the Americans did not heavily commit their own armor divisions until Cobra - and indeed, until it made significant headway. But that was largely a matter of terrain on the one hand and doctrine about the use of armor on the other. The US infantry divisions were not sitting around waiting for something to happen in the month of July. They were banging through the hedgerow country, and the German defenders in front of them. Just as the British were trying to bang through the German defenders around and behind Caen.

The Allies attrited the Germans heavily from late June to late July, in all categories but especially in operational armor strength. At the time of Cobra, the German armor fleet was between half and a third what had originally been sent to the theater, while the Allies had been replacing their losses and adding fresh formations ashore. It was reduced still further by the breakout fighting itself, to a quarter its original strength, and then halved again by the suicidal attempt at Mortain. The failed British offensives certainly played a role in that overall attrition process. But probably just about their share of it, having half the front and half the forces ashore.

That Cobra succeeded where Goodwood had failed was not fated beforehand. German armor strength had already been substantially reduced before either operation. The differences between them have to be found in the tactics employed, the nature of the ground, and especially in the particular state of the German forces in front of either, as a result of the attrition efforts made by the forces directly opposite them.

It is worth noting that 1SS and 21 Pz, the armor formations that lost most heavily from "Goodwood", had 180 runners between them before the attack, only 1/4 of them Panthers, the rest Pz IVs or StuG. 40% of their armor strength was not operational by the end of the attack. But the Brits had lost 400 tanks and failed. 116 Pz and the 341 StuG brigade, both entirely fresh, had about the same number of runners between them when they were thrown in to stop "Cobra", and 1/3rd of them were Panthers. In a few days their operational armor was reduced by half, much like the other case; a bit worse. The Americans did not lose 400 tanks, nor did the attack fail.

[PiggDogg]

Jason,

Thanks again for an insightful article. How do you find the time for this? However, your effort is greatly appreciated.

Cheers, Richard

[Andreas]

The only thing I would add is that if you look at it along a time-line, it seems as if (in very general terms) the Germans threw all their tanks at the Commonwealth when they were strong (up to mid-July, say), and all their tanks at the US when they were desperate. Which changes the picture quite a bit.

Also, the ground over which the attack for GOODWOOD went was good for tanks and AT alike, and during the two day offensive, only one UK armoured division (11th) got decisively involved (and clobbered, with the loss of 191 of its 264 tanks, losses so bad in terms of leaders that it was close to being disbanded immediately afterwards, according to Delaforce), while Guards came a bit late to the party, and 7th AD managed to never arrive at all somehow. Traffic jam like a London rush hour. Don't know what the situation was for COBRA.

Having said all that, some of the Commonwealth leadership was appalling, as can be seen by the number of commanding officers relieved of their duty.

[Manx]

A nice insight, and from my studies, seems to back up what i have read. But one factor you don't mention : How much of a factor was Allied air superiority in how events took their course in both the Commonwealth and US sectors? In my understanding, much of the German armour, which was already delayed in it's deployment, had great difficulty in making it to the front...if it made it there at all.

[Andrew H.]

I think it's also useful to keep the larger strategic picture in mind -- the British beaches were closest to Germany, and were on terrain that was good for tanks. It would be reasonable for the Germans to conclude that their main priority should be in prevening these allied units from unhinging Caen and striking towards the Ruhr. The Germans may also have believed that this was the Allies' initial plan.

By contrast, US moves to clear Cherbourg and move south, were less immediately threatening.

However, given all of that that, I am sort of surprised that proportionally more tanks were not sent against the British. On second thought, it may just be that the reserves were placed closer to the British -- behind Caen or wherever, in anticipation that they would be needed against British attacks, but they could also be used against US attacks, too.

Of course several commentators have written the the Allied plan should have been to make a narrow strike to the Ruhr, so it was no unrealistic if the Germans believed that this was what was planned. Of course, if the plan had been to make a narrow strike, the US troops would probably have to have landed at the British beaches,and vice versa, since the Brits pretty much landed all they had on the beaches and the bulk of replacement manpower was American.

[dalem]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

Of course, if the plan had been to make a narrow strike, the US troops would probably have to have landed at the British beaches,and vice versa, since the Brits pretty much landed all they had on the beaches and the bulk of replacement manpower was American.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Interesting. I have read that one of the simpler reasons for the arrangement of invasion beaches was because when the U.S. divisions started arriving in the UK all the zones to the Southeast were already taken by British troops so the U.S. took over the SW portion. Then when they planned the invasion they didn't want convoys crossing each others' Channel routes during the night, so the Brits had to go to the eastern beaches and the U.S. to the west regardless of eventual role.

-dale

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Having said all that, some of the Commonwealth leadership was appalling, as can be seen by the number of commanding officers relieved of their duty.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's a whole other can of worms, as some would say it was scapegoating. From the Canadian side, though, I would have to agree with you - aside from that taunts of "Keller is yeller", John English and Stacey both talk about regimental and brigade officers coming up wanting.

I am not so sure you can entirely blame them; most Commonwealth formations were either green as grass, or else battle weary from long years in the Med. Some like Simonds learned very quickly, others - as you point out - had to go.

Of course, not all the firings are indicative that the leadership was truly horrid. Using my regiment as an example, LCol Maclauchlan handled Hill 67 in July very poorly, but went on to win a DSO for his leadership of the Calgary Highlanders later on at Claire Tizon. For many, it was just a case of getting used to fighting a real war after playing at it in England for so many years.

Do you think it possible that many officers were sacked that might otherwise have developed into decent leaders?

[JasonC]

First, on the point about the armor being sent against the Brits when it was strong, and the US when the Germans were desperate. There is some truth in this but it is still an overstatement. Forces were arriving throughout the month of June, and some were trickling in even in July. It was not like everything came at once, and therefore the Brits faced theirs all in a bunch.

Second, on the question of air. It delayed arrivals and reduced motor transport, but the actual loss in tank strengths due to it was not significant compared to ground action. You get things like an armor division loses 5 tanks on the way to the front. A more significant effect might be from the interdiction of spares, and running tanks over roads at night to reach the front, instead of arriving by train. Both caused breakdown losses - reduced readiness of the available AFVs - rather than total write offs. Both sectors obviously benefitted.

In theater, both the US and the Brits used heavy air power during large attacks. Goodwood and Cobra both saw enourmous carpet bombing raids by heavy bombers. These certainly KOed a few tanks and above all stunned defenders in the forward battle zone. It also tended to make a moonscape that was difficult for vehicles to navigate. That is probably responsible for part of the "traffic jam" aspect of Goodwood, and in the case of Cobra the US infantry divisions had to push for a few days to get through the bombed-out zone, before the ground ahead was suited to armor.

There is also the idea that British armor must have been incompetent to incur the losses they took, and I believe there is something to that - tactically rather than because of the middling commanders. An example is Epsom in late June.

The Brits attacked with 500 tanks, and you might think this gave them overwhelming local odds. But actually, almost 100 of that total were Stuarts; only about 400 mediums took part. And the Germans threw in between 400 and 500 mediums of their own to stop the attack - an operation as big as Mortain. This included 9SS and 10SS, their attached corps-level Tiger battalion (which worked with 10SS because that division had no Panther battalion), the Panther battalion of 2 Pz (borrowed), and the defending 12SS which was in the direct path of the attack. It is not exactly surprising the Brits did not break through on that occasion.

Goodwood is the outlier in terms of British losses and German success. The German armor was no longer anything like fresh. The Brits did have local odds. But they lost more heavily than in the preceeding attacks. Comparing Cobra, what stands out is the fact that the Americans had kept their armor out of most of the battle until then. A few loaned teams assisted infantry operations or checked counterattacks, but from behind the front. Most of the armor work in July was done by the independent armor battalions or by the TDs. The US had nearly 1500 AFVs in largely fresh armor-heavy formations, for Cobra. And they still didn't go first. The infantry did, and made them a hole through the bomb zone.

The tactical problem the Brits experienced several times was due to leading with armor, or armor becoming relatively unsupported by the other arms, and too soon - meaning, still in the defended zone covered by German PAK, FLAK, and tanks. I think these tactical differences in combined arms practice, interacting with the terrain, were the primary factor. Compared to them, leadership differences, forces fielded, and type of opposition show only minor variation on the two sectors, it seems to me. The US had a better armor doctrine in practice, and the Brits fought over ground particularly unsuited to overfoundness for leading with massed tanks.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

In theater, both the US and the Brits used heavy air power during large attacks. Goodwood and Cobra both saw enourmous carpet bombing raids by heavy bombers ... It also tended to make a moonscape that was difficult for vehicles to navigate. That is probably responsible for part of the "traffic jam" aspect of Goodwood....<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The traffic jam was more due to only having a single bridge to feed three armd divs across, and to the restrictions imposed by the limited gaps in the minefields. The Goodwood bombing was mainly on the flanks of the intended breakin/through, and used instantaneous (Point Detonating) fuzes to minimise cratering.

Note: the minefields were mostly British in origin. Presumably the airborne intended to fight a defensive battle in what was originally their sector, and set themselves up accordingly.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>...the Brits fought over ground particularly unsuited to overfoundness for leading with massed tanks.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Out of interest, what would you consider to be good ground for the british attacks? The open ground around Goodwood wasn't it, and the close country of the Bocage prsumably wouldn't have been especially suitable for massed armour.

Also, I think you are being a bit general with your description of British tactics. There are plenty of examples of attacks initiated by infantry divisions, with the armour to be used for exploitation. Goodwood was, as you say, an outlier in terms of losses and tactics. I realise 'overfondness' is not the same as 'always used', but I think the intended meaning is nearly the same.

Regards

JonS

[PiggDogg]

Remember, by 1944, for the Brits had basically run out of infantry. In order to keep up with the large manpower replacement needs, the Brits were required to even canabalize back line infantry divisions to provide a sufficient number of infantry replacements for the front line fighting divisions.

For this reason, among others, it was cheaper and more effective to commit many tanks and thus have tank/vehicle casualties instead of having as many infantry casualties. For the Brits, literally machines were cheaper than men.

The British deficiency in required infantry numbers also explains their extreme caution and heavy preparation for offensive actions.

Cheers, Richard

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Richard Cuccia, the PiggDogg:

In order to keep up with the large manpower replacement needs, the Brits were required to even canabalize back line infantry divisions to provide a sufficient number of infantry replacements for the front line fighting divisions.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

and even got to the stage of disbanding frontline units - including divisions - to make replacements available for other units.

Grim times

[JasonC]

I am well aware the Brits sometimes led with the infantry, as they did for instance in Epsom. The failure there, as I thought I explained rather clearly, was due to the armor odds they faced after the German reaction. I still can detect what I'd call "cavalry thinking" in their usual employment of armor, and I am hardly the only one.

As to ground that would have worked better with the tactics they used in Goodwood, either open enough that the German PAK and FLAK couldn't hide from artillery, or covered enough the British tanks had places to hide, would have been preferable. Almost all open wheatfield, except for enough hiding places for guns, was particularly bad for the "line ahead" approach.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS:

and even got to the stage of disbanding frontline units - including divisions - to make replacements available for other units.

Grim times <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Why the plural? Aside from 59th Staffordshire Div, which other divs were disbanded?

[JonS]

oops - my bad. But, even disbanding 'only' one div - in addition to the other, smaller, units - is still a fairly significant step, wouldn't you say?

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

I am well aware the Brits sometimes led with the infantry, as they did for instance in Epsom. The failure there, as I thought I explained rather clearly, was due to the armor odds they faced after the German reaction. I still can detect what I'd call "cavalry thinking" in their usual employment of armor, and I am hardly the only one. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not sure if it was Cavalry thinking, or plain incompetence. It is also a TO&E issue, since British armoured divisions were tank heavy formations - there just was not a lot of infantry in them, compared to a German Panzerdivision. 260 medium tanks and four battalions of infantry. In the German division, it was about 120 tanks IIRC, and five battalions of infantry (including the Pioneer battalion).

It is interesting to read the comments on the battle, by von Luck, Dempsey and the OC A Squadron 3rd RTR, Bill Close (all in Delaforce's history of 11th AD). The German defender and the British low-ranking commander agree that it really was lacking (Bill Close calls it a 'shambles').

Dempsey comes up with the story that losses were avoided, and he has a point too. 11th AD lost 191 tanks. Total KIA in the division were 210, total casualties 735. An example how 'cheap' it was to use armour - 2nd Northants Yeo was to all intents and purposes destroyed. It lost 53 out of 64 or so tanks. It had 25 KIA. An infantry battalion in that situation might have had 100 or more KIA.

Tank losses were also not as bad as one might imagine, since the British held the battlefield, they recovered their tanks, except for brew-ups.

But yes, the British command did not exactly put in a stellar performance there.

[JasonC]

The ratios weren't that far off, actually. The German panzer division of June 1944 still had quite a few tanks at TOE. Counting the Jadgs or StuGs in the AT battalions, a number of the divisions that fought in Normandy showed up with 200-225 tanks. With 4-6 infantry battalions, plus 1 1/2 other infantry like (recce and engineer) - the higher figure was for the SS layout.

But after a bit of action, the German divisions were often down to ~100 runners, while their infantry losses had not been that bad. (It wasn't that all the other tanks were totaled - many were in the shop). That wasn't because of better TOEs, though. The smaller, ~150 tank Panzer division organization wasn't standard until late 44.

I think it had more to do with tactics and tasking than with TOEs. The US armored formations were also tank heavy, but in practice every task force had both infantry and armor, with cross attachments at company and platoon level everywhere. And borrowed teams from infantry divisions where more infantry strength was wanted.

Also, the Brits didn't always try the "fan out the tanks and crawl ahead through open wheat" brainstorm. It is also worth noticing that the reason that idea fails is German fire discipline (and camo) - letting them hang themselves en masse into fields of fire before opening up.

If every time a gun or tank on the defending side drew into LOS it opened up, then the line of firing tanks would have quickly overpowered each in turn. It is just that if they don't, and wait until they have lots of targets and it is a long way back to any kind of cover, before all opening up at once - then such attacks get turned into toast. The Germans got pretty good at doing that, on the steppe.

[JasonC]

Incidentally, I say "cavalry thinking" because Goodwood fits an inglorious British pattern with strong armor attacking in WW II. It wasn't the first time they managed to lose 400 tanks in an afternoon, while attacking an enemy outnumbered in pure tank terms, but aided by PAK and heavy FLAK. They did it several times in North Africa, too.

And even long after the war, British armor enthusiasts told a version of the history of the war that was kinda screwy, in which the French mistake was parcelling tanks out to support infantry, and the true and proper solution was to mass the tanks, so they wouldn't be slowed down by the other arms. Sufficiently massed tanks operating on their own, in this picture, were supposed to be decisive.

Also, if you see the troop layouts for an offensive, and hear about the traffic jams behind the front, and the question when to "release" the armor, etc - it reads quite similar to the official WW I British histories, with literal cavalry divisions massed behind the front anticipating "breakthrough". Even at Cambrai, where the Brits invented mass tank attack. And the early tankers from WW I were full of the doctrine "don't tie us to the infantry, let us run".

It is really rather depressing for anyone wondering if mankind in general is capable of understanding somewhat subtle notions involving more than one distinction, or that can't be solved by avoiding one error or veering in one preferred direction. Combined arms and working with infantry and the French mistake are endlessly conflated, simply because they all have one contrary - massed tanks operating alone.

The fact that that contrary is just as big a mistake, while by now admitted and while certainly understood by higher level military planners by mid war in all countries, was not at all understood by everyone. And often the combined arms that worked was hit upon by accident, in what you might call a "total dose", aka throw everything at 'em and hope something works.

As an example, NZ troops won the Crusader fight after the main armor force had lost it and been practically destroyed. They did so by working closely with their attached "infantry tanks", in something close to a true combined arms fashion. Though hampered by tanks so meant for dueling (originally) they had no HE shell, and in inadequate numbers for the best armor-infantry-gun ratio.

There are still plenty of people who think true armor doctrine out of WW II was just to mass the tanks, and others who think they know better who don't see any real difference between "throw everything at em and hope something works", and real combined arms.

Which is the difference between 2 out of 3 of your branches being defeated and the overall attack failing in consequence, and using just the right tool on every tactical obstacle in front of you and so succeeding. Did every captain, major, colonel, and brigadier in the UK forces understand that distinction in June of 1944? I rather think not.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Which is the difference between 2 out of 3 of your branches being defeated and the overall attack failing in consequence, and using just the right tool on every tactical obstacle in front of you and so succeeding. Did every captain, major, colonel, and brigadier in the UK forces understand that distinction in June of 1944? I rather think not.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The impression I get is that the junior officers understood it much better than the senior commanders - the old 'Lions led by donkeys' comes to mind.

If the tankers and the infantry got to practice co-operation, they did wonders. E.g. South Alberta Regiment and 10 Brigade in 4th Canadian Armoured, or (later in the war) 8th Armoured Brigade and 43rd Wessex. The South Albertas were respected by their 'flatfooted friends' because they stayed with them at night, not withdrawing to laager, and they were upfront with them all the time. They also had a good ratio, of one Squadron (company) tanks to one infantry battalion. The fact that the South Albertas were a fully trained infantry battalion helped, too.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

If the tankers and the infantry got to practice co-operation, they did wonders. E.g. South Alberta Regiment and 10 Brigade in 4th Canadian Armoured, or (later in the war) 8th Armoured Brigade and 43rd Wessex. The South Albertas were respected by their 'flatfooted friends' because they stayed with them at night, not withdrawing to laager, and they were upfront with them all the time. The fact that the South Albertas were a fully trained infantry battalion helped, too.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course, having such an excellent regimental history written for them doesn't hurt either, eh? Perhaps if other regiments had books as good as SOUTH ALBERTAS AT WAR written about them, amateur historians like us might be more sympathetic towards them? The more you know someone, the harder it is to hate them...

[JasonC]

"The more you know someone, the harder it is to hate them"

Somehow this overly general statement fails in cases like Himmler - LOL

[lcm1947]

And here I was worrying that I might have to buy some books. Excellent topic, thank you again.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Of course, having such an excellent regimental history written for them doesn't hurt either, eh? Perhaps if other regiments had books as good as SOUTH ALBERTAS AT WAR written about them, amateur historians like us might be more sympathetic towards them? The more you know someone, the harder it is to hate them...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well yes - then again, the point about not withdrawing was apparently made by an infantry man in direct comparison to the tankers from the other regiments in 4th Armoured. So maybe they just were a lot better.

Tank tracks is another good history, by the OC 9th RTR about his regiment, IIRC. But even so it did not leave me with the same feeling about the quality of the unit. Maybe it is not written as well (okay, that is certain), but it could also just be that they weren't as good in cooperating with the infantry? Difficult to say.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

"The more you know someone, the harder it is to hate them"

Somehow this overly general statement fails in cases like Himmler - LOL<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jason, for once I completely agree with you.

However...did you know Himmler took balloons to extermination camps to give out as presents to children - so they would have one last toy to play with before doing their duty for the Reich?

Not that I like him any more for that...but I think the point I was making is that you can put positive spin on anything, especially if you are writing a regimental history.

Hitler loved his dog, too.

[JasonC]

"you can put positive spin on anything"

Speak for yourself. I'm sure some can, perhaps you can. Myself, I find I am frightfully constrained by the fact that before I say something, I have to think it is true, and relevant.

Returning a tiny bit toward the topic, the idea that more detailed examination of every unit in the history of warfare would reveal an increasing confidence in each unit's stellar, world-historical prowess, growing in direct proportion to the amount known about every brawl it ran across, strikes me as - to put it charitably - "distinctly unlikely".

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

"Returning a tiny bit toward the topic, the idea that more detailed examination of every unit in the history of warfare would reveal an increasing confidence in each unit's stellar, world-historical prowess, growing in direct proportion to the amount known about every brawl it ran across, strikes me as - to put it charitably - "distinctly unlikely".<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You miss the point. Most regimental histories in Canada were written shortly after the war, by officers who had served directly in those regiments. Even as late as the early 1960s, it was considered "bad form" among regimental historians to include controversial elements of the unit histories, mostly because the protaganists were mainly still alive.

An example is my own unit, of which two WW II histories were written. If you read the 1954 version by Roy Farran, the Calgary Highlanders excelled at everything they did, and the unit was populated by efficient, yet colourless, officers.

If you read the version by David Bercuson written in the last decade, you actually find out that the CO who commanded in Normandy was shell shy, wore a US helmet because it offered more protection, dug deep bunkers, and was hated by the men.

Roy Farran was a British commando officer who was new to Canada in 1954 and probably commissioned specially to write the history. Bercuson was a labour historian with no connection to the regiment whatsoever.

So the question is, how many larger histories have used regimental histories like Farran's as references, instead of primary research? Military history unfortunately isn't a case of x, y and z variables acting in precision. It's all about presentation and interpretation. Witness David Irving - there is a good discussion of him in the General Forum from a week or so ago, actually. Look how Irving uses words (or excludes them) to change meaning subtly.

The same thing happens in regimental histories - whether on purpose or accidentally. I would say that in the 1940s, 50s and 60s - at least up here - it was often on purpose. For high minded ideals, perhaps, but done just the same.